Entry deterrence/accommodation with imperfect strategic thinking capability

Both through empirical research and laboratory experiments it has been shown that managers are heterogeneous in strategic thinking-i.e., not all the managers can accurately conjecture their competitors’ behavior and actions. In this paper, we examine the entry deterrence/accommodation strategy of an incumbent firm facing a potential entrant that may behave less strategically than the incumbent in the way of conjecturing competitors’ actions and beliefs. We adapt the Cognitive Hierarchy model to capture this heterogeneity among the managers of the entrant firm and the incumbent firm. Surprisingly, we show that the incumbent can deter entry by investing in expanding the market size and the competition may increase the incumbent’s incentive to invest in market expansion. If entry does occur, the market expansion in our model also benefits entrant comparing to the case without market expansion. This feature of our result sets it apart from the standard result in the entry deterrence literature, which tends to suggest that incumbent has to either over-invest in actions harmful to entrant if entry occurs. In our model investing in expanding the market size makes the entrant to update its belief about the incumbent’s strategic thinking capability downward and thus, decreases the entrant’s expected profitability, which in turn deters entry. Our research has important implications especially for emerging markets given that the lack of management talent is a particularly severe problem among local firms in emerging markets and multinational companies pioneer in the emerging markets with great market expansion opportunities have to face the potential entry of local companies.     

Entry and exit in disequilibrium

Most entrepreneurship theory depicts disequilibrium as the most common state for entrepreneurial activity and yet remarkably very little empirical research investigates the role of entry and exit in this type of external environment. Drawing on economics and organizational ecology we outline reasons why the interrelation between entry, exit and incumbent firms is likely to vary when the actual number of firms is higher or lower than the number that a market can sustain. We also introduce a new empirical methodology to explain entry and exit levels in two different types of disequilibria comprising situations when markets under and over shoot carrying capacity. Using a data set on the retail industry, we find that in undershoots a lack of competition between incumbent firms restores equilibrium by creating room for new-firm entry. In contrast, in overshoots competition induced by new firms (in particular strong displacement) restores equilibrium. We also find that equilibrium-restoring mechanisms are faster in over than undershoots. The results highlight that the behaviour and impact of entry and exit varies depending on the type of disequilibrium.     

Start-ups as drivers of market mobility: an analysis at the region–sector level for The Netherlands

Although recent literature suggests that competition among incumbent firms is caused by the entry of new firms, this relationship has not yet been tested directly. In this study a regression model is established in which a direct measure of competition among incumbent firms, the market mobility rate, is explained by start-up rates and control variables. The results show that the effect of start-ups on market mobility varies by sector. There is a strong positive relationship for industry sectors but an insignificant relationship for service sectors. These results suggest differences in the types of entry between sectors and in the roles start-ups play in different sectors.     

Entry mode selection and its impact on an incumbent supply chain coordination

This paper considers a supply chain where a manufacturer sells its product through a retailer. In such a market, a potential entrant can make a substitute product by imitating the incumbent's product and then sells it to the common market with one of three alternative entry modes: (i) selling through the incumbent's retailer, (ii) selling through another independent retailer, or (iii) selling directly to consumers. Faced with the entrant's entry, the manufacturer has managed to offer a value-added service to add to its product's value at a cost. We investigate the entrant's optimal entry mode when the manufacturer offers profit-sharing contracts to the retailer and when it does not, and discuss the impact of the potential invader's entry on the incumbent firms' performances. The results show that: (1) the entrant sells directly to consumers when faced with weak value competition, and sells through another retailer against fierce value competition. (2) If the value competition is relatively fierce and the efficiency of the value-added service is relatively high as well, the incumbent firms can benefit from the new entry. (3) A profit-sharing contract, as a coordination policy, can fully coordinate the incumbent supply chain no matter whether there exists a potential entrant or not, yet the entry can affect the distribution of the profits between the incumbent manufacturer and retailer.     

