Spatial random utility model with an application to recreation demand

The paper examines the relevance of unobserved spatial dependence between individual decision-makers in the analysis of discrete choices. To incorporate spatial interdependencies in the behavioral analysis, we propose a spatial random utility model of recreation demand. The model combines the set-theoretic concept of spatial neighborhood, endogeneity of spatial interdependencies, and unobservable individual preferences. Our estimation procedure uses an efficient pseudo maximum likelihood estimator. We apply the model to the study of recreational travel demand in Iowa and evaluate the significance of unobserved spatial interdependencies between individual households in recreational travel choices.     

Applied Welfare Economics with Bounded Rationality: Public Policies Toward Remote Sensing

Earlier experimental evidence indicates that some decision makers under-invest in information when it is costly. This insight is applied to the cost–benefit analysis of the provision of data obtained by satellites. In fields like agriculture, remotely sensed information of great precision can be provided to additional farmers at minimal extra costs if a service for farmers with similar information needs is set up. Here, the tendency to under-invest in information asks for creative solutions by the private sector: bankers may work together with rational producers in setting up the information service and promoting it. However, if producers financial resources are insufficient, public intervention, in the form of a free information service may be necessary.The author would like to thank an anonymous referee, Stephan von Cramon-Taubadel, Sean Flynn, Daniel Heller, and Carlos Lenz and participants of the Lisbon Conference of the International Atlantic Economic Society, particularly Asatoshi Maeshiro, for helpful comments.     

Intertemporal price discrimination in infinite horizon

In infinite horizon, a credible durable-good monopolist may resort to intertemporal price discrimination. We provide an analytical characterization of his optimal price policy when consumers and the monopolist have different values for the trade because of distinct discount factors.     

Viscous demand

In many markets, demand adjusts slowly to changes in prices, i.e., demand is “viscous”. This viscosity gives each firm some monopoly power, since it can raise its price above that of its competitors without immediately losing all of its customers. The resulting equilibrium pricing behavior and market outcomes can differ significantly from what one would predict in the absence of demand viscosity. In particular, the model explains the importance of market share as an investment, as well as “kinked demand curves”. It also explains how apparently “competitive” pricing behavior can lead to outcomes that mimic those of collusion.     

When is multidimensional screening a convex program?

A principal wishes to transact business with a multidimensional distribution of agents whose preferences are known only in the aggregate. Assuming a twist (= generalized Spence-Mirrlees single-crossing) hypothesis, quasi-linear utilities, and that agents can choose only pure strategies, we identify a structural condition on the value b(x,y) of product type y to agent type x — and on the principal?s costs c(y) — which is necessary and sufficient for reducing the profit maximization problem faced by the principal to a convex program. This is a key step toward making the principal?s problem theoretically and computationally tractable; in particular, it allows us to derive uniqueness and stability of the principal?s optimal strategy — and similarly of the strategy maximizing the expected welfare of the agents when the principal?s profitability is constrained. We call this condition non-negative cross-curvature: it is also (i) necessary and sufficient to guarantee convexity of the set of b-convex functions, (ii) invariant under reparametrization of agent and/or product types by diffeomorphisms, and (iii) a strengthening of Ma, Trudinger and Wang?s necessary and sufficient condition (A3w) for continuity of the correspondence between an exogenously prescribed distribution of agents and of products. We derive the persistence of economic effects such as the desirability for a monopoly to establish prices so high they effectively exclude a positive fraction of its potential customers, in nearly the full range of non-negatively cross-curved models.     

Is diversity in Delphi panelist groups useful? Evidence from a French forecasting exercise on the future of nuclear energy

This paper further enhances the analytical power of Delphi methodology by identifying the advantages, disadvantages and challenges presented by increasing diversity among panel groups. Using Delphi survey data on the future of nuclear energy in France, we analyze the origins of the variety of judgments within and between two panels: one of experts and one of laypeople. We investigate the determinants of the stability of those opinions both in one given round and over several rounds of opinion-formation. We reach an apparently paradoxical conclusion: that non-expert judgment is less stable, but not necessarily less accurate, than that of experts, judgments on the part of experts sometimes being clouded by self-interest. Apart from highlighting some factors underlying the controversy over nuclear power, our paper calls for greater participatory democracy in Delphi panels, but also demonstrates the limits of such an extension.     

