An investigation of how the informal communication of firm preferences influences managerial honesty

This study investigates the effectiveness of informal firm communication at motivating managerial honesty. Specifically, it focuses on the effectiveness of informal cost targets, which communicate firms’ specific cost preferences to managers without tying managers’ compensation to reporting costs that meet those targets. I develop predictions about how the tightness of an informal cost target influences the effect that a cost target has on managers’ reporting honesty. Using an experimental setting, I examine three levels of target tightness—loose, moderate, and tight—within a uniformly distributed cost range and where participants’ financial incentives are to ignore the cost target and fully misreport their cost information. I find that both moderate and loose cost targets, on average, increase honesty relative to when the firm does not communicate a specific target or it communicates a tight target. Tight targets have no significant effect, positive or negative, on honesty. Whereas prior research focuses only on the potential benefits of firms communicating their general preferences, my study provides important insights regarding the potential incremental effectiveness of communicating specific preferences.     

Subjective adjustments to objective performance measures: The influence of prior performance

This field study examines whether and how supervisors’ subjective adjustments to objective performance measures are influenced by their prior subjective evaluations of employees. Evaluations were determined entirely subjectively in the sample internal audit organization in 2005. In 2006, the organization introduced a pay-for-performance incentive plan that established four objective measures of audit manager performance. Then, knowing the challenges of objectively measuring manager performance, the organization gave supervisors the discretion, mandate, and training to subjectively adjust each of the objective measures when performance as indicated on the individual measures misrepresented managers’ true performance.     

Inexperienced investors and bubbles

We use mutual fund manager data from the technology bubble to examine the hypothesis that inexperienced investors play a role in the formation of asset price bubbles. Using age as a proxy for managers’ investment experience, we find that around the peak of the technology bubble, mutual funds run by younger managers are more heavily invested in technology stocks, relative to their style benchmarks, than their older colleagues. Furthermore, young managers, but not old managers, exhibit trend-chasing behavior in their technology stock investments. As a result, young managers increase their technology holdings during the run-up, and decrease them during the downturn. Both results are in line with the behavior of inexperienced investors in experimental asset markets. The economic significance of young managers’ actions is amplified by large inflows into their funds prior to the peak in technology stock prices.     

Implicit Employment Contracts: The Limits of Management Reputation for Promoting Firm Productivity

Implicit employment contracts are a common way to motivate firm productivity but also require that employees trust management to be fair when allocating postproduction firm resources between employees and owners. We use an experiment to study the problem of motivating firm productivity, which depends on levels of owner investment and employee productive effort, when managers have an incentive to favor the owner's interests over those of the employee. Drawing on research in psychology and behavioral economics, we argue that reputation concerns can more effectively promote firm productivity when manager compensation is relatively insensitive to how much the owner is allocated after production occurs. Consistent with our predictions, we find that reputation concerns lead to greater firm productivity and higher payoffs for all firm members, but only when manager pay is relatively insensitive to the owner's ex post allocation. In addition to offering testable empirical implications, our theory and results are important because they can help explain why executive compensation is, in practice, surprisingly insensitive to owner returns.     

The effect of rankings on honesty in budget reporting

We conduct an experiment to investigate the effect of rankings, which are pervasive in practice, on the honesty of managers’ budget reports, which is important for sound decision making in organizations. Participants in our experiment are ranked in one of four ways: (1) firm profit, (2) own compensation, (3) both firm profit and own compensation, and (4) randomly, which serves as our baseline condition. None of the rankings affect participants’ remuneration. Compared to our baseline (random rankings) setting, where participants indeed exhibit honesty concerns, we find that rankings based on firm profit significantly increase honesty and that rankings based on own compensation significantly decrease honesty. Participants who received both rankings were significantly more honest than participants in the own compensation rankings condition. We did not, however, find significant differences in honesty between the both rankings and firm profit rankings conditions. As such, participants in the both rankings condition seemed to focus more on the firm profit metric than on the financially congruent own compensation metric. We also find that our results are stable across periods, suggesting that the effects of rankings neither increased nor dissipated over time. We discuss the contributions of our study and concomitant findings to accounting research and practice.     

