The Macroeconomic Outlook

A slow recovery is expected from the current recession. Since reaching a trough in the September quarter of 1990, real gross domestic product (GDP) has followed a flat path which is likely to continue through to the September quarter of 1991. A slow recovery may then commence in the December quarter of 1991. This is consistent with real GDP growth of -0.9 per cent in 1990-91 followed by 2.4 per cent in 1991-92 and around 3 per cent per annum to the mid- 1990s compared with 'normal' growth of 2.5 per cent per annum.
This recovery is likely to see the unemployment rate at over 10 per cent for most of 1991-92, before moving to around 8 per cent by the mid-1990s.
Inflation may fall sharply from a peak of 8.0 per cent in 1989-90 to a trough of 3 to 4 per cent in 199 1–92, due to the recession and movements in oil prices. With a slow recovery, inflation may increase to 4 to 5 per cent per annum in the medium term.
The current account deficit has fallen from 5.9 per cent of GDP in 1989-90 to a likely level of 4.1 per cent in 1990-91, but part of this gain is cyclical rather than structural. Thus the deficit is expected to increase to around 5 per cent during recovery and remain flat to the mid- 1990s, implying steady increases in the ratio of foreign debt to GDP.
Looser monetary policy would erode part of the forecast sustained reduction in inflation. Looser fiscal policy would lead to a higher current account deficit.     

The Macroeconomic Outlook

This quarterly two-year forecast from the Access Economics Murphy (AEM) model updates that presented in the corresponding article in the 4th quarter 1991 issue of the Australian Economic Review.
As predicted in the previous forecast, the economy entered a slow recovery in the December quarter of 1991. Steady growth averaging close to 1 per cent per quarter is likely during 1992–93 and 1993–94.
Unemployment may peak at around 10 3/4 per cent in mid-1992, before slowly falling to a year-average level of around 9 per cent in 1993–94.
Under the influence of the recent recession, CPI inflation is likely to be around 2 per cent per annum on a year-on-year basis for both 1991–92 and 1992–93. With economic recovery, it is forecast to rise to 4.5 per cent per annum in 1993–94.
While the recession has helped bring the current account deficit down from near 6 per cent of GDP in 1989–90 to around 3 per cent for 1991–92, it will rise with economic recovery, and is forecast to exceed 5 per cent of GDP by 1993–94, compared with a sustainable level of 3 to 3 1/2 per cent.
The economic recovery is not proving to be as strong as forecast in One Nation.
However, there is a recovery clearly underway, and any further easing of monetary and fiscal policy risks prejudicing a substantial part of the recent impressive gains on inflation and creates a major medium-term problem for public finances.     

The Macroeconomic Outlook

This two-year quarterly forecast from the Access Economics Murphy (AEM) model updates that presented in the 2nd quarter 1992 issue of the Australian Economic Review.
The economic recovery is patchy, with only public final demand and housing investment moving forward decisively, but could broaden in 1993, if private business fixed investment begins increasing. It has fallen by a recession-inducing one-third since the middle of 1989.
GDP growth could rise from a mediocre 2.4 per cent in 1992–93 to a strong 4.3 per cent in 1993–94.
Unemployment may remain around 11 per cent for the remainder of 1992–93, before falling to a year-average level of about 10 per cent in 1993–94.
CPI inflation under 2 per cent per annum on a year-on-year basis is likely in 1992–93 but, with economic recovery and the flow-through effects of the depreciation, it is forecast to rise to 4 per cent per annum in 1993–94. The current account deficit is rising with economic recovery, and by 1993-94 could be 5 per cent of GDP, compared with a sustainable level of 3 to 3.5 per cent.
An assessment of the accuracy of the AEM model and government official economic growth forecasts in the recession years of 1990–91 to 1992–93 was conducted, using the forecasts from the Business Review Weekly's panel as a reference point. The high accuracy ranking of the AEM forecasts is consistent with international evidence that the most accurate forecasts are model-based with judgmental adjustments. The official forecasts met international standards of accuracy from 1978–79 to 1989–90, and the recent fall in their performance is puzzling.     

Potential Growth and Inflation: Estimates for Australia, the United States and Canada

Estimates of potential output growth for Australia, the United States and Canada are presented and analysed in this article. We define potential growth as that growth rate consistent with a steady (domestic component of the) inflation rate (SIRG). At around 4 per cent per annum, Australia's SIRG has been relatively stable for the past 30 years, which seems inconsistent with the view that wide‐ranging microeconomic reform in the 1990s raised growth potential. However, we show that the reduction in employment growth in Australia from the 1980s to the 1990s may account for the absence of a rise in potential growth. In Canada and the United States the SIRGs are closer to 3 per cent, and we explore the reasons why potential growth estimates are higher for Australia than for North America. We also discuss why Australia's growth averaged less than its potential in the 1980s and 1990s and the possible use of our estimates for monetary policy purposes.     

