The role of performance measurement and evaluation in building organizational capabilities and performance

This study examines the processes through which the availability of broad-based strategically relevant performance information impacts on the performance outcomes of organizations. We explore the role of evaluation mechanisms in influencing managers’ use of broad-based performance measurement information for feedback and feed-forward control. We hypothesize that these resultant decision-making patterns impact the exploitation and identification of strategic capabilities within an organization and in turn organizational performance. Using a structural equation model, we find support for a model in which the degree of commonality between measures identified as decision-facilitating and decision-influencing is significantly associated with the use of decision-facilitating measures for both feedback and feed-forward control. In turn, the extent to which decision-facilitating measures are actually used by strategic business unit managers impacts on the strategic capabilities of the organization and subsequently its performance. Overall the results suggest that to encourage managers to use the multiple financial and non-financial performance indicators increasingly incorporated in contemporary performance measurement systems it is imperative that performance evaluation schemes are also designed to reflect these measures. To the extent performance evaluation schemes do not reflect such decision-facilitating measures it is less likely managers will use these indicators to effectively manage performance. The resultant performance implications for the organization arise from the impact of these decision effects on the exploitation of existing capabilities and the search for and identification of new strategic opportunities.     

Implementing performance measurement innovations: evidence from government

Using data from a government-wide survey administered by the US General Accounting Office, we examine some of the factors influencing the development, use, and perceived benefits of results-oriented performance measures in government activities. We find that organizational factors such as top management commitment to the use of performance information, decision-making authority, and training in performance measurement techniques have a significant positive influence on measurement system development and use. We also find that technical issues, such as information system problems and difficulties selecting and interpreting appropriate performance metrics in hard-to-measure activities, play an important role in system implementation and use. The extent of performance measurement and accountability are positively associated with greater use of performance information for various purposes. However, we find relatively little evidence that the perceived benefits from recent mandated performance measurement initiatives in the US government increase with greater measurement and accountability. Finally, we provide exploratory evidence that some of the technical and organizational factors interact to influence measurement system implementation and outcomes, often in a complex manner.     

Using strategic performance measurement systems for strategy formulation: Does it work in dynamic environments?

This paper examines how strategic performance measurement systems (SPMS) influence organisational performance through the shaping of the strategic agendas and strategic decision arrays that result from the processes of (re)formulation of intended strategies. Using a combination of archival and survey data collected from 267 medium and large Spanish companies, we find evidence supporting a positive association between SPMS and organisational performance that is mediated by the comprehensiveness of the strategic decision arrays. We find this mediation is negatively moderated by the level of environmental dynamism, so that the comprehensiveness of strategic decision arrays that result from strategy (re)formulation processes mediates the association between SPMS and organisational performance when environmental dynamism is low, but not when environmental dynamism is high.     

Undetected Deviations in Tests of Controls: Experimental Evidence of Nonsampling Risk*

The objective of the study was to examine the effects of three independent variables ‐ accountability, audit workpaper structure, and type of control deviations ‐ on auditors' detection failure rates during control tests in a purchases, payables, and payments cycle. The experimental design used a between‐subjects manipulation of accountability and workpaper structure, and a within‐subjects manipulation of deviation type. Consistent with prior research, we observed an alarmingly high detection failure rate of 42.3 percent. This failure rate was not affected by levels of accountability or workpaper structure, although postexperiment evidence suggests that these variables were successfully manipulated. Failure rates did depend on the type of seeded control deviation, with nonmonetary deviations being overlooked most frequently. In addition to replicating prior research, our study makes two further contributions. First, we provide empirical evidence that supports Hirst's (1992) speculation that successful manipulations of accountability may not affect auditor performance because auditors may self‐induce levels of accountability that create a ceiling effect on auditor performance. Second, we observe that although auditors perceived that highly structured workpapers allowed them to be more effective and efficient when performing tests of controls, their actual audit performance was not more effective and, on average, was less efficient.     

The judgmental effects of strategy maps in balanced scorecard performance evaluations

We examine whether supplemental information displays affect decisions made using a common strategic performance measurement system, the balanced scorecard. A distinguishing feature of the balanced scorecard (BSC) is the number and diversity of its metrics. To effectively formulate a decision from such a complex information set, managers must view these measures within their strategic context ( [Kaplan and Norton, 1993] and [Kaplan and Norton, 1996] ). However, academic studies indicate that problems in communication and comprehension of the strategic logic underlying the scorecard hinder its implementation and use ( [Lipe and Salterio, 2000] , [Malina and Selto, 2001] , [Ittner et al., 2003a] and [Ittner et al., 2003b] ). We investigate whether a supplemental information display, in the form of a strategy map, results in performance evaluation judgments consistent with the recognition of relations between performance metrics and strategy. Strategy maps are causal diagrams depicting temporally-separate and non-linear relations between scorecard performance measures and overriding strategic objectives. As predicted, we find that performance evaluation decisions are more consistent with the achievement of strategic objectives when participants are provided with strategy maps.     