Capital market consequences of managers' voluntary disclosure styles

This paper studies the capital market consequences of managers establishing an individual forecasting style. Using a manager-firm matched panel dataset, I examine whether and when manager-specific credibility matters. If managers' forecasting styles affect their perceived credibility, then the stock price reaction to forecast news should increase with managers' prior forecasting accuracy. Consistent with this prediction, I find that the stock price reaction to management forecast news is stronger when information uncertainty is high and when the manager has a history of issuing more accurate forecasts, indicating that individual managers benefit from establishing a personal disclosure reputation.     

The relation between equity incentives and misreporting: The role of risk-taking incentives

Prior research argues that a manager whose wealth is more sensitive to changes in the firm?s stock price has a greater incentive to misreport. However, if the manager is risk-averse and misreporting increases both equity values and equity risk, the sensitivity of the manager?s wealth to changes in stock price (portfolio delta) will have two countervailing incentive effects: a positive “reward effect” and a negative “risk effect.” In contrast, the sensitivity of the manager?s wealth to changes in risk (portfolio vega) will have an unambiguously positive incentive effect. We show that jointly considering the incentive effects of both portfolio delta and portfolio vega substantially alters inferences reported in prior literature. Using both regression and matching designs, and measuring misreporting using discretionary accruals, restatements, and enforcement actions, we find strong evidence of a positive relation between vega and misreporting and that the incentives provided by vega subsume those of delta. Collectively, our results suggest that equity portfolios provide managers with incentives to misreport when they make managers less averse to equity risk.     

Restatement costs and reporting bias

Financial restatements are costly, but frequent, events and many firms restate several times. We explore why rational managers engage in misreporting despite the costly consequences. To guide our analysis, we build a parsimonious model of reporting bias and the cost of restating. In our model, the observed cost of a restatement conveys information about the true cost of biasing financial statements, which the manager incorporates into the optimal choice of bias. A restatement hence offers managers an opportunity to learn about the true cost of reporting bias, which allows them to update their biasing strategy if the observed cost differs from the expected. We test the model's predictions by analyzing how firms' accruals quality changes after observing the costs attached to restating, which we measure as the market loss following a restatement scaled by the restatement's net income effect. We find that future accruals quality is increasing in the cost of restating and the change in the cost of restating. Consistent with our stylized model, our results indicate that rational managers use the insights from prior restatements to improve their future bias strategy.     

Do changes in audit actions and attitudes consistent with increased auditor scepticism deter aggressive earnings management? An experimental investigation

Audits are claimed to not only enhance the detection of fraud but also the deterrence of fraud. This study examines whether different audit procedures and attitudes conveyed to management deter aggressive earnings management that may be fraudulent, and whether such different procedures and attitudes conveyed influence managers’ perceptions about the ethicality of any anticipated earnings management. In an experiment with 171 senior corporate managers, we find that compared to the condition where the audit proceeds the same as last year, managers anticipate that there would be less earnings management when the nature of evidence collected has increased probative value; and when the auditor conveys a more sceptical attitude via more critical inquiry combined with either an increase in the evidence extent (increased sample size) or the nature of the evidence. However, this reduction in anticipated earnings management is not found with either the increased extent of evidence collected alone or more critical inquiry alone, suggesting that a combination of action and attitude changes compared to a change in either action alone or attitude alone better signals to managers the heightened scepticism that enhances the effectiveness of auditor deterrence. We also find, after controlling for the underlying ethical disposition of managers, that the different audit procedures and attitudes conveyed to management affect managers’ perceptions of the ethicality of anticipated earnings management. Interestingly, the conditions that engender greater earnings management also paradoxically increase managers’ perceived unethicality of the anticipated earnings management. Together these findings have implications for how different changes in audit approaches may result in differential managerial responses about their intention to commit fraud and its appropriateness. This study is one of the first papers to provide experimental empirical evidence that specific audit actions conveying heightened scepticism have significant influence on managerial judgments and behaviours with respect to committing aggressive earnings management.     

Environmental uncertainty and managers’ use of discretionary accruals

Although an organization’s environmental uncertainty may induce greater variability in reported earnings, managers have incentives to reduce this variability. The flexibility accorded by generally accepted accounting principles (GAAP) provides managers the means to accomplish this via exercising discretion in recognizing accounting accruals. Thus, we examine the relation between managers’ use of discretionary accruals and environmental uncertainty. Overall, evidence suggests managers use discretionary accruals to reduce the variability in reported earnings more when firms operate in high uncertainty.     

