On the Regulation of Social Norms

A model is developed to understand how norms can be influencedby "norm entrepreneurs," for example, lawmakers, governmentagencies, unions, etc. Two instruments of influencing the dynamicsof norm-following behavior are analyzed, namely transformingthe (monetary) incentives and changing the meaning or the reputationalvalue of following a norm. Both forms of norm regulation areincorporated into Akerlof's model of social custom (1980), andthe comparative static properties of norm destruction and normcreation for different types of norms are derived. In particular,it is shown how norms should be regulated when almost everybodyfollows them and when they take the form of bandwagon and snobnorms.     

Optimal Redistribution with Endogenous Social Norms

In this paper, we examine the effect of social norms on redistributive policies, where social norms are reflected in the degree of work participation among the different skill classes. Participation is driven both by the material incentives and heterogeneous preferences for leisure of each skill class, and by an endogenous social norm. Results for optimal redistributive taxation show that when the social norm enters as a benefit or cost for participants, participation taxes are generally lower than in its absence. Multiple participation equilibria can occur, and an engineered shift from a low‐ to a high‐participation equilibrium can be Pareto‐improving in the long run.     

Social Norms and Private Provision of Public Goods

The formation of social norms for voluntary contributions to a public good is analyzed in a game in which people have preferences for private consumption, a public good, and social approval. Each person chooses to be one of the two types: a contributor or a non‐contributor. Thereafter, each person meets people who can observe his type. A non‐contributor feels disapproval, whereas a contributor feels approval if he believes that a contributor observes his type. The game has two asymptotically stable states: one in which everybody is a contributor, and one in which nobody is a contributor. Governmental subsidization of the public good can move the society to the former state, whereas a governmental contribution to the public good can move the society to the latter. Indeed, this crowding in or crowding out prevails even after policy reversal.     

集体行动与社会规范的演进

文章描述了达成集体行动基础的两条研究路径,一是关注实验研究提供的证据及其可能的理论解释;二是考察真实世界的经验证据。关于集体行动的这两条研究路径是很活跃的研究领域,出现了很多重要的研究成果。其中一个重要的发现是,世界上的人有许多类型,有一些人会比另一些人更愿意为了集体行动的潜在收益而发起互惠行动。因此,一个核心的问题是,潜在的合作者如何相互发出信号,以及如何设计制度以促成而不是破坏有条件的合作。尽管还没有完全成熟的理论面世,不过,基于演化的一些理论对各种基于实验或者田野调查的研究发现的解释力也许是最强大的,因而有可能成为这一领域的核心理论。     

社会排斥对地位消费行为倾向的影响

情境因素会导致消费者心理状态发生变化,对他们后续消费行为产生影响。基于自我肯定理论,本文探讨了社会排斥这一情境因素对消费者地位消费行为倾向的影响机理,认为消费者需要借助地位消费行为带来的自我肯定效用,以提升由社会排斥导致的自我价值感知威胁而诱发的自尊感知下降。以MBA、公司员工、在校本科生为被试,通过四项实验研究,本文发现,社会排斥能对消费者的地位消费行为倾向产生促进作用;此促进作用通过自我价值感知和自尊感知的链式中介效应传导;遭遇社会排斥后,若获得其他途径的自我肯定机会,则此促进作用会减弱。     

Conspicuous Consumption and Social Segmentation

This paper develops the idea that conspicuous consumption has an impact on social segmentation, i.e., on the partition of the society into communities. Even though agents do not value conspicuous goods per se, they are competing in a signalling race in order to benefit from social interactions within a community. First, we study the equilibria of this model defining the optimal strategies and the equilibrium partition that characterizes pooling and separating equilibria. In a second step, as conspicuous consumption is a pure waste of money, we study a possible Pareto–improving taxation policy.     