Observability and Subjective Performance Measurement

Accounting research provides theory and evidence on the choice and use of subjective performance measures for evaluating managerial performance. However, accounting research does not focus on the subjective performance measurement of managerial behaviour once measures have been chosen. We extend accounting research by investigating the factors that influence the subjective performance measurement decision. We predict that the level of subjective performance measurement is influenced by the informativeness of financial performance measures and by the verifiability of the nonfinancial measures in a formula‐based incentive plan. We expect that the measures' informativeness and verifiability depends on the observability of both the managerial behaviour being subjectively measured and the reliability of the financial and nonfinancial performance measures. More specifically, we hypothesize that the influence of the levels of the financial performance measures on the level of subjective performance measurement is moderated by the observability of either the managerial behaviour being measured (for the financial measures) or the performance measures' reliability (for the nonfinancial measures). Data from a firm provide support for our hypotheses.     

CEO turnover in China: the role of market-based and accounting performance measures

We investigate the relationship between chief executive officer (CEO) turnover and firm performance in China's publicly traded firms. We provide evidence on the use of accounting and market-based performance measures in CEO turnover decision. We also investigate the moderating roles of noise in performance measures, firm growth opportunities, state-owned enterprises, and corporate governance reform on the weights attached to these performance measures. We observe that Chinese listed firms rely more on accounting performance than on stock market performance when determining CEO turnover. Firms with noisier performance measures and larger growth opportunities rely less on both accounting performance and stock market performance in CEO replacement decision. State-controlled firms are more likely to use accounting performance to determine CEO turnover. Finally, we observe that the weight attached to the accounting performance measure is significantly reduced and the weight attached to the stock market performance measure is significantly increased after the governance reform. We also observe that the reform has different impact on state-owned firms and private firms in terms of the sensitivity of CEO turnover to firm performance.     

审计意见中的信息指标权效重构

代理人通过操纵信息来实现机会主义的行为已受到持久关注,本研究则考察在审计意见出具的过程中,审计双方不改变信息,但加重对自身更有利的指标的影响力的行为。以中国上市公司为样本的检验结果表明,会计业绩和市场回报都对审计意见具有解释力,当市场回报在同行业内相对于会计业绩的排序位置越差,其对审计意见的影响力也越大,同时,并没有证据表明,客户加强了表现较好的业绩指标的影响力。结果表明,表现较差的指标对审计意见的影响力得到增强,这可能源于审计方对执业风险的重视。进一步的测试表明,重构的效果随着公司业务复杂度的提升而下降,说明复杂的经营环境削弱了审计方的重构能力。综合结论为审计方的权效重构行为提供了经验证据。     

Do joint ventures and strategic alliances create value for bondholders?

This paper investigates whether joint ventures and strategic alliances create value for bondholders by examining the bond market’s reaction to announcements of these two types of cooperative business activities. Based on 2964 announcements from 1985 to 2011, we find that joint ventures and strategic alliances create significant value for bondholders. The average two-month abnormal bond return is 0.64% for joint ventures and 0.70% for strategic alliances. We find no evidence of a wealth transfer between the bondholders and stockholders. We further explore the determinants of bond value creation through hypotheses on the synergy effect, the alleviation of financial constraints, and real options. The results of our study show that financial synergy is a main driver of bondholder wealth effects in joint ventures, while operating synergy is a dominant factor in strategic alliances. We also find evidence to support the real option hypothesis for both events. Finally, we show that the structure of bond contracts plays an important role in the link between synergy and abnormal bond returns.     

The comparative effect of process and outcome accountability in enhancing professional scepticism

Responding to concerns about insufficient professional scepticism in audits (e.g. PCAOB, 2011 , 2012 ; ASIC, 2012 ), we investigate the effect of process and outcome accountability in enhancing the level of professional scepticism and the differences in effects across audit experience levels. In our experiment, we manipulate the type of accountability (outcome versus process) for both novice auditors and audit seniors. We examine the effect on four measures of professional scepticism and find that auditors show greater levels of professional scepticism when they are expected to justify their judgment process, rather than their final judgments. Our results also show that the professional scepticism of novice auditors improves to a greater extent than that of more experienced auditors (audit seniors) under process accountability.     

