可口可乐和百事可乐的竞争对抗分析

本文根据陈明哲的竞争对抗模型，从竞争对手分析、竞争行为的驱动力、企业间的攻击和反应以及竞争 后的结果这样的顺序来分析可口可乐和百事可乐之间的竞争。     

可口可乐和百事可乐的竞争对抗分析

本文根据陈明哲的竞争对抗模型，从竞争对手分析、竞争行为的驱动力、企业间的攻击和反应以及竞争后的结果这样的顺序来分析可口可乐和百事可乐之间的竞争。     

竞争制胜——需建立新型竞争观

竞争需要转变观念。文章着重阐述了超越竞争、合作竞争、敏捷竞争三种竞争观。     

基于竞争对抗模型的企业竞争战略分析——以格兰仕与美的市场竞争为例

竞争对抗模型是分析企业竞争博弈的非常有用的工具。它从竞争性行为的驱动力分析出发,进而分析竞争对手,分析可能采取的攻击性行为和反应及其影响因素,最后可以得出竞争对抗可能的结果。文章运用该模型来分析格兰仕在微波炉市场反击美的的竞争对抗行为,可以得出如下结论:格兰仕必然采取进军空调市场的反击行为;格兰仕与美的在微波炉市场将共存和发展;反击防御战略是格兰仕最优的战略选择。     

定点超越:增强企业竞争优势的新方法

90年代以来 ,一种新的管理方法——定点超越 ,在西方发达国家悄然兴起并迅速普及。其原因在于它具有实效性和广泛适用性 ,它能帮助企业不断寻求新的竞争优势。我国“入世”在即 ,借鉴其经验 ,对我国企业增创竞争新优势不无启迪     

产业集群竞争优势刚性及其超越路径

产业集群是一种新的产业空间组织形式 ,它不仅具有强大的竞争优势 ,而且也是区域经济竞争优势的重要来源。然而 ,本文分析指出 ,构筑产业集群竞争优势的某些特质 ,同时也是削弱其应对外部环境变化能力 ,最终引致其生成竞争优势刚性乃至走向衰退的根本原因 ,并在此基础上提出了超越这些刚性的路径 ,以实现区域经济的持续发展     

合作竞争的系统学原理

随着市场经济发展的不断深入和顾客要求的不断提高,市场竞争日趋激烈,合作已成为一个成熟企业应对竞争的有效手段,而且这种合作关系相对于其他优势是难以模仿的。形成合作竞争的趋势由是系统的固有特性决定的,是不以人的意志为转移的客观规律,这在实际的横向和纵向合作竞争系统中得到了体现。合作竞争的系统学原理使企业获得了巨大的效益,我国和谐统一的文化传统更为合作竞争提供了强大的原动力。     

论从对抗性竞争到合作竞争

本通过运用企业的契约理论、经济增长理论和博弈论来解释为什么越来越多的企业从对抗性竞争走上了合作竞争的道路，是什么力量推动许多企业从对抗性竞争转向合作竞争，以及经济效率，交易费用等发生了哪些变化。同时说明当前企业之间由对抗性竞争到合作竞争的转变，其实质是一个外部利润内在化的过程。通过这种制度变迁和创新，以增加“合作剩余”，实现帕累托改进。     

不确定环境下的公司信用政策

公司信用政策的运用是公司财务战略管理的重要组成部分,在不确定环境下,“总信用成本”可视为公司信用政策的决策成本;本文讨论了在收益、成本与风险两难冲突下信用政策的决策模型及安全性与流动性管理策略、赢利性管理策略。     

Mass Media Competition, Political Competition, and Public Policy

If better informed voters receive favourable policies, then mass media will affect policy because mass media provide most of the information people use in voting. This paper models the incentives of the media to deliver news to different groups. The increasing-returns-to-scale technology and advertising financing of media firms induce them to provide more news to large groups, such as taxpayers and dispersed consumer interests, and groups that are valuable to advertisers. This news bias alters the trade-off in political competition and therefore introduces a bias in public policy. The paper also discusses the effects of broadcast media replacing newspapers as the main information source about politics. The model predicts that this change should raise spending on government programmes used by poor and rural voters.     

