Information Acquisition and the Equilibrium Incentive Problem

I study the optimal incentive provision in a principal–agent relationship with costly information acquisition by the agent. I emphasize that adverse selection or moral hazard is the principal's endogenous choice by inducing or deterring information acquisition. The principal designs the contract not only to address an existing incentive problem but also to implement its presence. Implementation of adverse selection relies on a steeper information rent to the agent than the standard menu, such that the agent is motivated to distinguish the efficient state of nature from the inefficient. Moral hazard is implemented by replacing the benchmark debt contract with a debt‐with‐equity‐share contract, such that the agent does not attempt to acquire information to either avoid debt or to extract rent.     

Moral hazard,debt overhang and capital structure

This paper investigates the impact of managerial moral hazard on the debt overhang of a firm by constructing a contingent claims model in which the manager faces costly effort. Using a calibrated capital structure model, we show that the costs of debt overhang become more serious in the presence of managerial moral hazard. Such costs even account for more than half of the total agency costs at a high level of cash flow. Moreover, in contrast to the results of Hackbarth and Mauer (2012), our model predicts a U-shaped relationship between the leverage ratio and investment opportunities of a firm, which is caused by managers’ moral hazard. Finally, by considering this moral hazard, we also show the coexistence of low leverage ratios and high credit spreads, which explains the phenomenon of “low debt levels and high credit spreads” observed in practice.     

Optimal timing of management turnover under agency problems

We explore the timing of the replacement of a manager as an important incentive mechanism, using a real options approach in a situation where the timing of the decision to replace the manager is related to a major change in a firm's strategies that involves spending large amounts of various sunk adjustment costs. Using a continuous-time agency setting, we show that when renegotiation is not possible, the early replacement of the manager of a lower quality project (prior to the first-best trigger level) occurs only if a moral hazard or an adverse selection problem exists. We also indicate that the possibility of renegotiation drastically changes the results.     

Convolution and composition of totally positive random variables in economics

This paper studies a class of multidimensional screening models where different type dimensions can be aggregated into a single-dimensional sufficient statistic. The paper applies results of totally positive functions to show that some critical properties of distributions of asymmetric information parameters, such as increasing hazard rate, monotone likelihood ratio, and single-peakedness are preserved under convolution or composition. Under some general conditions, these invariance results also provide a natural ordering of alternative screening mechanisms. I illustrate how these preservation results provide a unifying framework to interpret several contributions in economic models of adverse selection, moral hazard, and voting.     

Why Do African Banks Lend So Little?

We put forward a plausible explanation of African banking sector under‐development in the form of a bad credit market equilibrium. Using an appropriately modified Industrial Organization model of banking, we show that the root of the problem could be unchecked moral hazard (strategic loan defaults) or adverse selection (a lack of good projects). Applying a dynamic panel estimator to a large sample of African banks, we show that loan defaults are a major factor inhibiting bank lending when institutional quality is low. We also find that once a threshold level of institutional quality has been reached, improvements in the default rate or institutional quality do not matter. This provides support for our theoretical predictions.     

Existence of optimal auctions in general environments

We provide a unified approach to the problem of existence of optimal auctions for a wide variety of auction environments. We accomplish this by first establishing a general existence result for a particular Stackelberg revelation game. By systematically specializing our revelation game to cover various types of auctions, we are able to deduce the existence of optimal Bayesian auction mechanisms for single and multiple unit auctions, as well as for contract auctions with moral hazard and adverse selection. In all cases, we allow for risk aversion and multidimensional, stochastically dependent types.     

Estimation of the effects of adverse selection and moral hazard on income-contingent loan plans for professional and graduate students

The increasing repayment burden of conventional student loans and the rapid growth of attendance costs are concerns that should spark renewed interest in income-contingent loans, especially for students in high-cost graduate and professional programs. This paper provides a model of the demand for income-contingent loans that can be used to estimate the possible effects of adverse selection and moral hazard on the financial viability of income-contingent loan plans. Simulations based on the loan-demand model are presented for medical students, and the results are discussed in terms of alternative options for reducing the effects of adverse selection and moral hazard.     

