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1.
We consider a sequential two-party bargaining game with uncertain information transmission. When the first mover states her
demand she does only know the probability with which the second mover will be informed about it. The informed second mover
can either accept or reject the offer and payoffs are determined as in the ultimatum game. Otherwise the uninformed second
mover states his own demand and payoffs are determined as in the Nash demand game. In the experiment we vary the commonly
known probability of information transmission. Our main finding is that first movers’ and uninformed second movers’ demands
adjust to this probability as qualitatively predicted, that is, first movers’ (uninformed second movers’) demands are lower
(higher) the lower the probability of information transmission.
JEL Classification C72 · C78 · C92 相似文献
2.
Attila Tasnádi 《Journal of Economics》2010,99(3):251-266
We consider a possible game-theoretic foundation of Forchheimer’s model of dominant-firm price leadership based on quantity-setting
games with one large firm and many small firms. If the large firm is the exogenously given first mover, we obtain Forchheimer’s
model. We also investigate whether the large firm can emerge as a first mover of a timing game. 相似文献
3.
This paper reports an experiment designed to shed light on an empirical puzzle observed by Dufwenberg and Gneezy (Games and
Economic Behavior 30:163–182, 2000) that the size of the foregone outside option by the first mover does not affect the behavior of the second mover in a lost
wallet game. Our conjecture was that the original protocol may not have made the size of the forgone outside option salient
to second movers. Therefore, we change two features of the Dufwenberg and Gneezy protocol: (i) instead of the strategy method
we implement a direct response method (sequential play) for the decision of the second mover; and (ii) we use paper money
certificates that are passed between the subjects rather than having subjects write down numbers representing their decisions.
We observe that our procedure yields qualitatively the same result as the Dufwenberg and Gneezy experiment, i.e., the second
movers do not respond to the change in the outside option of the first movers. 相似文献
4.
Tetsuo Yamamori Kazuhiko Kato Toshiji Kawagoe Akihiko Matsui 《Experimental Economics》2008,11(4):336-343
We conducted a laboratory experiment to study the effects of communication in a dictator game, while maintaining subjects’
anonymity. In the experiment, the recipient has an opportunity to state a payoff-irrelevant request for his/her share before
the dictator dictates his/her offer. We found that the independence hypothesis that voice does not matter is rejected. In
particular, if the request is for less than half of the pie, the dictator’s offer increases as the recipient’s request increases.
Additionally, there is no dictator who is other-regarding and, at the same time, does not react to the recipient’s request.
Electronic Supplementary Material The online version of this article () contains supplementary material, which is available to authorized users. 相似文献
Electronic Supplementary Material The online version of this article () contains supplementary material, which is available to authorized users. 相似文献
5.
This paper provides a comparative-statics analysis of punishment in public-good experiments. We vary the effectiveness of
punishment, that is, the factor by which punishment reduces the punished player’s income. The data show that contributions
increase monotonically in punishment effectiveness. High effectiveness leads to near complete cooperation and welfare improvements.
Below a certain threshold, however, punishment cannot prevent the decay of cooperation. In these cases, punishment opportunities
reduce welfare. The results suggest that the experimenter’s choice of the punishment effectiveness is of great importance
for the experimental outcome.
Electronic Supplementary Material The online version of this article () contains supplementary material, which is available to authorized users. 相似文献
Electronic Supplementary Material The online version of this article () contains supplementary material, which is available to authorized users. 相似文献
6.
We propose a novel experimental method that disentangles strategically- and non-strategically-motivated behavior. We apply
it to an indefinitely-repeated prisoner’s dilemma game to observe simultaneously how the same individual behaves in situations with future interaction and in situations with no future interaction, while controlling
for expectations. This method allows us to determine the extent to which strategically-cooperating individuals are responsible
for the observed pattern of cooperation in experiments with repeated interaction, including the so-called endgame effect.
Our results indicate that the most common motive for cooperation in repeated games is strategic. 相似文献
7.
The Kreps–Wilson–Milgrom–Roberts framework is one of the most renowned ways of modeling reputation-building. Once the number
of repetitions of the game is considered as a choice variable, such a framework can fruitfully be employed to study the optimal
length of the commitment to a relationship. We analyze a model where a principal plays with an agent a finitely repeated trust
game, characterize the optimal length of the relationship between principal and agent when the principal’s preferences on
the agent’s type stochastically change over time and show that a commitment to a stable relationship may be optimal (even)
in very unstable environments.
相似文献
8.