Application of the controllability principle and managerial performance: The role of role perceptions

The controllability principle stipulates that the evaluation of a manager should be based only on elements that are under the manager's control. Arguments for and against its application are theoretically well understood, but empirical evidence based on the evaluation of the perceptions of managers and their implications for managerial performance is scarce. By empirically analyzing the effects on managerial performance, this paper explores managers’ responses to the application of the controllability principle. We draw on role theory and analyze how role ambiguity and role conflict mediate this basic relationship. Moreover, we test whether application of the controllability principle equally affects role perceptions of top-level managers and those of lower and middle-level managers. Empirical analysis of survey responses from 440 managers reveals that role perceptions completely mediate the effect of application of the controllability principle on managerial performance. This effect is insignificant in the group of top-level managers, who appear to cope with uncontrollable factors more effectively.     

Performance measures,consensus on strategy implementation,and performance: Evidence from the operational-level of organizations

In this article, we examine how consensus between operational-level managers and employees on strategy implementation affects the effectiveness of performance measures and employee performance. We use field-based surveys and proprietary archival data from a Taiwanese financial services company to answer our research questions. Consistent with the predictions of person–organization fit theory, we find that consensus on the implementation of the customer-oriented strategy is positively associated with frontline employees’ performance. Our results also indicate that the incentive effect of using performance measures in performance evaluation and promotion is stronger for employees with a higher level of consensus. Our findings suggest that consensus is critical to the success of an organization’s strategy implementation and the effectiveness of performance measures.     

Are Entrenched Managers’ Accounting Choices More Predictive of Future Cash Flows?

We examine the role manager entrenchment has on firms’ financial reporting quality. More specifically, we test whether entrenched managers’ reported accruals deviate from industry norms and whether entrenched managers’ abnormal accruals are more (or less) predictive of future cash flows. Consistent with implications from prior research, we find that firms with entrenched managers generally report lower levels of abnormal accruals (in an absolute sense), but the abnormal accruals utilized by entrenched managers are more predictive of future cash flows. Contrary to a more traditional view of manager entrenchment, our evidence suggests that entrenched managers report higher quality abnormal accruals. While prior research provides evidence that manager entrenchment is associated with negative economic outcomes, we argue that attempts to limit entrenchment are unlikely to improve financial reporting quality and may actually lower quality. Future corporate governance research should consider not only the level but also the quality of the association between accounting choices and manager entrenchment.     

Work and life: the end of the zero-sum game

Most companies view work and personal life as competing priorities in a zero-sum game, in which a gain in one area means a loss in the other. From this traditional perspective, managers decide how their employees' work and personal lives should intersect and often view work-life programs as just so much social welfare. A new breed of managers, however, is trying a new tack, one in which managers and employees collaborate to achieve work and personal objectives to everyone's benefit. These managers are guided by three principles. The first is to clearly inform their employees about business priorities and to encourage them to be just as clear about personal priorities. The second is to recognize and support their employees as whole people, not only acknowledging but also celebrating their roles outside the office. The third is to continually experiment with the way work gets done, looking for approaches that enhance the organization's performance and allow employees to pursue personal goals. The managers who are acting on these principles have discovered that conflicts between work and personal priorities can actually be catalysts for identifying inefficiencies at the workplace. For example, one manager and his staff found a way to accommodate the increased workload at their 24-hour-a-day command center while granting the staff more concentrated time off. So far, these managers have usually been applying the principles without official sanction. But as the business impact of their approach becomes better appreciated, the authors predict, more and more companies will view these leaders as heralds of change.     

