Linking environmental uncertainty to non-financial performance measures and performance: a research note

Several previous research studies have reported mixed results concerning the direct association between non-financial performance measures and performance. The presence of environmental uncertainty on this relationship has not been established. This paper makes a contribution to this area by proposing that it is in conditions of environmental uncertainty that non-financial measures are most useful in improving organizational performance. It analyses empirical data from a sample of New Zealand manufacturing organizations to test the hypothesis that non-financial measures of performance would lead to improved organizational performance under conditions of increased environmental uncertainty. Multiple regression analysis of the data suggests that performance should be a declining function of the size of the ‘mismatch’ between an organization's environment and use of the different combinations of non-financial performance measures. Further, the paper concludes that prior mixed results may be attributed to the omission of environmental uncertainty.     

The limits of granularity adjustments

We provide a rigorous proof of granularity adjustment (GA) formulas to evaluate loss distributions and risk measures (value-at-risk) in the case of heterogenous portfolios, multiple systematic factors and random recoveries. As a significant improvement with respect to the literature, we detail all the technical conditions of validity and provide an upper bound of the remainder term for finite portfolio sizes. Moreover, we deal explicitly with the case of general loss distributions, possibly with masses. For some simple portfolio models, we prove empirically that the granularity adjustments do not always improve the infinitely granular first-order approximations. This stresses the importance of checking some conditions of regularity before relying on such techniques. Smoothing the underlying loss distributions through random recoveries or exposures improves the GA performances in general.     

Different uses of performance measures: The evaluation versus reward of production managers

This study examines how the importance that is attributed to a variety of financial and non-financial performance measures depends on the type of use – evaluation versus reward. Survey data, collected on a sample of industrial companies, provide consistent evidence of a difference in the importance attached to performance measures for these two uses. More importance is attached to both financial and non-financial performance measures for the periodic evaluation than for variable rewards. The study also shows that the influence of production strategy and departmental interdependence on the importance attached to performance measures differs for evaluation and reward uses. A production strategy focused on differentiation by product-performance has a negative effect on the importance attached to financial measures for variable rewards but no effect on their importance for periodic evaluation. Moreover, departmental interdependence decreases the importance attached to financial measures for variable rewards but not for periodic evaluation. Departmental interdependence also has only a positive effect on non-financial measures for periodic evaluation and no effect on non-financial measures for variable rewards. Overall, the data suggest that it is essential to distinguish between different uses when studying performance measurement choices and their determinants.     

The impact of prior performance on the risk-taking of mutual fund managers

We analyze the impact of prior performance on the risk-taking behavior of mutual fund managers. We contribute to the existing literature by using different measures of risks, a larger data set, and an econometric approach capturing non-linear effects and assigning exact probabilities to the mutual fund managers’ adjustment of behavior. We find that prior performance in the first half of the year has, in general, a positive impact on the choice of the risk level in the second half of the year. Successful fund managers increase the volatility, the beta, and assign a higher proportion of their portfolio to value stocks, small firms, and momentum stocks in comparison to unsuccessful fund managers. Unsuccessful fund manager increase, on average, only the tracking error. We thank an anonymous referee, Bernd Brommundt, Alexander Ising, Stephan Kessler, Axel Kind, Angelika Noll, Jennifer Noll, Ralf Seiz, Stephan Süss, Rico von Wyss, and Andreas Zingg for valuable comments. We acknowledge helpful comments of the participants from the Joint Research Workshop of the University of St. Gallen and the University of Ulm in 2005.     

Implied measures of relative fund performance

We evaluate the relative performance of funds by conditioning their returns on the cross-section of portfolio characteristics across fund managers. Our implied procedure circumvents the need to specify benchmark returns or peer funds. Instead, fund-specific benchmarks for measuring selection and market timing ability are constructed. This technique is robust to herding as well as window dressing and mitigates survivorship bias. Empirically, the conditional information contained in portfolio weights defined by industry sectors, assets, and geographical regions is important to the assessment of fund management. For each set of portfolio characteristics, we identify funds with success at either selecting securities or timing-the-market.

The effect of performance feedback on prior budgetary participative research using survey methodology: An empirical study

Prior research examining the relation between budgetary participation and job performance explicitly or implicitly posits budgetary participation and intervening variables such as role ambiguity, motivation, job satisfaction, and job-relevant information as independent variables; job performance as the dependent variable. However, these studies are often based on correlated data in which the direction of causation is unknown. This paper uses attribution theory to examine whether job performance affects perceptions of budgetary participation and/or intervening variables (e.g. role ambiguity). Using a laboratory experiment and multivariate analysis of variance (MANOVA), the findings of this study show that knowledge of performance, obtained through performance evaluations and/or external cues, affects individuals’ perceptions regarding budgetary participation, job satisfaction, role ambiguity, motivation, and job-relevant information. The results of the study may undermine correlations between self-reported data on individual characteristics (e.g. motivation) and performance data, as well as correlations between self-reported data on organizational variables (e.g. budgetary participation) and performance data. The study provides suggestions how researchers could overcome problems associated with causal directions in future budget participation studies that link self-reported individual and organizational characteristics to job performance.     

