Procedural justice in managerial performance evaluation: Effects of subjectivity,relationship quality,and voice opportunity

This study investigates the effect of subjectivity in performance evaluation on managerial perceptions of procedural justice. Using survey data from a sample of 317 managers, we examine two forms of subjectivity: use and weight of subjective performance measures and ex post flexibility in the weighting of multiple performance measures. We also examine the interaction effects of two contextual factors, superior–manager relationship quality and voice opportunity, on the association between subjectivity and perceived procedural justice. The results suggest that only the superior's use of ex post flexibility in weighting multiple performance measures adversely affects managers' perceptions of procedural justice. Moreover, superior–manager relationship quality reduces the negative effects of ex post flexibility in weighting multiple performance measures on procedural justice, whereas voice opportunity amplifies this negative effect. These findings have practical and theoretical implications, as they shed new light on the trade-off between the informative benefits and perceived unfairness of incorporating subjectivity into performance evaluation.     

The effect of benchmarked performance measures and strategic analysis on auditors’ risk assessments and mental models

As the audit environment becomes more demanding and complex, so does the set of analytical tools available to an auditor. The purpose of this paper is to examine the effect of two complex audit technologies commonly used by auditors, benchmarking of performance measures and strategic analysis, on the risk judgments of auditors carrying out the initial planning of an audit. We conduct an experiment that utilizes a Balanced Scorecard for organizing and evaluating analytical evidence about the performance of business units within a large client. Our first principal finding is that external benchmarking can cause an auditor to focus on performance measures that are unique to a business unit and disregard performance measures that are common to multiple business units but not benchmarked. However, our second finding is that an in-depth strategic analysis completed prior to assessing a client’s business risk or risk of material misstatement allows an auditor to incorporate more information from performance measures in risk assessments regardless of whether the performance measures are benchmarked. Strategic analysis facilitates a more balanced and accurate assessment of the risks across the business units being evaluated. We also provide evidence that the latter result occurs because in-depth strategic analysis allows auditors to develop a more complete mental model of a client, which has been a long time belief of advocates of business risk audit methodologies and consistent with current and emerging auditing standards on risk assessment.     

Revisiting mutual fund performance evaluation

Mutual fund manager excess performance should be measured relative to their self-reported benchmark rather than the return of a passive portfolio with the same risk characteristics. Ignoring the self-reported benchmark results in different measurement of stock selection and timing components of excess performance. We revisit baseline empirical evidence fund performance evaluation utilizing stock selection and timing measures that incorporate the self-reported benchmark. We introduce a new factor exposure based approach for measuring the – static and dynamic – timing capabilities of mutual fund managers. We overall conclude that current studies are likely to be misstating skill because they ignore the managers’ self-reported benchmark in the performance evaluation process.     

The role of performance measurement and evaluation in building organizational capabilities and performance

This study examines the processes through which the availability of broad-based strategically relevant performance information impacts on the performance outcomes of organizations. We explore the role of evaluation mechanisms in influencing managers’ use of broad-based performance measurement information for feedback and feed-forward control. We hypothesize that these resultant decision-making patterns impact the exploitation and identification of strategic capabilities within an organization and in turn organizational performance. Using a structural equation model, we find support for a model in which the degree of commonality between measures identified as decision-facilitating and decision-influencing is significantly associated with the use of decision-facilitating measures for both feedback and feed-forward control. In turn, the extent to which decision-facilitating measures are actually used by strategic business unit managers impacts on the strategic capabilities of the organization and subsequently its performance. Overall the results suggest that to encourage managers to use the multiple financial and non-financial performance indicators increasingly incorporated in contemporary performance measurement systems it is imperative that performance evaluation schemes are also designed to reflect these measures. To the extent performance evaluation schemes do not reflect such decision-facilitating measures it is less likely managers will use these indicators to effectively manage performance. The resultant performance implications for the organization arise from the impact of these decision effects on the exploitation of existing capabilities and the search for and identification of new strategic opportunities.     

Performance measures,consensus on strategy implementation,and performance: Evidence from the operational-level of organizations

In this article, we examine how consensus between operational-level managers and employees on strategy implementation affects the effectiveness of performance measures and employee performance. We use field-based surveys and proprietary archival data from a Taiwanese financial services company to answer our research questions. Consistent with the predictions of person–organization fit theory, we find that consensus on the implementation of the customer-oriented strategy is positively associated with frontline employees’ performance. Our results also indicate that the incentive effect of using performance measures in performance evaluation and promotion is stronger for employees with a higher level of consensus. Our findings suggest that consensus is critical to the success of an organization’s strategy implementation and the effectiveness of performance measures.     

