高管权力、董事高管责任保险与财务重述

本文在考察董事高管责任保险对财务重述产生影响的基础上,分析高管权力对这一关系的调节效应。研究显示,那些已经购买D&O保险的公司随后发生财务重述的概率更高,而高管权力的增大则推升了D&O保险诱发的财务重述的概率。这一结果表明,我国上市公司引进D&O保险有着较为强烈的机会主义动机,而高管权力的增大对于上市公司机会主义行为的实施起到了推波助澜的作用。     

会计信息可比性与高管薪酬契约有效性

会计信息在高管激励契约中的作用历来是理论与实务中关注的重要问题。本文以2006～2016年我国上市公司为对象,研究会计信息可比性与高管薪酬契约有效性之间的关系,结果发现,会计信息可比性与公司高管薪酬-业绩敏感度之间存在显著正相关关系。与国有企业相比,会计信息可比性对薪酬契约有效性的影响在非国有企业中更为显著。进一步分析发现,会计信息可比性与高管薪酬-业绩敏感度之间的正相关关系在信息复杂程度较高、内部控制质量较差、外部监督较弱的企业中更为显著。总体而言,本文的研究结果表明会计信息可比性特征对薪酬契约有效性具有重要影响。     

性别、教育水平与高管薪酬

本文以R2012年末的中国A股房地产行业上市公司的数据为研究样本,考察我国房地产行业的高管薪酬的影响因素,实证结果显示：高管薪酬与企业的主营业务收入呈现正相关关系与企业市值成正比,同时高管的薪酬也随着学历的增加而不断的增加。因此可以得出高管在以企业市值最大化也就是股价最大化的情况下来经营企业往往会达到双赢。     

高管权益薪酬选拔效应与企业创新

以2006-2016年我国上市公司实施的高管权益薪酬为研究对象,探究高管权益薪酬选拔效应对企业创新的影响及机理。构建并拟合权益薪酬选拔效应理论模型,证实了高管权益薪酬对偏好风险的高管具有选拔效应,在此基础上进行实证检验发现：(1)高管权益薪酬选拔效应能够激励企业创新,机理是保留偏好风险的高管。(2)不同权益薪酬方式中,股票期权选拔效应能有效激励创新;限制性股票选拔效应在管理层权力较大时失效;复合方式选拔效应受股票期权和限制性股票价值配比的影响。(3)高管权益薪酬选拔效应与风险承担效应对创新激励具有协同作用。本文以选拔偏好风险的高管为视角,为上市公司合理配置创新导向的高管权益薪酬、促进企业创新提供理论依据。     

高管主动离职、薪酬契约参照点与企业绩效

突破传统委托代理中最优契约理论分析范式,本文引入契约参照点理论,基于2012-2018年我国A股上市公司数据,实证检验了高管主动离职对企业绩效的影响以及多维薪酬契约参照点对二者关系的调节作用。研究发现：高管主动离职对企业绩效产生了负向影响;薪酬契约参照点正向调节了高管主动离职与企业绩效的关系,且外部薪酬契约参照点的调节作用更显著。进一步研究发现,高管主动离职对企业绩效的负向影响以及薪酬契约参照点的调节作用在民营企业中更显著。机理检验发现,高管主动离职通过道德风险效应影响了企业绩效。本文的结论丰富了高管主动离职经济后果的相关研究,拓展了薪酬契约参照点的研究范畴,为减少高管主动离职和提高企业绩效提供了理论依据。     

高管薪酬契约、风险控制与企业绩效--中国上市银行的实证分析

基于代理理论和制度理论的视角,运用2008—2013年中国上市银行的数据对风险控制、企业绩效和高管薪酬之间的关系进行了实证检验。结果表明：不同性质的上市银行高管薪酬具有显著差异;企业绩效对高管薪酬有正向影响,中国上市银行已经建立起基于业绩的高管薪酬制度;风险控制对高管薪酬有正向影响,中国上市银行的高管薪酬与风险成本调整后的绩效相适应。     

高管薪酬、员工薪酬与公司的成长性——基于中国中小上市公司的经验数据

高管薪酬的激励作用一直是研究的热点,而很多学者忽略了同样具有激励作用的员工薪酬。本文对深市中小板上市公司2007-2011年的数据进行了实证分析,通过研究薪酬激励与企业成长性的关系,寻找企业可持续发展的方式。研究结果表明:员工薪酬与高管薪酬仅在国有中小上市公司中具有激励作用,可以提高其成长性;通过对薪酬差距的研究可知,在设计薪酬时不仅要考虑薪酬的绝对值和相对值,还应注意企业所处的具体情境,考虑高管团队协作需要、财务风险、技术复杂性和企业规模等因素对薪酬差距的影响。     

关键下属高管晋升锦标赛的创新激励效应研究

本文以2006-2016年我国A股上市公司为样本,探讨关键下属高管与CEO之间的薪酬差距如何影响企业创新.研究发现:关键下属高管-CEO薪酬差距越大,企业创新产出越高.进一步地,相比整个高管团队内部的薪酬差距,关键下属高管与CEO之间的薪酬差距对企业创新的影响更强;关键下属高管-CEO薪酬差距对企业创新的激励效应主要体现在关键下属高管晋升CEO的机会较大时,以及国有企业和技术密集型行业中.此外,降低代理成本是关键下属高管-CEO薪酬差距促进企业创新的重要作用机制,且关键下属高管-CEO薪酬差距促进了企业创新对企业价值的提升作用.本文研究结论对推动企业创新及优化上市公司高管薪酬激励体系具有重要的现实意义.     