Spatial Evolution of Social Norms in a Common-Pool Resource Game

We study the conditions for the emergence of cooperation in a spatial common-pool resource (CPR) game. We consider three types of agents: cooperators, defectors and enforcers. The role of enforcers is to punish defectors for overharvesting the resource. Agents are located on a circle and they only observe the actions of their two nearest neighbors. Their payoffs are determined by both local and global interactions and they modify their actions by imitating the strategy in their neighborhood with the highest average payoffs on average. Using theoretical and numerical analysis, we find a large diversity of equilibria to be the outcome of the game. In particular, we find conditions for the occurrence of equilibria in which the three strategies coexist. We also derive the stability of these equilibria. Finally, we show that introducing resource dynamics in the system favors the occurrence of cooperative equilibria.      

我国居民不同收入群体的消费需求研究

我国改革开放以来,在居民总体收入逐渐增加的同时,居民的收入差距有所扩大,由此形成了高、中、低三个不同的收入群体。不同的收入群体有自己不同的消费特征,其对消费需求的影响也是不同的。认识和掌握各收入群体的消费特点和他们对消费需求的影响,有利于采取相应的对策,引导和鼓励他们的消费。     

Long-run Study of Residential Water Consumption

The estimation of dynamic models and themeasure of long-run effects arerare in residential water demand studies. Weshow in this paper that a dynamicmodel of water consumption can be derived froma structural optimisation programsolved by local communities. Thisnonlinear model is estimated on asample of French municipalities and is foundasymptotically equivalent to a dynamic panel data model that is linear in theparameters. The latter includes anoriginal error-component structure that allowsfor a flexible heterogeneity pattern, including both the usual idiosyncraticeffect, and an additional individualeffect affected by a multiplicative time-varyingparameter. As usual GMM estimators for panel data are not consistent inthis case, we propose a new GMMprocedure that yields consistent and efficientestimates of short- and long-runprice elasticities (respectively −0.26 and−0.40).     

Public Goods,Social Norms,and Naïve Beliefs

An individual's contribution to a public good may be seen by others as a signal of attributes such as generosity or wealth. An individual may, therefore, choose their contribution so as to send an appropriate signal to others. In this paper, we question how the inferences made by others will influence the amount contributed to the public good. Evidence suggests that individuals are naïve and biased toward taking things at “face value.” We contrast, therefore, contributions made to a public good if others are expected to make rational inferences versus contributions if others are expected to make naïve inferences.     

Social Norms and the Time Allocation of Women's Labor in Burkina Faso

This paper proposes that major determinants of allocation of women's time are social norms that regulate the economic activities of women. The emphasis on norms contrasts with approaches that view time allocation as determined by household-level economic variables. Using data from Burkina Faso, it is shown that social norms significantly explain differences in patterns of time allocation between two ethnic groups: Mossi and Bwa. Econometric results show women from the two groups exhibiting different responses to changes in farm capital. Implications are that policies changing social norms may have more permanent effects on altering women's behavior.     

完善社会保障促进居民消费

一、社会保障体系不健全导致消费需求不足中国的社会保障体系已建立了几十年，这套保障体系社会覆盖面小，保障功能欠缺，还带有计划经济的烙印，难以适应市场经济的需要。第一，它是“单位保险”。除了国家预算的抚恤和社会救济支出外，绝大部分社会保障费用都是由单位掌握，由单位向本单位职工提供福利补助津贴。这使筹集社会保障基金的压力几乎全部落到企业头上，大大加重了企业的负担。特别是老企业，离退休职工多，养老金和医疗费用支出大，负担加重，失去了社会保险应有的调剂功能。如果企业经营不善，一旦破产倒闭，不仅在职职工失业…     

完善社会保障与促进消费的关系研究

文章在总结国内外社会保障与消费关系理论研究的基础上,对我国一段时期社会保障与消费的实证分析证明了社会保障与消费具有极强的相关性,而业已滞后的社保体系建设已经成为中国经济增长动力向消费需求切换的最大瓶颈。通过对我国构建社会保障体系的条件和困境的分析,提出了完善社会保障促进消费的对策建议。     

