Corporate financial policy with pension accounts: an extension of the Modigliani–Miller theorem

We build a model of an incomplete market economy with a firm, which we apply to the study of corporate financial policies with pension accounts. We show that prior to ERISA, even though the sponsoring firm's integral financial policy is neutral for its market value, it may affect the economy by creating a pension call option. On the other hand, in the post‐ERISA periods, the firm's financial policy is not only neutral for its value but also has no real effect on the economy. Thus, the Modigliani–Miller theorem is valid in this sense.     

Short-termism of long-term investors? The investment behaviour of Dutch insurance companies and pension funds

Countercyclical investment strategies of large institutional investors such as insurance companies and pension funds can support financial stability, while procyclical investment behaviour is considered as destabilizing at a macro level. Yet, there is limited understanding of how insurance companies and pension funds invest during market shocks, such as the global financial crisis. Investigating the equity and fixed income portfolios of Dutch non-life insurers, life insurers and pension funds, we find evidence for procyclical behaviour by insurance companies (both life and non-life). For pension funds, we find evidence for countercyclical behaviour during market upturns.     

Voluntary participation and intergenerational risk sharing in a funded pension system

We explore the feasibility of a funded pension system with intergenerational risk sharing when participation in the system is voluntary. Typically, the willingness of the young to participate depends on their belief about the future young's willingness to do so. We characterise equilibria with voluntary participation and show that the likelihood of their existence increases with risk aversion and financial market uncertainty. We find that mandatory participation is often necessary to sustain a funded pension pillar and to let participants benefit from intergenerational risk sharing.     

Public or Private Orientation of Pension Systems in the Light of the Recent Financial Crisis

This paper studies the appropriateness of a public or private orientation of pension systems in the light of the recent financial crisis, which has underscored the difficulties and contradictions associated with each system. The different institutional arrangements, in which public or private pension systems are embedded, are key components when assessing their responses to the crisis. Particularly, private pension systems are intertwined with financial markets, while social insurance-based pension systems are linked to the labour market mechanisms. This paper compares the British and French pension systems, as “archetypes” of private-oriented and public-oriented systems, respectively, the first relying on the market and private pension schemes, and the second on mandatory social insurance. This paper shows that the crisis has upheld the founding principles of the public (French) and private (British) pension systems to maintain the existing institutional configurations. At the same time, both systems have strengthened the role played by means-tested benefits and minimum pensions for low-income groups to offset the weaknesses of one or the other system, as emphasised by the crisis.     

我国最优混合养老保险体制的选择:收益和风险分析

养老金研究的核心问题之一在于选择合适的养老金计划运行方式。文章基于中国实际,通过引入随机性的"权衡理论"模型分析发现,在代表性参保人效用最大化前提下,运行方式选择类似于金融资产组合问题。所谓的艾隆条件只是在确定性模型下的特定结果。在加入风险因素后,即便在艾隆条件下,引入一定的积累制也将改善养老金体系的运行状况。两种制度最优的混合比例将受到人口增长率、工资增长率、个人风险规避倾向和金融市场因素的共同影响。分析结果表明提高养老金计划运行收益率和养老基金分散化投资有利于增进参保人效用。     

养老金资产的本土化投资偏好分析——OECD国家的投资经验对中国的启示

随着世界各国养老保障体系的完善,养老金资产规模迅速扩大,各国都将规模庞大的养老金资产投资于金融市场进行保值增值。从OECD国家和新兴市场国家两个方面分析了OECD国家养老金资产在进行投资时存在本土化投资偏好的原因。为了借鉴国外养老金投资管理的经验,逐步完善我国养老保障体系,提出一些有关投资管理的政策建议。     

养老金发展的影响因素分析——基于美国私营养老金发展的实证研究

本文以自愿原则的美国私营养老金的发展为例,对影响养老金发展的诸多因素进行了量化的分析,得出如下结论:经济发展水平,包括金融资本市场的发展水平是影响养老金资产最终积累额的最重要因素.     

中国企业年金税收优惠政策的比较与选择

2005年,随着首批金融机构获得企业年金经办资格认证,中国企业年金保险进入到具体实施阶段.然而,直到2006年底,关于企业年金的缴费方式、基金的投资管理、给付机制、法规监管以及税收优惠政策等一系列相关问题仍未解决,成为严重制约企业年金市场发展的瓶颈.本文着重从企业年金税收优惠政策的比较与选择入手,结合城镇基本养老保险的情况,通过核算国家税式支出、企业年金积累额等指标,对国家采取适当的企业年金税收优惠政策去引导和促进企业年金市场的发展提出理论依据.     

