The effects of environmental taxes and quotas on the optimal timing of emission reductions under Choquet–Brownian uncertainty

The effects of two environmental policy options for the reduction of pollution emissions, i.e. taxes and non-tradable quotas, are analyzed. In contrast to the prior literature this work endogenously takes into account the level of emissions before and after the adoption of the new environmental policy. The level of emissions is determined by solving the firm's profit maximization problem under taxes and fixed quotas. We find that the optimal adoption threshold under taxes is always larger than the adoption threshold under fixed quota, even in a setting characterized by ecological uncertainty and ambiguity – in the form of Choquet–Brownian motions – on future costs and benefits over adopting environmental policies.     

Environmental Taxes and First-Mover Advantages

This paper studies whether governments prefer to be leaders or followers in environmental policies. To analyze this question I assume transboundary pollution and two countries that have to decide whether to set environmental taxes sequentially or simultaneously. When taxes are set sequentially an effect, denoted as the sequential setting effect, arises that raises the equilibrium taxes. I show that whether governments prefer to be leaders or followers in taxes depends on the degree to which environmental pollution spills over to trading partners. When this overspill is low enough, taxes are strategic complements and both the leader and the follower obtain greater welfare than under a simultaneous tax setting. However, the leader country obtains greater welfare than the follower. In this case, governments set taxes sequentially. When the degree to which environmental pollution spills over to trading partners is high enough, taxes are strategic substitutes and governments set taxes simultaneously. In this case, each government wants to avoid becoming the follower in taxes.     

The effects of environmental policies on the abatement investment decisions of a green firm

This paper focuses on environmental policies aimed at rising investment in pollution abatement capital. We assume that ecological uncertainty, i.e., uncertainty over the dynamics of pollution, affects firm investment decisions. Capital irreversibility is not postulated but endogenized using a quadratic adjustment cost function. Using this framework, we study the effects of environmental policies considering taxes on polluting inputs and subsidies to reduce the cost of abatement capital. Environmental policies promoted to enforce abatement capital may generate the unexpected result of reducing the abatement investment rate.     

Optimal tax rules and public sector efficiency with an externality in an overlapping generations model

This paper examines optimal tax rules and public sector efficiency, integrating them in a second-best world with pollution by using an overlapping generations model. The second-best world is characterized by the comparative statics of green preferences. The main results obtained are as follows. First, the marginal cost of public funds may be reduced by the externalities, regardless of the choice of taxes. Second, optimal environmental and non-environmental tax rules are additively and directly affected by the dynamic efficiency of capital accumulation per unit labour (DECAL), and indirectly by it, through the efficiency of the public sector. Environmental taxes going beyond Pigovian ones may be welfare-improving if the DECAL is improved by the environmental tax. Even optimal non-environmental tax rules should additively and directly counter the dynamics of pollution to consider the income effects of the optimal tax system for the future. Third, the “additivity property,” or the “principle of targeting,” does not hold even in the absence of incentive compatibility constraints. The essential reasons for this are clarified as follows: distortions that should be countered by taxes; that is, the income effects of the optimal tax system and the DECAL in this model, break the equality between optimal environmental taxes and the externalities measured by governments. Finally, growing environmental concerns may, in fact, increase pollution. The inverse relationship between environmental and labour income taxes may not hold.     

Strategic Environmental Policy under Free Trade with Transboundary Pollution

We analyze the effects of trade liberalization on environmental policies in a strategic setting when there is transboundary pollution. Trade liberalization can result in a race to the bottom in environmental taxes, which makes both countries worse off. This is not due to the terms of trade motive, but rather the incentive, in a strategic setting, to reduce the incidence of transboundary pollution. With command and control policies (emission quotas), countries are unable to influence foreign emissions by strategic choice of domestic policy; hence, there is no race to the bottom. However, with internationally tradable quotas, unless pollution is a pure global public bad, there is a race to the bottom in environmental policy. Under free trade, internationally nontradable quotas result in the lowest pollution level and strictly welfare‐dominate taxes. The ordering of internationally tradable quotas and pollution taxes depends, among other things, on the degree of international pollution spillovers.     

Trade Liberalization and Environmental Taxation in Federal Systems

The literature on trade liberalization and environment has not yet considered federal structures. In this paper, we show how the design of environmental policy in a federal system has implications for the effects of trade reform. Trade liberalization leads to a decline in pollution taxes, regardless of whether pollution taxes are set at the federal (centralized) or local (decentralized) level, and it increases social welfare. The effect under a decentralized system is smaller than if these taxes are set by the federal government, and pollution emissions therefore decline in this case. Moreover, majority bias interacts with trade liberalization if federal taxes are used.     

Externalities in a spatial context: The case of air pollution

In this paper air pollution externalities are analyzed in an explicit spatial setting that recognizes the spatial interdependence of polluters and their victims. Optimal environmental policies are shown to consist not only of Pigouvian taxes but of two other policies. First, regulations controlling the allocation of land between polluters and victims are needed. Secondly, if pollution taxes are imposed by local governments, in general it will be necessary for the federal government to take some of the tax proceeds and redistribute them amongst localities. For example, some of the proceeds in heavily taxed and polluted communities may have to be redistributed to lightly taxed and polluted communities.     