Discretion and bias in performance evaluation: the impact of diversity and subjectivity

This paper examines the impact of performance measure diversity and the use of subjective performance measures on performance evaluation bias. The empirical results indicate that both performance measure diversity and subjectivity are positively related to performance evaluation bias. More specifically, I find that the use of multiple objective performance measures and the use of subjective performance measures are related to more compressed performance ratings and more lenient performance ratings, which could result in problems in personnel decisions and future incentives.     

Observability and Subjective Performance Measurement

Accounting research provides theory and evidence on the choice and use of subjective performance measures for evaluating managerial performance. However, accounting research does not focus on the subjective performance measurement of managerial behaviour once measures have been chosen. We extend accounting research by investigating the factors that influence the subjective performance measurement decision. We predict that the level of subjective performance measurement is influenced by the informativeness of financial performance measures and by the verifiability of the nonfinancial measures in a formula‐based incentive plan. We expect that the measures' informativeness and verifiability depends on the observability of both the managerial behaviour being subjectively measured and the reliability of the financial and nonfinancial performance measures. More specifically, we hypothesize that the influence of the levels of the financial performance measures on the level of subjective performance measurement is moderated by the observability of either the managerial behaviour being measured (for the financial measures) or the performance measures' reliability (for the nonfinancial measures). Data from a firm provide support for our hypotheses.     

Performance evaluation inflation and compression

We provide a behavioral account of subjective performance evaluation inflation (i.e., leniency bias) and compression (i.e., centrality bias). When a manager observes noisy signals of employee performance and the manager strives to produce accurate ratings but feels worse about unfavorable errors than about favorable errors, the manager’s selfishly optimal ratings will be biased upwards. Both the uncertainty about performance and the asymmetry in the manager’s utility are necessary conditions for performance evaluation inflation. Moreover, the extent of the bias is increasing in the variance of the performance signal and in the asymmetry in aversion to unfair ratings. Uncertainty about performance also leads to compressed ratings. These results suggest that performance appraisals based on well-defined unambiguous criteria will have less bias. Additionally, we demonstrate that employer and employee can account for biased performance evaluations when they agree to a contract, and thus, to the extent leniency bias and centrality bias persist, these biases hurt employee performance and lower firm productivity.     

City size and fund performance

The literature predicts that the average skill level and productivity are higher in larger cities. Prior studies use workers’ wage or education differentials to indirectly link city size and output. This article relates city size and productivity directly, using performance data of U.S. equity mutual funds. On average, funds in financial centers perform better than other funds in terms of both gross and risk-adjusted returns, but this difference is driven only by more experienced managers. Among funds in financial centers there is strong evidence of a positive relation between performance and manager experience in a given city, especially among New York funds. More importantly, we observe performance improvements of the same manager at the same fund in financial centers but not elsewhere. Our tests provide novel evidence of knowledge spillovers and learning in cities.     

A review of behavioural and management effects in mutual fund performance

This paper surveys and critically evaluates the literature on the role of management effects and fund characteristics in mutual fund performance. First, a brief overview of performance measures is provided. Second, empirical findings on the predictive power of fund characteristics in explaining future returns are discussed. Third, the paper reviews the literature on fund manager behavioural biases and the impact these have on risk taking and returns. Finally, the impact of organizational structure, governance and strategy on both fund risk taking and future performance is examined. While a number of surveys on mutual fund performance are available, these have not focused on the role of manager behavioural biases, manager characteristics and fund management strategic behavior on fund performance and risk taking. This review is an attempt to fill this gap. Empirical results indicate that finding successful funds ex-ante is extremely difficult, if not impossible. In contrast, there is strong evidence that poor performance persists for many of the prior “loser fractile” portfolios of funds. A number of manager behavioural biases are prevalent in the mutual fund industry and they generally detract from returns.     

Triangulation of audit evidence in fraud risk assessments

Drawing on the triangulation framework of audit evidence ( and ), we experimentally test for the conditions, if any, under which financial-statement auditors alter their fraud-risk assessments based on whether external evidence provides positive or negative news about underlying business performance. We focus on the condition in which two kinds of management-controlled audit evidence – evidence from the financial statements and evidence from internal data depicting performance of a key business process – is contradicted by external evidence suggesting that a key business objective has not been attained. According to the triangulation framework, such contradictory external evidence should heighten auditors’ skepticism about the veracity of management-controlled evidence and increase their assessment of fraud risk.     

Early Birds versus Just-in-Timers: The effect of procrastination on academic performance of accounting students

This study investigates the effect of procrastination on academic performance. Prior research has often relied upon self-reported measures of procrastination, which are only weakly correlated with actual procrastination. We use the start and submission of a set of online homework problems as two objective, direct measures of student procrastination and the grade on the assignments as a measure of performance. In our study, there were a number of potential benefits to submitting online assignments ‘just-in-time’. Thus, there was a direct benefit to procrastination, which students had to weigh against potential drawbacks. With a sample size larger than those previously reported in the literature, we find that for both procrastination measures, task procrastination is associated with lower task performance. To ensure that our results are not just an association between performance and student quality, we test for the association between task procrastination and task performance, while controlling for student quality. We find that even after controlling for student quality, task procrastination is associated with lower task performance.     

