高管权力、董事高管责任保险与财务重述

本文在考察董事高管责任保险对财务重述产生影响的基础上,分析高管权力对这一关系的调节效应。研究显示,那些已经购买D&O保险的公司随后发生财务重述的概率更高,而高管权力的增大则推升了D&O保险诱发的财务重述的概率。这一结果表明,我国上市公司引进D&O保险有着较为强烈的机会主义动机,而高管权力的增大对于上市公司机会主义行为的实施起到了推波助澜的作用。     

企业内部控制与财务重述的关系研究

近年来财务重述及内部控制越来越受到企业和社会的关注,本文分析了两者的关系,并进行更深层次的研究,希望在此基础上能够提出对未来研究的启示。     

高管自利行为下高管控制权与高管薪酬关系的研究

近年来上市公司的高管薪酬增长迅速并出现"天价薪酬",这引起了社会的广泛关注,很多学者的研究证实高管在设置薪酬契约时存在自利行为。本文通过对已有研究的回顾,从高管自利行为的基础上探讨高管薪酬这一热门话题,提出了高管的自利行为将导致其薪酬随着控制权的提高而增加的假设。本文以2009-2011年间我国上市公司为样本进行验证,结果支持了本文的假设。     

高管薪酬与公司业绩的关系

公司高级管理层的薪酬问题越来越受到社会的普遍关注。高管薪酬问题是由于控制权和所有权的分离而产生的。高管的薪酬进而又产生了代理成本问题。本文研究的目的是分析高管薪酬与公司业绩之间的关系。经研究发现:高管薪酬与公司业绩之间存在显著正相关。     

2011年上市公司财务重述与内部控制关系研究

以2011年的A股上市主板市场公司为样本,从公司治理角度研究财务重述与内部控制的关系。研究表明,财务报告重述与内部控制质量呈现负相关关系,不同类型的财务报告与内部控制质量的关系没有明显的差别。同时内部控制的重点在控制活动更容易抑制异常财务报告重述。     

财务重述与审计相关问题研究综述

财务重述是上市公司在发现并纠正前期财务报告差错时,重新表述以前公布的财务报表的行为。注册会计师审计与财务重述之间有着千丝万缕的联系,本文从审计的视角出发,对国内外财务重述与审计相关问题进行了综述,并就国内外研究文献进行了对比分析,以期为该领域的未来研究奠定基础。     

高管薪酬与盈余管理的关系实证研究

以2014~2015制造业A股上市公司为研究对象,从显性薪酬和隐性薪酬两个视角深入探究高管薪酬与盈余管理的关系。研究发现,显性薪酬的重要组成成分货币薪酬和股权激励与盈余管理均显著正相关,即货币薪酬和股权激励会诱发高管进行盈余管理活动;在职消费能够减少高管盈余管理行为;在职消费与盈余管理存在U型相关。     

高管薪酬对盈余管理的关系研究

在所有权与经营权分离的公司治理结构中,所有者与管理层之间的委托代理矛盾也逐渐显现,从而引发了公司高管薪酬与盈余管理的问题,本文主要通过实证分析研究高管薪酬对公司盈余管理的影响,并根据分析结果得出相关结论和建议。     

高管薪酬契约设计的研究进程与展望

随着经济的发展,企业的委托一代理问题日益为政府、企业相关利益人和学者所关注。通过企业的高管人员薪酬契约来实现对高管人员的激励与约束,在最大程度上降低代理成本,已经成为各方共识。对高管薪酬的讨论和研究在报刊杂志和专业论文中层出不穷,     

高管薪酬外部公平性研究综述

近年来,员工的薪酬差距持续拉大,这种差距不仅存在于企业内部,还存在于行业内、企业间。行业间、企业间薪酬差距过大,员工极易产生不公平感从而消极工作,提高了代理成本。本文对高管薪酬外部公平的相关研究成果进行了梳理和归纳,并对未来的研究方向进行了展望,以期为日后完善研究提供参考。     

Determinants of the levels and changes in non‐executive director compensation

This study examines the economic and director‐specific determinants of non‐executive director (NED) compensation in the Australian setting. We find that NED compensation is associated with firm size, complexity, growth, risk and liquidity. It is also associated with director reputation, experience, connectedness and the directors' involvement with the firm. The additional compensation paid to the chairperson is positively associated with their prior experience and negatively associated with NED reputation and involvement. We find inconclusive evidence on the association between changes in NED compensation and firm performance.     

Shareholder protection and bank executive compensation after the global financial crisis

We use a hand-collected international database to analyze the change in the risk-taking incentives embedded in bank executive compensation after the onset of the global financial crisis. Our results reveal a reduction in both the risk sensitivity of stock option grants (vega) and total and cash pay-risk sensitivities in countries suffering systemic banking crises. This reduction is greater in countries with strong shareholder protection, especially in banks with good corporate governance, solvent banks, and banks that suffered a reduction in their specific investment opportunity set. The regressions control for government intervention, banking development, and crisis intensity. Our results confirm that the contracting hypothesis is more relevant in countries with stronger shareholder protection, and provide support for measures improving shareholder rights in the approval of bank executive compensation.     

Optimal regulation,executive compensation and risk taking by financial institutions

We present an equilibrium model of financial institutions to examine the optimal regulation of risk taking. Shareholders provide incentives for management to increase risk to excessive levels. Regulators use caps on asset risk and compensation to achieve the socially optimal risk level. This level trades off costs of risk shifting and costs of bank default. Without regulation, equilibrium risk lies above the optimal level. If information and enforcement are perfect, either policy tool (caps on asset risk or compensation) achieves the optimal risk level. If there are frictions – if enforcement is limited, if there is uncertainty about the incentives facing management and costs of risk shifting, or if regulation cannot be bank specific – welfare can be improved by employing both policy tools.     

