Analyst characteristics, timing of forecast revisions, and analyst forecasting ability

We first examine whether analysts with certain characteristics that prior research has identified are related to superior forecasting ability systematically time their forecast revisions later in the fiscal quarter. We then examine whether this superior ability persists after controlling for the timing advantage by using relative forecast error, a measure that largely eliminates the timing advantage of recent forecasts. Using a sample of quarterly earnings forecast revisions over the 20-year period from 1990 to 2009, we find that analysts with more firm-specific and general experience and more accurate prior-period forecasts, analysts employed by larger brokerage firms, and analysts who follow fewer industries and companies tend to revise forecasts later in the quarter. We also find that analyst characteristics that are positively correlated with revision timing are negatively related to relative forecast errors. These results are consistent with analyst characteristics being useful proxies for analyst forecasting ability and analysts with greater ability revising forecasts later in the quarter.     

Understanding analysts' use of stock returns and other analysts' revisions when forecasting earnings

We investigate analysts' use of stock returns and other analysts' forecast revisions in revising their own forecasts after an earnings announcement. We find that analysts respond more strongly to these signals when the signals are more informative about future earnings changes. Although analysts underreact to these signals on average, we find that analysts who are most sensitive to signal informativeness achieve superior forecast accuracy relative to their peers and have a greater influence on the market. The results suggest that the ability to extract information from the actions of others serves as one source of analyst expertise.     

A comparison of buy‐side and sell‐side analysts

There is very little research on the topic of buy-side analyst performance, and that which does exist yields mixed results. We use a large sample from both the buy-side and the sell-side and report several new results. First, while the contemporaneous returns to portfolios based on sell-side recommendations are positive, the returns for buy-side analysts, proxied by changes in institutional holdings, are negative. Second, the buy-side analysts' underperformance is accentuated when they trade against sell-side analysts' recommendations. Third, abnormal returns positively relate to both the portfolio size and the portfolio turnover of buy-side analysts' institutions, suggesting that large institutions employ superior analysts and that superior analysts frequently change their recommendations. Abnormal returns are also positively related to buy-side portfolios with stocks that have higher analyst coverage, greater institutional holding, and lower earnings forecast dispersion. Fourth, there is substantial persistence in buy-side performance, but even the top decile performs poorly. These findings suggest that sell-side analysts still outperform buy-side analysts despite the severe conflicts of interest documented in the literature.     

Information footholds: Isolating local presence as a factor in analyst performance and trading

I compare the performance of buy/hold/sell recommendations from foreign, local, and expatriate (foreigners with local operations) analysts in an emerging market. Location appears to be important: expatriate analysts significantly outperform foreign analysts. Expatriates also significantly outperform locals, implying that other factors such as global resources also play a role, and a variety of controls for the characteristics of the recommending firm does not alter findings. Trading based on expatriate recommendations generates significantly positive risk-adjusted returns. Furthermore, foreign and local institutional investors appear to trade on the superior information of expatriate analysts, even when it contradicts their own information.     

The Reluctant Analyst

We estimate the dynamics of recommendations by financial analysts, uncovering the determinants of inertia in their recommendations. We provide overwhelming evidence that analysts revise recommendations reluctantly, introducing frictions to avoid frequent revisions. More generally, we characterize the sources underlying the infrequent revisions that analysts make. Publicly available data matter far less for explaining recommendation dynamics than do the recommendation frictions and the long‐lived information that analysts acquire but the econometrician does not observe. Estimates suggest that analysts structure recommendations strategically to generate a profitable order flow from retail traders. We provide extensive evidence that our model describes how investors believe analysts make recommendations, and that investors value private information revealed by analysts' recommendations.     

Sell‐Side School Ties

We study the impact of social networks on agents’ ability to gather superior information about firms. Exploiting novel data on the educational background of sell‐side analysts and senior corporate officers, we find that analysts outperform by up to 6.60% per year on their stock recommendations when they have an educational link to the company. Pre‐Reg FD, this school‐tie return premium is 9.36% per year, while post‐Reg FD it is nearly zero. In contrast, in an environment that did not change selective disclosure regulation (the U.K.), the school‐tie premium is large and significant over the entire sample period.     

How Skilled Are Security Analysts?

The majority of security analysts are identified as skilled when the cross-section of analyst performance is modeled as a mixture of multiple skill distributions. Analysts exhibit heterogeneous skill—some are high-type, and some are low-type. On average, the recommendation revisions of both types exhibit positive abnormal returns. The heterogeneity stems from differential ability to produce new information; all analysts can profitably process news. Top analysts outperform because more of their recommendations are influential (i.e., associated with statistically significant returns) and both their influential and noninfluential recommendations are more informative. A majority of research firms are also identified as skilled.     

