Do option-like incentives induce overvaluation? Evidence from experimental asset markets

One potential reason for bubbles evolving prior to the financial crisis was excessive risk taking stemming from option-like incentive schemes in financial institutions. By running laboratory asset markets, we investigate the impact of option-like incentives on price formation and trading behavior. The main results are that (i) we observe significantly higher market prices with option-like incentives than linear incentives. (ii) We further find that option-like incentives provoke subjects to behave differently and to take more risk than subjects with linear incentives. (iii) We finally show that trading at inflated prices is rational for subjects with option-like incentives since it increases their expected payout.     

Cashing In On Quality? Pay Incentives and the Quality Culture

In this article, the authors explore the relationship between total quality management (TQM) and financial incentives in British manufacturing industry. In particular, they examine the view of some of the most influential quality management ‘gurus’ that there is an incompatibility between incentive pay and TQM. Drawing on survey and case study evidence, they show that TQM is being implemented in the presence of financial incentives. Furthermore, those organisations which had such incentives did not appear to have less success in implementing TQM. On the basis of the evidence presented, the authors conclude that it is not possible to rule out a role for financial incentives in implementing TQM, although incentives are only likely to form one element in a broader implementation strategy.     

Financial reporting fraud and CEO pay-performance incentives

Because prior studies find mixed results on the relation between CEOs’ pay performance incentives and a firm’s likelihood of financial reporting fraud, we restudy their relationship using innovative research methods. First, we concentrate on incentives from granting options rather than equity-based incentives. Second, we emphasize vested options, disregarding unvested option holdings, and take the logarithm transformation of option incentives. Third, we analyse the impact of option incentives on future financial reporting irregularities. Using this innovative approach as well as a full sample and a matched sample, we find that an increase in executives’ option incentives raises the likelihood of financial reporting violations. Moreover, the effect of option incentives on financial reporting fraud is moderated by auditor effort. In addition, we find that another proxy for the measurement of executives’ option incentives, namely, the number of vested options by executives, is highly correlated with the CEO’s vested stock option sensitivity.     

Managing Discretionary Accruals and Book‐Tax Differences in Anticipation of Tax Rate Increases: Evidence from China

This paper investigates how firms manage their earnings to trade off various incentives when tax rates increase. We hypothesize and find that firms generally choose to manage their taxable income upward in a book‐tax non‐conforming manner rather than in a book‐tax conforming manner before a tax rate increment, which in turn reduces the detection risk of aggressive financial reporting. These results suggest that firms give more weight to tax incentives and tax audit or regulatory inspection risks than to boosting financial reporting income in tax management. However, when firms have higher book management incentives or lower tunneling incentives (i.e., non‐state‐owned enterprises), we find that they manage their taxable income and book income upward together (i.e., in a book‐tax conforming manner), whereas their counterparts (i.e., state‐owned enterprises) do not. Overall, our paper contributes to the literature by demonstrating the interplay of tax, tunneling and financial reporting incentives in influencing tax management strategies. The findings from our paper should also help government and regulators understand more about firms’ reactions to tax rate increases.     

REPETITION AND FINANCIAL INCENTIVES IN ECONOMICS EXPERIMENTS

Abstract While experimental methods have been an effective tool for economic research, there have been controversies on the methodological aspects. The reason why we need to care about it is clear: if the method in an experiment is not valid, the results from that experiment cannot be valid too. Among other things, the methodological issues of financial incentives and repetition, which are norms in experimental economics, have been at the centre of many debates. While there are previous reviews that investigate financial incentives and repetition separately, our view is that the effects of these two factors are interdependent rather than independent. Thus, our review here is more specific and more conditional, that is, we are interested in the answer to the question, ‘Do we need to use financial incentives conditional on the use of repetition?’ After we discuss the relationship between financial incentives and repetition, we argue, from a review of 44 experimental studies, that using financial incentives would be more necessary to improve the validity of experimental results if an experimenter needs to use repetition.     

The impact of incentives on the accuracy of subjects in judgmental forecasting experiments

There is an ongoing debate in the social sciences about whether or not financial incentives are needed in order to obtain good performance from experimental subjects. This debate often extends into the research on judgmental forecasting. Thus, an experiment was conducted to assess the effects of financial incentives on time series forecasting accuracy. There was no evidence that financial incentives impacted forecasting accuracy in stable time series. Financial incentives also had no impact immediately after instabilities occurred and no impact once the trend in the data had fully emerged.     

Understanding peak avoidance commuting by subway: an empirical study in Beijing

Congestion is a major problem for peak-hour commuters in the Beijing subway system, as it leads to long queuing times and overcrowded vehicles. This paper explores to what extent peak travel can be reduced by providing incentives for peak avoidance. In a stated preference study, travellers’ responses to two financial and two non-financial incentives were measured, and factors increasing or limiting the response were identified. Our results suggest that all four incentives can be reasonably effective tools and the financial incentives seem to have a slightly stronger effect than the services and credit-for-gifts-based scenarios. Ordered logit models indicate that various factors influence people’s receptiveness of incentives for peak avoidance which relate to the ease of change or presence of alternatives and receptiveness to incentives. Both theoretical and policy implications are concluded that the proposed factors and incentive system can help solving the subway congestion in Beijing.     