Scale economies,entry, and welfare

This study shows how scale economies, initial size differences among firms, potential competition, and adjustment costs may influence the entry of firms into a dynamic oligopoly. It also examines the effects of these factors on the final size distribution of firms in an industry, and on the welfare levels of consumers and producers. We find that low to moderate scale economies are insufficient for Cournot-Nash competition to drive small firms from the market. Only when scale economies are quite high will the distribution of firm sizes become degenerate. Potential competition and the size of incumbent firms' capital stocks are additional barriers to entry. The welfare conclusion is that there may be a government role to preserve potential competition, but also to dissuade small firms from entering certain markets where there are economies of scale.     

Free in-network pricing as an entry-deterrence strategy

This paper analyzes the entry-deterring power of free in-network pricing with multiple incumbents. Free in-network pricing may deter entry since it creates network externality that intensifies competition. One may expect that a particular entry-deterrent strategy adopted by all incumbents would have more entry-deterring power than when it is adopted by some incumbents only. However, we show that when free-in network plan has entry-deterrence power with two incumbent firms, sometimes one incumbent offering free in-network plan may have more entry deterrence power than both firms offering free in-network plans. In other words, we find that an asymmetric adoption of entry-deterrence strategies by the incumbent firms may be the best for entry deterrence. This result highlights the importance of the strategic choice of the pricing plan as a function of not only the likelihood/cost of entry but also of the plan choices of other firms, and may partially explain the asymmetric strategies used by competing firms.     

Can Mergers to Monopoly,Price Fixing,and Market‐Division Agreements Raise Welfare?

Naked market division, price fixing agreements and mergers which result in dominant positions have long been opposed by the courts and the government because of the high likelihood that they will result in a reduction in output and an increase in price. We show that the opposite may be true if the market is characterized by marketing spillovers. When marketing investment is required to educate consumers about the general capabilities or qualities of a product, marketing efforts by one producer will benefit rival producers. A theoretical model of these types of markets shows that marketing spillovers can forestall entry altogether or force incumbent firms to engage in ‘limit marketing’ that leaves the market underserved from a welfare‐maximizing perspective. Under these circumstances, market output and social welfare are potentially raised not only through horizontal agreements among competitors, but also through cost‐raising strategies and commitments to predatory behavior by incumbent firms.     

Learning to export: Export growth and the destination decision of firms

I find evidence that the geographic expansion of firm exports occurs slowly over time and that a large share of export growth is due to incumbent exporters entering new destinations. New exporters enter large countries and destinations with characteristics similar to their domestic market. Less similar, distant or less developed countries are entered by firms already exporting to other destinations. I formulate a dynamic general equilibrium model to test if these patterns are due to firms learning how to export (as other recent empirical findings have suggested) or other factors considered in the literature. In this model, heterogeneous firms experience learning in the form of market entry costs that depend on export history. Using Russian firm level data, I find that learning plays a significant role in explaining the observed entry patterns, which standard trade models cannot account for.     

Incumbent innovation and domestic entry

This paper analyzes the escape-entry incentive for innovation by incumbent firms. The threat posed by the possibility of leading-edge firms entering the market influences incumbent innovation. To overcome problems of endogeneity, we apply an instrumental variable approach to analyze a rich firm-level dataset (1987–2000) for Germany. We find evidence that domestic entry has a negative effect on incumbent product innovation, which is a strong indication of new entrants’ comparative advantage in commercializing new ideas. In contrast, domestic entry has a positive effect on incumbent process innovations, an effect also known as the escape-entry effect.     

Competing with multinational enterprises’ entry: Search strategy,environmental complexity,and survival of local firms

This study examines the competitive dynamics between foreign and local firms. We posit that multinational enterprises (MNEs)’s entry in foreign markets significantly reduces the survival rate of local firms in the short term, but that this effect gradually diminishes over time. The proposed conceptual framework is operationalized through the combination of the widely used agent-based model and the economic model of competition. The agent-based model allows us to study the behavior of firms under the context of different markets and the environmental complexity while the competition model determines the competition between firms as well as the entry and exit of firms. Our results obtained from the simulation study reveal that the negative effect of foreign entry is heightened as environmental complexity increases. However, local firms with a broader knowledge search are better able to confront the negative impact of foreign entry over time. We also find that the negative effect of foreign entry on the survival of local firms is weaker for local firms with a strong retrieval capacity.     

