The dynamic provision of product diversity under duopoly

This paper builds a dynamic duopoly model to examine the provision of new varieties over time. Consumers experience temporary satiation, and hence higher consumption of the current variety lowers demand for future varieties. The equilibrium can be characterized by a combination of monopolistic pricing and nearly zero profits (competitive timing). In particular, if the cost of producing a new variety is not too low then firms tend to avoid head-to-head competition and set the short-run profit maximizing price. However, firms tend to introduce new varieties as soon as demand has grown sufficiently to cover costs. From a second best perspective, the equilibrium may exhibit excessive product diversity. However, if firms coordinate their frequency of new product introductions, then consumers are likely to be harmed. It is also shown that equilibrium prices are moderated by two factors. First, consumers’ option value of waiting reduces their willingness to pay. Second, competition reduces firms’ incentives to engage in intertemporal price discrimination.     

INNOVATION AND COMPETITIVE PRESSURE*

I analyze the effects of competition on process innovation and product introduction and obtain robust results that hold for a range of market structures and competition modes. It is found that increasing the number of firms tends to decrease cost reduction expenditure per firm, whereas increasing the degree of product substitutability, with or without free entry, increases it—provided that the average demand for product varieties does not shrink. Increasing market size increases cost reduction expenditure per firm and has ambiguous effects on the number of varieties offered, while decreasing the cost of entry increases the number of entrants and varieties but reduces cost reduction expenditure per variety. The results are extended to other measures of competitive pressure and to investment in product quality. The framework and results shed light on empirical strategies to assess the impact of competition on innovation.     

Firm Heterogeneity,New Investment and Acquisitions

This paper presents a model of investment in which heterogeneous firms choose between new investment and acquisitions. New investment involves purchasing a new plant for an existing variety. Acquisitions involve purchasing a plant and a variety from a selling firm. Using a variable‐elasticity demand system, I show that if varieties within a differentiated industry are imperfect substitutes, mid‐productivity firms invest. As varieties approach perfect substitutability, high‐productivity firms invest. For both cases, within the region of investing firms, the most productive choose acquisitions over new investment. In analyzing firm‐level data from Compustat, I find evidence that supports these predictions.     

Quantity competition with access fees

We analyze an oligopoly model where firms choose both quantities and access fees. Per unit prices are determined endogenously to equate quantity demanded with quantity supplied at each firm. In a Nash equilibrium of the game played by firms, the per unit prices equal marginal cost and access fees may or may not extract all consumer surplus. As the number of firms increases, access fees fall below net consumer surplus and toward zero. Existence is guaranteed if Marshallian consumer surplus is not too concave. With open entry, quantity competition with access fees may be less efficient than without access fees.     

Plant variety protection in developing countries. A report from the field

The establishment of intellectual property rights (IPRs) for plant varieties has caused considerable controversy, but there is relatively little empirical evidence on performance and options in developing countries. This paper summarizes the results of a recent five-country study, concentrating on the conduct of plant variety protection (PVP) regimes. It examines PVP in the context of other mechanisms that provide incentives for plant breeding. It discusses the principal options available to developing countries and examines the ability of PVP to offer protection from competing firms and from on-farm seed saving. It also looks at the administrative and management requirements of PVP regimes. Although the paper does not discuss patent protection for biotechnology it examines the IPR requirements for the introduction of transgenic varieties. Developing countries need to establish an appropriate PVP system, but PVP should be seen as part of a broader strategy for seed system development.     

Big Data for Creating and Capturing Value in the Digitalized Environment: Unpacking the Effects of Volume,Variety, and Veracity on Firm Performance*

