城中村改造的博弈分析

城中村问题是我国城市化进程中的一个特有现象.当前城中村改造的难点在于如何均衡改造参与主体各方利益.本文运用博弈论方法,通过分析改造过程中参与主体政府、村民、开发商三方的利益得失,建立城中村改造博弈模型,得出两种战略均衡组合符合博弈均衡结果,并在此基础上提出三种城中村改造模式.     

财政扶持下的深圳市城中村改造博弈分析

城中村是城市化过程中被城市用地所包围的农村土地,进行城中村改造是城市化进程中一项亟待解决的问题。深圳城中村改造是政府、村居民和开发商的三个主体在博弈中实现利益均衡的过程,通过建立城中村改造的博弈模型,分析在财政扶持城中村改造下三方博弈的均衡,并对深圳城中村改造作了进一步探讨。     

论城中村改造中政府与村民的博弈

我国城中村改造涉及的利益主体有政府、村民和开发商,其中,以政府和村民的权力和权利博弈最为突出.在围绕着征收补偿数额的整个博弈过程中,文章认为主要包括国家利益和个人利益的博弈、政府价格和村民价格的博弈.政府和村民的实际不合作关系,往往使城中村改造工作难以进行下去.文章从共赢的角度出发,提出了包括树立城中村改造的本位理念、重构城中村改造的基本原则、界定城中村改造的权利义务在内的对我国目前城中村改造工作的法律构想.     

城中村村民的自主改造分析

文章试图从经济学的角度对城中村改造进程中三个主体的博弈分析，论述城中村村民在维护自身的权益与提高生活质量的前提下，如何通过自主改造，放眼全局，促使三方博弈最终达到均衡，以求城中村改造的顺利完成。     

城中村改造中的利益关系分析与应对

城中村改造是一个多方的利益博弈过程,利益协调是城中村改造工作的难点所在。文章利用利益相关者分析的方法,对城中村改造中三个主要利益相关者———城市政府、开发商、城中村村民的利益进行了分析,揭示出了改造过程中的主要利益冲突,并得出了明确各自合理利益所在是改造成功的必要前提的结论,在此基础上,针对性地提出了规范政府公权力;确立符合市场经济规则的拆迁补偿机制;建立利于利益相关者参与及权利保障的项目社会评价制度;探索与市场经济条件相适应的安置模式等应对措施。最后介绍了石家庄市的城中村改造工作。     

基于调研和博弈模型分析的城中村改造模式研究——以山西省太原市城中村为例

城中村是我国特有土地所有制下,在快速推进城市化过程中所出现的一种新的社会问题.太原市作为中部省份的省会城市,也夹杂着城市现代化和村庄改造的矛盾与冲突.文章基于实地调研的基础上,试图挖掘太原市城中村改造中存在的问题,并用主体博弈模型的方法来试求均衡解,希望能为城中村改造的实践模式提供启示.     

“城中村”改造中制度安排的选择

在"城中村"改造过程中将涉及到政府、村民和开发商三者的利益冲突与协调,"城中村"改造合理的制度安排将平衡利益主体之间的关系,从动态博弈理论的分析中可得出三种制度选择,即政府主导型、村民自治型和政府、村民、开发商共同改造型,政府部门根据自己的实际情况采取最佳的制度安排。     

国家权力下的土地产权博弈——城中村问题的实质

城中村问题是我国转型经济快速城市化过程中出现的特殊现象。其实质在于:国家权力介入集体土地产权利益分配,形成国家和集体(代表城中村村民)之间的产权博弈。这一问题的解决需要一个渐进过程,国家行政命令式的社会资源配置方式逐渐转化为产权主体之间平等经济权利的交易方式,权力(或权利)与利益需要对等。在城中村集体土地产权博弈过程中,权力与利益的不平衡转换产生了利益冲突。城中村改造需要平衡这种权力与利益的转换,化解冲突。     

利益相关者与城市治理

近日，笔者拜读了河北联合大学王胜本博士的专著《城市治理的架构与机制--一种利益的解析视角》一书，作者以利益相关者参与的角度分析了现代城市治理中各个利益主体的行为机制，构建了城市治理参与主体的博弈模型，为城市治理机制的建立和城市治理各主体间博弈均衡的实现提供了理论指导。同时作者以唐山市为例，深入探讨了城市治理各主体的利益定位和利益目标的实现。     

农转非社区多元主体利益博弈下的协同治理研究——对成都市龙华二期社区治理的考察

现阶段,中国的社区治理正处于权力和资源的重组过程中,命令与控制的被动管理格局逐步被平等、弹性的网络组织结构所取代;传统的单一主体的治理模式向多元治理过渡.在社区各类主体都是"经济人",有自己的偏好和利益诉求,都追求自身利益的最大化,不可能做到完全的理性行为,必然会产生利益非合作博弈.文章是以成都市在"撤村建居"和"城中村"改造中产生的新型"农转非"社区为例,探索各治理主体如何摒弃利益执着,达成互动合作的正和博弈关系的社区治理模式.     

虚拟产业集群的管理创新

虚拟产业集群能否有效地促进企业和区域经济的发展,取决于虚拟产业集群的管理创新。本文从集成管理理论的角度,探讨了虚拟产业集群的概念、独特优势,并提出了虚拟产业集群管理创新的新思路。     

“Large” versus “Small” Players: A Closer Look at the Dynamics of Speculative Attacks

What is the role of “large players” (e.g., hedge funds) in speculative attacks? Recent work suggests that large players move early to induce smaller agents to attack. However, many observers argue that large players move late in order to benefit from interest‐rate differentials. We propose a model in which large players can do both. Using data on currency trading by foreign (large) and local (small) players, we find that foreign players moved last in three attacks on the Norwegian krone during the 1990s. During the attack on the Swedish krona after the Russian moratorium in 1998, foreign players moved early. Gains by delaying attack were small, however, because interest rates did not increase.     