Enabling control and the problem of incomplete performance indicators

To which extent do managers care about the design characteristics of performance indicators and other control systems? The paper examines this question with the help of the framework of enabling and coercive control. Drawing upon data from a longitudinal field study in a manufacturing organisation, we study operational managers’ attitudes towards the incompleteness of performance indicators. Managers are likely to perceive performance indicators as enabling if the latter facilitate their actions without unduly constraining them. This is true even for incomplete performance indicators as long as managers can handle these indicators in a flexible way, treating them as means rather than ends when carrying out their work. Our case also shows, however, how a flexible use of indicators becomes more difficult to sustain once top management signals an increased importance of the indicators. Incompleteness then becomes a more pressing concern for managers. We illuminate the various forms of top management sense-giving through which such tightening of control is achieved and we show how they translate into managers’ perception of the control system as being a coercive rather than enabling one. Taken together, the findings of the present paper add to our understanding of enabling and coercive forms of control and also extend previous studies that have addressed the problem of incomplete accounting information.     

The economics of earnings manipulation and managerial compensation

This article examines managerial compensation in an environment where managers may take a hidden action that affects the actual earnings of the firm. When realized, these earnings constitute hidden information that is privately observed by the manager, who may expend resources to generate an inflated earnings report. We characterize the optimal managerial compensation contract in this setting, and demonstrate that contracts contingent on reported earnings cannot provide managers with the incentive both to maximize profits and to report those profits honestly. As a result, some degree of earnings management must be tolerated as a necessary part of an efficient agreement.     

Takeover protection and managerial myopia: Evidence from real earnings management

We examine whether takeover protection exacerbates or mitigates real earnings management (i.e., using abnormal real activities to meet near-term earnings targets). Consistent with Stein’s (1988) prediction that takeover pressure induces managerial myopia, we find that less-protected firms are associated with higher levels of real earnings management. We further disentangle the value-destroying and signaling effects of real earnings management by finding that although abnormal real activities in general are associated with lower future performance, abnormal real activities intended to just meet earnings targets are associated with higher future performance, consistent with real earnings management conveying a signal of superior future performance in addition to a general value-destroying effect. Taken together, our evidence suggests that takeover protection reduces managers’ pressure to resort to real earnings management as a costly means of signaling better future performance.     

Global equity fund performance, portfolio concentration, and the fundamental law of active management

This paper investigates the relation between portfolio concentration and the performance of global equity funds. Concentrated funds with higher levels of tracking error display better performance than their more broadly diversified counterparts. We show that the observed relation between portfolio concentration and performance is mostly driven by the breadth of the underlying fund strategies; not just by fund managers’ willingness to take big bets. Our results indicate that when investors strive to select the best-performing funds, they should not only consider fund managers’ tracking-error levels. More important is that they take into account the extent to which fund managers carefully allocate their risk budget across multiple investment strategies and have concentrated holdings in multiple market segments simultaneously.     

Self‐Serving Attribution Bias,Overconfidence, and the Issuance of Management Forecasts

Prior studies document that managers consider a variety of costs and benefits when deciding whether to issue earnings forecasts. Using an abstract experiment and a survey of experienced financial managers, we provide evidence that managerial overconfidence may also contribute to this decision. Our experiment shows that participants engage in self‐serving attribution, giving greater weight to internal than external factors as explanations for good performance. This increases confidence in improved future performance, which increases their willingness to issue forecasts. Two facets of the stable individual trait overconfidence, dispositional optimism and miscalibration, also contribute to confidence in improved future performance and willingness to issue forecasts. Consistent with these results, experienced financial manager survey participants believe other managers are likely to overestimate the extent to which they contribute to positive firm performance, and both overoptimism about firm performance and overconfidence in their ability to predict future firm performance contribute to issuance of earnings forecasts.     

The strategic competence of accountants and middle managers in budget making

This paper aims to advance the notion of the “situated functionality of numbers” (Ahrens & Chapman, 2007) by investigating the practical knowledge of strategy which shapes the calculations performed by accountants and middle managers when they are making a budget. It proposes an in-depth investigation of the budgeting conversations collected during an extensive field study in a large construction firm that had undertaken a new partnership strategy. Drawing on a conversation analytical approach, it identifies three micro-practices of calculation constitutive of the accountants’ and middle managers’ strategic competence: invoking the usefulness of numbers to activate local projects; constructing the acceptability of numbers to report them to external partners; authorising the plausibility of numbers to reconcile local contingencies and global coherence. The paper then explores how accountants and middle managers come to a mutual understanding of their respective accountabilities when they perform their strategic competence. It ends by discussing the unintended consequences of these transformations in their professional roles.