Sensitivity of executive pay to accounting performance measures in all-equity firms

We investigate the relation between chief executive officer compensation and accounting performance measures as a function of the firm's capital structure. We specifically analyse pay–performance relationships for all‐equity firms relative to high‐levered firms. We find a significant positive association between return on equity and the level of compensation for all‐equity firms. Consistent with optimal contracting theory, we cannot discern any such relationship for high‐levered firms. Because of agency costs of debt, managerial compensation in high‐levered firms plays the role of a precommitment mechanism in addition to its conventional role of aligning management incentives with shareholder interest.     

The relevance of financial statement information for executive performance evaluation: Evidence from choice of bonus plan accounting performance measures

I explore whether the type of accounting performance measure used in the CEO bonus plan provides an indication of the informativeness of the firm's financial statements for purposes of performance evaluation. Using contingency table analysis and LOGIT regressions, I find firms with high levels of unrecorded intangible assets rely significantly less often on accounting rate-of-return measures (vs. earnings alone) in executive bonus plans.     

Eco-control: The influence of management control systems on environmental and economic performance

Eco-control is the application of financial and strategic control methods to environmental management. In this study, we investigate to what extent eco-control influences environmental and economic performance. Using survey-data from a sample of Canadian manufacturing firms, the results suggest that eco-control has no direct effect on economic performance. A mediating effect of environmental performance on the link between eco-control and economic performance is observed in different contexts. More specifically, eco-control indirectly influences economic performance in the context of (i) higher environmental exposure, (ii) higher public visibility, (iii) higher environmental concern, and (iv) larger size. This study contributes to the management accounting literature by providing insight into the roles and contributions of management accounting in the context of sustainable development.     

Growth rates as measures of financial performance

This teaching note provides a vehicle to help students understand, calculate, and communicate growth rates as part of the process of financial performance evaluation. The note also makes use of the graphic capabilities and functions available within Excel. Graphics are widely used by companies in their annual reports to highlight financial performance and to focus on change over time. Many companies also report 3, 5, and 10 year growth rates for selected financial data in their annual reports. Alternative approaches for calculating growth rates are presented with a focus on understanding the differences that can exist in the resulting calculated values. The underlying biases and the advantages of each approach are discussed. A project appropriate for classroom use in a Financial Accounting or Financial Statement Analysis course is included in an Appendix.     

Option prices as predictors of stock prices: intraday adjustments to information releases

The purpose of this study is to analyse the evolution of payment behaviours by emphasizing the role of the regulation and the financial opening. We test whether the convergence process of payment technologies and regulations is propagated from upstream to downstream through the channel of standardized products, leading to the convergence of the demand for payment services. A test of conditional beta-convergence, relating to the use of five payment instruments, is performed on a panel of European countries. In general, results show evidence for convergence for all means of payment.     

The influence of loan officers on loan contract design and performance

We investigate the extent to which loan officers generate independent, individual effects on the design and performance of syndicated loans. We construct a large database containing the identities of loan officers involved in structuring syndicated loan deals, allowing us to systematically disentangle borrower, bank, and loan officer fixed effects. We find that loan officers have significant influence on interest spreads, loan covenant design, and loan performance. Inclusion of borrower fixed effects increases our power to rule out the alternative that loan officer fixed effects reflect the matching of officerds to borrowers based on time-invariant borrower characteristics. We document heterogeneity in loan officers’ influence across loan contract terms, with loan officers exerting stronger influence over covenant package design than over interest spreads, but marginal influence on loan maturity. Lead officers have greater influence than participant officers over covenant package design and loan performance, but less robust differential influence on interest spreads.     

CEO turnover in China: the role of market-based and accounting performance measures

We investigate the relationship between chief executive officer (CEO) turnover and firm performance in China's publicly traded firms. We provide evidence on the use of accounting and market-based performance measures in CEO turnover decision. We also investigate the moderating roles of noise in performance measures, firm growth opportunities, state-owned enterprises, and corporate governance reform on the weights attached to these performance measures. We observe that Chinese listed firms rely more on accounting performance than on stock market performance when determining CEO turnover. Firms with noisier performance measures and larger growth opportunities rely less on both accounting performance and stock market performance in CEO replacement decision. State-controlled firms are more likely to use accounting performance to determine CEO turnover. Finally, we observe that the weight attached to the accounting performance measure is significantly reduced and the weight attached to the stock market performance measure is significantly increased after the governance reform. We also observe that the reform has different impact on state-owned firms and private firms in terms of the sensitivity of CEO turnover to firm performance.     