公司治理结构与财务重述的关系研究

论文采用计量方法和多案例研究法,探究了公司治理结构对财务重述的影响以及财务重述后公司治理结构的变化。从股权结构、董事会和管理层三方面表征公司治理结构的概念,并基于2014-2018年沪深A股上市公司11772个样本的计量分析发现:股权集中度和高管薪酬与财务重述呈显著负相关关系,董事长总经理一肩挑和董事会规模与财务重述之间呈显著的正相关关系。后续基于103家已发生财务重述公司的多案例研究发现:当财务重述发生后,公司内部治理结构也往往进行一些调整,提高股权集中度、减少董事长总经理一肩挑情况、缩小董事会规模、变更高管人员和提升高管薪酬等是一般的应对措施。论文的研究工作对公司治理结构调整、防范财务重述等具有启示作用,同时,也对财务重述和公司治理结构的相关研究提供了新的视角。     

高管薪酬、团队特征与公司业绩敏感性——来自A股制造业上市公司的经验证据

本文以679家A股制造业上市公司2007～2009年间1946个时间序列的观测值为研究样本,实证检验了高管薪酬、团队特征与公司业绩之间的敏感性。实证结果表明:对制造业上市公司而言,高管薪酬与业绩是同向变化的;高管年龄越大,企业经营的惰性越大;高管的教育水平没有显著影响公司业绩;两职兼任利于管理层制定高薪酬,但是并没有显著提高企业绩效;管理层股权激励并没有显著提高公司业绩,但有助于管理层利用权力获取高额薪酬;财务杠杆成为拉低高管薪酬的反向力,一定程度上既有助于激励管理层实现组织目标,又能限制管理层利用权力从企业获得高薪酬。     

The impact of board ethnic diversity on executive pay-to-performance sensitivity: Australian evidence

We examine how board ethnic diversity impacts executive pay-to-performance sensitivity. Using firm-year observations in Australia for the period 2007–2017, we document that board ethnic diversity leads to higher executive pay-to-performance sensitivity. The finding is robust in controlling for endogeneity using instrumental variable regression analysis, as well as using modified measures of board ethnic diversity. We also document that the impact of board ethnic diversity on executive pay-to-performance sensitivity is more pronounced for firms suffering from high agency costs and when the CEO's ethnicity is different from that of the majority of the board. This study helps to inform the debate on the issue of board ethnic diversity in Australia.     

What is a fair amount of executive compensation? Outrage potential of two key stakeholder groups

The public discussion of executive compensation often centres on ‘fair’ and ‘unfair’ amounts and the public outrage over compensation that is deemed too high. The academic literature states that such outrage can lead to outrage costs, pressuring firms to adjust compensation levels. However, it is unclear what a ‘fair’ compensation is for various stakeholders and how their fairness concerns relate to outrage constraints. Based on surveys among two key stakeholder groups (representative eligible voters and investment professionals), we provide evidence that fairness is an important criterion for both groups but that opinions on how large a fair compensation amount should be are widely dispersed. Moreover, personality traits systematically influence fairness opinions through self‐serving interpretations of distributive justice and personal risk attitudes, indicating that a ‘fair’ amount of executive compensation may strongly depend on the involved stakeholders. Investigating thresholds for outrage, i.e., amounts above which compensation is judged ‘unfairly’ high, we show that even though investment professionals care for fairness as well, ‘capital market outrage’ might not equate to ‘public outrage’. Our paper contributes to the literature on outrage constraints by linking individual fairness concerns to outrage potential and has implications for transparency of executive compensation and research on shareholder activism.     

Does tunneling explain the sensitivity of executive compensation to other member firms’ performance?

This study examines how executive compensation is set when a firm is a business group member. Using Korea's unique setting of family-controlled business groups, we find that a member firm's executive cash compensation is positively linked to the stock performance of other member firms as well as its own. Further analyses reveal that this positive link is consistent with the hypothesis that corporate managers are rewarded for their decision to benefit the controlling family at the expense of the firm they manage. Specifically, we find that the sensitivity of executive pay to other member firms’ performance exists only in respect to firms in which the cash flow rights of the controlling family exceed those of the subject firm. We also find that this sensitivity is strengthened if the controlling family's control–ownership disparity in the subject firm is above the sample median.     

Determinants of the levels and changes in non‐executive director compensation

This study examines the economic and director‐specific determinants of non‐executive director (NED) compensation in the Australian setting. We find that NED compensation is associated with firm size, complexity, growth, risk and liquidity. It is also associated with director reputation, experience, connectedness and the directors' involvement with the firm. The additional compensation paid to the chairperson is positively associated with their prior experience and negatively associated with NED reputation and involvement. We find inconclusive evidence on the association between changes in NED compensation and firm performance.     

