Compatibility between monetary and fiscal policy under EMU

The debate over the Stability and Growth Pact (SGP) as a part of European Monetary Union, has highlighted the need to assess the extent to which fiscal policies of union members should be constrained as a pre-requisite for price stability within the union. In this paper, we develop a two country open economy model, where each country has overlapping generations of finitely lived consumers who supply labour to imperfectly competitive firms which can only change their prices infrequently. We examine the case where the two countries have formed a monetary union, but where the fiscal authorities remain independent. We show that the fiscal response required to ensure stability of the real debt stock is greater when consumers are not infinitely lived. In principle, this allows for some compensating behaviour between governments, but we show that the scope for compensation is limited. The monetary authority can abandon its active targeting of inflation to stabilise the debt of at most one fiscal authority, and any other combination of policies will either result in price level indeterminacy and/or indefinite transfers of wealth between the two economies. Finally, in a series of simulations we show that fiscal shocks have limited impact on output and inflation provided the fiscal authorities meet the (weak) requirements of fiscal solvency. However, when monetary policy is forced to abandon its active targeting of inflation, then fiscal shocks have a much greater impact on both output and inflation.     

Banking crises in monetary economies

Abstract.  This paper analyzes the effect of inflation on banking crises in a model in which money and banks play essential roles. The model's equilibrium replicates some key features of actual banking crises, namely, the partial suspension of payments and the desire to hold cash even in the absence of pressing liquidity needs. When banks have access to a stable foreign currency, inflation has a threshold effect on banking crises: higher inflation reduces the likelihood of crises when inflation is below the threshold; the reverse happens when inflation exceeds the threshold. This result appears to be broadly consistent with available evidence.     

Inflationary Financing of Government Expenditure in an Endogenous Growth Model

This paper analyses the role of inflation in economies with endogenous growth and congestion in public services. Optimal policy rules are derived for public services and investment. The other findings are as follows. Monetary policy should maximize economic growth. The more inefficient the public sector is, the higher the growth‐maximizing inflation rate is. If a currency union accepts a new member with an inefficient public sector, this will boost inflation in the union and decrease growth and welfare in all member economies of the union.     

Dollarization and the inflation threshold

Abstract.  Empirical evidence suggests non-linearity in the impact of inflation on financial intermediation and real activity. Evidence also suggests that high inflation affects financial intermediation through the substitution of dollars 'under the mattress' for savings in domestic banks. We model an economy where inflation and real activity are positively related at low levels of inflation. However, when the inflation rate exceeds a threshold, agents substitute dollars for deposits issued by domestic banks, reducing the scale of financial intermediation and investment. As a consequence, at high levels of inflation, capital stock and output become negatively related to the inflation rate.     

Unions, monetary shocks and the labour market cycle

This paper provides a new growth model by considering strategic behaviour in the supply of labour. Workers form a labour union with the aim of manipulating wages for their own benefit. We analyse the implications on labour market dynamics at business cycle frequencies of getting away from the price-taking assumption. A calibrated monetary version of the union model does quite a reasonable job in replicating the dynamic features of labour market variables observed in post-war U.S. data.     

Political influence,central bank independence and inflation in Africa: A comparative analysis

This paper develops a new de facto measure of central bank independence (CBI) based on two recent measures of the turnover rates of central bank governors introduced by Vuletin and Zhu (2011), complemented with measures of alliance with the government in power, captured by prior executive appointment, tribe proximity, and political party affiliation. Using 1980–2009 data from 13 countries from the CFA zone (a currency union) and 18 non-CFA countries, the new index is used to 1) examine whether CBI can help achieve price stability in Africa and 2) show how CBI affects African countries that are part of a monetary union. We find that higher turnover rates lead to higher inflation. Our results are robust to the decomposition of the turnover rates into premature removals and ally replacements. Furthermore, we find that for CFA zone countries, central bank autonomy has no effect on inflation and instead inflation is driven by other variables such as the fixed exchange rate regime or commodity price shocks.     

Central Bank Independence, Inflation Variability, and the Revenue Smoothing Hypothesis

This paper examines the revenue-smoothing hypothesis, which posits that an optimizing government will adjust both taxes and inflation to meet shocks to government spending. Our contribution is to examine this through the lens of a new methodology that relates both the first and second moments of inflation rates to central bank independence (CBI) measures. Unlike existing least-squares-based CBI papers, this study uses a maximum likelihood framework that facilitates the direct inclusion of CBI parameters in the residual covariance matrix. This new approach allows for a more intensive use of information contained in the CBI indexes and the estimates obtained are better reflective of CBI influences. Our results provide stronger evidence confirming the revenue-smoothing hypothesis, in particular for those countries with more independent central banks.     

