我国企业杠杆收购的融资结构研究

杠杆收购作为一项金融创新工程,引发了美国经济的双重革命,杠杆收购独特的融资结构对于股东价值创造具有重要的意义。杠杆收购的融资就是通过利用资本市场和货币市场中的金融工具和机构投资者,使公司新的资本结构起到改善公司治理的作用。不同融资方式所构造的资本结构可通过股权和债权特有作用的发挥及其合理配置,来协调出资人与经营者之间、出资人与债权人之间的利益和行为。文章试就我国企业杠杆收购的融资结构进行相关探讨。     

私募股权融资对上市企业经营绩效的影响分析

私募股权融资是近年来在国内外资本市场上兴起并迅速发展的一种融资方式,目前,在我国资本市场上成为与公开发行股权融资并驾齐驱的融资方式.本文从私募股权融资在我国的应用状况入手,以2007年进行过私募股权融资的上市企业为样本,考察了私募股权融资对上市企业经营绩效的影响,发现私募股权融资对上市公司经营绩效有显著的积极作用.     

论上市公司并购手段的单一性对并购的制约

由于中国并购融资手段的单一性，并购主体难以利用资本市场的融资便利条件进行融资，使国际通行的杠杆收购无法实现。而由于股权分割，换股并购在中国也缺乏现实的操作基础。因此，中国应该放松并购的融资管制，实现股票的全面流通，为企业进行大规模的战略性并购创造条件。     

上市公司海外并购的绩效研究——基于现金流的视角

国外已有许多关于内部资本市场效率的研究,其基本结论是认为发达国家的企业的内部资本市场可能是无效的。由于我国上市公司没有提供各经营部门的详细数据,目前国内对内部资本市场效率的研究还极少。本文考察了我国上市公司海外并购行为中收购公司的内部资本市场效率对其海外并购绩效的影响,主要考察公司与外部资本市场的现金流入、流出对收购公司绩效的直接影响。     

杠杆收购下如何提高信息披露质量——以龙薇传媒并购万家文化为例

人们日益增长的精神文化需求为文化传媒行业带来了巨大的发展空间与潜力,越来越多的企业通过VC/PE融资、并购重组等方式实现规模扩张,业绩增长。杠杆收购作为一种并购模式,一旦被滥用,容易扰乱资本市场秩序,造成不良后果。本文以龙薇传媒杠杆收购万好万家文化股份有限公司为例,分析其并购过程、并购动因与并购失败原因,从信息披露质量角度探讨明星效应下应当如何规范并购交易过程,保证信息披露的真实性、完整性、及时性。     

企业并购融资视角的多层次资本市场建设

我国资本市场环境对企业并购融资形成制约,表现在:一些上市公司通过增发股票募集资金的活动多是关联公司之间的非实质性收购;债券融资在我国企业并购中难于实施;混合性并购融资渠道亟待构建和完善.为提高并购融资的市场化水平,构建通畅的并购融资渠道,必须加强多层次资本市场建设,大力培育以投资银行为代表的中介机构;创立并购投资基金,并允许保险等战略性资金进入并购市场;放松对债券市场的管制;加强金融产品创新.     

跨境并购杠杆融资的偿债风险分析

随着中国消费升级和产业转型,越来越多的中国企业通过并购重组,特别是海外并购实现自身经营转型。融资是国内企业跨境并购面临的主要难题之一,近年来可交换私募债、并购基金、股权融资等融资工具方兴未艾,在跨境并购中发挥着重要作用,国内并购案例中不乏杠杆收购的雏形。本文总结了跨境并购的发展趋势及常见融资模式,分析了杠杆融资的特征及主要风险点,并对商业银行参与杠杆融资提出了一些建议。     

并购融资视角下多层次资本市场建设

我国资本市场环境对企业并购融资形成制约,表现在:一些上市公司通过增发股票募集资金的活动多是关联公司之间的非实质性收购;债券融资在我国企业并购中难于实施;混合性并购融资渠道亟待构建和完善。为提高并购融资的市场化水平,构建通畅的并购融资渠道,必须加强多层次资本市场建设,大力培育以投资银行为代表的中介机构;创立并购投资基金,并允许保险等战略性资金进入并购市场;放松对债券市场的管制;加强金融产品创新。     

