环保创新补贴和环境税约束下的企业自主创新行为

进行环境技术创新、实施清洁生产,是企业突破环境限制、应对环境规制、履行社会责任、提升竞争力的重要途径。基于环境税和环保技术创新补贴相结合的环境规制制度,建立了环境规制约束下的企业三阶段自主创新模型,运用逆向归纳法,分析了企业自主创新行为。结果发现：以技术创新为手段化解环境规制,可以提高企业市场份额,在两企业都进行环保技术创新的情况下,最优环境税总是小于排污对环境的边际损害;对环保技术创新既可以进行补贴,也可以进行征税,这主要依赖于污染对环境边际损害的大小。因此,谁率先实施环保技术创新,谁就可以优先于竞争者在市场中获得更多的“货币投票”,同时政府可以通过加强环境规制来刺激企业进行环保技术创新。     

关于我国课征环境税的建议

与其它经济和非经济的政策手段相比，环境税有它自身的优点。首先探讨了课征环境税的理论基石，分析了在当前形势下在我国课征环境税的必要性，在此基础上提出了我国课征环境税的设想。     

中美农业补贴政策的比较及启示

2002年美国制定的《农业安全与农村投资法案》正式生效,联邦政府决定全面增加对农业的投资和补贴.因此,有必要通过对美国农业补贴政策的研究,分析我国农业补贴的现状.将中美两国的农业补贴政策进行比较,总结我国农业补贴政策存在的主要问题,并提出了相应的政策建议.     

环境保护政策体系中的环境税

环境保护是公共政策目标之一。环境税的终极目标是促进环境保护。环保目标不可能一蹴而就,只能是有计划分步骤进行。因此,可将遏制环境恶化、促进环境改善作为阶段性目标。环境税是最稳定、最具持久力的一种环保政策工具。面对经济发展过程中,污染物排放总量急剧     

环境税的优越性分析

随着环境问题的日益严重,人类在不断寻找改善环境的各种办法。影响环境的经济政策主要有收费、补贴、许可证交易以及押金制度等。环境税作为环境经济政策的重要组成部分,它的实施对外部成本的内部化有重要的意义和作用。在众多的环境保护措施中,环境税已被证明是一种行之有效的办法。我国可在现行环境保护政策的基础上逐步过渡试行,最后开征独立环境税。     

环境偏好和环境税视角下企业技术决策博弈分析

构建双寡头垄断市场下企业技术决策的博弈模型,并将消费者环境偏好和环境税引入模型。首先分析消费者的环境偏好对市场需求的影响;然后运用逆向归纳法探讨企业在环境税约束下的两阶段博弈;最后分析消费者环境偏好和环境税对企业技术决策的综合影响。研究表明:消费者的环境偏好降低了双寡头垄断企业的市场需求,激发了企业在没有环境税下采纳绿色技术的动机;当征收环境税时,企业采纳绿色技术的效益与环境税率的关系曲线呈倒U型,消费者的环境偏好与环境税引发的效益区间正比变动。     

策略性贸易政策的结构效应与比较优势发挥

加工贸易领先已经成为我国当前出口贸易的显著特征,但也反映出我国经济发展中所存在的结构性问题。改革开放以来的出口导向型贸易战略强调了初始比较优势的发挥,但不利于要素禀赋结构的升级,这要求贸易政策必须有机结合进口替代的产业导向和出口促进的市场导向,寻求两套刺激体系的协调。实行策略性贸易政策对我国的比较优势发挥、经济结构调整和贸易增长方式转变,都具有重要意义。     

农业支持和补贴政策的国际比较

由于各国在自然禀赋条件、经济发展阶段、国内市场规模、文化历史传统以及社会制度等方面差别很大,对农业实施补贴的动机或补贴政策的目标不尽相同,所采取的补贴手段多种多样。从对美国、欧盟和日本以及一般发展中国家的农业补贴政策进行比较分析中,可以探求农业补贴政策体系的基本性质和基本特征以及这些国家农业补贴政策调整的发展方向和趋势,为中国农业补贴政策的调整提供思路。     