Equilibrium unemployment with outsourcing and wage solidarity under labour market imperfections

We evaluate the effects of outsourcing and wage solidarity on wage formation and equilibrium unemployment in a heterogeneous labour market, where wages are determined by a monopoly labour union. We find that outsourcing promotes the wage dispersion between the high- and low-skilled workers. When the labour union adopts a solidaristic wage policy, it will dampen this tendency. Further, higher outsourcing will increase equilibrium unemployment among the high-skilled workers, whereas it will reduce it among the low-skilled workers. Overall, outsourcing will reduce economy-wide equilibrium unemployment under the reasonable condition that the proportion of high-skilled workers is sufficiently low.     

Macroeconomic dynamics in Macedonia and Slovakia: Structural estimation and comparison

This paper estimates a structural macroeconomic model using data for Macedonia and Slovakia to characterize possible challenges Macedonia can face concerning macroeconomic stabilization during its transition process. A comparison of the estimated model parameters suggests that, in Slovakia, the output gap is less sensitive to real interest rate movements and prices experience greater inertia. The estimated monetary policy reaction functions show Macedonia and Slovakia as inflation targeters, with Macedonia as the more conservative one, despite its officially applied exchange rate targeting regime. The differences in the estimated parameters imply differing transmission mechanisms for Macedonia and Slovakia. Consequently, the variance of domestic variables in Slovakia is most influenced by monetary policy shocks, while there is no single dominating shock explaining the volatility of Macedonia's macroeconomic variables. The exchange rate shock, the monetary policy shock and the demand shock are jointly important in determining the volatility of Macedonia's variables. The model simulations indicate that Macedonia experiences lower output gap and inflation volatility than Slovakia. This comes, nevertheless, at the cost of higher interest rate and real exchange rate volatility in Macedonia, which could be an indication of more volatile financial markets with possible negative implications for financial stability.     

How strong is the case for a populist central banker? A note

Conventional wisdom holds that a conservative central banker reduces equilibrium inflation with no cost in terms of real activity. More recently, this proposition has been turned around in models with inflation averse wage setters who are Stackelberg leaders vis-à-vis the central bank: In this case a populist central banker with no interest in inflation was shown to lead to the first-best equilibrium. This note demonstrates that the Stackelberg assumption is crucial for this result and that the Nash solution of the same model does not generally support the case for a populist central banker.     

Wage restraint and monetary union

Existing work on wage bargaining predicts more aggressive wage setting under monetary union. This is exemplified by Cukierman and Lippi (2001) who postulate that wages are set having area-wide prices in mind. The insight of aggressive wage behaviour has not been confirmed by the EMU experience, which has been characterised by wage moderation. The present paper investigates the possibility of wage restraint using a monetary union model which, realistically, assumes that trade unions set wages with national prices in mind. Drawing on plausible ranges for all parameter values (and macroeconomic shocks), our simulations show that a monetary union elicits real wages that are broadly comparable to those obtained under monetary autonomy. The confidence bounds around these results are rather wide, in particular including scenarios of wage restraint.     

Inflation and Openness with Non‐Atomistic Wage Setters

This paper analyses the impact of trade openness on inflation in a strategic framework characterised by monopolistic production in the domestic sector and unionised labour markets. By stressing the interplay between internal and external sources of economic distortion, we show that the economy's inflationary bias reduces up to a critical level of trade openness. Beyond this threshold, wage setters may be induced to behave more aggressively in open economies, leading to higher equilibrium inflation. Based on a regression analysis that investigates the combined effect of labour market institutions and openness on inflation across nineteen OECD economies, we show that inflation is negatively related to openness when wage bargaining is decentralised, while there is virtually no link between openness and inflation at higher levels of wage centralisation.     

Heterogeneity and convergence of regional inflation (prices)

It is generally thought that members in a monetary union experience a similar level of inflation. This paper verifies this conventional belief. Using regional data, we present statistical evidence of heterogeneous inflation in Japan. Not only does the average inflation differ significantly across regions, but regional inflation responds differently to common economic and monetary factors. Furthermore, we show no evidence of price convergence in the entire group of regions although there is some evidence of convergence in subgroups. These results suggest that diversified regional inflation can exist within a monetary union.     