社会养老金金融功能的制度安排研究

社会养老金制度设立方式直接关系到一国经济体系的健康运行和发展.从社会养老金制度的产生和相当长的发展过程中,大多数国家大体上都是采用的随收随支的制度.这种制度一般只从政治、社会的安定等原因而设立的,没有考虑社会养老金制度对国民经济发展的直接作用,社会养老金制度只有社会保障功能.社会养老金制度合理安排金融功能,能够使社会养老金积累规模巨大的长期储蓄资金,促进资本市场的成熟发展,对经济发展产生巨大的推动作用,社会保障功能也得到加强.     

Backing out of private pension provision: lessons from Germany

Financing pensions in the EU is a challenge. Many EU countries introduced private pension schemes to compensate declining public pension levels due to reforms made necessary by demographic change. In 2001, Germany introduced the Riester pension. Ten years after introduction the prevalence rate of this voluntary private pension scheme approximates 37 %. However, numerous criticisms raise doubts that the market for Riester products is transparent. Using the 2010 German SAVE survey, this article investigates terminated and dormant Riester contracts on a household level for the first time. Respectively 14.5 and 12.5 % of households who own or have owned a Riester contract terminated or set dormant their contract. We find that around 45 % of terminated or dormant Riester contracts are caused at least partly by product-related reasons, which is significantly higher than for endowment life insurance contracts. The uptake of a new contract after a termination is more likely if a termination is product-related. Nevertheless, after a termination 73 % of households do not sign a new contract, which can have serious long-term consequences for old-age income. Households with low income, low financial wealth or low pension literacy are more likely to have terminated or dormant contracts. Low income and low financial wealth households also have the lowest prevalence rate of Riester contracts and are at higher risk of old-age poverty.     

Modeling longevity risk transfers as Nash bargaining problems: Methodology and insights

The problem of longevity risk has recently received considerable attention. In this paper, we apply economic modeling methods to longevity risk securitization, which is now regarded by pension and insurance industries as a solution to the problem. Specifically, we model the trade of a longevity security as a two-player bargaining game, and use Nash's bargaining solution to determine the outcome of it. Our work not only offers an alternative method for pricing longevity securities, but also reveals several properties about the market for longevity securities. First, a trade would occur if the longevity security is an effective hedging instrument, and the trade would benefit all agents involved. Second, a trade of longevity risk can reduce pension plans' bankruptcy risk, safeguarding the financial security of pension plan members. Finally, compared to the competitive equilibrium, Nash's bargaining solution yields higher trading prices. Therefore, as the market becomes more competitive, pension plans may hedge longevity risk at a lower cost.     

中国养老保险基金不同资产投资收益分析

资产收益率与经济周期之间存在密切联系。在经济周期的不同阶段,养老保险基金的资产配置结构和比例要作相应的调整,同时应关注金融产品所处行业对收益率的影响。而且,由于中国资本市场尚不成熟,养老保险基金可以适度介入实业投资,主要包括战略型产业、公用事业型产业和成长创新型产业,以实现基金保值增值,维护国家产业安全、分享经济发展成果、推动国家创新战略的目的。     

Why do Households Leave Money on the Table? The Case of Subsidized Pension Products

Abstract

Many individuals only save money in their savings account for their old-age provision rather than investing in more profitable asset classes. That is despite the existence of subsidized pension products, for which smallest contributions can be made monthly, which guarantee the capital preservation, and which offer higher expected returns than saving money in bank deposits. We investigate the determinants that affect individuals’ decision to leave money on the table by not investing in subsidized pension products. Our results show that financial literacy and financial advice are positively related to holding such pension products. In that, our results emphasize the role of financial literacy and financial advisors for sound financial decision-making in increasingly complex financial markets.     

Market access for sale

This paper focuses on the links between foreign lobbying and preferential market access granted by the United States' government to exporters in the rest of the Americas. We first develop a simple framework based on Grossman and Helpman [Grossman, G., Helpman, E., 1994. Protection for sale. American Economic Review 84 (4) 833–850.] to explain how lobbying by foreign firms affects their preferential access to the United States market. We then estimate the model using data on tariff preferences and lobby contributions for the 34 countries in the region. Empirical results suggest that foreign lobbying is an important force behind preferential market access to the United States. The structural estimates indicate that the weight given to foreign lobby contributions in the United States' government objective function is five times higher than the weight granted to tariff revenue forgone due to preferences. Thus, our results indicate that market access is up for sale and foreign lobbies are buying it.     