Locating audit expectations gap within a cultural context: The case of Saudi Arabia

This paper offers an insight into the types of ‘audit expectations gap’ that exist within a cultural context. Specifically, it investigates if the business and social environment affect the perceptions of audit performance of users and auditors. Using a combination of mail questionnaires and semi-structured interviews, the study reveals the existence of a ‘performance gap’ with respect to the roles specified in the statutory pronouncements and those that can reasonably be expected of auditors in Saudi Arabia. The results further indicate the ‘performance gap’ arises from four factors in the environment within which auditing is practiced: licensing policy, recruitment process, the political and legal structure, and dominant societal values. Interview results reveal the influence of institutional and cultural settings on the audit expectations gap and indicate that the inclusion of Islamic principles in auditing standards and the code of ethics would help reduce the expectations gap that exists in Saudi Arabia.     

Subjective evaluations with performance feedback

Firms use subjective performance evaluations to provide employees with both incentives and feedback. This article shows that if an objective measure of performance, however imperfect, is available, subjective evaluations with incentive effects can be sustained even without repeated interaction. Although full efficiency cannot be achieved in general, it is achievable if the firm can commit to a forced distribution of evaluations and employs a continuum of workers. When the number of workers is small, a forced distribution is useful only if the objective measure is poor. The model also shows that a leniency bias in evaluations can improve incentives.     

UK investors’ perceptions of auditor independence

The auditor’s role in society is that of validating the truth and fairness of financial statements. If owners of organisations doubt the auditor’s independence, financial statements will lack credibility. This questionnaire-based study investigated how investors perceive three potentially independence-impairing auditor–client relationships: the joint provision of audit and non-audit services, an audit firm’s economic dependence upon a client and long-term relationships between auditor and client. The objective was to determine whether, after a series of high-profile corporate collapses, owners retain faith in the integrity of the auditor. The results suggest that economic dependence and the provision of non-audit services are perceived as greater threats to auditor independence than long-term relationships between the auditor and client.     

EVIDENCE ON THE COMPENSATION OF PORTFOLIO MANAGERS

We surveyed 396 portfolio managers about the structure of their compensation. Overall, more compensation packages are subjective/discretionary than objective/formula based. Firm success factors such as firm profitability have more effect on bonuses than do client success factors such as investment performance. Differences in the structure of compensation across firms, clients, job types, and manager characteristics reflect likely differences in the underlying contracting environments, especially differences in the difficulty of monitoring performance and exerting control.     

Manager characteristics: Predicting fund performance

A great deal of research effort has sought to understand whether fund managers have skill. However, most of this research draws inferences from fund returns attributable to funds that may have been managed by many different managers over the years. In this paper we focus on the fund manager. We put together a comprehensive data base of manager returns, including a time series of managers' career returns, concatenating performance from the different funds that a manager may have managed over time. We relate these returns to the characteristics of the managers as we seek to understand whether these characteristics have an impact on: manager skill; manager style; and on performance persistence.     

A Framework for Evaluating Process Quality for Audit Engagements

Audit quality has been researched from several perspectives. Most recent research has been oriented toward end user surrogates for audit quality. This study, on the other hand, focuses on the development of a more objective and comprehensive measure of audit quality based on an evaluation of the actual audit processes completed for a unique engagement. To achieve this objective, over 200 audit practitioners participated in a series of structured group processes designed to elicit group consensus, first on the factors affecting audit process quality and subsequently on objective measures of deviations in each of the identified factors. A separate group of approximately 100 practitioners provided relative weights for each identified factor's effect on overall audit quality. The combination of measures and corresponding weighting factors is used as the foundation for a comprehensive framework for evaluating audit process quality.     

Managerial incentives, derivatives and stability

In this paper we model the derivative strategies optimally undertaken by a manager (or head of a profit center in a hedge fund) when the detailed derivative positions taken are not contractible. We show that with commonly-used incentive features in the compensation structure, managers have incentives to implement complex derivative strategies that lead to a slight reduction in default probabilities (or a slight increase in performance measures) with a high probability at the cost of allowing for the possibility of disaster states involving large losses, although with a very small probability. Such disaster states cause systemic instability (similar to the experience of Long-Term Capital Management in September 1998). We discuss possible audit strategies, governance mechanisms and incentive structures that will ameliorate the probability of systemic instability arising from such incentives in a market with a rich enough menu of derivatives. We characterize the optimal intensity of audit effort with and without the presence of such derivative strategies. The dependence of the optimal audit intensity on the legal liability regime and different rules for apportioning the auditor's liability is derived. Our results also relate the optimal audit intensity to the cost and efficiency parameters of the audit firm.