The Economic Situation

Throughout the first nine months of 1976 the Australian economy has remained virtually stagnant, with output and employment increasing only marginally and unemployment rising also. With the government following a severely contractionary policy in an attempt to break inflation the economy seems poised for a further modest downturn in the next nine months so that a self-sustaining recovery from the current recession does not seem to be in prospect before the second half of 1977. On the basis of existing policies our forecasts indicate a rate of growth of real GDP of only about 1.0 per cent in 1976–77, implying a further significant rise in unemployment during the financial year. There have been some hopeful signs in recent months of a reduction in inflation — the consumer price index increases in the first three quarters of 1976 were modest and wage rate increases remain closely in line with the wage indexation guidelines — but three factors have emerged to cast doubt on whether this improving trend will continue. The first is the effect of the recent drought on prices of foodstuffs, particularly meat, and the second is the expected 1.5 to 2.0 per cent increase in the consumer price index as a result of the changes in the method of financing hospital and medical services. These two factors mean that the December quarter increase in the consumer price index may be more than 5 per cent, threatening a further stimulus to inflation in 1977. Thirdly, present government policies could easily lead to a breakdown of the wage indexation system and a return to some form of collective bargaining over wage rates. Assuming nevertheless, a de facto continuation of partial indexation in 1977, we expect increases in male award wages and male average earnings of about 13 per cent during 1977, these increases being similar to those during 1975 and 1976 but much below the increases of 36 per cent and 28 per cent respectively recorded during 1974. Our forecasts also indicate increases in the consumer price index of 14 per cent during 1976 and 11 per cent during 1977, following increases of 16.3 per cent and 14.0 per cent during 1974 and 1975 respectively. These forecasts indicate that the government's fiscal, monetary, exchange rate and wage policies are likely to come under heavy challenge early in 1977, and decisions taken at that time are likely to be major determinants of economic developments in Australia in the next few years. The Institute would again urge a shift to a co-operative package including full wage indexation, with cuts in indirect taxes and public sector charges to wind down inflation and expand the economy. On current indications, labour productivity will be no higher in 1976–77 than in 1973–74, because of the weakness of total output, so that the whole burden of wage increases in that three year period has fallen on unit costs of production. It is our belief that the twin problems of inflation and unemployment will only be defeated in Australia when both cuts in indirect or direct taxes and increases in productivity are applied to reducing inflation in the context of an orderly system of wage and price determination.     

The International Economy — A Survey

In most of the major world economies the hesitancy evident toward the end of last year has dissipated and the cyclical upswing in economic activity was well advanced by the middle of 1976, with the recovery showing particular strength in the first half of 1976 inthe United States and in West Germany. Even so industrial production had not yet returned, by the end of June 1976, to the previous cyclical peak in any of the major economies. With the OECD countries in aggregate sure to achieve a real growth rate of 4 per cent in 1976, and quite possibly an appreciably higher rate, the attention of many national and international policy makers is turning to ways of moderating the recovery so that inflationary pressures can be minimised. For in spite of the depth of the 1974/75 world recession the outlook for inflation remains threatening, much more so than at the corresponding stage of the previous cycle in 1972. In the twelve months to May 1976 consumer prices rose by 9.0 per cent in all OECD countries and this figure is disturbingly high for the trough of a serious recession. World commodity prices have risen about 35 per cent in dollar terms in the past year; as in the 1973–74 boom the major economies are now moving into an upswing simultaneously, thus compounding possible demand effects on inflation; business investment has fallen sharply in all countries during the recession, and only in the United States is a strong recovery in investment currently in evidence. The rate of growth of wages has however moderated in most countries, reflecting weak labour market conditions, lower consumer price increases and in countries such as United Kingdom and Canada the successful implementation of incomes policies. With output increasing, the rate of growth of unit wage costs has in most cases dropped sharply.     

An empirical investigation into the impact of US federal government budget deficits on the real interest rate yield on intermediate-term treasury issues, 1972–2012

This study provides new empirical evidence on the impact of the federal budget deficit on the real interest rate yields on intermediate-term debt issues of the US Treasury, represented herein by the ex post real interest rate yields on 3-year Treasury notes and 7-year Treasury notes, two interest rate measures that have received essentially no attention in the economics and finance literature in recent years. This study is couched within a loanable funds model that includes two ex post real interest rate yields, the monetary base as a per cent of GDP, the change in per capita real GDP, net financial capital inflows as a per cent of GDP and the budget deficit as a per cent of GDP. This study uses annual data for the study period 1972 to 2012, a time period that includes ‘quantitative easing’ monetary policies by the Federal Reserve. Two-stage least squares estimations reveal that the federal budget deficit, expressed as a per cent of GDP, exercised a positive and statistically significant impact on the ex post real interest rate yields on both 3-year and 7-year Treasury notes, even after allowing for quantitative easing and other factors. The study also considers the time period 1980 to 2012 and offers simple robustness testing.     