The determinants of new firm formation in italian manufacturing

This paper focuses on entry of small firms in the manufacturing industries. It is argued that the exit option can be viewed as an insurance against risks of failure, increasing the likelihood of entry in an uncertain environment; the result is implicit in recent stochastic models of competition and entry decision under uncertainty. A regression model of industry birth rates in the Italian manufacturing industries provides empirical evidence on the impact of factors determining the decision to enter and the supply of new entrepreneurs. In our estimates, yearly entry rates are found to decrease with entry costs and barriers and to increase with market growth, expected growth of small firms, risks of failure and an index of spatial concentration of activities.     

Deregulating and privatizing statutory monopolies

Considering an homogeneous goods Cournot framework with cost asymmetries between the regulated incumbent and the unregulated entrant, this paper investigates the welfare effects of market liberalization and privatization. The positive efficiency effects of market liberalization depends on reallocation of the production between firms and on the extent of the “output distortion” due to the existence of imperfect information. More competition in a previously statutory monopoly reduces the cost of imperfect information. In terms of social welfare, we derive conditions on the desirability of entry and show that privatization is complementary to deregulation, i.e. privatization makes entry more desirable.     

Competition and product innovation in dynamic oligopoly

We investigate the relationship between competition and innovation using a dynamic oligopoly model that endogenizes both the long-run innovation rate and market structure. We use the model to examine how various determinants of competition, such as product substitutability, entry costs, and innovation spillovers, affect firms’ equilibrium strategies for entry, exit, and investment in product quality. We find an inverted-U relationship between product substitutability and innovation: the returns to innovation initially rise for all firms but eventually, as the market approaches a winner-take-all environment, laggards have few residual profits to fight over and give up pursuit of the leader, knowing he will defend his lead. The increasing portion of the inverted-U reflects changes in firm’s investment policy functions, whereas the decreasing portion arises from the industry transiting to states with fewer firms and wider quality gaps. Allowing market structure to be endogenous yields different results compared to extant work that fixes or exogenously varies the market structure.     

Capacity Constrained Firms and Expansion Subsidies: Should Governments Avoid Generous Subsidies?

This paper examines entry deterrence and signaling when an incumbent firm experiences capacity constraints. Our results show that if the costs that constrained and unconstrained incumbents incur when expanding their facilities are substantially different, separating equilibria can be supported under large parameter values whereby information is perfectly transmitted to the entrant. If, in contrast, both types of incumbent face similar expansion costs, subsidies that reduce expansion costs can help move the industry from a pooling to a separating equilibrium with associated efficient entry. Nonetheless, our results demonstrate that if subsidies are very generous entry patterns remain unaffected, suggesting a potential disadvantage of policies that significantly reduce firms’ expansion costs.     

Tie-in contracts with downstream competition

A tie-in contract has frequently come under scrutiny for its role as an exclusionary device. A firm that is a monopolist in a primary market can utilize such contracts to exclude a more efficient rival in a secondary market. When the firms sell through competing retailers, the leveraging firm may offer tie-in contracts to the retailers inducing them to purchase both primary and secondary products entirely from it such that the rival is excluded. We examine whether such tie-in contracts are profitable for an incumbent firm under different conditions of (i) the ability to commit to prices by the upstream firms and (ii) downstream competition among the retailers. We show that when retailers compete in prices, then regardless of whether the entrant is able to commit to its own prices, an exclusionary tie-in strategy is profitable (not profitable) for the incumbent when it is able (unable) to commit to prices. However, when retailers compete in quantities, the entrant’s commitment ability does matter. Specifically, an exclusionary tie-in strategy (i) may be unprofitable for an incumbent when both upstream firms are able to commit to their prices, depending on the degree of cost advantage of the entrant; (ii) is always profitable when it alone can commit to its price; and (iii) is unprofitable when both upstream firms cannot commit to their prices. Our results extend to situations where the products are complementary or substitutes and where the retailers may be asymmetric in nature.     