Taxation of a Polluting Non-renewable Resource in the Heterogeneous World

This paper extends the literature on the taxation of polluting exhaustible resources by taking international heterogeneities and national tax-setting into account. We propose a two-country Romer model of endogenous growth in which the South is endowed with the stock of an essential polluting non-renewable resource and world economic growth is driven by a northern research sector. We consider the stock of pollution as affecting global welfare. First, we characterize the optimal environmental taxation policies. Second, we examine the impacts of national taxes. Their time profile determines the extraction path, the dynamics of pollution accumulation and that of world output. Their respective levels entail inter-country interactions by altering the efficiency of the world resource allocation, the tax revenues and the resource rents. We study isolatedly the distortional and distributional effects of local taxes. Then, we completely assess the overall impact of a unilateral tax increase. Finally, we find that, even if heterogeneous countries coordinate their taxation policies to correct the global environmental problem, their divergent strategic interests cause another global, non-environmental distortion in the allocation of the resource.     

Federal transfers, environmental policy and economic growth

We study the effects of commonly used cross-country transfer programs on uncoordinated national environmental policies, economic growth and natural resources in a federal economy. Natural resources are a federation-wide public good. In each member country, production degrades the environment, but clean-up policy can improve it. Clean-up policy is financed by taxes on polluting firms’ output and cross-country redistributive transfers. We solve for a symmetric Nash equilibrium among national governments. Transfer policies that lead to higher pollution taxes make existence harder, and are harmful not only to growth but also to the environment. The best way to improve environmental quality is to implement a taxation system that stimulates growth and broadens tax bases to finance national clean-up policies.     

Optimal fiscal policy in a model with inherited aspirations and habit formation

In this paper, we analyze optimal fiscal policies in an overlapping generations framework, where preferences exhibit aspirations in consumption and environmental quality as well as habit formation. We focus on the second best policies when the government needs to finance a given stream of public expenditures by using distortionary taxes. We derive necessary and sufficient conditions under which the competitive equilibrium is characterized by levels of capital and environmental quality that are too small and a level of labor supply that is too large. Our numerical simulations show that an optimal fiscal policy can be used as an effective stabilization device and that when consumption taxes are fixed, the planner implements maintenance investment and capital income subsidies while financing public spending through labor and fixed consumption taxes.     

TRIMs, environmental taxes, and foreign investment

Various second-best policy mixes of investment measures and environmental taxes for a polluted, small open economy with foreign capital and immovable trade restrictions are examined. The optimal policy mix depends on the types of trade restrictions. When tariffs are in place, strict policies of pollution taxes and export requirements are optimal for alleviating tariff-induced consumption and production distortions. When involuntary quotas are used in lieu of tariffs, however, the optimal policy mix is a zero export requirement and Pigouvian taxes on pollution. For the case of VERs, however, the optimal policy demands export requirements and a less stringent pollution tax.
TRIMs, impôts environnementaux et investissement étranger. Ce mémoire examine certains ensembles de politiques de second-ordre portant sur l'investissement et les impôts environnementaux dans une petite économie ouverte polluée où il y a capital étranger et restrictions au commerce international. Quand on a des droits de douane en place, des politiques de fiscalité environnementale et d'exportations requises sont optimales pour corriger les distorsions aux patterns de production et de consommation engendrées par les droits de douane. Cependant quand des contingentements involontaires sont en place plutôt que des droits de douane, le mélange optimal de politiques est de ne pas requérir d'exportation mais d'imposer des taxes à la Pigou sur la pollution. Pour ce qui est des restrictions volontaires à l'exportation, le mélange optimal de politiques réclame une taxe moins forte sur la pollution accompagnée par un certain niveau d'exportation requis.     

Environmental policy instruments and imperfectly competitive international trade

Policy makers, industrialists and environmentalists express concern that the imposition of tough environmental policies in some countries displaces production, and hence pollution, to countries which impose less tough environmental policies. Yet empirical studies of such impacts suggest they are small. However, these findings are derived from models in which international trade is modelled as being perfectly competitive. In this paper I model trade as imperfectly competitive with scope for strategic behavior by producers, in this case investment in capital. I show that the choice of environmental policy instrument can have a marked impact on the incentives for producers to act strategically, with environmental standards significantly reducing the incentives for strategic overinvestment relative to environmental taxes or no environmental policy at all. Whether welfare is higher using standards or taxes depends on whether producing countries are also significant consumers of the polluting product, and on whether all producing governments act to reduce emissions or only some subset of governments. To assess the quantitative significance of these theoretical results I conduct policy simulations on a calibrated model of the world fertilizer industry. These simulations show that the impact of environmental policy on strategic behaviour can be large.     