Strategy Selection,Surrogation, and Strategic Performance Measurement Systems

Strategic performance measurement systems operationalize firm strategy with a set of performance measures. A consequence of such alignment is the tendency for managers to lose sight of the strategic construct(s) the measures are intended to represent, and subsequently act as though the measures are the constructs of interest, a phenomenon referred to as surrogation. We investigate how involvement in strategy selection affects managers’ propensity to exhibit surrogation. We predict and find that strategy selection reduces surrogation. Surprisingly, we do not find that engaging in strategy deliberation, a key process underlying strategy selection, reduces surrogation. Thus, managers’ involvement in the actual choice of strategy appears to be both a necessary and sufficient condition to mitigate surrogation. Our paper broadens understanding of factors that influence surrogation, such as the effects of different aspects of managers’ strategic involvement and buy‐in. Further, by documenting how managers behave within (as opposed to simply with) strategic performance measurement systems, we highlight the potential for managers to endogenously influence the effectiveness of such systems.     

What are the consequences of board destaggering?

In this paper, we examine the consequences of the decision to destagger the election of directors using a sample of firms that switched from a staggered to a destaggered board structure from 2002 through 2010. We find that the likelihood of destaggering increases in shareholder activism, firm size, and poor prior accounting performance. Furthermore, we find that firms that destagger tend to have larger boards and a lower entrenchment index prior to destaggering. We then use our determinants model to identify a sample of control firms that maintained a staggered board structure. Employing a difference-in-differences research design, we find that, relative to our control firms, firms that destaggered experience declines in Tobin’s q and accounting performance, measured by ROA. In addition, the negative effect on Tobin’s q is most pronounced in firms with greater advisory needs, consistent with the notion that destaggering results in worse performance when the advisory role of boards is more important. Contrary to claims made by proponents of destaggered boards, we find no evidence that CEOs are less entrenched after destaggering. We also provide some evidence suggesting that investment in R&D falls in the post-destaggering period, consistent with the view that after destaggering board members have shortened incentive horizons. Taken together, our evidence is contrary to the earlier studies that claim that destaggered boards are generally optimal and value-increasing.     

同行业间避税与企业的战略反应——来自我国A股上市公司的经验证据

本文运用2007-2016年中国A股上市公司数据,引入同行业竞争者的股票异常回报作为工具变量,研究同行业竞争者避税行为对企业战略反应的影响。研究发现,相比国有企业,民营企业的同行业竞争者避税行为与企业避税存在战略互补效应,即同行业竞争者的避税行为越激进,企业会选择更加激进的避税策略。探究可能影响这种战略互补效应的机制,结果显示民营企业很可能会模仿同行业领导者等被认为避税行为更有效合理的竞争对手制定避税策略。进一步发现地理距离衰减有利于降低同行业信息收集成本,导致同行业间战略互补反应更显著,即同行业避税政策模仿具有“本土偏好”。本文提供了同行业竞争对企业避税影响的因果关系证据,揭示了同行业竞争者避税行为是企业避税行为的重要影响因素。     

An investigation of Customer Accounting systems as a source of sustainable competitive advantage

This study examines whether using customer accounting systems for resource allocation purposes is a source of sustainable competitive advantage. Based on a longitudinal data set comparing the performance of firms that adopt customer accounting and their industry benchmarks, we find that financial performance increases post adoption, leading to significant abnormal positive performance vis-à-vis average industry benchmarks (4–5%-points ROA difference) in the first two years following the adoption. However, we also show that this effect deteriorates over time, suggesting that the adoption of management accounting systems is a source of temporary rather than sustainable competitive advantage. The results are robust to other strategic events around the time of adoption, different matching of peers, and the influence of other factors that could be expected to influence firm performance. We discuss the implications of these findings for management accounting research and practice.     

Determinants of accounting innovation implementation

Accounting innovations are often not successfully implemented or diffused throughout the organization. This study seeks to explain this phenomenon. One of the major impediments to the successful implementation of accounting innovation is that management accounting systems are generally used to serve the decision control needs of top management while at the same time purportedly supporting the decision management needs of lower level managers. To the extent that the accounting system is used for decision control, innovation creates the potential for wealth effects to occur. This prompts managers, whose wealth will be negatively affected, to resist accounting innovation. We present conditions where it is likely for negative wealth effects to occur. Under these conditions the system will fail to achieve its intended objectives. Our theoretical model examines how decentralization choices influence resistance to accounting innovation. We argue that delegation of decision rights can limit the potential for resistance in two ways—(a) by creating the environment which allows managers to ensure that their subunits are able to adapt to the new signals provided by accounting innovations and (b) by enabling subunit managers to become involved in the design of these systems. Our model also enables us to assess the consequences on organizational outcomes when subunit managers resist accounting innovations. Based on data collected from production managers, our results demonstrate the importance of decentralization choices on the effective implementation of accounting innovations.     