Corporate Opacity and Cost of Debt for Family Firms

This paper uses a sample of Chinese firms to examine the impact of corporate opacity on the relationship between family control and firms’ cost of debt. We find that family control is associated with a lower cost of debt on average, and a negative impact exists mainly in firms with relatively low corporate opacity. We further provide evidence that the moderating effect of corporate opacity becomes more pronounced when investors’ perception of controlling families’ moral hazard of expropriation is higher. Our results are robust to alternative opacity proxies and controlling for endogeneity of family control using the instrumental variable method. Our study highlights that controlling families are heterogeneous in their impact on the shareholder–debtholder relationship in family firms, and debtholders view corporate opacity as an important reference in assessing the extent of potential agency conflicts in China.     

Agency Problems and Commitment in Delegated Bargaining

In the context of (one-sided) delegated bargaining, we analyze how a principal (a seller) should design the delegation contract in order to provide proper incentives for her delegate (an intermediary) and gain strategic advantage against a third party (a buyer). We consider situations in which there are both moral hazard and adverse selection problems in the delegation relationship and where the seller tries to gain strategic advantage by imposing a minimum price above which she pays the delegate a commission. It is shown that incentives and commitment are substitutes. A low-type agent is given less discretion in dealing with the buyer and weaker incentives, while a high-type agent is given more discretion and stronger incentives .     

企业劳动契约的激励模型分析——一种发生在道德风险之前的逆向选择问题

本文分析了企业劳动契约的制定过程以及企业和员工之间的委托代理关系,企业在制定劳动契约时会面临发生在道德风险之前的逆向选择问题。在将其与企业的人力资源管理实践相结合构造出相关模型,以及对这一委托代理模型的激励约束进行分析之后,得出这样的结论:企业作为委托人在制定劳动契约时应该综合考虑代理人(员工)的外在机会效用水平,内生成本函数,效用偏好函数和努力水平等激励影响因素。     

金融资产定价异常与资产定价模型:理论与实证

通过委托-代理理论对传统资产定价模型进行的拓展,得出了信息不对称下的扩展资产定价和代理成本资产定价模型.据此,进一步通过因子分析设计出了反映逆向选择、道德风险和代理成本的相应变量,并运用上市公司的相应数据对传统的资产定价模型(CAPM)、羊群效应CAPM、FF三因素模型、扩展的CAPM和代理成本CAPM进行了对比分析.对比结果显示:在保证系数和模型准确性的前提下,运用二阶段最小二乘法(TSLS)对扩展的CAPM和代理成本CAPM的估计结果相较于上述三类模型显示了更强的解释力度.     

基于产品生命周期的顾客忠诚意图动态演化模型研究

本文将委托-代理理论和关系营销理论相结合发展了一个顾客-品牌关系形成过程的概念化模型以探讨品牌忠诚的生成机理。根据逆向选择和道德风险的委托代理问题,品牌信号和品牌溢价可以作为解决上述问题的策略。然而,上述策略本身并没有减轻消费者对品牌所提供利益的不确定性和对企业采取机会主义的担心。因此,文章认为顾客对品牌的信任机制才是减少不确定性和机会主义的核心构件。     

Innovation contests with entry auction

We consider innovation contests for the procurement of an innovation under moral hazard and adverse selection. Innovators have private information about their abilities, and choose unobservable effort in order to produce innovations of random quality. Innovation quality is not contractible. We compare two procurement mechanisms—a fixed prize and a first-price auction. Before the contest, a fixed number of innovators is selected in an entry auction, in order to address the adverse selection problem. We find that–if effort and ability are perfect substitutes–both mechanisms implement the same innovations in symmetric pure-strategy equilibrium, regardless of whether the innovators’ private information is revealed or not. These equilibria are efficient if the procurer is a welfare-maximizer.     