Competition,comparison, and innovation

Competitive firms can make a comparison with each other and easily figure out the better strategy, while monopoly firms cannot. Therefore, a competitive firm may be more likely to try low cost innovations than a monopoly firm may.     

Growth, Competition and Welfare

The impact of competition on growth and welfare is analysed by developing a model in which the number of firms, profit margins and innovation rates are endogenous. Different regimes of oligopolistic competition are distinguished. The tougher the price competition, the lower the profit margins for a given rate of concentration. This reduces the number of firms and product variety in a free entry equilibrium. Consequently, tougher competition implies larger firm size and higher rates of innovation since new technologies can be applied in a larger market. Oligopolistic pricing leads to underinvestment in firm-specific knowledge, even if inter-firm knowledge spillovers are neglected.     

Cost Competition, Fragmentation, and Globalization

This paper proposes a model in which the removal of barriers to trade and factor mobility is associated with endogenous fragmentation of the value–added chain. Fragmentation is the outcome of cost competition—the profit–maximizing choice of cost structure by monopolistically competitive firms. An expansion of the integrated trading area can induce globalization not only in the horizontal dimension associated with love–of–variety preferences, but also vertically as firms vary specialization of production stages. While increased trade is likely to induce fragmentation when the number of firms is fixed, free entry can either reverse or intensify this result.     

Competition, knowledge, and local government

This paper applies the insights of Austrian economics to an important issue in local political economy. Basic economic theory holds that greater competition produces superior outcomes in private goods markets. The same should be true in the ??markets?? for the output of local government. Brennan and Buchanan (1977, 1980) show that interjurisdictional competition may serve as a potential restraint on the monopoly powers of local Leviathan and Tiebout (1956) shows that it may help lead to the production of efficient quantities of local public goods. However, other potential virtues of competition in the market for local collective goods have been largely ignored. This paper explores those other virtues as well as the neoclassical theoretical foundations of the Tiebout (1956) model, upon which much of this literature is based. This has public policy implications for local governments, which have taken on increased importance given the recent global movement towards more decentralized government.     

Cognitive Rules, Institutions, and Competition

Rules exert an important influence on rational individual behaviour. In economic analyses, two different types of rules occur that both induce rule-following behaviour. However, they are rarely distinguished. The differentiation of institutions (as interpersonal rules) and cognitive rules (as intrapersonal rules) allows for a clarification of substantial differences between the two types of rules, for example, concerning the incorporated knowledge and rule-persistence. Furthermore, the analysis of the interrelation of the two types of rules offers fruitful insights that still are not much explored in economics. The important dimensions to be considered are rule-harmony that stabilises institutional arrangements, and rule-conflict that induces pressure on persistent institutions. In this context, competition can be seen as a medium of interaction that allows individual agents to learn both about the behaviour of interacting agents and the nature and effects of the institutional framework. The integration of competition - as the core concept of economics - into the interplay of institutions and cognitive rules explores a missing point within the analysis of the economics of rules.     

竞争、效仿与政策创新

本文描述和评论了政策创新文献,评估了他们的整体贡献。政策推广的研究来源于某种共享的信念,政策推广研究有变量研究和过程研究,它们之间是可以互相学习的。本文解释了在美国为什么有些州首先接受新的观念而其他的州却落在后面,论述了政策推广的内在决定因素和外在条件。     

Competition,taxation and economic growth

The paper mainly examines the relationship between economic growth, tax policy and sectoral labor distribution in an endogenous growth model with expanding varieties. For analyzing these relationships, we consider an economy where three sectors of production are vertically integrated: final goods sector, intermediate goods sector and research sector. We show that the extent of imperfect competition in the intermediate products market affects both economic growth and the allocation of the available labor to all the sectors employing this input. The resources from capital taxation, which are used for financing research sector, have a U-shaped effect on growth and lead to a movement of the labor from research sector to final goods sector. Additionally, we show that if there exists a higher competitive structure in an economy, the probability of the positive effect of an increase in tax on growth gets higher.