Coexistence of GM and non-GM crops with endogenously determined separation

The possibility that genetically modified (GM) crops may contaminate non-GM crops through pollen-mediated gene flow presents a challenge to coexistence of GM agriculture with conventional and organic farming systems. In this paper an analytical model of coexistence is developed that allows for endogenous derivation of efficient widths and allocation of pollen barriers to limit contamination of non-GM crops. To reflect the uncertainty that surrounds pollen dispersal mechanisms the model contains a stochastic contamination function and safety rule decision mechanism, constraining the level of contamination to remain below a tolerated adventitious presence with a given probability. Two policies are considered and their performance is tested: the tolerance level of adventitious presence, and the allocation of responsibility for implementing coexistence measures to either GM or non-GM farmers. The relative size of GM rents (the value of productivity gains and the non-pecuniary benefits from GM crops), rents for identity preserved non-GM crops (price premiums realised over the GM crop price), characteristics of farms, and possible variation in agricultural landscapes are also taken into account. The findings indicate that conventional adventitious presence tolerances can be met without ex ante mandating large widths of pollen barriers. At the policy level, the findings of this paper are relevant for setting region-specific pollen barriers widths, and/or for establishing institutions that facilitate cooperative coexistence.     

Tax enforcement,tax compliance and tax morale in transition economies: A theoretical model

The focus of this paper is the analysis of the relationship between tax enforcement, tax compliance and tax morale within countries characterised by rapid introduction of market institutions and slow evolution of political regimes, such as transition economies. The paper investigates a coordination game in which the government is ex-ante committed to tax enforcement and can observe the proportion of tax-compliant agents in the economy. In turn, two groups of agents (third-party reporting and self-reported income) are keen to evade taxes unlawfully but have limited information on how many others evade taxes; their tax morale is therefore an endogenous function of agents' perception on tax compliance. The model predicts that the lower the quality of political institutions and the weaker tax morale, the less tax compliance can be achieved. The third-party reporting group will also be bearing higher tax burden than the self-reported income group. The model entails that having political institutions of good quality is not a sufficient condition to conduce to tax enforcement or tax compliance. Due to the endogenous role of tax morale, the government could be pushed ex-post towards poor or no tax enforcement. If good political institutions are not accompanied by good information about the enforcement of tax collection, there is scope for co-existence of poor tax enforcement, low tax compliance and weak tax morale. As such, this model well describes the tax evasion behaviour observed since the outset of transition from planned to market economy.     

A contest with the taxman - the impact of tax rates on tax evasion and wastefully invested resources

We develop a moral hazard model with auditing where both the principal and the agent can influence the probability that the true state of nature is verified. This setting is widely applicable for situations where fraudulent reporting with costly state verification takes place. However, we use the framework to investigate tax evasion. We model tax evasion as a concealment-detection contest between the taxpayer and the authority. We show that higher tax rates cause more evasion and increase the resources wasted in the contest. Additionally, we find conditions under which a government should enforce incentive compatible auditing in order to reduce wasted resources.     

Precaution under mixed uncertainty: Implications for environmental management

A model of pollution control subject to two types of uncertainty is presented. First, the natural decay of the pollution stock follows stochastic dynamics that drives a diffusion pollution process (“stochastic uncertainty”). Moreover, the damage coefficient which determines the amount of damage corresponding to each pollution stock can undergo an abrupt increase at some uncertain future time (“event uncertainty”). The model admits an explicit and simple dynamic characterization of the optimal emission rule and the ensuing pollution process. When only one type of uncertainty is permitted (by setting either the variance of the stochastic process or the hazard rate for the damage increase to zero) it acts to promote the intuitive response of precaution. However, allowing the two types to interact gives rise to a non-monotonic behavior, whereby increasing the stochastic variance first enhances, then diminishes the response to the hazard. The results confirm and expand recent findings based on discrete-time formulations.     

Global stability condition on the plane: A general law of demand

It is well known that global stability of competitive equilibrium obtains only under quite stringent restrictions. This paper identifies a set of restrictions which may be interpreted as a very weak form of the so-called Law of Demand and shows how this may imply global stability for motion on the plane. It is also of some interest that this condition is satisfied by a perturbed version of the celebrated Scarf example which does not satisfy existing conditions for global stability.     