Group incentives and financial performance: the moderating role of innovation

Using a nationally representative and multisource data set, this study examines the mediating role of organisational commitment in the relationship between group incentives and financial performance. The study also investigates the moderating role of innovation in these relationships. The results demonstrate that organisational commitment partially mediates the relationship between group incentives and financial performance. The findings of this study support the hypotheses that the relationships of group incentives with organisational commitment and financial performance are stronger in more innovative companies than in less innovative companies. The results provide implications on how group incentives affect financial performance and which organisations in particular should provide their employees with group incentive practices.     

Financial incentives and advanced construction procurement systems

Construction clients often use financial incentives to encourage stakeholder motivation and commitment to voluntary higher‐order project goals. Despite the increased use of financial incentives, there is little literature addressing means of optimizing outcomes. Using a case‐study methodology, the examination of a successful Australian construction project demonstrates the features of a positively geared procurement approach that promotes the effectiveness of financial incentives. The research results show that if the incentive system is perceived to be fair and is applied to reward exceptional performance, and not to manipulate, then contractors are more likely to be positively motivated.     

Incorporating recycling into post-disaster debris disposal

Although large amounts of disaster-generated debris significantly strain landfill capacities, until recently existing policy provided no financial incentive to consider other disposal alternatives such as recycling. In 2007, the U.S. Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) released a new pilot program that provides incentives for communities to recycle by allowing them to retain revenue from the sale of disaster debris. This first-ever policy offers significant financial benefits for communities seeking to cleanup in an environmentally responsible way but requires reexamining existing assumptions and decision processes that are based on prior reimbursement programs. This paper presents a decision model with recycling incentives for locating temporary disposal and storage reduction (TDSR) facilities in support of disaster debris cleanup operations. A facility location model is proposed to incorporate the unique assumptions, objectives, and constraints of disaster recovery in light of FEMA’s new policy.     

The importance of financial incentives on retirement choices: New evidence for Italy

This study exploits a new dataset to quantify the effect of financial incentives on retirement choices. This dataset contains—for the first time for Italy—information on seniority. The effects of marginal incentives and social security wealth (SSW) on retirement go in the expected direction; when employees become eligible for pension benefits, the change in financial incentives they experience is so great that their retirement probability increases by 30 percentage points.We also find that the procedure used in previous Italian studies to impute seniority leads to a considerable overestimation of that variable and of SSW. We show that, due to these measurement errors, the estimate of the SSW coefficient takes the wrong sign. A comparison of retirement studies across countries (see Gruber and Wise [Gruber, J., and Wise, D., (2004). Social Security Programs and Retirement Around the World: Micro-Estimation, NBER. The University of Chicago Press, Chicago and London.]) provides prima facie evidence that a lack of good quality data often leads to wrongly signed estimates of the SSW coefficient.     

The timing of retirement — New evidence from Swiss female workers

We investigate the responsiveness of individual retirement decisions to changes in financial incentives. A reform increased women's normal retirement age (NRA) in two steps from age 62 to age 63 first and then to age 64. At the same time retirement at the previous NRA became possible at a benefit discount. Since the reform affected specific birth cohorts we can identify causal effects. We find strong and robust behavioral effects of changes in financial retirement incentives. A permanent reduction of retirement benefits by 3.4% induces a decline in the age-specific annual retirement probability by over 50%. The response to changes in financial retirement benefits varies with educational background: those with low education respond most strongly to an increase in the price of leisure.     

The Route to Take‐up: Evidence from the UK Pension Credit Reform

Viable routes to increase the take‐up of cash transfer programs include raising the financial incentive to claim and reducing claiming barriers. Older people's response to both is evaluated exploiting the introduction of Pension Credit in the UK. The reform involved improved application assistance, simplified claiming procedure, extended recertification interval, less intrusive reporting requirements and outreach campaigning; also, the cash entitlement was increased for a subgroup of pensioners. The behavioral response is identified using Family Resources Survey data. Results support the effectiveness of financial incentives, while no effect is found in the case of reducing barriers policies when unaccompanied by financial incentives.     

Federal mandates with local agenda setters

This paper investigates the effect of local monopoly agenda setting on federal standards. Federal standards specify a minimum (or maximum) point in policy space which can be raised (or lowered) by local option. Without local agenda setters, this creates incentives for nonmajoritarian outcomes, with a tendency for policies to be too high (low). Local agenda setters may have incentives to distort these outcomes even further. We demonstrate that federal standards can counterbalance the distortions of local agenda setters. We wish to thank LEESP, CNRS, and NSF for financial support. The paper has benefitted from helpful comments by Andy Postlewaite, Howard Rosenthal, Norman Schofield, and an anonymous referee.     