DYNAMIC ENVIRONMENTAL TAXES UNDER INTERNATIONAL DUOPOLY

This paper studies a dynamic game of environmental taxes between two countries in the absence of explicit trade policies when both governments and firms act strategically. We demonstrate that the environmental tax in the steady‐state equilibrium in a dynamic environmental tax game is lower than that in a static environmental one. Therefore, the dynamic behaviour of the governments results in an increase in the environmental damage. Further, as a result of international cooperation on environmental taxes between two countries in the beginning of policy competition, there is an increase in the optimal environmental tax. This implies that it is important to set cooperative environmental taxes in the beginning of policy competition because non‐cooperative environmental taxes in the dynamic game result in the race‐to‐the‐bottom, which does not lead to environmental improvement.     

International Trade and the Environment: Theoretical and Policy Linkages

I review and extend three approaches to trade and environmental policies: competitive general equilibrium, oligopoly and monopolistic competition. The first two have surprisingly similar implications: deviations from first-best rules are justified only by constraints on policy choice (which motivates what I call a “single dividend” approach to environmental policy), and taxes and emissions standards differ in ways which reflect the Le Chatelier principle. I also show how environmental taxes may lead to a catastrophic relocation of industry in the presence of agglomeration effects, although not necessarily if there is a continuum of industries which differ in pollution intensity. *An earlier version was presented as an invited plenary lecture to the European Association for Environmental and Resource Economics Conference, Oslo, 1999.     

Inter‐regional competition,comparative advantage and environmental federalism

In this paper, we compare endogenous environmental policy setting with centralized and decentralized governments when regions have comparative advantages in different polluting goods. We develop a two‐region, two‐good model with inter‐regional environmental damages and perfect competition in product markets, where both regions produce both goods. Despite positive spillovers of pollution across regions, the model predicts that decentralization may lead to weaker or stricter environmental standards or taxes, depending on the degree of regional comparative advantage and the extent of transboundary pollution. This suggests that federalism can lead to either a “race to the bottom” or a “race to the top,” without relying on inefficient lobbying efforts or capital competition.     

THE EFFECTS OF ENVIRONMENTAL TAXES An empirical study of water and solid waste levies in Flanders*

ABSTRACT ** ** Résumé en fin d'article; Zusammenfassung am Ende des Artikels; resúmen al fin del artículo.
: Environmental problems are considered by the majority of economic agents as important factors in making public policy. As a result, economic and market-integrated instruments are increasingly being used as alternatives to traditional environmental policy instruments. This article aims to determine the actual effect of environmental taxes on pollution levels. In particular, a case study of Flemish environmental taxes on water and solid waste pollution is reported. A quantitative model for testing the actual effectiveness of environmental taxes is developed, based on similar studies that analysed Dutch environmental policy. The conclusions of this analysis are extended with a qualitative analysis of information provided by in-depth interviews. Data-driven empirical research of the Flemish situation does not confirm the expected direct relationship between an increase in taxation and a decrease in pollution. In general, industrial firms do not consider the present taxation system a legitimate one for changing their polluting activities. As a result, the greening’of management is limited and environmental taxes are considered by the majority of firms as a mere business taxation rather than a system to create a switch from polluting to non-polluting behaviour.     

完善我国环境保护税收制度的思考

当前,我国资源破坏和环境污染问题相当严峻,要实现中国跨世纪环保政策目标和可持续发展战略,必须依靠税收这种有效的经济手段。但是,我国现行的税费政策总体作用有限,因而必须进一步完善我国环境保护税收制度,一是改革和完善现行资源税;二是及时开征环境保护税;三是在其它一般性税收中采取各种税收调节措施,体现环保目标。     

Environmental policies in a differentiated oligopoly revisited

Constructing a model of polluting oligopoly with product differentiation, we consider how product differentiation, together with the presence and absence of free entry, affects optimal pollution tax/subsidy policies. The sign of the short- and long-run optimal pollution taxes are highly sensitive to the parameter measuring product differentiation as well as the presence of free entry. How they are affected by a change in product differentiation, which is not addressed in the existing literature, is also made clear.     

Taxes versus quotas for a stock pollutant

We compare the effects of taxes and quotas for an environmental problem where the regulator and polluter have asymmetric information about abatement costs, and environmental damage depends on pollution stock. An increase in the slope of the marginal abatement cost curve, or a decrease in the slope of the marginal damage curve, favors taxes. An increase in the discount rate or the stock decay rate favors tax usage. Taxes dominate quotas if the length of a period during which decisions are constant is sufficiently small. An empirical illustration suggests that taxes dominate quotas for the control of greenhouse gasses.     

Emission Taxes versus Other Environmental Policies

In the environmental policy of most countries, various forms of quotas and direct regulation are more important than environmental taxes. This paper addresses four arguments which are often given against the use of emission taxes. The three arguments related to information asymmetries and non-convexities are valid in the sense that they point to complications in the use of environmental taxes. The fourth argument is related to the employment effects of different types of environmental policies in economies with unemployment. Although this argument is frequently used by politicians, the analysis provides no justification for it. On the contrary: in the model used, employment is higher with environmental taxes than with non-revenue-raising environmental policies.