Survival and the art of profit maximization

We study the relationship between rationality and economic survival in a simple dynamic model, where agents from different populations interact repeatedly through random matching. An explicit criterion (“bankruptcy”) determines whether agents survive each interaction; all agents are presumed to be aware of this criterion. Survival in each interaction depends on two factors: the strategies agents adopt when they interact, and the wealth levels they bring to the game. The model is completely symmetric with the only difference between the agents of different populations being their objectives. We consider the case where there are two populations of agents in which all agents from one group have as their objective, maximizing the expected profits from each interaction, while all agents from the other attempt simply to maximize the probability of surviving (i.e., not going bankrupt in) the interaction. We show that under the equilibrium dynamics, the proportions of each group in the total population must be bounded away from zero, but the balance is in favor of the survival-probability maximizers in that their numbers as a fraction of total population must always exceed 1/2, and can be arbitrarily close to unity. On the other hand, the fraction of total wealth controlled by the expected profit maximizers must also be at least 1/2, and can asymptotically tend to unity.     

A note on the multiple partners assignment game

In the assignment game of Shapley and Shubik [Shapley, L.S., Shubik, M., 1972. The assignment game. I. The core, International Journal of Game Theory 1, 11–130] agents are allowed to form one partnership at most. That paper proves that, in the context of firms and workers, given two stable payoffs for the firms there is a stable payoff which gives each firm the larger of the two amounts and also one which gives each of them the smaller amount. Analogous result applies to the workers. Sotomayor [Sotomayor, M., 1992. The multiple partners game. In: Majumdar, M. (Ed.), Dynamics and Equilibrium: Essays in Honor to D. Gale. Mcmillian, pp. 322–336] extends this analysis to the case where both types of agents may form more than one partnership and an agent's payoff is multi-dimensional. Instead, this note concentrates in the total payoff of the agents. It is then proved the rather unexpected result that again the maximum of any pair of stable payoffs for the firms is stable but the minimum need not be, even if we restrict the multiplicity of partnerships to one of the sides.     

Erratum to “Do pure indivisibilities prevent core equivalence? Core equivalence theorem in an atomless economy with purely indivisible commodities only” [J. Math. Econ. 41 (4–5) (2005) 571–601]

We consider a pure exchange economy with a continuum of agents and finitely many indivisible commodities. Every commodity can be consumed only in integer amounts. Thus, agents’ preferences are locally satiated and no commodity bundle has necessarily local cheaper points. We introduce a core which is an intermediate concept between the strong core and the weak core. In our economy, this core is the most natural concept in the sense that it coincides with the set of all exactly feasible Walras allocations.     

An analysis of the effect of noise in a heterogeneous agent financial market model

Heterogeneous agent models (HAMs) in finance and economics are often characterised by high dimensional nonlinear stochastic differential or difference systems. Because of the complexity of the interaction between the nonlinearities and noise, a commonly used, often called indirect, approach to the study of HAMs combines theoretical analysis of the underlying deterministic skeleton with numerical analysis of the stochastic model. However, it is well known that this indirect approach may not properly characterise the nature of the stochastic model. This paper aims to tackle this issue by developing a direct and analytical approach to the analysis of a stochastic model of speculative price dynamics involving two types of agents, fundamentalists and chartists, and the market price equilibria of which can be characterised by the stationary measures of a stochastic dynamical system. Using the stochastic method of averaging and stochastic bifurcation theory, we show that the stochastic model displays behaviour consistent with that of the underlying deterministic model when the time lag in the formation of price trends used by the chartists is far away from zero. However, when this lag approaches zero, such consistency breaks down.     

Efficient trading with nonlinear utility

In an environment in which agents have nonlinear utility and sufficiently asymmetric initial endowments, we show that efficient trading is achievable. This result is in contrast with Myerson and Satterthwaite (1983), which shows efficient trading is not possible if agents have linear utility and asymmetric initial endowments. Our result is also different from Cramton et al. (1987), in which they maintain the linear utility assumption as in Myerson and Satterthwaite but assume that traders’ initial endowments are relatively symmetric.     