杠杆收购及其融资问题

<正> 京东方收购韩国现代TFT-LCD业务的巧妙融资安排值得国内企业借鉴杠杆收购的特点杠杆收购(LBO)是收购方主要利用外部融资来取得目标方控制权,并以目标公司的资产和现金流为交易所产生的债务提供担保和偿付的一种交易方式。在整个交易金额中,外部资本占主要部分,而买方的自有资本只占其中很小比例。这类并购十分适合于资金不足又急于扩大生产规模的企业。一、杠杆收购的资金来源主要是不代表企业控制权的债务性融资,主要是运用企业的融资杠杆,即调整企     

论私募股权基金杠杆收购与债券市场的发展

近几年来,我国本土私募股权基金的并购活动比较活跃,但是其发展还存在一定的障碍,主要表现在债券融资市场尚未成为融资主渠道。本文通过分析美国杠杆收购活动中融资结构的变迁,指出开发债券市场有利于发展我国私募股权基金的杠杆收购活动。     

The role of private equity group reputation in LBO financing

This paper investigates whether the reputation of acquiring private equity groups (PEGs) is related to the financing structure of leveraged buyouts (LBOs). Using a sample of 180 public-to-private LBOs in the US between January 1, 1997 and August 15, 2007, we find that reputable PEGs are more active in the LBO market when credit risk spreads are low and lending standards in the credit markets are lax. We also find that reputable PEGs pay narrower bank and institutional loan spreads, have longer loan maturities, and rely more on institutional loans. In addition, while we find that PEG reputation is positively related to buyout leverage (i.e., LBO debt divided by pre-LBO earnings before interest, taxes, and amortization (EBITDA) of the target), and leverage is significantly positively related to buyout pricing, we do not find any direct relation between PEG reputation and buyout valuations. The evidence suggests that PEG reputation is related to LBO financing structure not only because reputable PEGs are more likely to take advantage of market timing in credit markets and but also because PEG reputation reduces agency costs of LBO debt.     

Do LBO Supermarkets Charge More? An Empirical Analysis of the Effects of LBOs on Supermarket Pricing

This article examines changes in supermarket prices in local markets following supermarket leveraged buyouts (LBOs). I find that prices rise following LBOs in local markets in which the LBO firm's rivals are also highly leveraged and that LBO firms have higher prices than their less leveraged rivals, suggesting that LBOs create incentives to raise prices. However, I also find that prices fall following LBOs in local markets in which rival firms have low leverage and are concentrated. These price drops are associated with LBO firms exiting the local market, suggesting that rivals attempt to “prey” on LBO chains.     

The impact of corporate governance mechanisms on value increase in leveraged buyouts

Using a novel, hand-collected dataset, comprising 321 exited buyouts in the UK in the period 1995 to 2004, this study examines the realized value increase in exited leveraged buyouts. Testing the free cash flow theory, we show that value increase and return characteristics of LBOs are to some extent related to the corporate governance mechanisms resulting from a leveraged buyout, especially managerial equity holdings. We show that return characteristics and the probability of a positive return are mainly related to size of the buyout target and acquisitions carried out during the holding period. Furthermore, we find that the return characteristics between insider driven buyouts and outsider driven buyins are different.     