Despite significant academic and managerial interest in big data, there is a dearth of research on how big data impacts the long‐term firm performance. Reasons for this gap include a lack of objective indices to measure big data availability and its impact, and the tendency of studies to ignore the costs associated with collecting and analyzing big data, assuming that big data automatically delivers benefits to firms. Focusing on how firms create and capture value from big data about customers, we use the resource‐based view and three dimensions of big data (i.e., volume, variety, and veracity) to understand when the benefits outweigh the costs. Relying on the number of downloads of mobile device applications, we find that volume of big data has a negative effect on firm performance. This result suggests that the “bigness” of big data alone does not ensure value creation for a firm, and could even constitute a “dark side” of big data. Because big data variety—measured as the number of types of information taken per each application—moderates the negative effects of big data volume, simultaneous high values of volume and variety allow firms to create value that positively affects their performance. In addition, high levels of veracity (i.e., a high percentage of employees devoted to big data analysis), are linked to firms benefiting from big data via value capture. These findings shed light on the circumstances in which big data can be beneficial for firms, contributing to a better theoretical understanding of the opportunities and challenges and providing useful indications to managers.     

R&D 'inputs' and 'outputs' of technology-based firms located on and off Science Parks

Science Parks (adjacent to universities) provide an important resource network for technology-based firms. To ascertain the 'added value' of a Science Park location the innovativeness (with regard to a variety of 'input' as well as 'output' measures) of independent technology-based Science Park firms are compared with the levels recorded by a comparable group of firms not located on a Park. Empirical evidence collected in 1992/93 from firms in a 'follow-on' sample (originally interviewed in 1986) as well as a 'new sample' study (independent firms that had located on a Science Park between 1986 and 1992) both revealed no statistically significant differences between the two groups on a variety of innovativeness measures. Results from both samples suggest Science Park firms do not directly invest more in R&D than off-Park firms nor do they record significantly higher levels of technology diffusion. The policy implications of the research findings are discussed.     

Market structure and market outcomes in deregulated rail freight markets

Using cross-section data on a national sample of city-pair markets for rail freight, I examine correlations between prices, quantities, and the number of single-line and interline firms serving markets. I estimate the reduced form of a structural model in which rail rates and quantities depend on the number of firms. I find that rates increase as the number of firms serving the market falls, and quantities shipped rise as the number of firms falls. The result is consistent with market power for rail freight shippers that causes markups to rise when fewer firms serve the market, and is not consistent with other explanations of the relationship between number of firms and rates and quantities. Interline shipment is much more costly than single-line, suggesting that mergers may be desirable even if they exacerbate market power problems.     

Organizing for solutions: Systems seller vs. systems integrator

This paper aims to examine how firms are organizing to provide integrated solutions: a business model for the supply of capital goods based on the provision of products and services as integrated solutions to individual customer's needs. The industrial marketing literature suggests that the origins of this business model can be traced back to early 1960s when firms adopted strategies and organizations for ‘systems selling’. The marketing literature helps us to identify two contrasting types of organizations: (1) the vertically-integrated systems seller that produces all the product and service components in a system; and (2) the systems integrator that coordinates integration of components supplied by external firms. The paper uses these two ideal types to analyse the strategies and organizations of five case study firms that have recently attempted to move into the provision of integrated solutions. It argues that there is no evidence to support the continuing dominance of the systems seller or a simple transition from systems selling to systems integration. A more complex pattern of organizational forms is emerging, combining elements of both systems selling (i.e. vertical integration into services) and systems integration.     

Strategic procurement, openness and market structure

We examine strategic procurement behaviour by governments and its effect on market structure in sectors, such as defence and pharmaceuticals, where the government is the dominant consumer. In a world economy with trade between producer countries, and between producers and non-producers, we use a modified Dixit–Stiglitz utility function with an independent taste for variety. There is free entry and exit by firms, but by anticipating their participation constraint governments can indirectly choose the number of domestic firms and their size through its choice of procurement price. Unlike the standard model with no independent taste for variety and no external sector of non-producer countries, there are incentives for subsidies, openness impacts on industrial structure and procurement coordination between producer countries affects firm numbers.     

The role of institutional arbitrage in the search for product innovation: Firm level evidence from Norway

Evolutionary theorizing conceptualizes the discovery of new products as a successful outcome from searching for innovation in which firms combine new and old knowledge and resources. Prior research has shown that the propensity for discovering new products is greatest when firms cross a technological and/or organizational boundary in the search for new knowledge. In this paper, we add a new dimension to this literature: we examine whether, and to what extent, crossing a national boundary, as when firms use knowledge from network partners in foreign countries, influences the likelihood that firms will introduce new products into the market. Drawing on theorizing on institutional arbitrage in the literature on national innovation systems (NIS) and varieties of capitalism (VOC), we propose that companies that cross a national boundary in searching for innovation are significantly more likely to introduce new products. Detailed survey data on firms; data on their network partners, including their location; and regression analysis show that the use of knowledge from actors in foreign NIS has a positive influence on product innovation.     

