基于合作理论的供应商--制造商讨价还价博弈

本文应用合作理论研究供应链管理中的最优决策问题,重点探讨了供应商与制造商之间的讨价还价博弈.在做出一系列模型假设的前提下,构造了双方的最优策略模型,并进行了求解.从得出的结论我们可以看出,为使双方能够顺利达成交易,供应商的报价必须在充分了解制造商相关信息的基础上满足一定的限制条件,否则只会导致谈判破裂.     

我国核电业主与设备制造商关系的博弈分析

数量有限的核电业主与设备制造商注定了双方之间的强依存关系,但是作为理性的"经济人"又使得各自为追求自身的利益最大化而违约.立足于我国核电业主与设备制造商关系的现状,建立了双方的非合作博弈模型和合作博弈模型,结果显示在合作博弈情况下任一方和整体的收益都要大于非合作博弈的收益.因此,认为通过建立良好的信用体系、制定合理的利益分配机制和进行连续的、反复的交易来形成利益制衡机制是我国核电业主和设备制造商之间的最优选择.     

基于博弈论的逆向供应链合作利润分配研究

逆向供应链成员的合作与否的博弈是以追求利润最大化为目的的,且又能够合理分配增加的总体利润,这样成员之间才能保持长久稳定的合作关系.本文基于单一制造商和单一第三方回收商的逆向供应链,运用博弈理论,分析了逆向供应链上制造商和第三方回收商在不同博弈结构下的利润,得出非合作博弈的均衡解和合作博弈的均衡解,在此基础上,得出双方合作会带来更多的整体利润和合作双方是基于贡献来分配增加利润的结论.     

基于溢出效应的技术创新利益主体行为的博弈分析

本文从技术创新的溢出效应出发, 研究了相关利益主体的行为选择决策博弈问题。本文首先讨论了技术创新溢出效应产生的根源及其所带来的后果; 随后, 研究直接利益主体之间关于技术创新行为选择的相互作用关系, 通过对比存在和不存在溢出效应两种条件下的静态博弈结果, 揭示了溢出效应对创新主体行为决策的内在作用机理; 进一步地, 研究作为间接利益主体的政府对直接利益主体技术创新行为选择的影响, 分析了两者基于溢出效应的静态博弈结果; 最后, 深入研究了企业和政府关于政策支持的动态博弈, 构建了完美信息动态博弈模型并求解得到其子博弈完美纳什均衡解。本文的研究可以为政府制定相关政策和直接利益主体进行技术创新决策提供理论支持。     

零售商主导型供应链强弱零售商间价格博弈研究

基于Hotelling差异化模型,在零售商主导二级供应链及零售商市场下,建立了强零售商、弱零售商、制造商三者之间的价格博弈模型,讨论了零售商之间Cournot竞争、Stackelberg竞争情况的均衡解问题,并通过对两种情况的对比得出,对于零售商主导二级供应链系统,零售商价格之间的Stackelberg博弈情况要优于Coumot博弈情况,但此时消费者利益受到较大的损害;零售商间的差异化对零售商主导型供应链中零售商自身以及制造商来说都将是有益的.     

供应链合作及制造商创新投资研究

在一个由供应商和制造商组成的供应链系统中,制造商在观察到需求不确定的实现值前从事成本降低投资.运用博弈理论,比较了不同供应链合作方式对制造商创新投资的影响.研究表明,当分配因子满足一定条件时,制造商在利益共享合约下的创新投资水平大于在普通合约下的创新投资水平.     

在需求时变情形下供应链的补货与定价决策研究

随着竞争的日益激烈，时间已成为影响产品价格和需求量的重要因素。本文考虑时间对价格和需求量的影响，利用博弈理论对供应链的供需关系及其补货与定价决策作了定量研究。在制造商首先确定销售价，配送商随后选择订货量的假设前提下，笔者导出了供方的最优定价和需方的最优订货量．即纳什均衡结果。在均衡状态下，供需双方在各补货周期内的利润随时问推移而减少，且当双方的补货周期相同时各方在整个经济寿命周期内的利润最大。此外，供应链的经济寿命周期随产品价格的下降速率增加而缩小。最后，我们通过计算实例说明了上述结果。     

企业并购的信号博弈分析

井购是市场经济体制下的一种产权交易活动，是并购双方在追求各自利益最大化前提下所进行的信号博弈过程。由于企业井购双方信息不对称性所导致的逆向选择，企业并购市场会出现分离均衡、混同均衡和准分离均衡三种状态，其中只有分离均衡是最理想和最有效率的均衡。文章建立了目标企业与并购企业之间的信号传递博弈模型，提出克服并购双方信息的不对称性和对目标企业进行合理估价是实现分离均衡的最有效方法。     