Economic Value Added in performance measurement: A simulation approach and empirical evidence

With increasing criticism on measuring executive performance based primarily on Total Shareholder Return (TSR), some academics and practitioners have revived discussions on using Economic Value Added (EVA) as an alternative. But if EVA failed to gain traction over the past two decades, is there any new evidence for it or different approaches to better implement it in corporate settings? In this study, we start by confirming EVA-related metrics' significant positive relationships with long-term TSR in the Australian market. Our empirical findings also address EVA's major drawback – too much complexity arising from accounting adjustments. Our results suggest that accounting adjustments are generally not necessary, and efforts should be re-directed to designing direct and intuitive plan mechanisms. In addition, we develop a pseudo environment to illustrate EVA's managerial benefits and potential to cultivate sustainable growth. To study this influence, we leverage capital-based simulation techniques and mimic executive decision making under different performance measurement conditions, which was typically only discussed in a qualitative or theoretical sense. We find that EVA-related metrics naturally induce long-term, strategic and sustainable decision making without limiting executives to overly focus on short-term profitability. This simulation approach not only provides quantitative evidence, but also gives practitioners in different market environments an expandable and scalable pseudo framework to test the effect of different incentive plans and inform performance target setting, a useful but often overlooked feature in, for instance, the Australian market, where data is relatively scarce.     

Aligning Performance Measurement Systems With Strategy: The Case of Environmental Strategy

Alignment of an organization's performance measurement system with its strategy is widely advocated as a guiding principle in management control system design. Despite its importance, it is far from clear what strategic alignment of performance measures entails, whether and how organizations achieve it. In this article we explore the alignment of performance measures focusing on firms' use of environmental performance indicators as the consequence of pursuing an environmental strategy. Based on the economic and contingency literatures on management control system design and performance measurement, we propose that the use of such performance measures is a consequence of changing the design of the performance measurement system to accommodate the strategy, and by increasing the informativeness of performance metrics. We test these propositions in a sample of financial managers in manufacturing firms in The Netherlands. We find that alignment to environmental strategy is mostly achieved through the increased quantification of environmental performance measures and via their increased sensitivity to managerial actions.     

Market segmentation,performance differences and strategic orientation - the case of German reinsurers

We apply the concept of strategic groups to the German reinsurance market. We use a cluster analysis to subdivide reinsurance companies into strategic groups and analyze the effect of a set of strategic choice variables on their performance. Furthermore, we examine the impact of the financial crisis of 2008 on the reinsurance sector. Our dataset encompasses 142 firm-year observations for the years 2004 until 2012. Our results indicate the existence of three strategic groups in the German reinsurance market. Moreover, we find that most strategic choice variables that characterize the individual strategic groups affect the reinsurers’ level of performance. Finally, we find that the reinsurers’ performance increased in the aftermath of the financial crisis. This holds in particular for professional reinsurance companies.     

The timeliness of performance information in determining executive compensation

We study whether boards of directors concentrate on performance near compensation decision times rather than providing consistent incentives for chief executive officers (CEO) throughout the fiscal year. We show empirically that managers can profit by moving sales revenue among fiscal quarters. Though this may suggest that boards use short-term trends when determining rewards, we find evidence consistent with boards tying pay to recent sales growth so as to use the best information about future performance. We also find that the timing of profits throughout the year does not affect CEO pay, which may suggest that smoothing firm income is important to CEOs.     

Acquisitions,Overconfident Managers and Self‐attribution Bias

We examine whether acquisitions by overconfident managers generate superior abnormal returns and whether managerial overconfidence stems from self‐attribution. Self‐attribution bias suggests that overconfidence plays a greater role in higher order acquisition deals predicting lower wealth effects for higher order acquisition deals. Using two alternative measures of overconfidence (1) high order acquisition deals and (2) insider dealings we find evidence supporting the view that average stock returns are related to managerial overconfidence. Overconfident bidders realise lower announcement returns than rational bidders and exhibit poor long‐term performance. Second, we find that managerial overconfidence stems from self‐attribution bias. Specifically, we find that high‐order acquisitions (five or more deals within a three‐year period) are associated with lower wealth effects than low‐order acquisitions (first deals). That is, managers tend to credit the initial success to their own ability and therefore become overconfident and engage in more deals. In our analysis we control for endogeneity of the decision to engage in high‐order acquisitions and find evidence that does not support the self‐selection of excessive acquisitive firms. Our analysis is robust to the influence of merger waves, industry shocks, and macroeconomic conditions.