Analysis of cybersecurity competencies: Recommendations for telecommunications policy

The paper aims to analyse and assess cybersecurity competencies and define the recommended solutions to improve the human factor in cybersecurity. The article presents the results of theoretical and empirical research that were carried out in 2019–2021. The research subject constitutes one of the priorities of many countries and international organisations. Cybersecurity is one of the essential foundations for implementing the idea of sustainable development. A cybersecurity analysis using a layered structure was proposed in the theoretical part. Empirical research was conducted using a diagnostic poll method based on a survey. The presentation of the research results includes an analysis of statistical dependencies. The paper presents the research results on cybersecurity competencies in the field of threats to state cyberspace and methods of securing and protecting data. An important element of the research was to identify forms of education that can be used to achieve greater efficiency in increasing cybersecurity competencies. The result of the implementation of the research objectives was the development of recommended solutions facilitating the improvement of the human factor in the field of cybersecurity.     

Regulating Data Privacy and Cybersecurity

This paper studies firms' data privacy and cybersecurity choices. We emphasise the strategic interdependence between these decisions and demonstrate that security in both the market equilibrium and the social optimum tends to be higher when data is shared. We also identify important market failures in the sense that firms tend to under-invest in security and over-share data. Our welfare analysis of a minimum security standard, disclosure and consumer education policies, liability rules and consumer mitigation strategies highlights the need for a co-ordinated approach to regulation.     

China׳s information security standardization: Analysis from the perspective of technical barriers to trade principles

There have been many attempts for ICT standardization in China. Among them, this paper deals with information security standards. Although information security is often mentioned regarding China?s ICT standardization, it has been rarely examined per se. While most studies on China?s ICT standardization focus on economic aspects (e.g. increased bargaining power) or the government?s role, this paper draws on legal aspects. We select WAPI and ZUC for case studies, and examine their legal aspects, particularly from the perspective of WTO?s TBT (technical barriers to trade) principles. We have found that China?s standardization strategy becomes international-bound and, in fact, the manner in which the Chinese government handles standardization projects has become refined, flexible, and communicative with foreign stakeholders. We see that the changes are responses to the trade concerns raised by foreign stakeholders in various TBT Committee meetings and bilateral meetings. In addition, the Chinese government appears to become market-oriented even in the field of information security where it previously maintained a rigid stance on the ground of national security. This paper points out that the changes are attributed to growing external pressure from foreign governments and firms as well as to internal efforts toward innovation based on indigenous technology.     

Managing for stakeholders,stakeholder utility functions,and competitive advantage

A firm that manages for stakeholders allocates more resources to satisfy the needs and demands of its legitimate stakeholders than would be necessary to simply retain their willful participation in the firm's productive activities. We explain why this sort of behavior unlocks additional potential for value creation, as well as the conditions that either facilitate or disrupt the value‐creation process. Firms that manage for stakeholders develop trusting relationships with them based on principles of distributional, procedural, and interactional justice. Under these conditions, stakeholders are more likely to share nuanced information regarding their utility functions, thereby increasing the ability of the firm to allocate its resources to areas that will best satisfy them (thus increasing demand for business transactions with the firm). In addition, this information can spur innovation, as well as allow the firm to deal better with changes in the environment. Competitive advantages stemming from a managing‐for‐stakeholders approach are argued to be sustainable because they are associated with path dependence and causal ambiguity. These explanations provide a strong rationale for including stakeholder theory in the discussion of firm competitiveness and performance. Copyright © 2009 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

The impact of post-merger integration on the customer–supplier relationship

While the impact of mergers and acquisitions (M&A) on internal stakeholders has generated considerable empirical study, comparatively little academic attention has been paid as to how external stakeholders such as customers are affected by, and respond to, M&A activity. This study adopts case-study methodology to illuminate how the customer–supplier relationship is affected by post-merger integration processes in the business-to-business context, with the aim of increasing our understanding of why customers respond to M&A in the ways that they do. The findings highlight the importance of a set of critical customer relationship variables through which post-M&A integration actions can influence customers' perceptions of the merged organisation and, ultimately, their purchase decisions. We also identify a set of specific individual integration actions that appear to trigger changes in the critical customer relationship variables. Together, the findings contribute to our understanding of the precise mechanisms through which M&A can affect customers' purchase decisions and the combining firms' market-related performance. More broadly, consistent with the stakeholder perspective, they reinforce the need to take account of external as well as internal stakeholders when considering the drivers of M&A outcome. Implications are discussed for future research as well as for B2B service industry executives involved in M&A.     