基于演化博弈的大型工程技术创新过程中业主与供应商的合作机制研究

大型工程建设规模庞大、技术复杂,往往需要通过技术创新来解决技术难题。本文利用演化博弈的分析方法,探讨大型工程技术创新过程中业主与供应商的利益共享与风险分担机制,以加强技术创新关键主体———业主与供应商之间的合作,从而提高大型工程组织技术创新能力。研究表明,诸如降低联盟成本、提高超额收益、增强业主自主创新的战略意识、完善供应商评价体系等手段可以加强双方在技术创新过程中的合作。     

浅谈石油石化企业独家采购谈判策略

石油石化企业往往由于涉密、抢险、专利技术、特许经营、功能配套、原厂备件、集中采购、战略合作等原因采用独家采购模式,导致采购价格可能偏离市场价格,存在较大的采购风险.采购人员需要制定完善的谈判方案,运用成本分析法、横向对比法、代理权限类比法、博弈与心理战等谈判策略,合理控制采购成本.     

供应中断下双源采购的供应链契约设计

考虑由一个制造商和两个供应商构成的两级供应链契约设计问题,将可靠性服从随机分布的供应商作为主供应商,将完全中断供应商作为次供应商,建立以利润最大化为目标的签约和执行两阶段博弈的动态规划模型,得到制造商的最优契约设计。制造商根据产品零售价格的变化灵活做出只与一个供应商签约、与两个供应商同时签约或都不签约的决定,供应商根据契约设计内容决定自己的最优生产规模。研究表明：供应商最优生产规模与产品的单位生产成本呈负相关,与单位变动支付和单位惩罚成本呈正相关;次供应商的订货量与其本身的可靠性呈正相关,与主供应商的可靠性呈负相关;供应商的固定支付与其相应的可靠性呈负相关。     

Game theoretical perspectives on dual-channel supply chain competition with price discounts and pricing schemes

This paper evaluates the impact of price discount contracts and pricing schemes on the dual-channel supply chain competition. Channel conflict occurs when the supplier enters the online direct channel. Traditional contracts normally require tedious administrational participation, full information of the cost structures, and other factors. The introduction of simple price discount contracts aims at providing easy implementation and effective coordination results. From supplier Stackelberg, retailer Stackelberg, and Nash game theoretic perspectives, we show that the scenarios with price discount contracts can outperform the non-contract scenarios. In addition, we show consistent pricing scheme can reduce the channel conflict by inducing more profit to the retailer. The leader in the games might, but is not guaranteed to, have advantages.     

A theory of hub-and-spoke collusion

We develop a model of hub-and-spoke collusion between a manufacturer and two retailers. Demand is stochastic, and collusion between retailers is difficult; the best collusive equilibrium is inefficient (Rotemberg and Saloner (1986)). In the hub-and-spoke collusive agreement, retailers transmit their information about the state of demand to the supplier. The supplier uses this information to adjust the wholesale price. By organizing the collusion, the supplier increases profits of the vertical chain. We show that, surprisingly, this type of collusive agreement can under some conditions improve consumer welfare.     

基于微分博弈的发电商报价模型及其分析

基于微分博弈原理,构建了发电商报价动态模型,在运用Hamilton—Jacobi—Bellman方法对其进行求解基础上,针对3家发电商的情况进行了数值仿真分析。分析表明：高边际成本的发电商报价策略的动态均衡会大于其Coumot-Nash均衡,而边际成本较低的发电商报价策略的动态均衡略低于CoumotoNash均衡;随贴现率的增大,发电商的均衡报价策略会经历由递增到递减的变化过程,而学习速度对发电商报价策略的影响则是相反的;当贴现率与学习速度同时变化时,对市场出清价的局部影响较为复杂,但当两者同时逐渐增大时,发电商报价策略的动态均衡会逐渐稳定在较高水平。     

Entry deterrence: The case of a buyer with market power

The model considers a seller operating under the threat of an arbitrarily large number of unknown potential entrants and facing a strategic buyer. It is shown that the seller's Nash best response function slopes downward in price-output space, while that of the buyer slopes upward. The Nash equilibrium may be associated with a lower probability of entry than the equilibrium at which the buyer behaves non-strategically. With the buyer as the Stackelberg leader, the price is shown to decrease relative to that at the Nash equilibrium, but the probability of entry may rise or fall.     