Range has it: decoding the information content of forecast ranges

Range forecasts have emerged as the predominant form of management forecasts, but prior research has overlooked the information conveyed by forecast ranges. This study fills this void by examining the information content of the extent to which managers’ forecast ranges overlap with the range of individual analysts’ pre-existing estimates (i.e., overlap). We expect managers to signal their superior private information by issuing low-overlap forecasts. We predict and find that, compared with high-overlap forecasts, low-overlap forecasts are associated with stronger market reactions and higher accuracy of management forecasts relative to analyst estimates. Moreover, when responding to low-overlap management forecasts, analysts with prior estimates out of management forecast ranges are more likely to revise into the management forecast range, less likely to revise toward the consensus, and more likely to improve in revised forecast accuracy. Our findings suggest that investors and analysts view low-overlap management forecasts as signals of superior private information.     

The Impact of NASD Rule 2711 and NYSE Rule 472 on Analyst Behavior: The Strategic Timing of Recommendations Issued on Weekends

Amendments to NASD Rule 2711 and NYSE Rule 472, enacted in May 2002, mandate that sell‐side analysts disclose the distribution of their security recommendations by buy, hold and sell category. This regulation enhances the transparency of analysts’ information and mitigates the long‐recognized optimistic bias in their recommendations. However, we find that analysts are more likely to issue sell recommendations or downgrade revisions on weekends when investors have limited attention after these rule changes. This pattern is more pronounced for prestigious analysts, who are more likely to influence stock prices. Market reaction tests reveal an incomplete immediate response and a greater drift to unfavorable recommendations issued on weekends. Finally, analysts who are more likely to release unfavorable recommendations on weekends exhibit higher future forecast accuracy. Our findings suggest that, while these regulatory changes effectively reduce analysts’ optimistic bias, they are also associated with an increased prevalence of a different form of distortion in the capital market.     

Do accurate earnings forecasts facilitate superior investment recommendations?

We find that analysts who issue more accurate earnings forecasts also issue more profitable stock recommendations. The average factor-adjusted return associated with the recommendations of analysts in the highest accuracy quintile exceeds the corresponding return for analysts in the lowest accuracy quintile by 1.27% per month. Our findings provide indirect empirical support for valuation models in the accounting and finance literatures (e.g., Ohlson, 1995) that emphasize the role of future earnings in predicting stock price movements. Our results also suggest that imperfectly efficient markets reward information gatherers, such as security analysts, for their costly activities in generating superior earnings forecasts.     

An Analysis of Accounting Frauds and the Timing of Analyst Coverage Decisions and Recommendation Revisions: Evidence from the US

This paper provides a comprehensive exploration of the types of accounting fraud committed by firms over the period 1995–2009. Using detailed data from US SEC Accounting and Auditing Enforcement Releases (AAER), we examine the likelihood and timing of analyst coverage decisions and recommendation revisions related to fraud firms versus firms without accounting fraud. We find that analysts have a higher probability of taking the more severe action of dropping coverage rather than only revising down recommendations for firms with any type of accounting fraud and also for specific egregious types of accounting fraud. Through the use of competing hazards models, we also find that accounting frauds and their egregiousness are positively (negatively) associated with the timeliness of the analysts’ action to drop coverage (revise only). Overall, we find that analysts’ actions may be useful in determining the occurrence of accounting fraud prior to the public announcement of the fraud.     

Information misweighting and the cross-section of stock recommendations

This paper provides evidence that analysts whose earnings forecast revisions showed signs of greater exaggeration in the past make recommendation changes that lead to lower abnormal returns than their peers. Interpreting stock recommendations as a forecast of future abnormal returns, I show that this evidence is consistent with the hypothesis that analysts who typically exaggerate or overstate the weight of their private information when issuing forecasts also do so when making recommendations. The paper also shows that past earnings forecasts provide incremental information about analysts' recommending behavior beyond that contained in past recommendations.     

Who was informative? Performance of foreign and local analysts’ stock recommendations during the Asian financial crisis

This paper examines the performance of foreign and local analysts’ stock recommendations in Indonesia, Malaysia, Thailand, and South Korea during the financial crisis of 1997–1998. Unlike most of the prior studies, our results provide strong evidence that neither of the two groups held a complete information advantage over the other during the period of crisis. Using a large dataset of analysts’ recommendations, we show that foreign analysts’ buy recommendations were more informative than local analysts’ buy recommendations, while the opposite held for sell recommendations, i.e. local analysts’ sell recommendations were more informative than foreign analysts’ sell recommendations. Our results provide evidence that neither of the frequently advanced explanations regarding relative performance of foreign and local analysts hold during the period of extreme uncertainty.     

