代理人能力分布不均情形下首位晋升制与末位淘汰制的比较研究

在基于相对业绩比较的锦标赛激励机制中,首位晋升制与末位淘汰制是两种常见的竞赛激励机制。在代理人能力分布不均情形下,将代理人之间的拆台行为引入传统的锦标赛模型,可以研究代理人能力分布不同时首位晋升制与末位淘汰制下代理人的行为以及对委托人收益的影响。通过数理模型推导可获得以下结论:第一,首位晋升制下代理人的努力水平和拆台水平均比较高,委托人采用首位晋升制更有利,能力分布对委托人最优选择不产生影响。第二,低能力代理人占多数时,高能力代理人努力水平过高,受到的拆台也更多,高能力代理人占多数时,低能力代理人努力水平更高受到的拆台更多,能力分布对代理人的行为产生影响。     

浅议绩效管理中末位淘汰制度

末位淘汰制是企业管理中绩效考核的一种制度。末位淘汰制是一种强势管理,旨在给予员工一定的压力,激发员工工作积极性;同时末位淘汰制也有不足之处,员工心理负担过重、同事关系紧张等。文章就企业管理中使用末位淘汰制提出了相关建议。     

高校人事制度管理中不宜实行末位淘汰制

末位淘汰制是众多员工激励手段的一种,既有优点,也有缺陷;成功地实行末位淘汰制需要具备公平、公正、公开的游戏规则和可以随时补充的后备资源。由于目前高校难以满足成功实行末位淘汰制的两个条件,因此, 高校不宜实行末位淘汰制。     

追逐热门的危险

近年来，在中国的管理界出现了许多热门的词汇，比如“末位淘汰制”，“自我管理团队”，“平衡记分卡”，“六个西格玛”，“360度考核”，“ERP”，“CRM”等等，不一而足。勿容置疑，它们对企业管理人员具有重要的学习和借鉴作用。     

末位淘汰——管理中的一柄“双刃剑”

末位淘汰作为一种管理手段在企业界被广泛采用,在实践中具有优缺点,实施末位淘汰要根据企业的实际情况,选择一个部门或几个部门进行。同时要注重培育良好的绩效文化,让刚性的末位淘汰变得充“满柔性”以有利于末位淘汰制的实施。     

末位淘汰制的弊端

末位淘汰制是企业对员工绩效考评时所采用的一种方法,比较学术的名称是"强制分类法",并在此基础上将被分在末端百分之五至百分之十的员工解聘的制度。该制度因美国通用电气公司(GE)的多年使用而闻名,并被许多中国公司所仿效,变成"热门"     

基于管理者素质模型的企业管理者晋升机制研究

建立一个全面、客观、公平、公正的企业管理者晋升机制,对于企业人力资源管理工作和企业的长远发展有着重要的实践意义。现有的基于年资、绩效和人际关系的三种主要的晋升机制在一定程度上都无法客观、公正、公平的评价员工的综合素质,影响了晋升的准确性。本文从管理者素质模型出发,提出构建科学的管理者职务晋升机制的基本框架。     

地方政府激励制度的比较分析

我国中央政府对地方政府进行激励主要采取两种模式:官员晋升锦标赛制和财政分成制。本文基于一个中央和地方政府进行序贯博弈的模型来研究两种激励模式的激励效果并对社会福利进行比较。当中国区域之间禀赋和发展水平差异较大以及各种外来冲击对产出的影响较大时,晋升锦标赛制不仅会遏制中国地区间的合作,而且与财政分成制相比,其引致的努力水平更低,无论从最大化中央政府效用的角度,还是从最大化社会福利的角度,晋升锦标赛制都次于财政分成制。     

论末位淘汰制在现代企业管理中的应用

面对日趋激烈的市场竞争 ,企业必须加强内部管理 ,提高综合竞争力。文章对末位淘汰制在现代企业管理中的作用及如何实施进行了综合的分析 ,对企业改制、进行现代化管理具有一定的借鉴作用。     