具有自营平台的制造商与零售商的竞争与合作模型

本文研究了由1个制造商和1个零售商组成的供应链中的竞争与合作定价问题,其中制造商具有平台直销渠道。本文建立了竞争下的Stackelberg博弈模型,并分析了解的唯一性和合理性,然后给出合作定价模型和各渠道的定价策略,结果表明制造商和零售商最优策略是降低线下渠道销售价格而线上平台销售价格不变。通过对比表明供应链合作所增加的收益等于非合作下零售商的收益,并证明了顾客对线下渠道购买偏好越高,合作所增加的收益越大。进一步地,分析了在合作的情况下制造商是否放弃通过平台直销渠道销售商品的问题,并给出双渠道下供应链总利润比单渠道下总利润高的判定条件。最后给出一个算例,对所获得的结论进行验证和补充。     

Target pricing: Demand-side versus supply-side approaches

The practice of target pricing has been a key factor in the success of Japanese manufacturers. In the more commonly known demand-side approach, the target price for the supplier equals the manufacturer's market price less a percent margin for the manufacturer but no cost-improvement expenses are shared. In the supply-side approach, cost-improvement expenses are shared and the target price equals the supplier's cost plus a percent margin for the supplier. Using a general oligopoly and Cournot duopoly models, we characterize the equilibrium and optimal policy for each approach under various conditions. We find that sharing cost-reduction expenses allows the manufacturer using the supply-side approach to attain competitive advantage in the form of increased market share and higher profit, particularly in industrial conditions where margins are thin and price sensitivities are high.     

Managing Supplier Involvement in New Product Development: A Multiple‐Case Study*

Existing studies of supplier involvement in new product development have mainly focused on project‐related short‐term processes and success factors. This study validates and extends an existing exploratory framework, which comprises both long‐term strategic processes and short‐term operational processes that are related to supplier involvement. The empirical validation is based on a multiple‐case study of supplier collaborations at a manufacturer in the copier and printer industry. The analysis of eight cases of supplier involvement reveals that the results of supplier–manufacturer collaborations and the associated issues and problems can best be explained by the patterns in the extent to which the manufacturer manages supplier involvement in the short term and the long term. The results of this study reveal that the initial framework is helpful in understanding why certain collaborations are not effectively managed yet conclude that the existing analytical distinction among four different management areas does not sufficiently reflect empirical reality. This leads to the reconceptualization and further detailing of the framework. Instead of four managerial areas, this study proposes to distinguish between the strategic management arena and the operational management arena. The strategic management arena contains processes that together provide long‐term, strategic direction and operational support for project teams adopting supplier involvement. These processes also contribute to building up a supplier base that can meet current and future technology and capability needs. The operational management arena contains processes that are aimed at planning, managing, and evaluating the actual collaborations in a specific development project. The results of this study suggest that success of involving suppliers in product development is reflected by the firm's ability to capture both short‐ and long‐term benefits. If companies spend most of their time on operational management in development projects, they will fail to use the leverage effect of planning and preparing such involvement through strategic management activities. Also, they will not be sufficiently able to capture possible long‐term technology and learning benefits that may spin off from individual projects. Long‐term collaboration benefits can only be captured if a company can build long‐term relationships with key suppliers, with which it builds learning routines and ensures that the capability sets of both parties are aligned and remain useful for future joint projects.     

发电公司的合作竞价策略研究

运用博弈论中的纳什均衡原理,通过构造发电公司的竞价博弈模型,研究发电公司的合作竞价策略。通过分析得出,在静态博弈中发电公司的合作竞价博弈可能是一个囚徒困境博弈或斗鸡博弈,也可能是一个智猪博弈,这主要取决于各发电公司成本之间的差异以及市场的最高报价限制。虽然在静态博弈中合作竞价是不稳定的,但在动态博弈中,发电公司之间有可能通过合作达到集体理性。最后根据分析所得出的结论提出了相应的政策建议。     

The Impacts of Contract Type on Broker Performance

This paper offers a theoretical and empirical analysis of the exclusive agency and exclusive-right-to-sell contracts used in real estate brokerage. The theoretical model predicts that while both contract types will yield the same price, the exclusive agency contract will result in faster sales than the exclusive-right-to-sell contract. In the empirical model, we find that houses sold faster under the exclusive agency contract than the exclusive-right-to-sell contract. However, houses sold with exclusive agency contracts also sold at a marginally lower price. We also find a slightly greater concession from the listing price at the negotiation stage of exclusive agency listings.