环境税的“双重红利”真的可能吗

尽管人们通常将双重红利理论作为环境税政策的理论基础,但是,双重红利受到学者越来越多的质疑。从社会福利改进的角度来看,环境税无法保证同时增进环境品质和个人福利。从环境保护的角度来看,环境补贴与环境税具有同等的环保功效。为了防范环境税仅仅成为政府获得财税收入的手段,我们在环境税的制定过程中应该谨慎对待双重红利理论,进而确保环境税切实提高全民环保意识和推动环保产业发展。     

环境税的区域节能减排效果及经济影响分析

文章从地方税视角,以单个省级行政区为研究对象,通过编制社会核算矩阵,利用GAMS软件构建了一个包含24部门的CGE模型,研究了环境税不同的征税环节和税率对区域节能减排效果及经济的影响。结果表明:(1)在两种征税方式和模拟的三档税率下,征收环境税对能源消费结构具有一定的优化作用,但也会给宏观经济带来一定的负面影响,即单纯地征收环境税很难实现节能减排和经济增长的"双重红利";(2)在两种征税方式下,随着环境税税率的提高,地区产品"总调入"和"总调出"整体上呈增加趋势,且"总调入"的变化幅度大于"总调出",但"出口"逐步增加,而"省际调出"则趋于减少;(3)"消费性环境税"比"生产性环境税"的节能减排效果要好,但"生产性环境税"带来的税收收入要大于"消费性环境税";(4)如果环境税收入全部归地方财政,则由于它弥补了地方政府其他税种收入的减少,税收总收入反而增加。因此,文章建议采用"消费性环境税(UPP)",初期税率采用10元/吨,且以高碳商品为试点对象。     

Strategic Environmental Policy, Clean Technologies and the Learning Curve

In the political discussion, it is often emphasized that the environmental service industry (which produces a clean factor of production) benefits from an early and strong environmental policy. This is especially likely if the costs of production are decreasing over time due to learning curve effects. Surprisingly, the environmental service industry has not been integrated into the theory of strategic environmental policy yet. Our main question is whether a national leadership in environmental policy can pay off if profits of the environmental service industry are taken into account. We consider a two-period model with one firm in each country competing on a third market. Emissions can be substituted by the clean factor when deciding upon the production technology. The unit costs of producing the clean factor in the second period are decreasing in the quantity produced in the initial period. We derive the optimal environmental policy for both periods from a national point of view and show that the presence of the environmental service industry can indeed lead to a national leadership in pollution control.     

Political Measures for Strategic Environmental Policy with External Effects

This paper investigates an environmental policy designed to reduce the emission of pollutants under uncertainty, with the agent problem as an optimal stopping problem. We first analyze the two cases in which there are one agent and two competing agents by following Ohyama and Tsujimura (2005). When we consider a model of strategic agents, we need to analyze the external economic effect that is peculiar to an agent’s environmental policy implementation. Then, to improve and resolve these external effects, we examine three alternative political measures, comprising an environmental subsidy, an environmental tax and an emission trading system. The results of the analysis indicate that the environmental subsidy and environmental tax promote environmental policy. However, they do not create an incentive to be the leader. On the other hand, an emissions trading system not only promotes environmental policy but also creates an incentive for leadership.This paper was previously circulated under the title “Political Measures for Strategic Environmental Policy with Induced Effects”. The authors would like to thank Masaaki Kijima for helpful comments. The authors would also like to thank Alistair Munro and two anonymous referees providing detailed comments and suggestions. This research was partially supported by Daiwa Securities Group Inc. The second-named author was partially supported by the Ministry of Education, Culture, Sports, Science and Technology, Grant-in-Aid for Scientific Research (B) (2), 16310118.     