基层税务人员激励中所产生的偏差问题分析

基层税务人员作为税收法规的具体实施者以及税收收入的主要承担者,其工作积极性的高低直接影响着国家的财政状况,因此对其激励就非常重要。本文从激励偏差的角度分析了影响基层税务人员激励偏差产生的原因,并提出了相应的解决策略。     

Lessons from a century of FED policy: Why monetary and credit policies need rules and boundaries

Wide operational and financial independence given to monetary and credit policies subjects the Federal Reserve to incentives detrimental for macroeconomic and financial stability. The absence of a monetary policy rule created go-stop incentives that produced inefficient volatility of both inflation and unemployment during the Great Inflation. Fed credit policy has undergone massive “mission creep” since the Fed was established. Being debt-financed fiscal policy, Fed credit policy beyond ordinary temporary lending to solvent depositories creates friction with the fiscal authorities and jeopardizes the Fed׳s independence. An ambiguous boundary of expansive Fed credit policy creates expectations of Fed accommodation in financial crisis—that blunts the incentive of private entities to take protective measures beforehand (to shrink counter-party risk and reliance on short-term finance, and build up equity capital) and blunts the incentive of the fiscal authorities to prepare procedures in advance to act systematically in times of credit turmoil. These points are illustrated with reference to the 2007–09 financial crisis. Part of the problem is that the independent Fed does not have the same incentive as the 19th century Bank of England to follow Bagehot׳s Rule. The paper concludes with a set of principles to preserve a workable, sustainable division of responsibilities between the independent central bank and the fiscal authorities.     

Environmental management accounting in Europe: current practice and future potential

Abstract

We examine the impact of managerial financial reporting incentives on accounting quality changes around International Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS) adoption. A novel feature of our single-country setting based on Germany is that voluntary IFRS adoption was allowed and common before IFRS became mandatory. We exploit the revealed preferences in the choice to (not) adopt IFRS voluntarily to determine whether the management of individual firms had incentives to adopt IFRS. For comparability with previous studies, we assess accounting quality through multiple constructs such as earnings management, timely loss recognition, and value relevance. While most existing literature documents accounting quality improvements following IFRS adoption, we find that improvements are confined to firms with incentives to adopt, that is, voluntary adopters. We also find that firms that resist IFRS adoption have closer connections with banks and inside shareholders, consistent with lower incentives for more comprehensive accounting standards. The overall results indicate that reporting incentives dominate accounting standards in determining accounting quality. We conclude that it is unwarranted to infer from evidence on accounting quality changes around voluntary adoption that IFRS per se improves accounting quality.     

Write-offs and Profitability in Private Firms: Disentangling the Impact of Tax-Minimisation Incentives

Private firms are likely to use the financial reporting process more for other objectives, such as tax savings, than for communicating performance. However, observing firms choosing accounting policies for tax-minimisation purposes is not straightforward due to (i) tax and non-tax costs of reporting lower income (ii) accounting policies that result in lower reported income and no tax savings but generate non-tax benefits (iii) preparers' multiple incentives and (iv) econometric issues. We observe a large sample of 20,505 private firms writing off assets in two separate regimes, one that generates tax savings and one that does not. Firms significantly decrease, but continue to use, write-offs after the adverse change in tax treatment of write-offs. The exogenous tax change should not affect other reporting incentives. This allows us to disentangle the tax-minimisation incentive from other (un-observable) incentives, including debt contracting, dividends and employee relations that contribute to the observed anomalous positive relationship between write-offs and profitability. We show that for private firms (i) obtaining tax savings is important overall (ii) non-tax costs and benefits are probably also important and (iii) earnings informativeness for future cash flows increases after the adverse tax legislation change.     

我国实行金融混业经营的分析

本文从国内金融业在此问题上的实践探索出发,借鉴外国的成熟经验,分析了引发金融混业经营潮流的宏观和微观两个方面的诱因。在此基础上从实现金融机构控制风险、稳健发展和拓宽利润来源、提高竞争实力等方面论证了我国目前探索金融混业经营的现实意义。并就管理模式、组织结构调整、加强内部风险控制能力等重点、难点问题进行了分析。     

国家金融审计的现实矛盾与解决方案

国家金融审计因其定位和项目组织的科学性,在发现重大违法违规线索、揭示金融风险、维护金融经济安全方面发挥着重要作用.同时,国家金融审计又面临着目标多元化与激励方式单一、事后审计为主的审计模式与"免疫系统"功能要求等多方面的矛盾.为化解这些矛盾,国家金融审计需要构建金融审计与金融监管的协作框架、改革完善激励机制、将金融风险管理技术引入金融审计、提高金融数据分析能力及审计信息的利用效率等.