Horizontal product differentiation,prices and quantity selection of a multi-product monopolist

A monopolist which serves a market in which tastes are uniformly spread along a circumference of a circle selects an optimal set of product varieties. The cost of installing an additional variety increases with the difference from the ‘main product’. It is shown that variety prices decrease and the degree of differentiation between any two varieties increases as products get more differentiated.     

Technological Progress and the Chamberlin Effect

A monopolist's incentive to invest in cost-reducing technological inventions may be detrimental to product quality. In a model with variable cost of quality and heterogeneous consumers there is a possibility of quality reductions when new technology makes larger scale production feasible. The effect on quality depends crucially on the number of varieties produced by the monopolist. If he produces just one variety, quality will be reduced, whereas if he produces two varieties quality reductions only appear for more efficient means of producing the high quality good.     

Commercial Innovations from Consulting Engineering Firms: An Empirical Exploration of a Novel Source of New Product Ideas

Industrial firms interact with many outside organizations such as the customers, suppliers, competitors, and universities to obtain input for their new product development (NPD) programs. The importance of interfirm interactions is reflected in a large number of interdisciplinary studies reported in a wide variety of literature bases. As a result, several sources of new product ideas have been investigated in the extant literature. Yet given the growing complexity and risks in new product development, there seems to be a need for managers to obtain input from new and unutilized sources. Apparently, one source that industry has not tapped adequately for its NPD efforts is the consulting engineering firms (CEFs). To fill the aforementioned gap in the literature, this article explores the roles and suitability of CEFs in new product development by conducting a rigorous in‐depth case research of new product idea generation in a large Australian firm manufacturing a variety of industrial products. To generate ideas for the sponsoring firm, longitudinal field interviews with 64 managers and engineers from 32 large CEFs were conducted over a one‐and‐one‐half year period. The findings of the field interviews were combined with the documentary evidences and the archival data. This longitudinal data collection enabled the author to generate new product ideas over real time and to gain access to the information that otherwise might have been difficult to obtain. The results suggest that CEFs are a rich source of new product ideas of potential commercial value. However, industry is making little use of CEFs, which underscores the need for industrial firms to collaborate and to establish an effective idea transfer relationship with them. Moreover, the services of CEFs are not restricted to idea generation but can stretch across the entire NPD process. These findings of the study encourage product managers to conceptualize NPD as a highly synergistic mutually interdependent process between CEFs and industrial firms rather than simply an arm's‐length consulting transactions. Given the dearth of research on idea generation with CEFs, this study highlights the findings that are novel and that go beyond the techniques of new product idea generation established in the extant literature.     

The certifier for the long run

We build a workhorse model to study the optimal and the equilibrium certifier from a long-run perspective. Firms enter the market, and invest in their capacity to provide quality, before the certification threshold is determined. With a certifier that cares about quality and externalities (such as an NGO), the threshold is demanding and the firms’ profits are small. Anticipating this, only a few firms enter the market, and they invest heavily. With a certifier mostly concerned with the firms’ profits (such as an industry association), the results are reversed. The relative importance of externalities, investments, and entry determines the socially optimal certifier identity as well as the type of certifier that is most likely to operate in equilibrium. The theory’s predictions are empirically testable and shed light on the variety of certifiers across markets and over time.     