POLICY MAKING IN DEFLATIONARY JAPAN*

The prolonged recession and deflation in Japan since 1990 presents novel problems to economists. The recession was certainly triggered by real factors such as the slowing down of capacity growth. At the same time, it was aggravated by the monetary contraction in the early 1990s and the inability of the monetary policy to cope with deflation, a fortiori a monetary phenomenon. With the zero‐bound interest rate, traditional monetary policy is of limited effect, and unconventional monetary policy, such as inflation (or price‐level) targeting, should be employed instead, in order to change the persistent deflationary expectations in the public.     

The Australian Economy after Devaluation

Before taking account of the measures announced by the government on and after 28 November 1976, the latest statistical information suggests that the economy was broadly on the course outlined in detail in Review 3'76. Both business investment and consumer demand appear to have fallen in real terms, seasonally adjusted, in the last few months. With public sector demand also weak the economy was moving Into a new period of modest decline in overall activity, so that real non-farm GDP was expected to grow by 1 to 2 per cent in 1976–77 and by only 1 per cent in calendar 1977. The rate of inflation has moderated in the first three quarters of 1976 and, in spite of the large increase in the consumer price index expected in the December quarter and the granting of full percentage wage indexation for the September quarter, the rate of inflation seemed likely to be lower in 1977 than in 1976.     

The effects of the monetary policy regime shift to inflation targeting on the real interest rate in the United Kingdom

This paper studies the effects of the monetary policy regime shift to inflation targeting on the stochastic properties of the real interest rate in the U.K. The empirical analysis suggests a constant mean of the real interest rate that shifts with the monetary policy regime change to inflation targeting in October 1992. The mean-reverting level of the real interest rate has decreased from 5.1% to 2.3% per annum with the change in monetary policy to inflation targeting. In addition, the shift in monetary policy regime to inflation targeting has reduced the volatility of the real interest rate and increased the persistence of real interest rate deviations from the mean. The results suggest that the central bank can affect the stochastic properties of the real interest rate through the choice of monetary policy regime over a long period of time.     

INFLATION TARGETING AND THE ECONOMY: LESSONS FROM CANADA'S FIRST DECADE

Inflation targeting has become the centerpiece of the monetary policy framework in a number of industrial countries and emerging economies. The first part of this article examines the Canadian experience with inflation targeting since its introduction in early 1991 and various issues that require resolution in establishing such a framework. It also examines the way inflation targets deal with demand, price, and productivity shocks. The second part focuses on Canada's economic performance during the 1990s. Factors other than monetary policy - most notably private sector restructuring and the fiscal situation in the first half of the decade - played an important role in the sluggishness of the recovery from the recession of 1990–91. Trend growth in Canada during the 1990s was lower than in earlier periods and than U.S. trend growth over the same period. The article examines the role of such factors as productivity growth and participation rates in explaining the differences. I conclude that a good monetary policy is necessary but not sufficient for good economic outcomes.     

House prices,credit and the effect of monetary policy in Norway: evidence from structural VAR models

This paper investigates the responses of house prices and household credit to monetary policy shocks in Norway, using Bayesian structural VAR models. The analysis indicates that the effect of a monetary policy shock on house prices is large, while the effect on household credit is muted. This is consistent with a relatively small refinancing rate (refinancing rate refers to the share of outstanding mortgages that are refinanced each period due to changes in, for example, house prices or interest rate) of the mortgage stock each quarter. Using monetary policy to guard against financial instability by mitigating property-price movements may prove effective, but trying to mitigate household credit may prove costly in terms of GDP and inflation variation.     

Sectoral variability and the foundations of optimal inflation rate

The recent monetary search models argue that the real effects of inflation on economic activity can be gauged through relative price variability (RPV). Our study uses a large panel data of 32 developed and emerging European economies to test the relationship between inflation and RPV. We use a panel threshold model to explore the regime-specific effects of inflation on RPV. Our results confirm a non-linear profile of the relationship between inflation and RPV. Consistent with the monetary search models, our results show that the effects of inflation on the RPV are more significant in its low (below 0.792% per annum) and high (beyond 2.064% per annum) regimes. Finally, we also report a strong moderating role of central bank independence (CBI) in the inflation–RPV relationship.     