Stakeholder value appropriation: The case of labor in the worldwide mining industry

Research Summary : We evaluate how the value appropriated by employees varies in response to an exogenous shock to the price of the firm's product and how this variation depends on institutional and ownership structures. Institutional and ownership structures that favor employees can influence firms’ location decisions and shareholders’ incentives to invest. Using data from the main copper mines in the world, we show that the value appropriated by employees rises in response to an exogenous increase in the price of minerals. Our results indicate that the magnitude of the increment in the value captured by employees is larger in stated‐owned companies, when labor regulations promote productivity‐based payments, when wages are determined through a centralized bargaining process, and when regulations associated with hiring and firing are more flexible. Managerial Summary : We show how labor regulations and state ownership affect the value appropriated by employees when there are exogenous changes in the price of the firm's products. Since the value generated by a firm is distributed among different stakeholders, a higher appropriation of value by employees results in lower appropriation by another party. Therefore, by changing the distribution of value, managerial decisions about location and entry could be affected. For instance, shareholders of firms with positive future expectations about the prices of their products might prefer to enter markets in which salary negotiations are not centralized or where partnership with the local government is not mandatory. Overall, our analysis calls for the consideration of the external environment when evaluating value appropriation by different types of stakeholders.     

Leveraging foreign institutional logic in the adoption of stock option pay among Japanese firms

Research summary : We investigate why Japanese firms have adopted executive stock option pay, which was developed with shareholder‐oriented institutional logic that was inconsistent with Japanese stakeholder‐oriented institutional logic. We argue that Japanese managers have self‐serving incentives to leverage stock ownership of foreign investors and their associated institutional logic to legitimize the adoption of stock option pay. Our empirical analyses with a large sample of Japanese firms between 1997 and 2007 show that when managers have elite education, high pay inequality with ordinary employees, and when firms experience poor sales growth, foreign ownership is more likely associated with the adoption of stock option pay. The study shows the active role of managers in facilitating the diffusion of a new governance practice embodying new institutional logic. Managerial summary : Why have Japanese firms adopted stock option pay for executives? Inconsistent with Japanese stakeholder‐oriented tradition in corporate governance, such pay has been believed to prioritize managerial attention to the interests of shareholders over those of other stakeholders. However, to the extent that shareholders' interests are legitimate in the Japanese context, executives who have self‐serving incentives to adopt such pay can leverage the need to look after shareholders' interest in their firms to legitimize their decisions. In a large sample of Japanese firms, we find that foreign ownership (representing shareholders' interests) is more likely to be associated with the adoption of stock option pay when managers are motivated to receive such pay, such as when they have elite education, high pay inequality with ordinary employees, or poor sales growth. Copyright © 2015 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Securities auctions with pre-project information management

This paper analyzes securities auctions in which bidders have an option to acquire information after winning the right to develop a project. The payment consists of an up-front cash bid and a contingent security bid, which distorts investment and information acquisition relative to the first-best. We order securities in terms of their steepness: the payment of a steeper security is more sensitive to high project values. The agent’s incentives to acquire information that prevents either cost overruns (Type I errors) or false cancellations (Type II errors) decrease with the steepness of securities. The optimal limited-liability securities auction involves bidding debt that minimizes the distortions in the agent’s incentives to acquire performance-enhancing information. The model delivers implications on the practices commonly observed in oil lease auctions.     