UK state pension deferral incentives and sustainability

Pay-as-you-go state pension schemes such as that operated in the United Kingdom face growing pressures from the rising old-age dependency ratio and improvements to life expectancies. Alongside compulsory increases in the statutory retirement age, governments have used incentives to encourage workers to postpone voluntarily their exit from employment, deferring their Basic State Pension in exchange for the additional financial reward of an enhanced pension at a later point in time. The impact of pension deferral upon the sustainability of the state pension system is dependent on the interplay of short-term savings from payment delay and increased subsequent longer-term payments to pension recipients. This article presents a model that simulates the financial effect of deferral uptake on the National Insurance Fund over a 40-year projection under alternative scenarios, including current and revised post-2016 deferral incentives. The findings indicate that the recent change in enhancement rate from 10.4 per cent to 5.8 per cent will significantly impact on state pension sustainability while still providing an incentive to defer. We estimate that any reduction below 4 per cent would result in zero uptake of the deferral option, based on a rational financial choice.     

To defer or not defer? UK state pension and work decisions in a lifecycle model

The UK state pension (which depends only on age) includes an option to defer take up which yields either a subsequent lump sum or higher weekly pension. We analyse the joint decisions on pension deferral and intertemporal labour supply/participation in a lifecycle setting. We show that deferral is purely a financial decision, but the impact of deferral on work decisions depends on preferences, wage rates, non-labour income and initial wealth. To exactly characterize this, we use a quasilinear utility function and provide calibrated simulations. We also discuss the choice between a lump sum or increased weekly pension.     

Optimal Decisions on Pension Plans in the Presence of Information Costs and Financial Literacy

Pension reforms are on the political agenda of many countries. Such reforms imply an increasing responsibility on individuals’ side in building an efficient portfolio for retirement. In this paper, we provide a model describing workers’ choices on the allocation of retirement savings in presence of (1) mandatory pension contribution; (2) different pension plans; and (3) information costs and financial literacy investment decisions. In particular, we characterize the results from both a positive and normative standpoint, by highlighting the determinants of individuals’ choice, with special focus on information costs, on the role of income and preferences, and by characterizing the optimal contribution rate to mandatory complementary pension plans. We also introduce endogenous financial literacy and analyze how its optimal level is determined and how it affects the decisions on pension plans.     

Occupation pension for public employees in the People's Republic of China: A new approach with defined benefit underpin pension plan

The State Council of the People's Republic of China announced a reformed pension plan for public employees with the occupation pension plan in January 2015, officially disclosing that the social pension systems for private and public employees will be unified. Our proposed occupation pension plan for public employees is one of the important components in transiting from a dual‐track pension system to a sustainable and unified system. We aim at providing a pension design, that is, the defined benefit (DB ) underpin pension with estimates of the costs and benefits. We have used a financial engineering approach to calculate the hedge contribution for a DB underpin hybrid pension plan benefit. We also treat pension benefit and salaries in aggregate. Therefore, we propose a stochastic and exogenous salary model. Employees’ total benefits can be determined by multiple factors, such as inflation, economic environment, and employer's preference. However, the expectation of employees’ total benefits should not be affected by the change of salary and pension benefits. Our results could facilitate the ongoing pension reform in the People's Republic of China, providing a rigorous benchmark with public policy implications as to plan design, cost estimation, as well as risk management approach.     

A new proposal of pension regimes typology: empirical analysis of the OECD countries

In the paper, we present a new typology of pension regimes based on two main dimensions: the extent of involvement of the state and the market, and the role of voluntary schemes. We propose three theoretical pension regimes. The study proves that our theoretical typology is also consistent with empirical pension systems in OECD countries. In order to group them into the similar pension models, we employ multivariate statistical analysis. As a result of our empirical research, the regimes distinguished in the theoretical framework have found their counterparts in the clusters of real pension systems operating in 30 countries.     

The political economy of entry barriers

We study a political economy model of entry barriers. Each period the policymaker determines whether to impose a high barrier to entry, and the special interest groups try to influence the policymaker's decision. Entry is accompanied by creative destruction—when many new firms enter, old firms are more likely to be driven out of the market. Therefore the current incumbents (industry leaders) tend to lobby for a higher entry barrier and potential entrants (industry followers) are likely to lobby for a freer environment for entry. We analyze both static and dynamic versions of the model to examine what kind of environment supports a policy that blocks entry. In the dynamic model, the economy can exhibit various different dynamics. In particular, multiple steady states may arise in equilibrium.