Market power,regulatory convergence,and the role of data in digital markets

The increased economic importance of digital services has profoundly changed the power structure in telecommunications and media markets. Although these services sometimes directly compete with traditional telecommunications services, the regulatory obligations for both players differ significantly. This article discusses three important areas deemed relevant in order to define a coherent regulatory framework and to account for the specific peculiarities of digital markets: First, challenges associated with assessing market power in digital markets. Second, challenges in harmonizing different regulatory obligations for digital services, and third, the vital role of data and data protection in the context of data-driven business models.     

Convergence and new regulatory frameworks: A comparative study of regulatory approaches to Internet telephony

As an archetype of convergence, Internet telephony has been questioning the continuing appropriateness of the current telecommunications policy and regulation. This article examines how policy makers and regulators in the US, the EU, Japan and Singapore have responded to the challenges brought about by Internet telephony. Their common approach seems to apply the existing regulatory framework to this new service. The authors argue that those responses will not be aligned with the dynamically changing communications environment and explain two key shifts taking place in the communications industry that should be taken into account to form more appropriate regulatory frameworks.     

The involvement of utilities in the development of broadband infrastructure: A comparison of EU case studies

Energy companies and other utility providers have been often involved in the provision of telecommunications services. Nevertheless, their contribution to broadband development has varied significantly over time. In the late 1990s, both local and national utilities in the European Union (EU) engaged in the provision of broadband networks, but only few of them managed to establish themselves as major broadband providers. More recently, new projects involving national utilities have been announced in several EU countries, opening new scenarios for utilities’ contribution to Next Generation Access (NGA) development. This paper identifies and explores the factors affecting the entry and the success of utilities in the EU broadband market, through the comparison of four case studies from four EU countries (Germany, Italy, Sweden and the UK). The evolution of utility involvement in the EU broadband markets is assessed against the interaction of market, technology and policy factors, focusing on the impact of policy and regulatory measures. As a result, this paper provides fruitful insights into the relevance and effectiveness of public interventions in broadband markets. Across the four case studies, public support and public ownership emerged as the main drivers for the involvement of utilities in EU broadband markets, with regulatory measures and economies of scope exerting a limited and decreasing influence. However, the contribution of utilities has varied significantly across the cases studied, reflecting the different approaches taken at national and local level to support broadband development, in spite of the common regulatory framework.     

The limitations of market-based regulation of the electronic communications sector

The European Union has recently implemented a system of regulation for the sector based on principles of competition law. The regulatory framework includes 18 markets where Regulatory Authorities should consider imposing ex ante obligations on dominant players. The paper explores the economic methodology being employed in particular to define market boundaries and concludes that the sector is too unstable for this approach to provide predictability and encourage long-term investment. In particular, emerging infrastructures and services can easily be captured while legacy networks remain subject to perpetual regulation. There are significant costs of excessive regulation and alternative approaches may be better.     

Convergence between telecommunications and other media: How should regulation adapt?

The paper examines the regulatory issues raised by technological convergence between telecommunications and other media. Market uncertainty for broadband services has gone hand in hand with both uncertainty over how to supply those services and a regulatory framework that will facilitate growth in the sector, ensure a competitive market and provide the necessary protections for consumers and the public. Development of the information market should be determined primarily by market forces. Intervention may be justified but a clear distinction needs to be drawn between regulation in the public interest and regulation to protect against market failure.     

Functional separation in Swedish broadband market: Next step of improving competition

Technological development together with liberalization policy has led to competition in the telecommunications market. Broadband has been recognized as a driving force in the social and economic development of nations, and many countries have introduced policies and/or regulatory frameworks to improve competition in broadband markets. An evolution can be seen from the 1980s until the present day through open access to local loop unbundling to several degrees of separation including functional separation. There are several countries implementing functional separation such as the UK, Italy, Sweden and, recently the EU. It has been suggested that functional separation can be an effective policy for increasing competition in broadband markets under certain circumstances. Sweden has implemented functional separation by amending the Swedish Telecommunications Act in 2008 to include mandatory functional separation as one of the powers of the PTS, the Swedish telecommunications regulator. Although TeliaSonera, the incumbent fixed line operator decided to voluntarily separate part of their business, the amendments to the law were debated with arguments similar to the debates in the EU following the new regulatory framework implemented in 2009. Against this background, this paper provides an overview of the development of functional separation in the EU and European countries such as Sweden and the UK. The paper also provides a theoretical and empirical analysis of the implementation of functional separation. The evolution of functional separation in Sweden is explained and ends with a discussion of the implementation of functional separation in the Swedish broadband market.     