Many previous empirical studies have suggested that cooperation and trust affect economic growth. However, the precise relationship between trust and cooperation (i.e. whether trust leads to cooperation or cooperation leads to trust) remains unclear and it is not known how the level of economic development affects the level of cooperation and trust. Using a combination of public goods, gambling game and trust game experiments, we investigate the links among cooperation, trust and economic development in four regions of China. Our results suggest that, first, there is a U‐shaped or V‐shaped relationship between cooperation and economic development. Second, on the one hand, cooperation leads to trust, and on the other hand, more cooperative behaviour may be created by rewarding trusting behaviour. Third, men are more cooperative and trusting than women. Furthermore, we find that the widely used ‘GSS trust’ question from the General Social Survey (GSS) does not predict either cooperation or trust, whereas the questions ‘GSS fair’ and ‘GSS help’ have weak predictive power for trusting behaviour but not for cooperative behaviour. 相似文献
9.
We report the results of experiments conducted over the internet between two different laboratories. Each subject at one site
is matched with a subject at another site in a trust game experiment. We investigate whether subjects believe they are really
matched with another person, and suggest a methodology for ensuring that subjects’ beliefs are accurate. Results show that
skepticism can lead to misleading results. If subjects do not believe they are matched with a real person, they trust too
much: i.e., they trust the experimenter rather than their partner.
JEL Classification C9 相似文献
10.
11.
Ferdinando Meacci 《The Review of Austrian Economics》2009,22(4):333-348
The Austrian notion of stages of production and the related principle of the greater productivity of roundabout methods, plus
the neo-Austrian notions of vertical integration and vertical division of labour, are utilized in this paper in an attempt
to reconstruct Smith’s convoluted arguments on the different employment of capitals in chapter 5, book 2, of the Wealth of Nations. Smith’s arguments are first clarified in the light of the two concepts of capital (money capital and productive capital),
of the two aspects of productive labour (living labour and dead labour) and of the two viewpoints (of an individual and of
society) on which Smith’s theory is based. The results of this clarification are then used to prove that, independently of
Smith’s own words but in consistency with his theory, the notions of “quantity” and “productivity” of productive labour have
a “vertical”, as well as a “horizontal”, dimension so that they fit both the input–output scheme and the Austrian framework
of time-consuming methods of production. 相似文献
12.
Ali M. Ahmed 《Applied economics》2013,45(21):2715-2723
This article reports results from two experiments that investigate possible incidence of discrimination against people with foreign backgrounds in Sweden. In the first experiment, participants played the trust game and the dictator game with co-players of different ethnic affiliation. The family name of the players was exposed to their co-players. Results for the trust game showed no significant discrimination against co-players with foreign backgrounds. On the other hand, the results for the dictator game showed a statistically significant discriminatory behaviour by men against co-players with non-European backgrounds. The discriminatory behaviour was solely a male phenomenon. In the second experiment, the dictator game was replicated to check the stability of the results in the first experiment. The second experiment also examined whether people with foreign backgrounds discriminate against other people with foreign backgrounds; that is, the purpose was to discover whether discrimination is systematic. The observations in the second experiment underlined the results found in the first experiment: foreign co-players are discriminated against by Swedish players. However, we did not find that people with foreign backgrounds discriminated against other people with foreign backgrounds. 相似文献
13.
In a haystack-type representation of a heterogeneous population that is evolving according to a payoff structure of a prisoner’s
dilemma game, migration is modeled as a process of ‘swapping’ individuals between heterogeneous groups of constant size after
a random allocation fills the haystacks, but prior to mating. Migration is characterized by two parameters: an exogenous participation-in-migration
cost (of search, coordination, movement, and arrangement-making) which measures the migration effort, and an exogenous technology—of
coordinating and facilitating movement between populated haystacks and the colonization of currently unpopulated haystacks—which
measures the migration intensity. Starting from an initially heterogeneous population that consists of both cooperators and
defectors, a scenario is postulated under which ‘programmed’ migration can act as a mechanism that brings about a long-run
survival of cooperation.
相似文献
Yong WangEmail: |
14.
Mike Felgenhauer 《Journal of Economics》2007,90(3):295-312
This paper studies interest group influence on policy making. Lobbying occurs in a first price auction where an interest group
wins with certainty, if her bid exceeds the loser’s bid by the policy maker’s valuation for the socially best policy. Otherwise
the latter implements the privately known best policy. In equilibrium the size of the policy maker’s valuation does not matter for the size of the policy bias. The idea is to construct a “reference game”
and to shift the support of the equilibrium mixed strategies into the original game, without altering the structure of the
densities. 相似文献
15.