市场时机对我国上市公司并购融资行为的影响

全流通格局开启了我国上市公司并购融资多元化的时代。在国内研究中,鲜有基于股权分置改革来研究市场时机对我国上市公司并购融资行为的影响。因此,本文以外部融资加权平均市账比作为市场时机的代理变量,通过建立Tobit模型进行实证检验与分析,发现在股票市场全流通的背景下,市场时机对上市公司并购融资行为具有显著的影响,但这种影响持续性很短,大约为3年。同时检验结果表明,市场时机、盈利能力对公司债务杠杆的影响在长期内会发生逆转。     

The evolution of capital structure and operating performance after leveraged buyouts: Evidence from U.S. corporate tax returns

This study uses corporate tax return data to examine the evolution of firms' financial structure and performance after leveraged buyouts (LBOs) for a comprehensive sample of 317 LBOs taking place between 1995 and 2007. We find little evidence of operating improvements subsequent to an LBO, although consistent with prior studies, we do observe operating improvements in the set of LBO firms that have public financial statements. We also find that firms do not reduce leverage after LBOs, even if they generate excess cash flow. Our results suggest that effecting a sustained change in capital structure is a conscious objective of the LBO structure.     

LEVERAGING THE UNDERINVESTMENT PROBLEM: HOW HIGH DEBT AND MANAGEMENT SHAREHOLDINGS SOLVE THE AGENCY COSTS OF FREE CASH FLOW

It is argued that leveraged buyouts (LBOs) provide managers with a powerful incentive to release excess cash rather than invest in negative net present value projects. This incentive is attributed to the large debt obligations associated with “junk” bond financing and to an increase in the shareholdings of top management. In this paper I explore the conditions under which leverage and management shareholdings complement one another in resolving the agency costs of free cash flow and would therefore optimally be used “together” as in an LBO. Complementarity is shown to obtain under plausible conditions, essentially because increased leverage reduces equityholders' share of investment returns. Increased management shareholdings then leverage this underinvestment effect. My analysis also helps explain why top managers who participate in an LBO receive a highly leveraged equity claim rather than a share of the “strip” that is generally provided to outside investors.     

Growth LBOs

Using a data set of 839 French deals, we look at the change in corporate behavior following a leveraged buyout (LBO) relative to an adequately chosen control group. In the 3 years following a leveraged buyout, targets become more profitable, grow much faster than their peer group, issue additional debt, and increase capital expenditures. We then provide evidence consistent with the idea that in our sample, private equity funds create value by relaxing credit constraints, allowing LBO targets to take advantage of hitherto unexploited growth opportunities. First, post-buyout growth is concentrated among private-to-private transactions, i.e., deals where the seller is an individual, as opposed to divisional buyouts or public-to-private LBOs where the seller is a private or a public firm. Second, the observed post-buyout growth in size and post-buyout increase in debt and capital expenditures are stronger when the targets operate in an industry that is relatively more dependent on external finance. These results contrast with existing evidence that LBO targets invest less or downsize.     

上市公司并购融资方式与治理绩效研究

采用资产负债率、内源融资率、股权融资率等指标来反映公司的融资方式,利用主成分分析方法构建一个指标体系来衡量公司治理绩效,对2007年发生并购的沪深上市公司的融资方式与治理绩效之间的关系进行回归分析.研究结果揭示出不同的融资方式在相当程度上影响着企业的治理绩效.     

Making the deal real: how GE Capital integrates acquisitions

Most companies view acquisitions and mergers as onetime events managed with heroic effort--anxiety-producing experiences that often result in lost jobs, restructured responsibilities, derailed careers, and diminished power. Little wonder, then, that most managers think about how to get them over with--not how to do them better. But even as the number of mergers and acquisitions rises in the United States, studies show the performance of the resulting companies falls below industry averages more often than not. To improve these statistics, executives need to view acquisition integration as a manageable process, not a unique event. One company that has done exactly that is GE Capital Services, which has assimilated more than 100 acquisitions in the past five years alone and, in the process, has developed a formal model for melding new acquisitions into the corporate fold. Drawing on their experiences working with the company to develop the model, consultants Ron Ashkenas and Suzanne Francis, together with GE Capital's Lawrence DeMonaco, offer four lessons from the company's successful run. First, begin the integration process before the deal is signed. Second, dedicate a full-time individual to managing the integration process. Third, implement any necessary restructuring sooner rather than later. And fourth, integrate not only the business operations but also the corporate cultures. These guidelines won't erase all of the discomfort that accompanies many mergers, but they can make the process more transparent and predictable for those involved.