An “American Dream” theory of corporate executive Fraud

In this paper, we first describe a “Broken Trust” theory that was introduced by Albrecht el al. [Albrecht, W. S., Albrecht, C. C., & Albrecht, C. O. (2004). Fraud and corporate executives: Agency, Stewardship and Broken Trust. Journal of Forensic Accounting, 5, 109–130] to explain corporate executive Fraud. The Broken Trust theory is primarily based on an “Agency” theory from economic literature and a “Stewardship” theory from psychology literature. We next describe an “American Dream” theory from sociology literature to complement Albrecht el al.'s (2004) Broken Trust theory. Like the Broken Trust theory, the American Dream theory relates to a “Fraud Triangle” concept to explain corporate executive Fraud. Finally, we provide some anecdotal evidence from recent high profile corporate executive Fraud to explore the American Dream theory. We conclude our thoughts on corporate executive Fraud from a teaching perspective.     

Economic policy uncertainty and executive turnover

This paper examines whether economic uncertainty increases executive turnover. The negative perception perspective and business change theory suggest that executives are more likely to leave their jobs during periods of corporate distress. However, the additive effects of internal and external risk are thought to prompt firms to carefully consider executive turnover, thereby reducing the likelihood of executive changes. Based on the literature, we propose a check-and-balance hypothesis for the relationship between external uncertainty and executive change, according to which the optimal superposition of the internal and external risks stemming from increased external uncertainty would be to avoid a wave of executive departures. Using a sample of Chinese A-share listed companies from 2010 to 2019 and the China economic policy uncertainty index of Baker et al. (2013), we examine the impact of economic policy uncertainty on executive turnover and our results support the check-and-balance hypothesis. Our findings enhance our understanding of how economic policy uncertainty affects executive turnover, and enrich the literature on corporate risk management and strategic management.     

How does the executive pay gap influence audit fees? The roles of R&D investment and institutional ownership

Using a sample of US firms from 2003–2014, this study examines how the executive pay gap affects audit fees for firms with different levels of R&D investment and institutional ownership. Consistent with managerial power theory, we find that the executive pay gap is positively associated with audit fees, and that the positive association is attenuated by intense R&D investment and higher institutional ownership. We also find that the executive pay gap more strongly affects audit fees after the passage of the 2010 Dodd–Frank Act and the PCAOB's 2012 call to identify the audit risk related to executive incentive compensation. Additional analyses show that the moderating effects of R&D investment and institutional ownership on the pay gap–audit fees association are not conditional on auditor tenure, but the moderating effect of institutional ownership is stronger for firms hiring specialist auditors. Collectively, our findings suggest that auditors consider the business context, such as innovation initiative and external monitoring, when assessing audit risk related to the executive pay gap.     

后危机时期欧美银行高管的薪酬问题：政府与银行家的博弈

源于银行业的金融危机促使欧美政府纷纷出台多项干预银行高管薪酬安排的政策措施,这些措施引发了银行家们的种种阻挠。文章在分析了政府与银行家们之间的多次政治交锋和相互博弈后,认为银行家们赢得了第一个回合一一强制性奖金上限遭到拒绝。但文章也指出这些银行家们在重压之下采取了某些“权宜之计”,如赞同对现金花红进行限制并延期发放;报酬以股票形式支付;当银行利润下降时,已发放的报酬存在追回和扣减的可能性等等。     

Factors that influence the perceived use of the internal audit function's work by executive management and audit committee

The internal audit function (IAF) is an important component of high-quality corporate governance. We study how the head of internal audit perceives the executive management team and the audit committee to rely on the IAF's work. It is not obvious from prior work or professional anecdotes whether the IAF satisfies the needs of both groups. If multiple factors influence the IAF's work, chief audit executives (CAEs) may find themselves in a situation with competing demands, which could then compromise quality for all stakeholders. Based on a unique dataset from CAEs, two logistic regression models identify factors that influence the degree to which IAF's results are perceived as being used by both executive management and the audit committee. The results show the existence of various factors that are relevant either to both groups (e.g., strategic project reports and IAF quality) or to only one (e.g., only audit committees are interested in risk management reports while only executive management teams are interested in internal control reports), depending on whether the IAF focuses on assurance or consulting work.     

金融机构高管薪酬存在风险敏感性吗？——基于中国上市金融机构的经验证据

基于中国上市金融机构2008-2016年的非平衡面板数据,研究金融机构高管薪酬风险敏感性问题.结果表明:金融机构的风险承担与高管薪酬呈显著的正相关关系,意味着金融机构高管薪酬契约存在风险敏感性;相较于非国有金融机构,国有金融机构高管薪酬风险敏感性较低;以监事会人数、监事会会议次数、独立董事占比与第一大股东持股比例作为代理变量,管理层权力在一定程度上影响风险承担与高管薪酬之间的关系.