Do Mutual Funds Profit from the Accruals Anomaly?

Using data on both fund stockholdings and fund returns, we examine whether actively managed equity mutual funds trade on and profit from the accruals anomaly. We find that few, if any, mutual funds trade on the anomaly. The top 10% of mutual funds that have the highest portfolio weights in low‐accruals stocks have a greater, but still relatively small, exposure to low‐accruals stocks. Nonetheless, these funds make significant profit net of actual transaction costs, exhibiting an average Fama‐French three‐factor alpha of 2.83% per year. We also find that these funds are smaller, less diversified, and exhibit higher fund return volatility and higher fund flow volatility.     

Mutual Fund Herding and the Impact on Stock Prices

We analyze the trading activity of the mutual fund industry from 1975 through 1994 to determine whether funds "herd" when they trade stocks and to investigate the impact of herding on stock prices. Although we find little herding by mutual funds in the average stock, we find much higher levels in trades of small stocks and in trading by growth-oriented funds. Stocks that herds buy outperform stocks that they sell by 4 percent during the following six months; this return difference is much more pronounced among small stocks. Our results are consistent with mutual fund herding speeding the price-adjustment process.     

Small-cap equity mutual fund managers as liquidity providers

This paper examines the relation between the performance of small-cap equity mutual funds and the liquidity characteristics of their asset holdings. We study the trading behavior of fund managers and show that on average, they tend to buy less liquid stocks and sell more liquid stocks. We introduce the notion of net “liquidity creation” by fund managers and examine its role in explaining the cross section of small-cap equity mutual fund returns. Our empirical results show that on average, small-cap mutual fund managers are able to earn an additional 1.5% return per year as compensation for providing such liquidity services to the market.     

Can Mutual Fund “Stars” Really Pick Stocks? New Evidence from a Bootstrap Analysis

We apply a new bootstrap statistical technique to examine the performance of the U.S. open‐end, domestic equity mutual fund industry over the 1975 to 2002 period. A bootstrap approach is necessary because the cross section of mutual fund alphas has a complex nonnormal distribution due to heterogeneous risk‐taking by funds as well as nonnormalities in individual fund alpha distributions. Our bootstrap approach uncovers findings that differ from many past studies. Specifically, we find that a sizable minority of managers pick stocks well enough to more than cover their costs. Moreover, the superior alphas of these managers persist.     

Flight-to-liquidity,market uncertainty,and the actions of mutual fund investors

We explore the trading decisions of equity mutual funds during ten periods of extreme market uncertainty. We find that mutual funds reduced their aggregate holdings of illiquid stocks. Exploring the drivers behind this result reveals that this is mainly driven by larger withdrawals from funds that hold less liquid stocks. We further find that the sell-off of illiquid stocks occurred only after initial deterioration in market conditions, consistent with retail investors’ response to bad performance. At a broader level, this shows that mutual funds consumed liquidity during periods where liquidity was most valuable. Moreover, the fact that fund managers traded in response to these withdrawals suggests a potentially magnifying channel for the drop in illiquid stock prices, also known as flight-to-liquidity.     

Agency costs,governance, and organizational forms: Evidence from the mutual fund industry

Using a comprehensive sample of mutual funds and fund families for the period 1992–2004, this study examines the impact of fund management companies’ organizational forms on the level of agency costs within mutual funds. We find that, all else being equal: (1) funds managed by public fund families charge higher fees than those managed by private fund families; (2) public fund families acquire more funds than private fund families; and (3) funds of public fund families significantly underperform funds of private fund families. Collectively, these findings suggest that agency costs are higher in mutual funds managed by public fund families. Our results are consistent with the idea that the agency conflict between the fund management company and fund shareholders is more acute for public management companies because of their shorter-term focus.     

Better than the original? The relative success of copycat funds

We construct hypothetical copycat funds to investigate the performance of free-riding strategies that duplicate the disclosed asset holdings of actively managed mutual funds. On average, copycat funds are able to generate performance that is comparable to their target mutual funds, taking into account transaction costs and expenses. However, their relative success increased significantly after 2004 when the SEC imposed quarterly disclosure regulations on all mutual funds. We also find substantial cross-sectional dispersion in the relative performance of copycat funds. Free-riding on the portfolios disclosed by past winning funds and funds that disclose representative holdings generates significantly better performance net of trading costs and expenses than the vast majority of mutual funds. The results indicate that free-riding on disclosed fund holdings is an attractive strategy and suggest that mutual funds can suffer from the information disclosure requirements.     