基于CGE模型的环境税优惠政策的环保效应分析

通过建立一个CGE模型,并对该模型在存在和不存在环境税优惠政策两种场景下的社会产出、产品供应和社会福利状况进行模拟分析,考察环境税优惠政策的环保效应。结果表明,环境税的税收减免在长期内对社会福利的影响不大,但是,它却会对环境税的环境保护效果产生较大的负面影响。在使用税收减免工具时,政府要从社会福利和环境保护、能源使用等方面加以考虑,避免社会总福利的净损失。     

Strategic Policy and Environmental Quality: Helping the Domestic Industry to Provide Credible Information

This paper shows that a country can improve an industry's competitiveness by requiring domestic firms to produce at the environmental standards at which they claim to produce or otherwise impose a penalty on those firms found cheating. Competitiveness will improve because this regulation will help the domestic industry to provide credible information about the environmental quality of its production. The credible information will differentiate domestic products from other products on the world market, and in this way increase consumers' willingness to pay for domestic products. Even if the government has no preferences for environmental quality, it has incentives to regulate its cheaters in order to help the domestic industry to provide credible information and thereby improve competitiveness.     

我国渔业补贴政策及其改革探索

我国的渔业补贴政策在一定程度上是积极有效的,但同时也存在补贴总量不足、渔业补贴结构不合理、补贴种类不齐全和补贴核算指标体系不规范等问题。针对存在的问题,我国应从补贴结构、补贴种类和核算方法三个方面对渔业补贴予以改进：从SCM协定中渔业补贴分类、产业结构和补贴方式三方面调整渔业补贴结构;从逐渐削减渔船燃油补贴、加大远洋渔业补贴、新增休闲渔业补贴、建立政府支持型渔业保险制度等方面调整渔业补贴种类;把生产者补贴等值法（PSE）作为渔业补贴核算方法。     

我国出口补贴转变为技改补贴的有效性分析

文章探讨了本国企业与外国企业在以产量竞争的方式争夺出口市场的情况下,本国政府对本国企业技改投资进行补贴的理论依据。通过两次运用两阶段博弈,文章对由补贴政策、企业技改投资、产量和利润水平决定构成的三阶段博弈进行了因果关系的比较静态分析,认为在一般情况下,对本国企业技改投资补贴有利于本国企业在国际市场中产量、市场份额和利润的增加,也有利于本国社会总福利水平的增加,对外国企业产量、利润和社会福利则形成负面影响。这一政策可接替在未来实施中具有不确定性的出口补贴政策。     

Strategic Environmental Policy Under Incomplete Information

This paper introduces incomplete information into recent analyses of strategic environmental policy. It is shown how asymmetric information between planners and producers affects national incentives to impose strategic environmental standards on domestic industries in international oligopolistic competition. Relative to the full-information case, incomplete information is likely to mitigate allocative distortions originating from strategic behaviour. A countervailing effect, tending to raise distortion, is however revealed from the analysis. This effect is absent when governments intervene in free trade through direct production subsidies. The results suggest that incentives to capture foreign rents are less reduced due to private information, when environmental standards, rather than direct production subsidies, are the strategic instrument.     

发达国家粮食补贴政策及其启示

粮食补贴政策是目前很多国家和地区支持农业发展、保护农民利益的主要方式之一。与发达国家相比,中国的粮食补贴政策有相似之处,但是在补贴模式、依据、标准等方面存在着计算复杂、具体操作不到位等问题,需要在借鉴的基础上,不断完善调整中国的粮食补贴政策。     

企业科技成果转化的政府财税政策研究

本文基于博弈的视角,采用逆向归纳法对企业和政府各自的行为决策进行分析,研究了垄断市场下政府推动企业科技成果转化的财税政策。研究结果表明:政府采用财税政策能够激励企业科技成果转化;对生产日常必需品的企业宜采用税收优惠政策,对生产非日常必需品的企业以及奢侈品的企业宜根据产品固定成本的比例来选择补贴方式,对固定成本比例高而变动成本比例很低的企业宜采用投入补贴的方式,对固定成本比例低而变动成本比例高的企业宜采用税收优惠的方式。以上结论对政府部门科学选择补贴方式具有重要的指导意义。