Choosing how to pay: The influence of foreign backgrounds

Is having a foreign background a relevant factor in choosing between payment instruments in consumer point-of-sale transactions after migration? We analyze this question using a unique diary survey in which both participants with a Dutch and a foreign background documented their daily purchases. We present several pieces of evidence suggesting that foreign backgrounds still influence the choice between payment instruments after migration to the Netherlands. For instance, we find that first-generation migrants from a number of countries that can be seen as cash-oriented are more likely to use cash in the Netherlands. At the same time, second-generation migrants have similar payment habits as individuals with a Dutch background. This finding suggests that payment behavior is not passed on between generations, but affected by host country payment habits. Finally, we suggest that, in this context, special information campaigns to increase debit card usage will not have clear net social benefits.     

Choice and change of measures in performance measurement models

This paper uses management control, resource-based, systems-based and contingency-based strategy theories to describe a large U.S. manufacturing company's efforts to improve profitability by designing and using a performance measurement model (PMM). This PMM includes multiple performance measures relevant to its distribution channel for products, repair parts and maintenance services. The PMM is intended to reflect the company's understanding of performance relations among strategic resources, operational capabilities, and desired financial outcomes. The PMM also reflects its intended distribution strategy, the types of performance necessary to achieve that strategy by its distributors, and its desired financial outcomes. Furthermore, the company uses the model to evaluate its North American distributors and intends to use these evaluations as a partial basis for annual and long-term rewards. Thus, the PMM embodies the measurable portion of the firm's management control system of its distribution channel.The study addresses four research questions: (1) Are measure attributes important considerations for performance measure choice? (2) Does the importance of attributes differ according to firm strategy? (3) Does the importance of attributes for design and use differ according to firm strategy? (4) Does a company trade-off some individual attributes for others? The questions are investigated using qualitative and quantitative analyses of archival documents and interviews with top managers and distributors. Principal findings are that measure attributes are important considerations for choice and change of performance measures, design attributes are more important than use attributes, the importance of attributes does not appear to differ according to strategy, and some individual attributes are traded-off for other attributes.     

The association between non-financial performance measures in executive compensation contracts and earnings management

Executive compensation, especially cash bonus compensation, has come under fire by the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC), the US Federal government, and the media for its role in the current economic crisis. Specifically, the SEC has argued that some compensation packages provide incentives for risk-taking that may undermine shareholder value over the long-term. Short-term incentive payments to executives in the form of cash bonuses are mostly contingent on reaching targets of accounting-related measures or financial performance measures (FPMs). However, the incentives from these payments may lead to accrual manipulation and earnings management (EM). Alternative measures are non-financial performance measures (NFPMs). We expect that firms that employ NFPMs in bonus contracts will have a lower prevalence of EM, since these measures tend to focus executives on the long-term. In this paper, we examine the type of performance measures used by firms in the S&;P 500 index in their cash bonus compensation. We find that firms that use both FPMs and NFPMs have lower discretionary accruals compared to firms that use only FPMs, consistent with lower income-increasing EM. However, we do not find evidence of a reduction in EM behavior using the incidence of meeting or just beating analyst earnings benchmarks, another common EM proxy. In additional tests on a subset of firms with equity offerings, in which incentives for income-increasing manipulation are likely high, we find that firms with NFPMs have lower discretionary accruals. The implication is that NFPMs can be used in compensation contracts to reduce EM behavior and mitigate erroneous executive compensation. This is important to investors as well as regulators, especially in light of the recent debate on compensation reform.     

Market reaction to and valuation of IFRS reconciliation adjustments: first evidence from the UK

We investigate the market reaction to, and the value-relevance of, information contained in the mandatory transitional documents required by International Financial Reporting Standards 1 (2005). We find significant negative abnormal returns for firms reporting negative earnings reconciliation. Although the informational content of the positive earnings adjustments is value-relevant before disclosure, for negative earnings adjustments it is value-relevant only after disclosure. This finding is consistent with managers delaying the communication of bad news until IFRS compliance. A finer model shows that adjustments attributed to impairment of goodwill, share-based payments, and deferred taxes are incrementally value-relevant but that only the impairment of goodwill and deferred taxes reveal new information. Our results indicate that mandatory IFRS adoption alters investors’ beliefs about stock prices.     

Financial and nonfinancial performance measures: How do they affect job satisfaction?

Recent interest on the use of nonfinancial measures (e.g. in the Balanced Scorecard) generally assumes that such measures are essential to overcome the inadequacies of financial measures. However, it remains unclear (1) if the behavioural effects of these nonfinancial measures are different from those of financial measures; and (2) whether these effects are influenced by the relative importance of nonfinancial measures vis-à-vis financial measures. This study hypothesises that the use of performance measures for performance evaluation will significantly affect managers' job satisfaction. However, these effects are indirect through the managers' perceptions of the fairness of these measures and the interpersonal trust these measures promote. Based on a sample of 70 managers, these expectations are supported by the results. More importantly, the results also suggest that (1) the process by which nonfinancial measures affect employee job satisfaction is not different from that of financial measures, and (2) the relative importance of nonfinancial measures vis-à-vis financial measures has no significant effect on employee job satisfaction. These results may have important theoretical and practical implications.