Top management team incentive heterogeneity,strategic investment behavior,and performance: A contingency theory of incentive alignment

Research summary : We develop and test a contingency theory of the influence of top management team (TMT) performance‐contingent incentives on manager–shareholder interest alignment. Our results support our theory by showing that although TMTs engage in significantly higher levels of acquisition investment when their average incentive levels increase, investors' responses to those large investments are generally negative. More importantly, however, we further find that within‐TMT incentive heterogeneity conditions that effect, such that investors evaluate TMTs' large acquisition investments more positively as the variance in those top managers' incentive values increases. Thus, within‐TMT incentive heterogeneity appears to increase manager–shareholder interest alignment, in the context of large acquisition investments. Managerial summary : We find that as the average value of TMTs' incentives increase, relative to their total pay, they invest more in acquisitions and investors' respond negatively to the announcement of those deals. However, we further show that investors respond more positively to acquisitions announced by TMTs whose members' incentive values vary (some TMT members hold higher incentives and others hold lower). Results imply that when TMT members hold differing incentives levels, they approach investments from divergent perspectives, scrutinize those investments more heavily, and make better decisions, relative to TMTs with similar incentives. They also suggest that boards seeking tighter manager–shareholder interest alignment may benefit from introducing variance into TMT members' incentive structures, as doing so appears to create divergent preferences that can improve team decision making. Copyright © 2016 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Realigning research and extension to focus on farmers’ constraints and opportunities

This paper argues that research and extension have failed to (1) develop technologies that take into account farmers’ resource constraints and risks; and (2) improve farmers’ capacity to adapt technologies to their own situations. The paper critiques continued use of blanket, high-dose fertilizer recommendations, arguing for approaches that teach farmers how to maximize returns from smaller, more affordable input purchases. Developing such technologies requires that researchers integrate a wider range of stakeholders (farmers, extension agents, agricultural exporters and processors) into research activities at an earlier point in time than has been the case. Although evidence that these new approaches are increasing the use of purchased inputs remains weak, a number of important lessons are emerging about how research and extension outcomes are influenced by institutional culture and incentives. The authors conclude that developing recommendations for small, affordable input doses and training farmers so they can adapt recommendations to their particular circumstances is as much an institutional challenge as a technology challenge.     

Managerial Incentives: Implications for the Financial Performance of Real Estate Investment Trusts

In the face of informational asymmetry, REIT equity investors may bear the costs of agency. Hence, it is in shareholders' interests to pay incentive fees to induce managers to utilize their superior information and to take suitable actions that reduce these costs. In this paper, the relation between financial performance and fees paid, and between fees paid and contractual incentives, are examined to determine whether equityholder interests are being served by the decisions of REIT managers. The data reveal that fees paid and financial performance are positively related, indicating that financial performance is at least partially endogenous with respect to managerial action. Moreover, the evidence also suggests that the industry fee structure has changed over the period in a manner that appears to have reduced the agency costs borne by equityholders, and by the end of the sample period the fees paid in general seem to reflect incentives that are consistent with the wealth maximization goal of equityholders.     

Horizontal Product Differentiation: Disclosure and Competition

This paper studies firms' incentives to disclose horizontal product attributes in a competitive environment. With competition, two elements play an important role: whether (i) firms can disclose only their own product characteristics or also those of their competitors, and whether (ii) competitors can react with their pricing decisions to the type of information disclosed. In all possible cases, full revelation is an equilibrium outcome. More importantly, it is generically the unique equilibrium outcome when (i) advertising is comparative and (ii) prices are also advertised, that is, announced simultaneously with the product information. When advertising is noncomparative or prices are not advertised, many nondisclosure equilibria exist.     

The role of B2B marketers in increasing cyber security awareness and influencing behavioural change

Although cyberspace is providing business opportunities, it is evident that B2B marketers need to pay attention to how to reduce the vulnerabilities associated with the use of computer technology. To reduce the possibility of a data breach, senior management need to increase threat awareness through the development of a behavioural awareness programme. We address how B2B marketers can contribute to increasing cyber security awareness by relating to an individual's knowledge and attitude that influences their behaviour. By drawing on the information systems management, marketing, communication and motivational research (social psychology) literature, we explain how persuasive communication theory in conjunction with motivation theory can be used to create an awareness programme to influence behavioural change. A qualitative research strategy was deployed and the critical friendship group and the group interview method were utilized. Fourteen highly experienced security experts participated in the study. The findings indicate that the process of knowledge creation can be enhanced by deploying functional theories of attitudes as this provides a basis to categorize staff according to their level of motivation and knowledge. This means that B2B marketers can play the role of co-ordinator when devising and implementing an appropriate cyber security awareness programme to help staff counteract the actions of cyber attackers. By reducing the gap between self-efficacy and perceived expectation, the confidence level of staff will be increased and attitudinal behavioural change will occur throughout the organization.     