The effect of internal control deficiencies on the usefulness of earnings in executive compensation

Since SOX 404 disclosures are informative about earnings, and due to the widespread practice of using earnings-based measures in executive compensation, this study examines whether reports of internal control material weaknesses (ICMW) under SOX 404 influence firms' reliance on earnings in tying executive pay to performance. Using 391 (366) firm-year observations with reported ICMW and 3648 (3138) firm-year observations for CEOs (CFOs) reporting NOMW under SOX 404, we find a decreased strength in the association between earnings and executives' (CEO and CFO) compensation when the firm reports an ICMW, and as the number of reported ICMW increases. In addition, we find this decreased weight on earnings for the more severe Company-Level than Account- Specific material weaknesses. Our study suggests that the ICMW report under SOX 404 provides incremental information for executive compensation beyond that contained in reported earnings.     

Non-executive compensation in German and Swiss banks before and after the financial crisis

We provide an extensive overview of the determinants of compensation schemes for non-executive employees in the German and Swiss financial services industry. We analyze how pay systems adjust in the aftermath of the financial crisis and find that the crisis had a deep impact on short-term bonus payments. Our results indicate that restrictions on bonus payments may lead to higher fixed salaries and, hence, to a lower performance sensitivity of compensation. We also show that fixed compensation packages are highly standardized between banks, whereas bonus payments are more strongly related to differences between individuals. In Germany, bonuses vary to a higher extent across companies, whereas in Swiss banks, the differences are almost negligible when adding firm controls.     

Cost behavior and executive bonus compensation

Prior literature provides compelling evidence of an asymmetric relation between executive bonus compensation and earnings performance. In particular, this literature reports that compensation committees assign greater weight to good (positive) earnings performance than poor (negative) earnings performance. Taken together, the prior literature provides strong support for critics who claim that compensation committees blindly protect executives from earnings underperformance. We further examine this issue by investigating whether a firm's cost behavior (i.e., the relation between expenses and sales) provides an explanation for the apparent inefficiency in executive compensation contracts. Our evidence suggests that executives are rewarded more for increases in ROA that arise from normal cost behavior than other increases in ROA consistent with these increases being perceived as more persistent. In contrast, we do not find such a relationship for decreases in ROA which suggests that executives are largely shielded from decreases in ROA that follow normal cost behavior. We examine two factors suggested by the prior literature, expected future sales and the extent of capacity utilization, which may provide an explanation for why executives are shielded from normal cost behavior decreases in ROA. When these additional factors are included in our empirical models, our evidence suggests that the asymmetric relation between changes in CEO bonus compensation and increases and decreases in earnings performance documented in prior literature goes away. That is, our results suggest that compensation committees do not blindly protect executives for earnings underperformance. On the contrary, our evidence suggests that these committees take into account other non-earnings information when deciding how much weight to give to a decrease in earnings and that executive compensation may not be as inefficient as suggested by prior research.     

后危机时期欧美银行高管的薪酬问题：政府与银行家的博弈

源于银行业的金融危机促使欧美政府纷纷出台多项干预银行高管薪酬安排的政策措施,这些措施引发了银行家们的种种阻挠。文章在分析了政府与银行家们之间的多次政治交锋和相互博弈后,认为银行家们赢得了第一个回合一一强制性奖金上限遭到拒绝。但文章也指出这些银行家们在重压之下采取了某些“权宜之计”,如赞同对现金花红进行限制并延期发放;报酬以股票形式支付;当银行利润下降时,已发放的报酬存在追回和扣减的可能性等等。     

The relationship between operating leverage and financial leverage

We model the relationship between operating and financial leverage. When operating leverage is exogenously specified, financial leverage is a monotonically decreasing function of operating leverage. When financial leverage is exogenously specified, operating leverage is initially increasing and subsequently decreasing in financial leverage. Finally, when both operating and financial leverage are chosen by the firm, they can be positively related, negatively related or unrelated, depending on which underlying parameter is driving the changes. Thus, operating leverage and financial leverage do not always behave as substitutes, as argued in the traditional literature. The relationship is complex, possibly non-monotonic and dependent on the circumstances; empirical tests need to take this reality into account.     

Executive compensation and corporate risk management

We provide the first evidence on the effects of executive compensation on corporate risk management for insurers. Our unique data set allows the construction of a new, more complete measure of corporate risk management behavior. Specifically, we include hedging-driven usage of not only derivatives but also insurance. To address potential endogeneity, we utilize a difference-in-differences approach, based on the implementation of FAS 123R that required firms to expense stock-based compensation at fair value. We find that the decline in the convexity of executive compensation following FAS 123R led firms to significantly increase corporate risk management, primarily through increased demand for insurance.     

金融危机启示:金融一体化监管趋势下的保险监管

任何一次危机的爆发都是风险释放的过程,研究危机更重要的是关注风险的积累过程。因此,分析危机前的风险积累过程,查找危机产生的原因,对防范和化解危机具有现实意义。本文通过对新近发生的美国次贷危机进而延伸到对10年前亚洲金融危机分析,以及全球金融一体化监管最新演进趋势的借鉴,论述我国保险监管组织架构的未来展望。