Macroeconomic Performance and Wage Bargaining in a Monetary Union

Building on a micro-founded model of a two-region monetary union, this paperanalyses the macroeconomic impact of institutional reforms in labour marketsand central banking that may occur as a result of monetary unification. Thepaper shows that monopoly distortions in the labour market are a key factorin evaluating the effects of central bank's conservativeness and wagecentralisation on inflation and unemployment. Wage restraint is favoured ina highly decentralised wage bargaining setup as well as under a liberalcentral bank, provided competition is high in the labour market.     

Money, credit and banking

In monetary models where agents are subject to trading shocks there is typically an ex post inefficiency since some agents are holding idle balances while others are cash constrained. This problem creates a role for financial intermediaries, such as banks, who accept nominal deposits and make nominal loans. In general, financial intermediation improves the allocation. The gains in welfare come from the payment of interest on deposits and not from relaxing borrowers’ liquidity constraints. We also demonstrate that when credit rationing occurs increasing the rate of inflation can be welfare improving.     

Pattern Bargaining and Wage Leadership in a Small Open Economy*

Pattern bargaining with the tradables (manufacturing) sector as the wage leader is common in Europe. We question the conventional wisdom that such bargaining produces wage restraint. In our model, all forms of pattern bargaining give the same outcomes as uncoordinated bargaining under inflation targeting. Under a monetary union, wage leadership for the non‐tradables sector is conducive to wage restraint, whereas wage leadership for the tradables sector is not. Comparison thinking might lead the follower to set the same wage as the leader. Such equilibria can arise when the leader sector is the smaller sector, and these can promote high employment.     

The Interaction between the Central Bank and a Single Monopoly Union Revisited: Does Greater Monetary Policy Uncertainty Reduce Nominal Wages?

Previous papers modelling the interaction between the central bank and a single monopoly union demonstrated that greater monetary policy uncertainty reduces the union's nominal wage. This paper shows that this result does not hold in general, since it depends on peculiar specifications of the union's objective function. In particular, I show that greater monetary policy uncertainty raises the nominal wage whenever union members tend to be more sensitive to the risk of getting low real wages than to the risk of remaining unemployed. This conclusion appears consistent with the evidence showing that greater monetary authority's transparency reduces average inflation .     

INFLATION AND THE PUBLIC DEFICIT WHEN THE UTILITY OF MONEY IS INSATIABLE*

When the marginal utility of money is positive even at very high levels of the asset (Yoshiyasu Ono's, 1994, assumption), the relationship between inflation and the public deficit at full employment may result in a unique perverse equilibrium where higher deficits reduce inflation. If there are two equilibria, the low inflation equilibrium is one where the perverse effect between inflation and the public deficit prevails; while in the high inflation equilibrium higher public deficits increase inflation. These results contrast sharply with traditional results found in the literature.     

The unbearable tightness of being in a monetary union: Fiscal restrictions and regional stability

We study how constrained fiscal policy can affect macroeconomic stability and welfare in a two-region model of a monetary union with sticky prices and distortionary taxation. Both government spending and taxes can be used to stabilize regional variables; however, the best welfare outcome is obtained under some tax variability and constant regional inflations. We use a variety of rules to characterize constrained fiscal policy and find that strict fiscal rules coupled with a monetary policy that targets union-wide inflation result in regional inflation stability and the welfare costs of such rules are not as unbearable as one would expect. Fiscal authorities can enhance welfare by targeting the regional output gap, while targeting regional inflation is less successful since inflation stability is guaranteed by the central bank.     

Regime-shifts and post-float inflation dynamics of Australia

Australia's inflation rate and inflation uncertainty during the post-float era 1983Q3-2006Q4 have acted as important barometers of Australia's macroeconomic performance. The conceptualization and measurement of the nexus between inflation and inflation uncertainty is subject to complex dynamics. We use the Markov regime switching heteroscedasticity (MRSH) model to capture long-run stochastic trend and short-run noisy components. This allows us to conclude that in post-float Australia the results deviate significantly from the mainstream Friedman paradigm on inflation and its uncertainty. We also critically review the plausibility of rival paradigms e.g. Keynesian-Mundell-Fleming, Friedman-Ball, Cukierman-Meltzer and Holland, explaining this paradoxical behavior. The analyses presented here provide valuable insights to policymakers grappling with the challenge of designing monetary policy to combat the adverse effects of inflation and inflation uncertainty for Australia emerging out of the global financial crisis.