Preferences for Stock Characteristics As Revealed by Mutual Fund Portfolio Holdings

This investigation of the cross-section of mutual fund equity holdings for the years 1991 and 1992 shows that mutual funds have a significant preference towards stocks with high visibility and low transaction costs, and are averse to stocks with low idiosyncratic volatility. These findings are relevant to theories concerning investor recognition, a potential agency problem in mutual funds, tests of trend-following and herd behavior by mutual funds, and corporate finance.     

Mandatory Portfolio Disclosure,Stock Liquidity,and Mutual Fund Performance

We examine the impact of mandatory portfolio disclosure by mutual funds on stock liquidity and fund performance. We develop a model of informed trading with disclosure and test its predictions using the May 2004 SEC regulation requiring more frequent disclosure. Stocks with higher fund ownership, especially those held by more informed funds or subject to greater information asymmetry, experience larger increases in liquidity after the regulation change. More informed funds, especially those holding stocks with greater information asymmetry, experience greater performance deterioration after the regulation change. Overall, mandatory disclosure improves stock liquidity but imposes costs on informed investors.     

隐性杠杆约束、流动性风险和投资者情绪

本文以2003—2019年间开放式主动管理型的股票型和偏股型基金为样本,以持仓占比为权重估算基金投组中A股的总市场风险暴露,检验结果表明,该序列上升反映了基金面临的隐性杠杆约束收紧,刻画了市场的弱流动性。内在逻辑在于,流动性收紧时,投资者难以通过融资直接增加杠杆,更倾向于重仓持有高市场风险头寸的股票而间接实现杠杆。本文发现隐性杠杆约束所刻画的风险在股票或基金收益截面上的无条件定价基本失效,而条件定价则依赖于低市场情绪与弱流动性。分解基金持股的敞口,进一步发现,因中小盘基金在流动性收紧时具有更强的流动性偏好,其持股的市场风险头寸能够更敏锐地捕捉到弱流动性风险。     

Liquidity Dry-ups in equity markets

This paper examines how mutual fund investors’ demand for liquidity provision endogenously affects stock liquidity in the equity market. We find that actively managed funds in the US tend to hold less liquidity than their respective benchmarks, which leads them to rely on only a small fraction of liquid stocks when it comes to liquidity demand. Using mutual fund sell transactions, we further show that mutual funds tend to sell more liquid stocks in their holdings when experiencing outflows. Concentrated sales of liquid stocks, however, significantly reduce the liquidity of these stocks, resulting in liquidity deterioration or dry-up among highly liquid stocks in periods of high market-wide liquidity demand. Overall, the results indicate that mutual funds fail to predict the liquidity of the asset at purchase.     

The effect of investor service costs on mutual fund performance

We examine the effect of investor service costs on mutual fund performance. Benchmarking passive funds against ETFs managed by the same fund company with the same investment objectives, we show that passive funds on average underperform ETFs by 42 bps in annualized net returns, of which about 90% can be attributed to investor service costs. Further benchmarking active funds against passive funds, we show that active funds on average outperform passive funds by 31 bps in annualized gross returns. However, the higher expense ratios charged by active funds lead to about 28 bps of underperformance in annualized net fund returns.     

Efficiency with costly information: a reinterpretation of evidence from managed portfolios

We investigate the informational efficiency of mutual fund performancefor the period 1965-84. Results are shown to be sensitive tothe measurement of performance chosen. We find that returnson S&P stocks, returns on non-S&P stocks, and returnson bonds are significant factors in performance assessment.Once we correct for the impact of non-S&P assets on mutualfund returns, we find that mutual funds do not earn returnsthat justify their information acquisition costs. This is consistentwith results for prior periods.     

International Real Estate Mutual Fund Performance: Diversification or Costly Information?

We investigate the net effect between diversification benefit and information cost of international real estate mutual funds from three dimensions: whether investors can benefit from investing in international real estate mutual funds, whether managers of international real estate mutual funds possess superior market knowledge and timing abilities, and whether investors are motivated by returns or diversification. Our findings are threefold. First, the results show that international real estate mutual funds perform better and are less risky than domestic real estate mutual funds before Jun 2007. That is, diversification benefits outweigh the information costs, and investors therefore gain from investing in international real estate mutual funds. However, the benefit is reduced because of the economic shock of sub-prime financial crisis. Second, on average, neither international mutual fund managers nor domestic mutual fund managers possess market timing abilities. Finally, we find that fund flows are driven by investors’ return-chasing behaviors and fund size, but not by diversification purpose.     

