Ultimate Ownership, Income Management, and Legal and Extra-Legal Institutions

This study provides evidence of the role of both legal and extra‐legal institutions in limiting the income management induced by the detachment of control rights from the cash flow rights of ultimate owners. The tests use a unique, comprehensive data set for firm‐level control and ownership structures from 9 East Asian and 13 Western European countries. Univariate regressions show that income management that is induced by the wedge between control rights and cash flow rights is significantly limited in countries with high statutory protection of minority rights (proxied by legal tradition, minority rights protection, the efficiency of the judicial system, or disclosure standards) and effective extra‐legal institutions (proxied by the effectiveness of competition laws, diffusion of the press, and tax compliance). Furthermore, multiple regression results show that a common law tradition and an efficient judicial system subsume the effects of the other legal institutions, and that a high rate of tax compliance subsumes the effects of the other extra‐legal institutions in curbing insider income management. It is surprising that a high rate of tax compliance ultimately has a greater effect than legal tradition and the efficiency of the judicial system. Although this finding is unexpected, given prior evidence on the dominant roles of legal institutions in macroeconomic issues and corporate policies, it is consistent with the recent argument that effective tax enforcement is like a public good in that it can reduce insiders' private control benefits. An implication of this finding is that closer attention to extra‐legal institutions has the potential to enhance our understanding of the institutional reforms needed to limit insider private control benefits.     

小额信贷机构所有权形式、管理与绩效分析——文献综述与引申

小额信贷机构(MFI)是集商业性和社会性为一身的特殊的金融机构,它对扶贫的巨大作用已经是国际学术界的共识,如何在保持其社会性的同时,充分发挥其商业性,使MFI能够可持续发展,为更多的穷人服务是目前研究的重点。本文综合了目前国际和国内学术界最新的所有权形式和管理方面的研究成果,试图从理论上回答这一问题:所有权形式与绩效无关,提高MFI的绩效应更侧重于管理因素。     

机构持股、终极产权与内部控制缺陷

依据机构持股具有的"有效监督"假说和"利益冲突"假说,本文从三个维度实证检验机构持股对内部控制缺陷的影响。研究发现:机构持股与内部控制缺陷显著负相关,大机构投资者(持股比率大于3%)对内部控制缺陷的抑制作用更强,验证了机构持股的"有效监督"假说;与非独立型机构投资者相比,独立型机构投资者对内部控制缺陷的抑制作用更大;与短期机构投资者相比,长期机构投资者更能抑制内部控制缺陷的产生。此外,终极产权性质会影响机构持股对内部控制缺陷的治理监督作用,总的来说,机构持股对内控缺陷抑制作用在非国企中更为明显,且不同类型机构持股对内控缺陷抑制作用在国企与非国企中存在差异。     

Ultimate Controller Ownership and Firm Value in Taiwan

Using a panel of 242 Taiwanese listed firms during a ten-year period (1997-2006), this study tests whether there is an optimal ratio of ownership ultimate control that maximizes firm value. This work adopts Tobin's q as the proxy for firm value and finds that cash flow rights less than 27.8 percent and control rights between 32.34 percent and 34.03 percent are an optimal level of ownership ultimate control to maximize firm value. This distribution of financing sources propels the nonlinear relationship uncovered in this study and sheds light on legal aspects of Taiwan's system of ownership structure.     

论事业单位财务管理

综述了目前事业单位财务管理仍然存在的诸多问题,并针对这些问题就如何规范财务主体的行为、堵塞漏洞、节约财政资金、提高经济运行质量,提出了具体的建议和措施。     

Ownership Differences and Firms' Income Smoothing Behavior

This paper examines the association between differences in ownership structure and income smoothing behavior in firms. The underlying constructs affecting this association include agency relationships, managerial incentives, information asymmetry, and firm profitability. A logistic regression model is used to test the association between income smoothing and variables related to inside ownership, institutional holdings, leverage, managerial compensation, profitability, and firm size. The evidence suggests that ownership differences, managers' incentive structures, and firm profitability are important in explaining income smoothing behavior in firms. By separating inside ownership and levels of debt into different levels, we are able to show the existence of a non-monotonic relationship between ownership differences and firms' income smoothing behavior.     