The Relevance of the Group for the Evolution of Social Norms and Values

Social group selection is explored as a scheme for the evolution of institutions giving rise to coordination and cooperation. Its crucial characteristic is the formation of psychic ties between group members which further the compliance with institutions by causing individuals to systematically underrate both the benefits of rule-breaking and the costs of rule-enforcement. With regard to the relationship between groups, these ties allow for the evolution of cooperation by enhancing selective forces acting between groups over those acting within. The resulting set of institutions represents a spontaneous order since neither perfect knowledge nor goodwill of any actor are required.     

社会规范与创业——基于62个国家创业数据的分析

本文研究社会规范对创业活动的影响,从影响大小、影响边界、影响机制层层深入,剖析社会规范对创业的激活效应、国家经济发展水平的调节作用以及内在传导机制。匹配和合并全球创业观察等四大国际性数据库62个国家、5年的615116份创业数据,通过工具变量Probit回归结果发现:(1)社会规范对创业活动具有显著促进作用;(2)在经济发展水平较低的国家,塑造良好、支持性的社会规范对创业具有更强的促进作用;(3)社会规范通过促进潜在创业者感知机会、承担风险、提高技能和拓展网络四方面的中介传导机制,进一步激活创业活动;(4)社会规范对创业的影响甚至超过一些正式制度因素对创业的影响。本研究显著拓展了制度理论特别是国家非正式制度影响微观创业的发现,对通过国家制度顶层设计激活创业、优化创业结构具有重要启示。     

试析社会保障对中国农村居民消费的影响

完善农村社会保障体系,促进农民收入增长,是解决三农问题的关键。影响中国农村居民消费的最为直接的仍然是收入问题,然农村社会保障体系的建立对于化解农村居民所面临的来自于自然、社会、市场等等风险,缓解收入不确定性的作用日益凸显,成为继收入之后影响农村居民消费的最重要因素,随着社会前进经济的日益发展,社会保障对农村居民消费的影响作用必将进一步彰显。     

社会水资源利用的投入产出研究

传统的水资源投入产出表的计量主体多样,单位不一,不仅难以直观体现水资源的投入产出关系,也不利于统计计算。文章提出水资源投入产出表一种新的编制思路,建立其中的投入产出模型,并在此基础上设计了社会水资源利用结构、产业水资源生产力、产业水环境冲击影响三种社会水资源利用评价指标。     

消费和社会投资的互动关系

目前投资领域开始出现政府投资与社会投资共同拉动经济增长,但政府投资的拉动作用仍略强于社会投资;而消费领域出现的却是政府消费率上升与居民消费率保持低位;外需对经济增长的贡献率起伏不定。我国经济增长动力机制应由目前的投资主导型转向居民消费、社会投资合力来推动。     

收入差距、位置消费与社会稳定

适度、合理的收入差距,不仅是激励人们竞争,促进发展的重要务件,也是位置消费产生的基本条件;但过分悬殊的收入差距则不仅会影响人们的社会心理,不利于提高有效消费,而且可能产生畸形的位置消费行为,甚至会因此影响社会的稳定.在分析和研究目前收入分配问题时,应当从位置消费的新视角研究它们对社会稳定的影响.研究位置消费有利于我们从人们相互比较的满意度中观察改革的效果,权衡各项利弊得失,并及时地采取微调措施,尽可能地减少改革的摩擦和阻力.     

The Dynamic Effects of Social Security on Individual Consumption, Wealth and Welfare

This paper presents a theoretical investigation of the dynamic effects of social security on individual consumption, wealth and welfare. The framework of analysis is Yaari's (1965) life–cycle model of saving with uncertain lifetime and borrowing constraint. A simple uniform social security system as well as an actuarially fair and fully funded social security system is considered. The presence of terminal wealth depletion is shown to play a pivotal role not only in the derivation of the results but also in the outcome of the analysis.