Do social factors influence investment behavior and performance? Evidence from mutual fund holdings

We study the economic significance of social dimensions in investment decisions by analyzing the holdings of U.S. equity mutual funds over the period 2004–2012. Using these holdings, we measure funds’ exposures to socially sensitive stocks in order to answer two questions. What explains cross-sectional variation in mutual funds’ exposure to controversial companies? Does exposure to controversial stocks drive fund returns? We find that exposures to socially sensitive stocks are weaker for funds that aim to attract socially conscious and institutional investor clientele, and they relate to local political and religious factors. The financial payoff associated with greater “sin” stock exposure is positive and statistically significant, but becomes non-significant with broader definitions of socially sensitive investments. Despite the positive relation between mutual fund return and sin stock exposure, the annualized risk-adjusted return spread between a portfolio of funds with highest sin stock exposure and its lowest-ranked counterpart is statistically not significant. The results suggest that fund managers do not tilt heavily towards controversial stocks because of social considerations and practical constraints.     

Information flows within financial conglomerates: Evidence from the banks–mutual funds relation

We study how information flows within financial conglomerates by analyzing the relations between mutual funds and banks that belong to the same financial group. We investigate the effect that the lending behavior of affiliated banks has on the portfolio choice of the mutual funds that are part of the same group. We show that funds (fund families) increase their stakes in the firms that borrow from their affiliated banks in the period following the deal by far greater amounts than other unaffiliated funds (fund families). We provide evidence that this strategy is information-driven. The performance of the positions of affiliated funds in the stocks of borrowing firms exceeds that of their other positions in nonborrowing stocks located in the same industry as well as that of other stocks having similar characteristics by up to 1.6% per month. Funds increase (decrease) their stock holdings in those borrowing stocks that subsequently provide positive (negative) abnormal returns, suggesting that they exploit privileged inside information not available to other market participants. This behavior is prevalent largely in funds located in close geographic proximity to their lending banks. Furthermore, it is exhibited mostly by young, small, and poorly performing fund families. Our evidence points to information flows within conglomerates through informal channels such as personal acquaintances.     

Do fire sales create externalities?

We develop three novel measures of the incentives of equity mutual funds to internalize the price impact of their trading. We show that mutual funds with stronger incentives to internalize their price impact accommodate inflows and outflows by adjusting their cash buffers instead of trading in portfolio securities. As a result, stocks held by these funds have lower volatility, and flows out of these funds have smaller spillover effects on other funds holding the same securities. Our results provide evidence of meaningful fire sale externalities in the equity mutual fund industry.     

ECONOMIES OF SCALE IN MUTUAL FUND ADMINISTRATION

Since many mutual fund expenses are fixed costs, asset growth should reduce the ratio of fund expenses to average net assets. A translog cost function is estimated for a sample of 2,610 funds to evaluate the existence and extent of economies of scale in mutual fund administration. The elasticity of fund expenses with respect to fund assets is significantly less than one, indicating there are economies of scale in mutual fund administration. Average costs diminish over the full range of fund assets; however, the rapid decrease in average costs is exhausted by about $3.5 billion in fund assets.     

Explaining persistence in mutual fund performance

This study investigates the determinants of persistence in mutual fund performance. Previous research that uses factor-mimicking portfolios and characteristic benchmarks to model fund performance fails to explain all the persistence in fund returns. This study employs a model that directly relates mutual fund returns to the characteristics of the stocks held by funds. Adjusting fund returns for the size of the stocks in which funds invest and financial ratios intended to capture fund manager investment styles explains all the persistence in mutual fund returns from 1976–1985, the period in which persistence is most prevalent.     

Management of flow risk in mutual funds

This paper is the first to relate the investment practices of U.S. equity mutual funds to their management of flow risk, defined as the adverse effect of investor in- and outflows on fund performance. Using a comprehensive merged sample of 2585 actively managed U.S. domestic equity funds from the CRSP mutual fund database and the SEC’s regulatory N-SAR filings, we are the first to detect differences in funds’ responses to flow risk. We find that funds using derivatives, such as options and futures on indices as well as individual stocks, have higher performance than non-using funds. We further show that this outperformance is the result of superior flow risk management using these derivatives and not a result of derivatives based stock-picking or market-timing activities. Overall, our findings document that superior flow management ability is valuable when managing open-end mutual funds and should be considered by investors and researches when evaluating fund performance.