终极控制人两权分离、所有权性质与股票流动性

以2003～2009年沪深两市仅发行了A股的上市公司为样本,使用高频交易数据构造相对有效价差和相对报价价差以衡量股票流动性,同时采用价差分解的方法构造逆向选择指标以衡量信息不对称程度,对这一问题进行了考察。研究结果表明:两权分离度越高,则股票流动性越低,信息不对称程度越高;和国有企业相比,这一关系在民营企业中表现得更加的明显。     

State Ownership,Political Institutions,and Stock Price Informativeness: Evidence from Privatization

In this paper, we examine the relation between government ownership and stock price informativeness around the world. Using a sample of privatized firms from 41 countries between 1980 and 2012, we find strong and robust evidence that state ownership is associated with lower firm-level stock price variation, i.e., stock price informativeness. Furthermore, we find that the relation between state ownership and stock price informativeness depends on political institutions. In particular, the adverse effects of state ownership on stock price informativeness are more pronounced in countries with lower political rights (i.e., lower political constraints on the government).     

Institutions and Bank Behavior: Legal Environment,Legal Perception,and the Composition of Bank Lending

This paper explores how the legal environment affects bank behavior in 20 transition economies. Based on a newly constructed data set we find that banks’ loan portfolio composition depends on the legal environment. If banks operate in a well‐functioning legal environment they lend relatively more to SMEs and provide more mortgages. On the other hand, banks lend more to large enterprises and to the government if the legal system is unsound. As a transmission channel we identify the banks’ willingness to accept collateral which depends on the bankers’ perceptions of the prevailing laws regarding collateral.     

Shareholder Rights,Insider Ownership and Earnings Management

This paper examines whether shareholder rights, which enable shareholders to replace managers, can constrain earnings management, and whether this effect is conditional on the level of insider ownership. Using the comprehensive shareholder rights measure constructed by Gompers et al. ( 2003 ), we find that firms with stronger shareholder rights are associated with fewer income‐increasing discretionary accruals, suggesting that stronger shareholder rights deter managers from reporting aggressive earnings. Moreover, if insider ownership introduces managerial entrenchment, managers with higher ownership would be insulated from shareholder discipline. Consistent with this entrenchment theory, we find that the association between shareholder rights and earnings management becomes insignificant in the presence of higher levels of insider ownership. Shareholder rights are negatively associated with earnings management only when insider ownership is low. Our results indicate that the disciplinary effect of shareholder rights can be attenuated by high levels of insider ownership.     

农村金融机构、居民贷款可得性与城乡收入差距

本文基于银行网点设立和家庭信贷选择的视角,研究了新型农村金融机构和传统农村金融机构对城乡居民贷款可得性和城乡居民收入差距的异质性影响。根据我国2000—2018年县域经济、金融机构网点和CHIP2018家庭调查等数据,研究发现,新型农村金融机构表现出良好的支农支小效果,缓解了农村地区信贷约束,比较而言,传统农村金融机构的表现相对偏弱。具体来看,新型农村金融机构的网点扩张提高了农村居民的贷款可得性,进而有利于缩小城乡收入差距。本文研究为我国农村金融机构改革提供了一定参考。     

The Effect of Ultimate Ownership on the Disclosure of Environmental Information

This study empirically examines whether environmental information disclosure (EID) is influenced by the characteristics of a firm's ultimate owners. Based on the EID of publicly listed firms in China, we qualitatively measure the quality of EID of each firm and link those quality scores to firm characteristics to understand the determinants of EID. We further link the EID scores to market valuation of the firm through the Ohlson valuation model to understand whether the market appreciates EID. Our results show that EID is more likely for government‐controlled firms, firms with less hierarchy in their ultimate ownership and firms with more discrepancy between voting rights and cash flow rights. Our results also indicate that the stock market appreciates environmental issues and that EID itself, as well as disclosure quality, is associated with a higher market valuation. Our results still hold with the endogeneity issue controlled.     