A test of monopoly price dispersion under demand uncertainty

A test of the predictions of Dana’s (2001) model of monopoly price dispersion under demand uncertainty using ticket price data from Major League Baseball shows that ticket price dispersion changes systematically with demand uncertainty, verifying the predictions of the model.     

Are the Energy Efficiency Technologies efficient?

This paper investigates a rather neglected issue regarding the impact of Energy Efficiency Technologies (EETs) on firms' productive performance. Possible influences may arise in the context of internal cost of adjustment, learning by doing effects and the capital vintage. A unique dataset was used which has resulted from a survey carried out among a sample of Greek EET adopters in the manufacturing sector. An econometric framework based on nested non-neutral frontiers, was developed to estimate the influence and the decomposition of EETs on firms' productive performance. The empirical findings reveal that the EETs affect positively the firms' technical efficiency and negatively the deterministic part of the frontier. Significant variations among industries and size groups appear to be present. Some policy implications are derived based on the empirical evidence supporting a mix of energy and technology directions.     

The monopolist is not the best environmentalist’s best friend: An example

This letter addresses the second-degree price discrimination issue when a monopolized product is tied with environmental quality. The monopolist may degrade environmental quality too much when marginal valuations of environmental quality and the good itself are positively related across consumers.     

Multilateral institutions for international economic policy coordination: bargaining vs voting

We study a world economy where worldwide policy coordination is essential to optimally stabilize unfavorable common supply shocks. We develop a two-stage game to investigate how to implement the first-best response to these shocks via a multilateral institution, whose board of directors is composed of a representative per each member country. In a first stage, national governments nominate their representatives on the board. In a second stage, the board collectively chooses stabilization policies. We compare the relative merits of two collective choice mechanisms – bargaining and majority voting – in avoiding manipulation of the cooperative agreement through the strategic nomination of national representatives.     

Carbon tax simulations using a household demand model

The main objective of this paper is to analyse consumer response and welfare effects due to changes in energy or environmental policy. To achieve this objective we formulate and estimate an econometric model for non-durable consumer demand in Sweden that utilises micro- and macro-data. In the simulations, we consider two revenue neutral scenarios that both imply a doubling of the CO₂ tax; one that returns the revenues in the form of a lower VAT and one that subsidise public transport. One conclusion from the simulations is that the CO₂ tax has regional distribution effects, in the sense that household living in sparsely populated areas carry a larger share of the tax burden.     

Amenity driven price effects and conservation reserve site selection: A dynamic linear integer programming approach

Most conservation reserve design models presented in the literature are static and ignore the dynamic economic aspects of site selection. Typically conservation programs operate under time-related (e.g. annual) budgets and purchase land over time in a sequential manner. The uncertainty of land development has been incorporated in a few dynamic reserve selection formulations using stochastic dynamic programming. However, the existing formulations do not explicitly deal with inter-temporal price and location linkages. We address this issue here and present a two-period linear integer programming model for conservation reserve design that incorporates amenity driven price feedback effects inherent in the reserve development problem. In addition, the model includes spatial and ecological criteria. We then use this model to answer the question “How suboptimal is ignoring amenity driven price effects in reserve design models?” We apply the model to artificially generated data sets and compare the results with the results of an iterated static model that considers only one period at a time. We find that the dynamic model with price feedback effects selects sites at a lower per-site cost. The policy implication of this finding is that conservation programs should avoid purchasing land in the same neighborhood over multiple time periods.     

A CLASS OF PERFORMANCE‐BASED SUBSIDY RULES*

We consider a benchmark static incentive scheme, i.e. a per unit subsidy, that induces a monopoly to produce a target output level. We show that the same output level can be achieved by a continuum of dynamic subsidy rules based on a performance indicator. The rules require only local information. The present value of the subsidies paid is smaller than the amount paid under the static subsidy. Each of the dynamic subsidy rules results at each moment in a lower per unit subsidy than the static subsidy. The subsidy rate depends on a state variable that reflects the monopolist's performance history.