Sunk Costs and the Entry Decision

This paper considers the role of sunk costs in the decision to enter a market. Its goal is to provide a policy-relevant approach to the question: when are sunk costs so great as to serve as a barrier to entry? To do this, the model presented nests both a model of pure hit-and-run entry and a simple “lottery-ticket” model of long-term entry in which the entrant knows that entry may or may not ultimately prove successful. It illustrates clearly the strategic differences between sunk and nonsunk fixed costs. The paper also considers the incumbent’s problem of choosing between entry deterrence and accommodation. Finally, out of this model comes a measure of the height of the sunk cost barrier to entry that may be useful for competition policy purposes.     

Black out of the blue light: An analysis of Kmart store closing decisions

We investigate the spatial and economic factors that influenced Kmart's decision to close about 600 under-performing stores as part of its Chapter 11 financial objectives review in 2002 and 2003. We develop a theoretical model of retail store location and estimate an empirical counterpart using a Logit model to investigate the economic and spatial factors that influenced this decision, including the degree and proximity of competition in the local market as well as local demographic characteristics. In general, our empirical results offer statistical support for the accepted paradigm, but our model offers modest predictive ability as to which stores were actually closed. One interesting extension is a discussion of the potential implications of store closing on the local population, especially with respect to low-income households’ access to discount stores.     

Vertical differentiation in oligopoly and license fees when outside innovator can enter the market: Two‐step auction

When an outside innovating firm has a technology to produce a higher quality good than the good produced at present, it can sell licenses of its technology to incumbent firms, or enter the market and at the same time sell licenses, or enter the market without license. We examine the definitions of license fee in such a situation in an oligopoly with three firms under vertical product differentiation, one outside innovating firm and two incumbent firms, considering threat by entry of the innovating firm using a two‐step auction. We show that in the case of uniform distribution of consumers' taste parameter and zero cost when the quality improvement (the difference between the quality of the high‐quality good and the quality of the low‐quality good) is small (or large), the two‐step auction is (or is not) credible, and license to two firms without entry strategy (or entry without license strategy) is optimal depending on credibility of the two‐step auction.     

Selective Price Cuts and Price Discrimination Bans in Network Industries

In order to encourage competition in network-based industries such as telecommunications, some jurisdictions have adopted regulatory rules which prevent the incumbent service provider from selectively cutting prices in response to market entry. Given such bans on price discrimination, the incumbent cannot react to competition by selectively adjusting prices, based on the competitive situation in a given market, but has to maintain the same price across all markets. This paper analyses the welfare effects of such a rule for both one-way networks (access model) and two-way networks (interconnection model) when consumers have switching costs. We find that, even though bans on price discrimination can induce inefficient entry for a range of parameter constellations, there are also cases where they induce efficient market entry. This is the more likely to be the case the higher the fixed costs of entry.     

Impact of institutional reforms and industry structural factors on market returns of emerging market rivals during acquisitions by foreign firms

This paper seeks to understand the joint impact of institutional reforms and industry structural factors on market returns earned by rivals in an emerging market during foreign acquisitions. We use a sample of 238 foreign acquisitions in India during the period 2004–2013 and find empirical evidence to support the notion that institutional reforms, foreign competition and business group competition positively impact the market returns of the rivals of acquired firms. Additionally, we find that the effects of foreign competition and business group competition on rivals’ market returns are shaped by the degree of institutional reforms in the industry, indicating that firms’ market returns in emerging markets during foreign acquisitions can be better understood through the incorporation of the joint role of industry structural factors and institutional reforms.