Matching soulmates

We study iterated matching of soulmates (IMS), a recursive process of forming coalitions that are mutually preferred by members to any other coalition containing individuals as yet unmatched by this process. If all players can be matched this way, preferences are IMS-complete. A mechanism is a soulmate mechanism if it allows the formation of all soulmate coalitions. Our model follows Banerjee, Konishi, and Sönmez, except reported preferences are strategic variables. We investigate the incentive and stability properties of soulmate mechanisms. In contrast to prior literature, we do not impose conditions that ensure IMS-completeness. A fundamental result is that, (1) any group of players who could change their reported preferences and mutually benefit does not contain any players who were matched as soulmates and reported their preferences truthfully. As corollaries, (2) for any IMS-complete profile, soulmate mechanisms have a truthful strong Nash equilibrium, and (3) as long as all players matched as soulmates report their preferences truthfully, there is no incentive for any to deviate. Moreover, (4) soulmate coalitions are invariant core coalitions—that is, any soulmate coalition will be a coalition in every outcome in the core. To accompany our theoretical results, we present real-world data analysis and simulations that highlight the prevalence of situations in which many, but not all, players can be matched as soulmates. In the Appendix we relate IMS to other well-known coalition formation processes.     

虚拟创新集群形成路径与动力机制研究

随着科学技术加速发展以及科技创新竞争日趋激烈,虚拟创新集群已成为创新的一个重要途径。首先,从集群认知、主体互动及合作行为3个视角分析了虚拟创新集群形成路径,界定了虚拟创新集群成型状态特征;其次,从内在驱动力、外部推动力、集成内力3方面分析了虚拟创新集群形成的动力机制。在此基础上,构建了动力因素对虚拟创新集群的影响模型。实证研究发现政府推动、成员质量、成员关系以及创新精神4个因素在集群形成过程中发挥重要作用。     

Welfare effects of payment truncation in piece rate tournaments

This article analyzes the optimal response of a principal to the regulatory proposal which would truncate agents’ bonus payment in a piece rate tournament at zero. In a model with risk-neutral and heterogenous abilities agents, we analyze the principal’s problem of optimal choice of contract parameters under both regular and truncated tournament scenarios. The results show that the principal could significantly mitigate potential welfare losses due to tournament truncation by adjusting the payment scheme. The optimal adaptation to tournament truncation results in a situation where both higher and lower ability players would benefit from the policy while average ability players would lose.     

公司声誉对公司效益影响的实证分析——基于“中国最佳雇主Top100”评选结果

根据"中国最佳雇主Top100"的排名结果,采用统计方法将声誉排名量化,并以净资产收益率和主营业务资产收益率作为上市公司效益的代理变量,采用相关分析和多元回归分析方法,利用样本上市公司的数据,对公司声誉和公司效益之间的关系进行实证检验。研究显示:公司声誉可促进公司后期效益的提升;获得声誉的公司的盈余持续性较强;声誉能够降低公司后期财务效益对前期财务效益的敏感程度和依赖性。     

Elimination contests with collusive team players

We consider a standard two-stage elimination (Tullock) contest where multiple (team) players can perfectly and publicly collude with each other throughout. We analyze and compare equilibrium outcomes under various seedings where the collusive players meet or are separated in the group stage. We identify the impact of collusion on the contest organizer and non-collusive players, as well as the organizer's optimal seeding. We find that collusion, while always undermining fairness of the competition, can hurt or benefit the organizer, depending on the discriminatory powers of the two stages. We also discuss issues such as sequential group-stage competitions, comparison between the elimination contest and the corresponding one-shot contest, secret collusion, and large discriminatory powers.     

Rock Paper Scissors

Rock Paper Scissors is used to resolve conflict when a compromise is not possible. Individuals playing ``games' tend to have biases they prefer to play. I show that Rock Paper Scissors with biased players results in a player with a high valuation for winning being victorious with a probability greater than a player with a low valuation. Thus, it frequently achieves the efficient outcome. Furthermore, as the benefit to victory increases for all players, victory for each player becomes equally likely. Therefore, it is often efficient for minor conflicts while it performs no better than a coin-flip for major conflicts.      

Learning and sophistication in coordination games

This paper studies the role of strategic teaching in coordination games and whether changing the incentives of players to teach leads to more efficient coordination. We ran experiments where subjects played one of four coordination games in constant pairings, where the incentives to teach were varied along two dimensions—the short run cost of teaching and the long run benefit to teaching. We show which aspects of the game lead subjects to adopt long run teaching strategies, and show that subjects try to manipulate their opponent’s actions to pull them out of a situation of coordination failure. We also show that extending a model of decision making by introducing a forward-looking component helps to track teachers’ behaviour more accurately, and describes the way players behave in a more unified way across both teachers and learners.     

B2C模式下转换成本对网上顾客忠诚影响实证研究

基于转换成本的视角,本文构建了一个影响网上顾客忠诚的概念模型。实证研究表明,网络程序转换成本、网络财务转换成本与网络关系转换成本这三种网络转换成本均正向影响网上顾客的行为忠诚度,只有网络财务转换成本和网络关系转换成本正向影响网上顾客的态度忠诚度。三种类型转换成本的构成因子对顾客的态度忠诚和行为忠诚的影响机理是不同的:利益损失成本、个人关系损失成本和品牌关系损失成本起着正向影响顾客态度忠诚的作用;评估成本、学习成本、利益损失成本和品牌关系损失成本起着正向影响顾客行为忠诚的作用。