对商业银行资本充足率要求的经济分析

本文从银行均衡的资本结构产生说起,接着说明了银行存款契约的内在缺陷,由此产生了担保制度。但是,担保制度又导致了银行经营者的道德风险和逆向选择,因此需要资本充足率监管制度。事实上,担保制度和资本充足率监管制度分别是对银行事前和事后风险防范提供一种制度安排,共同保障银行业有效顺利运转提供安全保障。     

On the generalized principal-agent problem: Decomposition and existence results

This paper addresses the class of generalized agency problems: situations in which adverse selection and moral hazard are jointly present. We present a decomposition of the principal's optimization problem under the first-order approach that sheds light on the interactions between the two types of private information, and also significantly improves tractability. We use the decomposition to (1) provide examples of closed form solutions of the optimal contract, and (2) analyze the existence of optimal contracts. We also show that the first-order approach is valid in generalized agency problems if the production technology satisfies the linear distribution function condition (LDFC) in actions and types. For more general production technologies the Mirrlees-Rogerson sufficient conditions need to be extended to include restrictions on the form of the optimal contract. Received: 11 August 1997 / 26 September 1999     

Platform Pricing Structure and Moral Hazard

We study pricing by a two‐sided platform when it faces moral hazard on the sellers' side. In doing so, we introduce an equilibrium notion of platform reputation in an infinite horizon model. We find that with transaction fees only, the platform cannot eliminate the loss of reputation induced by moral hazard. If registration fees can be levied, moral hazard can be overcome. The registration fee determines the participation threshold of sellers and extracts them, whereas (lower) transaction fees provide incentives for good behavior. This provides a motivation for platforms to use registration fees in addition to transaction fees.     

信息不对称与中小企业融资困难分析

中小企业在我国经济建设中发挥着重要的作用,但由于中小企业与银行之间存在信息不对称而引发的逆向选择和道德风险,从而导致了其融资困难。本文认为,作为资金需求方的中小企业,应提高其融资管理水平,降低“道德风险”所产生的融资成本。而作为资金供给方的政府和金融机构,应研究制定中小企业融资制度,降低融资市场的“逆向选择”。     

“When Should Manufacturers Want Fair Trade?”: New Insights from Asymmetric Information when Supply Chains Compete

We study a model of competing manufacturer/retailer pairs where adverse selection and moral hazard are coupled with promotional externalities at the downstream level. In contrast to earlier models mainly focusing on a bilateral monopoly setting, we show that with competing brands a ‘laissez‐faire’ approach towards vertical price control might not always promote productive efficiency. Giving manufacturers freedom to control retail prices is more likely to harm consumers when retailers impose positive promotional externalities on each other, and the converse is true otherwise. Our simple model also suggests that, with competing supply chains, consumers and manufacturers might prefer different contractual modes if promotional externalities have substantial effects on demands.     

Time will tell: interaction effects of franchising percentages and age on franchisor mortality rates

Drawing from franchising and organizational ecology literatures, we hypothesize that franchising provides benefits to franchisors by addressing issues of adverse selection, moral hazard, holdup, obsolescence, and senescence. We assert that, over time, these benefits increase such that the more a franchise chain utilizes franchisees rather than company-owned outlets, the greater the franchising benefits accrue to the franchisor. We test our propositions by studying the mortality rates of 393 franchise organizations in the U.S. automotive products and services sector over the 21-year time period 1985–2005, using proportional hazard analysis. We find that older franchise chains with higher percentages of franchised units have lower mortality rates than older franchise chains with lower percentages of franchised units. We also find that younger franchise chains with higher percentages of franchised units have higher mortality rates than younger franchise chains with lower percentages of franchised units.     

供应链合作伙伴的逆向选择问题

供应链合作关系中存在不少风险。合作企业之间的信息不对称,未来事项不确定性和复杂性和因此造成的合同不完全性,使道德风险和逆向选择问题在合作中难以避免。文中从解决逆向选择问题角度,研究供应链合作伙伴选择问题。