Innovation and Product Development Strategies in the Italian Motorcycle Industry

The motorcycle industry in Italy offers fertile ground for anyone interested in developing a better understanding of the role innovation plays in enhancing a firm's competitive position. This industry includes both domestic and Japanese firms, with companies ranging from high-volume manufacturers to specialty or niche producers. Firms trying to gain a competitive edge in this crowded field must contend with not only advances in product and process technology, but also the whims of fashion. In a survey of top-level marketing and product development managers from eight leading firms in the Italian motorcycle industry, Moreno Muffatto and Roberto Panizzolo explore the innovation models these firms employ to enhance their competitive position. Their study has the following objectives: categorizing the various competitors in terms of their product and market strategies and their product development and innovation strategies; highlighting differences between the methods of Italian and Japanese firms competing in this market; analyzing the relationships between firms, as well as the roles suppliers play in the various innovation strategies; and identifying the various organizational models employed by the firms in this industry. Different product and market strategies are identified on the basis of three variables: total production volume, the number of different products offered, and the number of different engine capacities offered. Using these variables, the companies in the study are categorized as volume producers, specialists, or niche specialists. The firms are further differentiated on the basis of the relative emphasis each places on product technology and design, product innovation, product variety, and time-based competition. In the firms studied, partnerships play a key role in new product development. Nearly every firm participates in joint projects, most often involving development of either an entire vehicle or an engine. Other partnerships involve firms in countries that offer emerging markets for the motorcycle industry. Organizational structures and strategies employed by the volume producers in this study include: the large product leader, who oversees concept definition and product planning; the project leaders group, which coordinates all phases of development, including activities assigned to external groups; the project managers matrix, a matrix organizational structure with a strong product orientation; and the business unit program manager, who oversees all projects within an independent business unit.     

‘Essential’ Patents,FRAND Royalties and Technological Standards

Standard Setting Organizations have developed FRAND agreements in order to prevent firms from holding up other participants once a standard is created. We analyze here the consequences of such agreements—in particular the requirements of fairness and non-discrimination—for the creation of technological standards that require the participation of existing patent holders. We abandon the usual assumption that patents bring known benefits to the industry or that their benefits are known to all parties. When royalty payments are increasing in one's patent portfolio, as is implicitly the case in FRAND agreements, private information about the quality of patents leads to a variety of distortions, in particular the incentives of firms to ‘pad’ by contributing patents that are ‘inessential’ for the given standard, a phenomenon that seems to be widespread. Several results emerge from the analysis: (i) the number of inessential patents co-varies positively with the number of essential patents; (ii) there is over-investment relative to the second-best, that is when padding cannot be avoided and (iii) the threat of disputes reduces incentives to pad but at the cost of lower production of strong patents; (iv) mitigating this undesirable side-effect calls for a simultaneous increase in the cost of padding, through a better filtering of patent applications.     

DESIGNING A MARKET STRUCTURE WHEN FIRMS COMPETE FOR THE RIGHT TO SERVE THE MARKET*

In many industries, a regulator designs an auction to select ex‐ante the firms that compete ex‐post on the product market. This paper considers the optimal market structure when firms incur sunk costs before entering the market and when the government is not able to regulate firms in the market. We prove that a free entry equilibrium results in an excessive entry when the entry costs are private information. Then, we consider an auction mechanism selecting the firms allowed to serve the market and show that the optimal number of licences results in the socially optimal market structure. When all the potential candidates are actual bidders, the optimal number of firms in the market increases with the number of candidates and decreases with the social cost of public funds. When the market size is small, as the net profit in the market decreases with the number of selected firms, entry is endogenous. As increasing competition in the market reduces competition for the market, the optimal structure is more concentrated than in the previous case.     

MARKET COMPETITION,R&D AND FIRM PROFITS IN ASYMMETRIC OLIGOPOLY*

We investigate a Cournot model with strategic R&D investments wherein efficient low‐cost firms compete against less efficient high‐cost firms. We find that an increase in the number of high‐cost firms can stimulate R&D by the low‐cost firms, while it always reduces R&D by the high‐cost firms. More importantly, this force can be strong enough to compensate for the loss that arises from more intense market competition: the low‐cost firms' profits may indeed increase with the number of high‐cost firms. An implication of this result is far‐reaching, as it gives low‐cost firms an incentive to help, rather than harm, high‐cost competitors. We relate this implication to a practice known as open knowledge disclosure, especially Ford's strategy of disclosing its know‐how publicly and extensively at the beginning of the 20th century.