The optimal neglect of inflation: An alternative interpretation of UK monetary policy during the “Great Moderation”

This paper argues that UK monetary policymakers did not respond to the inflation rate during most of the “Great Moderation” that ran from the early 1990s to the mid-2000s. We derive a generalisation of the New Keynesian Phillips curve in which inflation is a non-linear function of the output gap and show that the optimal response of the policy rule to inflation depends on the slope of the Phillips curve; if this is flat, manipulation of aggregate demand through monetary policy does not affect inflation and so policymakers cannot affect inflation. We estimate the monetary policy rules implied by a variety of alternative Phillips curves; our preferred model is based on a Phillips curve that is flat when output is close to equilibrium. We find that policy rates do not respond to inflation when the output gap is small, a situation that characterised most of the “Great Moderation” period.     

Is Monetary Policy Too Tight?

Monetary policy has steadily become tighter over the past twelve months. In various statements, the Government has indicated its view that monetary policy needs to be tight in order to subdue an 'excessively high' rate of growth of domestic demand. This article asks whether the current stance of monetary policy is now too restrictive and, if so, what the consequences might be for the pattern and growth of economic activity during 1989-90. A number of scenarios based on alternative settings of monetary policy in 1989-90 are derived from a short-term simulation model of the Australian economy. The scenarios suggest that, if monetary policy remains at the current degree of tightness, the Australian economy may well experience a recession in 1989-90. Some easing of monetary conditions is mandatory if a sharp and unnecessary slowdown of economic activity is to be avoided. Exactly how far monetary policy should be eased depends crucially on the rate of growth of autonomous investment.     

The Steady Inflation Rate of Economic Growth

This paper considers the existence of a path of GDP corresponding to steady inflation in the prices of domestic goods. We estimate the steady inflation rate of growth, denoted the SIRG, at a little over 4 per cent p.a. in the post-float period in Australia. Changes in inflation are modelled as a nonlinear combination of growth and changes, in import price inflation. Because import price inflation is more volatile than overall inflation, policy that targets overall inflation may require growth to fluctuate considerably, whereas growth can be steady if the target is steady inflation of domestic goods' prices.     

The role of the exchange rate in Canadian monetary policy: evidence from a TVP-BVAR model

A time-varying parameters Bayesian structural vector autoregression (TVP-BVAR) model with stochastic volatility is employed to characterize the monetary policy stance of the Bank of Canada (BoC) in terms of an interest rate rule linking the policy rate to the output gap, inflation and the exchange rate. Using quarterly bilateral Canadian–US data, we find such an interest rate rule to have little explanatory power for the early part of our sample starting in the mid-1980s, but to become more suitable to explain interest rate dynamics from the mid-1990s onwards. Whereas the exchange rate turns out to be the major determinant of the policy rate in the 1980s, its importance declines throughout the 1990s and 2000s, although it continues to be influential even towards the end of the sample period ending in 2015Q2. We also find interest rate shocks to have become more effective in influencing the macroeconomy over time, indicating that the BoC has continually gained monetary policy credibility. We associate this development with the BoC successively de-emphasizing the role of the exchange rate in informing interest rate decisions, thereby alleviating the potential monetary policy conflict between targeting the exchange rate and maintaining the price stability goal.     

Assessing the Impact of US Macroeconomic Policies and Inflation Rates on the Australian Economy*

A three-equation system is specified with Australian monetary base growth, the domestic budget deficit and the domestic inflation rate as dependent variables Lagged values of these three variables and their US counterparts are entered as explanatory variables in each equation. Results for 1967-83 suggest a possible effect of lagged US monetary base growth on Australian monetary base growth plus a positive direct impact of US inflation on Australian inflation.     

The Optimality of a Zero Inflation Rate with Menu Costs: Australia

This paper juxtaposes the policy trend towards a zero inflation rate against the theoretical standard of optimal deflation at the real interest rate. It extends an example monetary economy to include a simple form of nominal adjustment costs and calibrates the model with recent evidence on Australian money demand. There is a critical value that the calibrated parameter for menu costs must exceed in order for a zero inflation rate to be optimal. An inflation rate of –2 per cent to 0 per cent is found to be optimal. The quantitative results, of whether inflation-adjustment costs imply a zero inflation rate policy for Australia, are tempered by the abstraction of the model and its sensitivity to parameters. Qualitatively, the paper shows the effects of changes in the adjustment cost function and in the structural parameters.     

Stability of Money Demand and Monetary Policy in Papua New Guinea (PNG): An Error Correction Model Analysis

An error correction model (ECM) is used to study the Properties of money demand and to evaluate the appropriate monetary policy in PNG. The study confirms that the determinats of money demand are real GDP, nominal interest and inflation rate. The income elasticity of money demand is very low. The demand for money in PNG was stable during 1979-95, suggesting that the monetary targeting regime by the PNG Central Bank is feasible. However, as PNG proceeds with economic reforms that Includes financial sector reform and a floating exchange rate regime, the stability of the demand for money may have to be re-examined periodically. The best approach for conducting the monetary policy in PNG is to target the inflation rate. [E41, E52, C22]