Cooperation is a pervasive social phenomenon, but more often than not economic theories have little to say about its causes and consequences. In this paper, we explore the hypothesis that cooperative behaviour might be motivated by pure self-interest when the “social” payoff in a game is increasing. We report the results of a series of experiments on the Centipede game. The experiments are organised in two subsequent steps. Subjects first participate in a 2-period trust game, randomly matched with unknown partners. We apply the strategy method in order to elicit their social preferences. On the basis of their pre-game behaviour, individuals are divided into three main social groups: selfish individuals, pure altruists and reciprocators. At the second step of the experiment, subjects play a repeated 6-move Centipede game with an increasing final payoff. Each subject plays twice, in a low and in a high-stake Centipede game, and he/she is informed about his/her co-player social preferences. We provide statistical evidence to identify the origin of cooperation within homogeneous and heterogeneous social groups. We construct a Poisson regression model to assess the determinants of the duration of conditional cooperation in the Centipede. 相似文献
16.
We investigate the role of intentions in two-player two-stage games. For this purpose we systematically vary the set of opportunity sets the first mover can choose from and study how the second mover reacts not only to opportunities of gains but also of losses created by the choice of the first mover. We find that the possibility of gains for the second mover (generosity) and the risk of losses for the first mover (vulnerability) are important drivers for second mover behavior. On the other hand, efficiency concerns and an aversion against violating trust seem to be far less important motivations. We also find that second movers compare the actual choice of the first mover and the alternative choices that would have been available to him to allocations that involve equal material payoffs. 相似文献
17.
The goal of the paper is to present a simple model of rational endogenous household formation in a general equilibrium framework
in which Pareto optimality at the economy level is not necessarily obtained. The simplest example of household formation is
the case in which pairs of individuals engage themselves in a bargaining process on the division of some wealth: if an agreement
on the distribution is (not) reached, we can say that the household is (not) formed. The vast majority of existing bargaining
models predicts agreements on an efficient outcome. A seminal paper by Crawford (Econometrica 50:607–637, 1982) describes
a very simple game with incomplete information in which, even with rational agents, disagreement causes welfare losses. We
embed that model in a general equilibrium framework and present some results on equilibria both in the bargaining game and
the associated exchange economy. Crawford’s results support Schelling’s intuition on the reasons of disagreement: it may arise
if players’ commitments are reversible. Crawford shows that high probabilities of reversibility tend to favor the bargaining
impasse, in fact with low probability. We prove that even if those probabilities are arbitrarily close to zero, disagreement
is an equilibrium outcome, with high probability. That conclusion seems to be an even stronger support to Schelling’s original
viewpoint. In the exchange economy model with that noncooperative bargaining game as a first stage, we present significant
examples of economies for which equilibria exist. Because of disagreement, Pareto suboptimal exchange economy equilibria exist
for all elements in the utility function and endowment spaces and they may coexist with Pareto optimal equilibria even at
the same competitive prices. 相似文献
18.
Friederike Mengel 《Journal of Evolutionary Economics》2009,19(3):397-415
We analyze a local interaction model where agents play a bilateral prisoner’s dilemma game with their neighbors. Agents learn
about behavior through payoff-biased imitation of their interaction neighbors (and possibly some agents beyond this set).
We find that the Eshel et al. (Am Econ Rev 88:157–179, 1998) result that polymorphic states are stochastically stable in such a setting is not robust. In particular, whenever agents
use information also of some agents beyond their interaction neighbors, the unique stable outcome is one where everyone chooses
defection. Introducing a sufficiently strong conformist bias into the imitation process, we find that full cooperation always
emerges. Conformism is thus identified as a new mechanism that can stabilize cooperation.
相似文献
Friederike MengelEmail: |
19.
We investigate cooperation using an incremental investment game in which the first-mover has the ability to make small, but
increasing incremental investments in their counterpart. Our experiment is designed to test whether establishing trust in
small increments is more effective than alternatives, including a one-shot investment game, a decrease only condition where
the amount the first-mover sends to the second-mover must be less than the amount previously sent, and an unrestricted condition
where the first-mover is not restricted by the amount previously sent. Although results were mixed, broadly, iteration affords
greater cooperation than one-shot games and, when given the choice, participants seem to prefer to build trust gradually.
Implications for institutional design are discussed.
相似文献
20.
Is group selection necessary? An alternative interpretation of homogeneous Middleman groups: Comments on Janet Landa’s paper 总被引:1,自引:1,他引:0
Richard A. Epstein 《Journal of Bioeconomics》2008,10(3):279-285
This article critiques the efforts by Janet Landa, David Sloan Wilson and others to use group selection paradigms to explain
the success of homogenous middlemen groups (HMGs). It argues that group selection theory cannot explain the conflicts of interests
that arise within HMGs or why they dissolve in certain occasions. Landa’s earlier explanations, which stressed the combination
of genetic (kinship) and social bonds in the creation of trust and cooperation in the extension of credit and the creation
of local public goods, better predicts both the strength and weaknesses of HMGs.
相似文献