Technological and geographic heterogeneity in broadband markets: The challenge for regulation

When the telecommunications industry was liberalised in Europe and North America in the 1980s and 1990s, it inherited a legacy of monopoly providers whose footprint was national or multi-regional in its character. The regulatory framework, particularly that adopted in EU member states, reflected this pattern of relatively homogeneous deployment achieved, in part, by decades of cross-subsidised pricing and universal service goals. Perhaps because of this legacy, telecommunications regulators have often adopted the presumption that relevant markets are national in character, unless proven otherwise Although geographically-variegated regulatory remedies have been permitted (even in the face of allegedly national relevant markets) and adopted in many member states, many regulators have never done so, and overly cautious thresholds for permitting geographically based forbearance suggest a continued bias towards presuming national markets and remedies. We find that this presumption of uniformity and the tendency to aggregate geographic markets together is not supported by first principles of antitrust analysis, although there may have been strong practical reasons to apply this presumption in the past circumstances of the telecommunications and broadband industries.On the ground, however, there has arguably never been as much heterogeneity across geographies and across technological solutions that provide effective ultra-fast broadband speeds. Both technological (i.e., product market) and geographic heterogeneity are likely to increase with the advent of mobile 5G networks. With their deployment, a cautious regulatory stance towards geographic variation and a cautious regulatory stance towards inter-technology or inter-modal competition may result in regulation that could exceed what is required to ensure effective competition and could instead distort the incentives to enter of facilities-based actors. This may also result in higher-cost and inefficient investment. A more geographically varied and technologically agnostic regulatory framework may satisfy the principle of proportionate and focused regulation—with the possibility that the locus of regulation shifts from the access network to bottleneck facilities such as fibre, ducts and poles.This discussion is especially germane when one considers the highly speculative nature of forecasts and projections about future demand, and the competing claims of proponents of 5G and fibre. While there is some scepticism about the performance of mobile networks, we note that pure mobile and fixed 5G services may have synergies in deployment, and that the idea of competing with residential broadband services is a core strategy of very influential large-scale industry actors. In terms of a future research agenda, regulatory decisions could benefit from much more research into the relationship between domestic and global bandwidth constraints and their influence on development of software and application, as well as much more quantitative research by academics on the drivers of bandwidth demand. The risks associated with promoting investment that results in large-scale wasted resources should also be central to the regulatory agenda.     

Leveraging the EU regulatory framework to improve a layered policy model for US telecommunications markets

What is the best way to overhaul the current telecommunications legislative framework in the United States? This is an ongoing debate among telecom policy analysts and many others affected by the legacy of regulatory compromises that govern US telecommunications (and related information and media) industry sectors. This paper compares a Layered Model for US telecommunications policy with the regulatory framework adopted by the European Union. Both approaches focus on service characteristics rather than underlying technological traits.¹ It becomes clear that the Layered Model could be adopted to move away from sector-specific regulation, and could successfully use conventional market analysis criteria.     

A pan-European telecommunications regulator?

Creating a single telecommunications market in the European Union is well under way, particularly with the approach of full competition after 1 January 1998. However, the regulatory framework needs to reflect the demands of the single market and the needs of industry. The European Commission has been reviewing whether a single pan-European telecommunications regulator would offer a valuable focus in streamlining the existing regulatory structure. In so doing, they commissioned Denton Hall and NERA to evaluate the needs of industry and the legal and practical approaches to the creation of a single regulator.     

The EU regulatory framework in telecommunications: A critical analysis

The paper analyzes the core telecommunications regulatory framework at European Union (EU) level which has been put in place since the beginning of the 1990s. We find lack of support by Member States of the European Commission’‘s liberalization program in several areas, including Member States’ resistance to rapid liberalization, cost orientation, an effective EU-wide licensing system, pro-competitive numbering policy (carrier selection), as well as EU-wide harmonized interconnection rules and universal service obligations. We also identify a number of shortcomings of European Commission measures, especially in the areas of price regulation, interconnection rules and licensing policy. To overcome these inefficiencies, we recommend the establishment of an independent European Regulatory Authorities (ERA) that is comprised of representatives from National Regulatory Authorities.     

Can open internet access be imposed upon European CATV networks?