Does Competition Lead to Agglomeration or Dispersion in EMR Vendor Decisions?

We examine hospital Electronic Medical Record (EMR) vendor adoption patterns and how they relate to hospital market structure. As in many network technology adoption decisions, hospitals face countervailing incentives to coordinate or differentiate in their choice of vendors. We find evidence of substantial agglomeration on EMR vendors, which increases as hospital markets become more competitive. These findings suggest that incentives to coordinate dominate incentives to differentiate overall, and the relative balance grows stronger in favor of coordination as markets become more competitive. Our findings also have important implications regarding antitrust policy. A potential downside of hospital consolidation—increased obstacles in information sharing due to vendor differentiation—should be taken into account in evaluation of hospital mergers.     

Horizontal subcontracting and investment in idle dispatchable power plants

We analyze horizontal subcontracting and show how idle production facilities can reduce contracting costs by credibly protecting against hold-up. Our analysis contributes to understanding competition between power firms that increasingly use intermittent generation sources. Their unilateral incentives to invest in maintaining underused units, such as dispatchable gas-fired plants, are underrated by plant profitability indicators. From a policy perspective, decentralized strategic investment incentives reduce the possible need for centralized security of supply measures. Our welfare analysis indicates that quantity competition can lead to a lower market-clearing price than price competition.     

The impact of firm cost and market size asymmetries on national mergers in a three-country model

This paper studies the impact of firm cost and market size asymmetries on merger decisions. I consider a model where a small and a large country compete in a third (world) market. Each of the two countries has two firms (with potentially different costs) that supply the domestic market and export to the third market. Merger decisions in the two countries are modeled as a simultaneously move game. The paper finds that firms in the large country have more incentives to merge than firms in the small country. In contrast, the government of the large country has more incentives to block a merger than the government of the small country. Thus, the model predicts that conflicts of interest between governments and firms concerning national mergers are more likely in large countries than in small ones.     

Food safety and product liability

This paper focuses on the U.S. product liability system for food poisoning cases and makes six key points. First, current legal incentives to produce safer food are weak, though slightly stronger in outbreak situations and in markets where foodborne illness can be more easily traced to individual firms. Far less than 0.01% of cases are litigated and even fewer are paid compensation. Second, even if potential plaintiffs can overcome the high information and transaction costs necessary to file lawsuits, monetary compensation provides only weak incentives to pursue litigation. Firms paid compensation in 56% of the 294 cases examined in this study and the median compensation was only $2,000 before legal fees. Third, indirect incentives for firms may be important and deserve more research. For example, firms may be influenced by costly settlements and decisions against other firms in the same industry. Fourth, confidential settlements, health insurance, and product liability insurance distort legal incentives to produce safer food. Fifth, the ambiguity about whether microbial contamination is “natural” or an “adulterant” hinders the legal system from effectively dealing with food safety issues. Sixth, a brief comparison of the incentives from U.S. and English legal systems suggests that more research is needed to understand the strengths, weaknesses, and relative impact of each country's legal system on the incentives to produce safer food.     

The information paradox in a monopolist’s credence goods market

Credence good markets, such as those for car repairs and medical treatments, are generally characterized by an ex-ante and ex-post information asymmetry between the uninformed customers and the informed expert. In this paper, we allow for both uninformed as well as informed customers to exist in a monopolist credence goods market. We analyze the implications of this kind of informational heterogeneity for the expert’s pricing decisions, incentives to commit fraud, as well as market efficiency and social welfare under different institutional arrangements. Most importantly, our approach enables us to evaluate endeavours to improve the level of customers’ information. Contrary to basic intuition, we find that recent developments and policy measures originally aimed at improving social welfare by increasing the level of information might actually backfire.     

Managerial incentives as a strategic variable in duopolistic environment

The paper investigates two interrelated problems. The first is the output choice of a firm in which decisions are made cooperatively by managers who might have conflicting objectives. The second is the managerial incentives scheme as a strategic choice of owners who wish to maximize profits. Using an example in which a duopolistic market is studied, the paper shows that giving managers incentives that combine profit and sales maximization might be the dominant strategy for the owners.