产权性质、行政背景独立董事及其履职效应研究

"二元化"职能观认为,独立董事兼具资源支持与监督职能。以2004²012年中国A股上市公司为样本,检验了不同产权性质企业选聘行政背景独立董事的动机以及"二元"职能之间的关系。结果显示:谋求政治关联的民营样本选聘的行政背景独立董事,资源支持职能较为明显,但监督职能有限;控制权归属不同,政府干预的动机不一,国有企业行政背景独立董事的履职效应存在显著差异:中央直属样本中,行政背景独立董事的资源效应明显,但监督效应有限;地方政府控制国有样本中,行政背景独立董事的资源效应显著增加,监督职能显著降低,政企共谋动机得以验证;国资委控制样本中行政背景独立董事的资源效应并不明显,但其监督职能显著。     

投资者法律保护、股权集中度与大股东行为

在不同的法系和国家中,对投资者的法律保护存在很大的差异。作为对投资者法律保护的替代,在投资者法律保护薄弱的国家,股权结构相对集中。为了保护投资者的利益,我国应该完善对投资者的法律保护,提高执法质量和会计质量,促进股权的适度集中,限制控制股东的掠夺行为。     

提高企业所得税征管质量和效率的探讨

目前在企业所得税征管方面还存在许多问题.提高企业所得税征管质量和效率的措施包括:加强企业所得税日常管理工作;加大对税务人员的培训力度;加大对纳税人关联企业交易往来的监控;严格审核纳税人申报的财产损失;提高税务稽查选案的准确率;保证税务稽查有的放矢,提高税务稽查的质量和效率.     

Ultimate Ownership and Adjustment Speed Toward Target Capital Structures: Evidence from China

We investigate whether ultimate ownership affects firms’ adjustment speed toward target capital structures for Chinese publicly listed companies over the period 1999–2009. We divide our sample into state-owned enterprises (SOEs) and non-SOEs according to their ultimate ownership. We find that SOEs have higher leverage ratios and slower adjustment speeds toward target capital structures. Our results are consistent with the trade-off theory, implying that the political resources of SOEs can lead to a higher persistence and slower leverage adjustment speeds in comparison to non-SOEs. Finally, our results also raise a question: Why do Chinese companies adjust their capital structure so fast?     

终极产权性质、第一大股东对盈余质量的影响分析

以我国2006年底已经实施了股改的深沪两地A股上市公司2007～2008年的经验数据为样本,采用收益-盈余模型检验了终极产权性质、第一大股东与盈余质量之间的关系,研究发现:对于已经实施了股改的上市公司,股权仍然相对集中;当上市公司属于国家终极控制时,盈余质量会较高;第一大股东持股比例与盈余质量正相关;第一大股东对上市公司董事会的控制能力与盈余质量正相关;其他大股东对控股股东的制衡能力对盈余质量的影响不显著.     

文化、制度与合资企业盈余管理

本文探讨企业盈余管理与国家文化之间的关系。利用2005到2007年在中国经营的合资企业数据,控制了不同国家经营环境差异的影响之后,我们发现出资国个人主义更强的合资企业倾向于更多地进行向上和向下的盈余管理,出资国不确定性规避更强的合资企业,更多地进行向下的盈余管理。上述影响在外资绝对控股公司更显著。进一步研究发现,文化对盈余管理影响较稳健,不受经营地市场化程度变化而改变。而文化的影响随着合资企业进入中国时间的增加而减弱,这反映了文化的融合与适应的过程。本文结论有助于我们理解文化差异对企业决策的影响,对引进外资、合资企业监管等有一定指导意义。     

两大法系会计法律制度:架构、特征与适应性效率

会计法律制度体系是市场经济中的基础性产权保护制度安排。英美会计法律制度体系的主体内容由宪法、财产法、合同法、侵权行为法、继承法、公司法和破产法中有关财产权利质的规定性与量的规定性以及会计准则构成,大陆法系会计法律制度体系主要由宪法、民法、商法、公司法和税法构成。与大陆法系会计法律制度相比,英美法系会计法律制度具有更高的适应性效率。运用SSP模型,本文论证了大陆模式是中国建立良序市场经济的必然选择,并设计了涵盖五个层级的中国会计法律制度框架体系。