Broadband over cable television networks has become a growing force on the retail market in the EU. Thus, a debate has always been raised whether cable television networks should also be subject to open internet access obligations as PSTN and fibre. This article aims to share its view from a legal perspective. In order to do so, it conducts a survey of the current regulatory measures on broadband over cable television networks within the 27 EU Member States, and then carries out an in-depth legal analysis on Member States that attempted to regulate broadband over cable television networks. The conclusion is that broadband over cable television networks is currently deregulated, and will probably remain so in the future.     

Good intentions,poor outcomes: Telecommunications reform in South Africa

As the first decade of democratic rule draws to a close in South Africa, this paper reviews the telecommunications reform process in terms of the performance of the sector against the twin national policy objectives of affordable access to communications services and accelerated development to meet the needs of a modern economy. It critiques the implementation of international reform models which have in practice tended to emphasise privatisation at the expense of other reform mechanisms—including competition and, in particular, regulatory measures. It argues that this has impacted negatively on affordable access and has inhibited market innovation.This paper identifies the root of the problem as the market structure. Designed around the vertically integrated incumbent operator, it induces inherently anti-competitive impertives that demands a resource-intensive regulatory response. The regulator has often not had the statutory powers, and seldom the capacity, to circumscribe the behaviour of the incumbent so that it does not impact negatively on new entrants. Without effective regulation, the assumed benefits of liberalisation—including more affordable access through improved management of the incumbent and more efficient allocation of resources in the market through competition—do not materialise.The paper argues that developing country telecommunications markets demand more from a regulator than simply meeting the threshold requirements of transparency and predictability via so-called international “best practice” models. Such a limited approach will not be sufficient to meet the challenges facing most developing countries. The highly imperfect nature of developing country markets, and the enormous income disparities and inequities that exist, require strategic regulation. This is necessary to enable innovative service provision, especially to under-serviced areas, and to facilitate fair competitive markets that promote the viability of the new entrants needed to build the information infrastructure—the infrastructure necessary for a country's participation in the global network economy.Simply removing all market-entry restrictions, however, is likely to place an even more onerous burden on already-struggling regulators and is unlikely to contribute to universal access and other developmental goals. A new policy approach involving the fundamental restructuring of the market is needed to remove the anti-competitive incentives that exist in the vertically integrated market structure that generally accompanies privatisation in developing countries. While a more horizontally structured market will not remove the incumbent advantage entirely, it is likely to reduce the need for constant adjustment of anti-competitive behaviour on the part of the incumbent, freeing up regulatory resources for more strategic regulation towards achieving national developmental objectives.     

Telecommunications in the land of the Thunder Dragon: recent developments in Bhutan

This paper charts the development of telecommunications in Bhutan. Since the introduction of telecommunications services in 1963 Bhutan has faced many challenges as it has sought to roll out a network that covers the whole population and country. A small population, a mountainous geography, a transitional economy and a unique approach to development—Gross National Happiness—present many challenges that need to be overcome if the telecommunications industry is to develop further. Added to this is the decision of Bhutan to join the outside world through membership of the ITU, APT and WTO that has added liberalisation and privatisation to the challenges faced by Bhutan. This paper identifies two broad policy options that Bhutan could adopt—network expansion nationally or investment concentration towards urban areas. The authors conclude that due to the limited resources available to Bhutan these policies are contradictory and will take the telecommunications industry in quite different directions if adopted.     

Competitive dynamics in Polish telecommunications, 1990–2000: growth,regulation, and privatization of an infrastructural multi-network

This paper analyzes the relationship between governmental regulatory policies and competitive dynamics amongst private operators and the national monopolist, TP SA, in three network segments of the Polish telecommunications sector. Special attention is paid to the evolution of organizational strategies in a regulatory environment characterized by constant strategic indecision and reorientations of national policy makers. The paper finds that regulatory/competition coevolution has taken diverse forms in the three network subsegments, with asymmetric duopoly operating in the local fixed network, hidden competition at work in the long-distance fixed network, and oligopolistic technology-driven competition characterizing the high-growth cellular network. The conclusion reached is that Polish telecommunications to date has been stuck in a broad stage of pre-competitive market maneuverings by domestic and international capital, in preparation for privatization of the national operator and for full liberalization as part of EU integration.     