On preferences over subsets and the lattice structure of stable matchings

This paper studies the structure of stable multipartner matchings in two-sided markets where choice functions are quotafilling in the sense that they satisfy the substitutability axiom and, in addition, fill a quota whenever possible. It is shown that (i) the set of stable matchings is a lattice under the common revealed preference orderings of all agents on the same side, (ii) the supremum (infimum) operation of the lattice for each side consists componentwise of the join (meet) operation in the revealed preference ordering of the agents on that side, and (iii) the lattice has the polarity, distributivity, complementariness and full-quota properties. Received: 5 March 1999 / Accepted: 12 May 2000     

The not-so-secret-agent: Professional monitors,hierarchies and implementation

Abstract. It is well-known that, when agents in an organization possess private information that is unverifiable by an outside party, games where agents simply announce their information can have multiple equilibria that may impede the successful implementation of the organization's objectives. We show that the introduction of a professional monitor (e.g. auditor, regulator, supervisor) can help to destroy the “bad' equilibria when agents have private information but have incomplete info rmation about others' information. Received: 21 May 1998 / Accepted: 26 May 2000     

Bilateral matching with Latin squares

We develop a general procedure to construct pairwise meeting processes characterized by two features. First, in each period the process maximizes the number of matches in the population. Second, over time agents meet everybody else exactly once. We call this type of meetings “absolute strangers.” Our methodological contribution to economics is to offer a simple procedure to construct a type of decentralized trading environments usually employed in both theoretical and experimental economics. In particular, we demonstrate how to make use of the mathematics of Latin squares to enrich the modeling of matching economies.     

Testing the Correlated Random Coefficient Model

The recent literature on instrumental variables (IV) features models in which agents sort into treatment status on the basis of gains from treatment as well as on baseline-pretreatment levels. Components of the gains known to the agents and acted on by them may not be known by the observing economist. Such models are called correlated random coe cient models. Sorting on unobserved components of gains complicates the interpretation of what IV estimates. This paper examines testable implications of the hypothesis that agents do not sort into treatment based on gains. In it, we develop new tests to gauge the empirical relevance of the correlated random coe cient model to examine whether the additional complications associated with it are required. We examine the power of the proposed tests. We derive a new representation of the variance of the instrumental variable estimator for the correlated random coefficient model. We apply the methods in this paper to the prototypical empirical problem of estimating the return to schooling and nd evidence of sorting into schooling based on unobserved components of gains.     

Modelling security market events in continuous time: Intensity based,multivariate point process models

A continuous time econometric modelling framework for multivariate financial market event (or ‘transactions’) data is developed in which the model is specified via the vector conditional intensity. Generalised Hawkes models are introduced that incorporate inhibitory events and dependence between trading days. Novel omnibus specification tests based on a multivariate random time change theorem are proposed. A bivariate point process model of the timing of trades and mid-quote changes is then presented for a New York Stock Exchange stock and related to the market microstructure literature. The two-way interaction of trades and quote changes in continuous time is found to be important empirically.     

The foundation of stability in extensive games with perfect information

This paper studies the decision-theoretic foundation for the notion of stability in the dynamic context of strategic interaction. We formulate and show that common knowledge of rationality implies a “stable” pattern of behavior in extensive games with perfect information. In the “generic” case, our approach is consistent with Aumann’s [Aumann, R.J., 1995. Backward induction and common knowledge of rationality. Games and Economic Behavior 8, 6–19] result that common knowledge of rationality leads to the backward induction outcome.     

Heuristic learning and the discovery of specialization and exchange

I develop and calibrate an agent-based model of boundedly rational, adaptive agents in a two-good production and exchange economy to replicate human-subject outcomes in the same eight-person experimental economy. To test agents’ ability to capture human behavior, I extend the model and use its output to make predictions about a second experimental environment in which the group of eight agents is slowly constructed by merging smaller groups. This environment improves human-subject performance in the specialization and exchange task, and commensurate improvement emerges for some parameterizations of the agent-based model. This iterative process yields incremental improvement of decision-level theories about economic discovery.     

Staring at the Abyss: a neurocognitive grounded agent-based model of collective-risk social dilemma under the threat of environmental disaster

Increasingly visible climate change consequences challenge carbon-based economies worldwide. While expert knowledge on climate change percolates through political initiatives and public awareness, its translation into large-scale policy actions appears limited. Climate change consequences unequally target regions, countries and social classes, a vital issue for social cooperation. When facing an imminent ecological collapse, in which conditions can self-interested agents gain environmental awareness and settle on a sustainable path of actions when their knowledge of the imminent collapse is bounded? This cooperation emerges from the interaction between individuals and the interaction of various cognitive processes within individuals. This article develops an agent-based model for this emergence of cooperation enriched with the Agent Zero neurocognitive grounded cognitive architecture. We investigate when agents endowed with deliberative, affective and social modules can settle on actions that safeguard their environment through numerical simulations. Our results show that cooperation on sustainable actions is the strongest when the system is at the edge of collapse. Policy measures that increase the environment’s resilience become internalized by the agents and undermine awareness of the ecological catastrophe. Depending on the cognitive channels activated, agent behaviors and reactions to specific interventions significantly vary. Our analysis suggests that taking different cognitive channels, deliberative, affective, social, and others into account, significantly impact results. The complexity of agent cognition deserves more attention to assess parameter sensitivity in social simulation models.