入世后国有商业银行的人才策略

人才是一个企业可持续发展的重要因素 ,对优秀金融人才的吸引、培养、使用和稳定是关系到国有银行长远发展的头等大事 ,因此 ,国有银行必须加大用人机制的改革 ,建立良好的用人机制、分配机制、教育培训机制 ,并加强企业文化建设 ,增强国有银行的凝聚力和员工的归属感。1.加大用人机制的改革。要建立科学的人才选拔机制 ,真正推行竞聘上岗、双向选择等选人用人制度。应该设置不同类型的员工发展的晋升通道。一类可以是管理类职务的晋升 ,另一类是技术级别的晋升 ,各类级别中又分为若干等级 ,两个晋升通道相比 ,管理类职务的晋升受人数的限制…     

Combining “real effort” with induced effort costs: the ball-catching task

We introduce the “ball-catching task”, a novel computerized task, which combines a tangible action (“catching balls”) with induced material cost of effort. The central feature of the ball-catching task is that it allows researchers to manipulate the cost of effort function as well as the production function, which permits quantitative predictions on effort provision. In an experiment with piece-rate incentives we find that the comparative static and the point predictions on effort provision are remarkably accurate. We also present experimental findings from three classic experiments, namely, team production, gift exchange and tournament, using the task. All of the results are closely in line with the stylized facts from experiments using purely induced values. We conclude that the ball-catching task combines the advantages of real effort tasks with the use of induced values, which is useful for theory-testing purposes as well as for applications.     

The impact of stress on tournament entry

Individual willingness to enter competitive environments predicts career choices and labor market outcomes. Meanwhile, many people experience competitive contexts as stressful. We use two laboratory experiments to investigate whether factors related to stress can help explain individual differences in tournament entry. Experiment 1 studies whether stress responses (measured as salivary cortisol) to taking part in a mandatory tournament predict individual willingness to participate in a voluntary tournament. We find that competing increases stress levels. This cortisol response does not predict tournament entry for men but is positively and significantly correlated with choosing to enter the tournament for women. In Experiment 2, we exogenously induce physiological stress using the cold-pressor task. We find a positive causal effect of stress on tournament entry for women but no effect for men. Finally, we show that although the effect of stress on tournament entry differs between the genders, stress reactions cannot explain the well-documented gender difference in willingness to compete.     

Information Policy in Tournaments with Sabotage

Sabotage is one of the main problems of tournament‐like reward schemes. Workers who are leading in a tournament are more dangerous rivals, and are therefore sabotaged more heavily. This implies that there is an extra cost to becoming a leader and, hence, to choosing high productive effort in the early stages of a tournament. The incentives to exert productive effort are thereby reduced. We show that this problem can be solved by concealing intermediate information on the performances of workers (i.e., by clever information management). Moreover, we offer experimental evidence indicating that such information management does increase productive efforts.     

“Success breeds success” or “Pride goes before a fall”?: Teams and individuals in multi-contest tournaments

We study the impact of progress feedback on players' performance in multi-contest team tournaments, in which team members' efforts are not directly substitutable. In particular, we employ a real-effort laboratory experiment to understand, in a best-of-three tournament, how players' strategic mindsets change when they compete on a team compared to when they compete individually. Our data corroborate the theoretical predictions for teams: Neither a lead nor a lag in the first component contest affects a team's performance in the subsequent contests. In individual tournaments, however, contrary to the theoretical prediction, we observe that leaders perform worse—but laggards perform better—after learning the outcome of the first contest. Our findings offer the first empirical evidence from a controlled laboratory of the impact of progress feedback between team and individual tournaments, and contribute new insights on team incentives.     

国企锦标赛激励效应与制约因素研究

本文尝试从锦标赛的角度为国企竞争理论提供信息经济学模型解释和实证支持。为了达到这一目的,本文从政府干预和共同代理的角度对经典的锦标赛模型进行细化和拓展,以揭示出国企锦标赛激励效应与制约因素,并收集2451家地方国有上市公司披露的薪酬差距数据对理论模型进行实证检验。理论模型表明,薪酬差距的扩大和国企经营者赢得经济锦标赛激励的强化会增加国企经营者的努力水平,因而有利于公司绩效的提升。不过,国企经营者赢得经济锦标赛的激励却受到政府行政干预和共同代理问题的制约。实证结果表明,我国地方国有上市公司薪酬差距与公司绩效显著正相关,而与地方政府行政干预和共同代理问题的严重程度显著负相关,从而支持了理论模型。     

Rank-order tournaments and selection

Rank-order tournaments are often presented as devices for aligning incentives in a principal-agent setting. In most of this literature agents are expected to be identical so that the principal is indifferent ex ante as to who wins the contest, implying that the selection properties of the tournament can be ignored. In this paper we consider a tournament which is not necessarily symmetric, and in which agent type is private information. The principal cares about who wins, but the basic tournament will not achieve perfect selection; the lower-type agent may sometimes win. In a two-player tournament we present a simple reward system in which the winner's reward depends upon which (if any) of two “test standards” is passed; conditions are presented under which this system allows the principal to choose the best agent. This system can be extended in a simple manner to rank types in ann-player tournament. We suggest that the theory can be applied to internal labor markets and research contests.     