Regulation and efficiency in transition: The case of telecommunications in Italy

In regulating the telecommunications industry, the separation between network and retail functions, which is designed to countervail the market power of incumbent operators, is a relevant issue. Despite its importance, little empirical research has addressed the effects of such a separation. Accordingly, this paper provides insights into the consequences of the Italian communications regulatory authority's (AgCom) decision to impose this type of separation on the incumbent telecommunications operator, Telecom Italia. In particular, the studied separation is between the firm's network-related functions, and those used for provision of its communication services. The present research finds that the type of separation implemented by AgCom allows a provider to maintain the advantages of operational scale in its network structure without dampening competition in the existing market for communications services. The study also offers further empirical evidence on the advantages of a composite vs. translog function in analyzing the multiproduct cost structure of a telecommunications operator.     

Managing and modeling the price reduction effect in mobile telecommunications traffic

As needs for telecommunications services diversify, an increasingly wide range of services is becoming available in the market. Service price reduction is one strategy used by service providers to retain existing subscribers. A price reduction for one service, however, can affect the individual-level usage for other services. Price reductions can also be imposed on a service provider by regulation. For these reasons, understanding how price reductions affect service usage is of growing importance to the telecommunications industry for purposes of pricing and tariff development. In this paper, an individual-level usage model for telecommunications services is developed and the effects on usage of a price reduction are analyzed. The model is applied to age-stratified aggregate traffic data for a Korean mobile telecommunication service provider. Finally, a 0-1 integer programming model is proposed for choosing which market segment should be targeted with a price reduction to minimize revenue loss. These models can be applied to market segmentation and price reduction strategy.     

Welfare effects of the Telecommunication Reform in Mexico

The telecommunication sector in Mexico was highly concentrated until 2013. The sector was mostly composed by a dominant player, a rationed market (low density of services), a poor institutional design, high tariffs, and weak regulation agents. The Herfindahl-Hirschman (HHI) index was 5333 for mobile telephone and 7,029 for fixed telephone services—among the highest scores in the world. In order to promote competition in the sector, Congress approved a reform in 2013 to establish a new regulator empowered to impose asymmetrical rules in the case of the predominance of a single firm. A declaration of preponderance of the dominant player was issued, promoting free interconnection rates and the mandatory sharing of its passive and active infrastructure with the rest of the firms in the industry. The new institutional design led to increased competition in the sector, decreasing the mobile and fixed telephone prices while increasing the coverage and penetration of these services. In this article, an applied general equilibrium model for the Mexican economy is employed to assess the impact of the Telecommunication Reform in Mexico in the telephone sector, consumer welfare, and income distribution. The model is static, encompassing 10 types of consumers (rural and urban and the five income quintiles) and 40 sectors (of which four are disaggregate telecommunications industries). It assumes fixed wages and capital rental prices as well as idle resources. The main results indicate that the effects of the reform are not minor; the drop in telephone prices would reduce the general consumer price index by almost 2%, and the value added would increase by more than 3%, benefiting mainly households in the highest income quantiles.     

Korean telecom policy in global competition: implications for developing countries

United States efforts to open the Korean telecommunications market have been incessant and tenacious, to the extent that Korea is the only country to be twice designated by the US as a priority foreign country (PFC). Through major restructuring driven by the Korean government, the telecommunications infrastructure of Korea has been strengthened and expanded, and in the process has posed a threat to the US telecommunications industry. Thus, since the late 1980s, the Korean telecommunications industry has been monitored and threatened with trade sanctions by the United States Trade Representative, and all internal restructuring has been closely related to bilateral negotiations with the US, and multilateral negotiations in the Uruguay Round. Based on interviews with key Korean telecommunications personnel and analyses of public documents, this research examines the Korean telecommunications market, telecommunications policies relative to the US and WTO, and the recent economic crisis that has affected the stability of the industry. The paper also offers five major recommendations to government and industry policymakers, including a more active and positive stance toward liberalisation, the relinquishing by bureaucrats of their monopolistic power over policymaking, the securing of an open and transparent policymaking process, and, in relations with the US, and the mobilisation of regional and multilateral organisations to ensure fair competition in telecommunications.     

Accounting for ARPU: New evidence from international panel data

Average revenue per user (ARPU) is commonly used by regulators and industry observers to compare the performance of mobile telephony markets. Under the new EU electronic communications regulatory framework, some national regulatory authorities (NRAs) have linked higher ARPU with ‘significant market power’. This paper empirically examines the determinants of ARPU in a systematic way, taking account of service quality, market environment, regulation and quantity of service. The robust results suggest that concentration may not be a reliable indicator of competition in mobile markets; there are economies of density in mobile markets; and higher GDP per capita increases ARPU.