     

A study of proportionality and robustness in economies with a commonly owned technology

Abstract. Studying one-input one-output economies, we say that an allocation is proportional if the input-output ratio is identical among agents and if each agent maximizes her welfare given this ratio. We propose three equity axioms based on this definition, and we use them to compare the main solutions to this simple equity problem. We also combine efficiency, robustness axioms and our proportionality axioms to characterize two solutions. Received: 11 June 1997 / Accepted: 26 May 2000     

A central limit theorem for endogenous locations and complex spatial interactions

We provide a new central limit theorem (CLT) for spatial processes under weak conditions that are plausible for many economic applications in which location is endogenous. In particular, our CLT is designed for problems that have some, but not necessarily all, of the following features: (i) Agents choose the locations of observations to maximize profits, welfare, or some other objective. (ii) The objects that are chosen (e.g., stores or brands) interact with one another. For example, they can be substitutes or complements. (iii) Interaction can be complex. In particular, interaction between i and j need not depend only on the distance between the locations of i and j, but can also depend on distance to or location of other observations k, or possibly on the number of other such observations.     

The Blocking Lemma for a many-to-one matching model

The Blocking Lemma identifies a particular blocking pair for each non-stable and individually rational matching that is preferred by some agents of one side of the market to their optimal stable matching. Its interest lies in the fact that it has been an instrumental result to prove key results on matching. For instance, the fact that in the college admissions problem the workers-optimal stable mechanism is group strategy-proof for the workers and the strong stability theorem in the marriage model follow directly from the Blocking Lemma. However, it is known that the Blocking Lemma and its consequences do not hold in the general many-to-one matching model in which firms have substitutable preference relations. We show that the Blocking Lemma holds for the many-to-one matching model in which firms’ preference relations are, in addition to substitutable, quota q-separable. We also show that the Blocking Lemma holds on a subset of substitutable preference profiles if and only if the workers-optimal stable mechanism is group strategy-proof for the workers on this subset of profiles.     

Social distance,heterogeneity and social interactions

A crucial ingredient in social interaction models is the structure of peer groups, which link individuals with similar characteristics. We propose and study a dynamic binary choice model with social interactions in which heterogeneity of peer group effects is modeled introducing diversity in individual characteristics and linking pairwise influences to a social distance between individuals. Our framework allows for mimetic as well as anti-mimetic interactions and a heterogeneous structure of peer groups across individuals. Dynamic equilibria are studied in the limit when the number of agents is large. We show that the model exhibits multiple equilibria resulting from conflicts between various group pressures the individuals are subjected to. We study in particular the correlation in the population at equilibrium between the characteristics of the agents and their decisions: this quantity has an interesting empirical interpretation and solves a simple analytical equation when the number of agents is large. Finally we discuss the empirical content of the model and present a consistent estimator for the parameter describing which is consistent for any typical population regardless of the structure of individual characteristics.     

More neighbors,more efficiency

This paper considers a finite population of agents located within an arbitrary fixed network. Every agent plays a coordination game with his neighbors. If one neighbor's payoff from a specific interaction exceeds his average payoff per interaction, the neighbor is perceived as better performing. Over time agents imitate the strategies of their better performing neighbors; occasionally they make mistakes. Sufficient conditions for emergence of Pareto efficient and risk dominant conventions are provided. The paper also illustrates the main results through relevant examples.     

Identification and estimation of econometric models with group interactions,contextual factors and fixed effects

This paper considers identification and estimation of structural interaction effects in a social interaction model. The model allows unobservables in the group structure, which may be correlated with included regressors. We show that both the endogenous and exogenous interaction effects can be identified if there are sufficient variations in group sizes. We consider the estimation of the model by the conditional maximum likelihood and instrumental variables methods. For the case with large group sizes, the possible identification can be weak in the sense that the estimates converge in distribution at low rates.