Friends can help: The effects of relationship in the Chinese book-building process

Using detailed bidding information in Chinese IPO book-building process, we find that institutional investors who have a close relationship with the underwriter are more likely to participate in bidding and their bidding prices are higher, compared to other institutional investors. We also find that related institutional investors bid higher when the underwriter is more likely to need or receive their support. Further analysis suggests that related institutional investors gain some benefits for their support to the underwriter, including receiving more shares in profitable IPOs, better timing their exit from the IPO in the open market, and receiving more optimistic earnings forecasts or stock recommendations from analysts of the underwriter. Regarding the economic consequence, we show that the underwriter is more likely to revise the offer price upward if related institutions bid higher. The evidence overall indicates the existence of relationship-driven bidding in the Chinese book-building process.     

Political contributions and analyst behavior

We show that the personal traits of analysts, as revealed by their political donations, influence their forecasting behavior and stock prices. Analysts who contribute primarily to the Republican Party adopt a more conservative forecasting style. Their earnings forecast revisions are less likely to deviate from the forecasts of other analysts and are less likely to be bold. Their stock recommendations also contain more modest upgrades and downgrades. Overall, these analysts produce better quality research, which is recognized and rewarded by their employers, institutional investors, and the media. Stock market participants, however, do not fully recognize their superior ability as the market reaction following revisions by these analysts is weaker.     

Regulation fair disclosure and the market’s reaction to analyst investment recommendation changes

Previous research has shown that affiliated analysts (those who are working for investment banks that underwrite securities for companies) have an incentive to provide optimistically biased recommendations from selective information they are given by the firm. In an effort to halt such activities, as of October 2000, Regulation Fair Disclosure (RegFD) prohibits selective disclosure of material non-public information by public companies to privileged individuals (such as favored research analysts) and requires broad, non-exclusionary disclosure of such information. We examine firms’ stock price reactions to investment recommendation changes from affiliated analysts versus unaffiliated analysts from October 1998 to November 2002, around the passage of RegFD. Similar to previous research, we find that investors reacted more significantly to recommendation downgrades by affiliated analysts than to those by unaffiliated analysts prior to the passage of RegFD. However, we find that the difference in the reactions to recommendation changes is not present after the passage of RegFD. We also find that stock price reactions to analysts’ (both affiliated and unaffiliated) recommendation changes decreased significantly after the passage of RegFD. Thus, RegFD appears to have curbed the selective disclosure of information (particularly negative information) by firms to affiliated analysts. Further, the smaller reactions to recommendation changes by all analysts after RegFD may reflect a change in analysts’ behavior (irrespective of information that is available) or a response by corporate managers to withhold information rather than risking a violation of fair disclosure rules.     

Interlock Concentration and Analyst Forecast Accuracy: Value Implications of Interlock

From the perspective of information commonalities among firms with director interlock relationships, this study mainly investigates the outcomes of earnings forecasts by analysts who choose to concentrate on interlocked firms (analysts following both a firm and its interlocked partner firm in their research portfolio). Using interlocked A‐share firms listed in the Chinese Shanghai and Shenzhen Stock Exchanges from 2008 to 2013 as samples, we empirically find that analysts who concentrate on interlocked firms produce more accurate earnings forecasts than analysts who do not. In additional analysis, we also find that analysts with an interlock concentration provide superior earnings forecast quality for other non‐interlocked firms in their research portfolios. Finally, through examining the market reaction to interlocked firms, we find that analysts with an interlock concentration provide new information and improve information efficiency for the capital market.     

The value of combining the information content of analyst recommendations and target prices

In assessing the usefulness of the analysts’ stock picking advice, the extant literature has largely focused on the profitability of either their stock recommendations or target prices in isolation. In this paper, we examine the profitability of investment strategies that exploit the information analysts convey through revisions in both their stock recommendations and target prices. We find that these strategies significantly outperform the comparable strategies that make use of only one analyst output.     

Forecast accuracy and stock recommendations

We examine whether it is profitable to trade according to the recommendations of analysts who made accurate earnings forecasts in a prior year. Prior research has shown that analysts who made the most accurate earnings forecasts in the current period also made the most profitable recommendations during that period. Unfortunately, our research shows that these accurate forecasters cannot be identified on the basis of their track record. While there is statistically significant evidence that forecasting ability is persistent, it is not sufficient to generate profitable stock recommendations in the future. We also attempted to identify superior analysts with respect to the combination of forecast accuracy and recommendation profitability. Even with this finer segmentation of analysts there is no difference in their ability to make profitable recommendations in the future. Furthermore, regardless of forecasting ability, analysts are pre-disposed to recommend stocks with low book-to-market ratios and positive price momentum. This bias may impede their ability to make profitable recommendations.