Men, women, and competition: An experimental test of behavior

This study reports a series of experiments that examine outcomes when agents are able to choose between a payment scheme that rewards based on absolute performance (i.e., piece rate) and a scheme that rewards based on relative performance (i.e., a tournament). We test for the presence and persistence of gender differences in performance and the rate of entry into the tournament option and whether these differences are sensitive to the structure of the tournament rewards. In the winner-take-all (WTA) condition, only the best performer in the tournament for each round received a payment ($4.50). In the graduated tournament condition, the same payment ($4.50) was divided among the first, second, and third finishers in the tournament. In the WTA condition, men showed significantly lower forecast errors than women. In addition, a clear sorting effect occurs in the WTA condition. In early rounds of the WTA condition, male entrants into the tournament show significantly lower forecast errors than female tournament entrants. However, the difference disappears over time. After controlling for forecasting skill, gender did not predict entry into the tournament for the WTA condition. However, lower forecasting skill reduced the probability of entry. In the graduated tournament, the situation was reversed. Men entered the tournament at significantly higher rates, even after controlling for skill. Forecasting skill had no impact on the decision to enter the tournament. While the average male entrant to the tournament had lower forecast errors than the average female entrant, the men entered at much higher rates. As a consequence, men were much more likely than women to enter the tournament too frequently.     

Incentive effects and overcrowding in tournaments: An experimental analysis

This study reports experiments that examine outcomes when agents choose between a payment scheme that rewards based on absolute performance (i.e., piece rate) and a scheme that rewards based on relative performance (i.e., a tournament). Holding total payments in the tournament constant, performance is higher when the tournament option is winner-take-all compared to a graduated tournament (i.e., second and third-place performers also receive a payment). Performance is higher in the winner-take all tournaments even among participants that choose the piece-rate option. While there is a modest amount of overcrowding, there are no significant differences in overcrowding across conditions. Entry rates into the tournament and the relative ability of tournament entrants (compared to non-entrants in the same condition) are higher in the graduated tournament condition than the winner-take-all conditions. Consequently, the winner-take-all tournament is more efficient than the graduated tournament (incentive effects are stronger and the overcrowding is about the same), but the graduated tournament provides a more effective mechanism to identify the most capable performer in a talent pool. Electronic Supplementary Material Supplementary material is available in the online version of this article at . JEL Classification D8 · J3 · L2     

Optimal seedings in elimination tournaments

We study an elimination tournament with heterogenous contestants whose ability is common-knowledge. Each pair-wise match is modeled as an all-pay auction. Equilibrium efforts are in mixed strategies, yielding complex dynamics: endogenous win probabilities in each match depend on other matches’ outcome through the identity of the expected opponent in the next round. The designer seeds competitors according to their ranks. For tournaments with four players we find optimal seedings for three different criteria: (1) maximization of total tournament effort; (2) maximization of the probability of a final among the two top ranked teams; (3) maximization of the win probability for the top player. We also find the seedings ensuring that higher ranked players have a higher winning probability. We compare our predictions with data from NCAA basketball tournaments.     

Competitive balance in a quasi-double knockout tournament

In 2001, the All-Ireland Gaelic Football competition changed from being a singleknockout tournament to a quasi-double knockout competition. Similar natural experiments in economics and operational research theory suggest such a change should reduce the competitive balance in the competition. Using a Hirschmann–Herfindahl Index measure of concentration and a bootstrapping approach, we confirm that the new structure leads to a less competitive outcome and, importantly, this outcome is less uncertain. Our bootstrapped results show that in the long run, with larger samples, there is less competitive balance in the new competition structure than in the older structure competition structure. Finally, we also consider a stochastic dominance approach to evaluating the change in tournament structure, but the low power due to the presence of ties in our small sample leads to an inconclusive outcome.