资本监管制度变革对我国银行业的影响与思考

中国银监会发布的《商业银行资本管理办法(试行)》是我国全面落实巴塞尔协议Ⅲ,完善资本监管的重大制度创新。新的资本办法提高了监管资本要求,扩大了风险覆盖范围,合理调整了风险权重,将有效提升我国银行业的资本质量和抗风险能力,优化商业银行的公司治理结构,推动其经营模式的转型,更好地服务实体经济发展。同时,我们也应进一步处理好宏观审慎政策与微观监管政策的有效衔接,在提高资本要求和防控风险的同时,适度开展金融创新,促进国民经济长期可持续发展。     

巴塞尔新协议对中国银行业监管的启示和影响

本文首先从资本充足率监管改革、流动性监管改革、宏观审慎监管改革以及宏观经济影响和参数标准等方面,全方位地评述了巴塞尔协议Ⅲ的主要内容.以此为基础,本文报告了巴塞尔协议Ⅲ对中国银行业监管的影响和中国经济的影响,并提出了相关应对的政策建议.     

国际监管改革对银行业发展影响的分析

2010年11月召开的G20峰会审议通过了Basel III改革议案,新方案提出了一系列更高的监管新标准,有助于提升银行系统稳健性,同时也给银行带来较大的资本压力,进而影响银行的业绩。本文在综述巴塞尔III改革成果的基础上,分析国内银行业实施巴塞尔III的优势和劣势,建议银行持续提高风险管理水平,深化新资本协议应用范围,结合风险成本和资本成本,有效评估各类业务综合成本收益率,合理开展资产配置和差异化业务策略的制定与实施,提高银行开展业务的主动性和议价能力。     

巴塞尔Ⅲ在监管理论与框架上的改进:微观与宏观审慎有机结合

巴塞尔Ⅲ作为此次国际金融危机后全球金融改革的重要成果,不但改进了传统金融监管理论只专注于单个金融机构风险而忽视了系统性风险的不足,而且在监管框架设计上,既注重加强微观审慎监管,又注重宏观审慎监管的有机结合。本文从阐释推动这次全球金融监管改革的理论基础出发,深入剖析了巴塞尔Ⅲ在微观审慎监管和宏观审慎监管上改进的原因与具体进展,最后探讨了巴塞尔Ⅲ可能对中国银行业的影响并提出对中国银行业改革的建议。     

部门逆周期资本监管框架及对中国的启示

2019年11月,巴塞尔委员会发布了《实施部门逆周期资本缓冲工具的指导原则》,进一步完善了《巴塞尔协议Ⅲ》逆周期资本缓冲政策框架,并建议各国监管当局可以针对信贷过快增长的信贷部门实施部门逆周期资本缓冲要求,缓解特定信贷部门的周期性失衡。我国虽然在2013年开始实施的《商业银行资本管理办法(试行)》中引入了逆周期资本监管条款,但至今尚未出台或公布具体的逆周期资本监管细则和要求。为此,我国银行业应以部门逆周期资本监管框架出台为契机,尝试运用部门逆周期资本缓冲工具调控经济部门的杠杆率,借鉴部门逆周期监管理念细化MPA考核指标,加快构建符合国情的逆周期监管指标体系,持续拓宽银行资本补充渠道,适时出台逆周期资本监管实施细则,不断提升我国逆周期资本监管的科学性、有效性和前瞻性。     

基于适应宏观审慎监管视角的我国银行业转型

银行业金融机构作为重要的监管对象,要及时根据监管体制的变化对经营策略作出调整,主动适应监管法规新要求.这对于监管政策有效性的发挥以及银行业的持续健康发展都具有重要意义.2008年国际金融危机爆发后,加强宏观审慎管理、防范系统性风险成为世界主要国家在金融监管领域改革的主要内容.面对监管领域的新变化,中国银行业需从适应宏观审慎监管的角度出发继续转型之路.本文通过对宏观审慎监管的内涵、特点以及对融入了宏观审慎监管理念的<巴塞尔 |||>的介绍,揭示出宏观审慎监管给我国银行业转型带来的新挑战,进而从适应宏观审慎监管的角度对深化我国银行业转型提出相应建议.     

宏观审慎资本监管框架下的银行业资产管理问题及对策——来自中国银行业的经验证据

《商业银行资本管理办法（试行）》的实施,对银行资产管理提出了更高的要求。目前我国银行的资产管理存在监管者与被监管者目标不一致性、被监管者缺乏宏观审慎的动力、资本工具创新弱化新资本监管框架效果等问题。针对这些问题,本文提出使用利益引导方式优化银行资产配置,及时跟踪研究金融工具创新潜在风险,准确识别系统性风险的状态和判断逆周期资本工具应用时点等方式来识别风险、预防风险。     

资产证券化监管框架的构建:从微观审慎向宏观审慎

从金融危机的教训得知,资产证券化创新严重影响到金融稳定,并且微观审慎监管的偏差及宏观审慎监管的缺位是当前资产证券化监管存在的缺陷。为此,关于资产证券化监管框架的构建必须考虑金融稳定的维护,并从宏观审慎监管的强化来改进资产证券化的监管。同时,为了提高信息的共享及协调程度,必须有机结合微观审慎监管和宏观审慎监管来构建资产证券化的监管框架。     

资产证券化监管框架的构建：从微观审慎向宏观审慎

从金融危机的教训得知，资产证券化创新严重影响到金融稳定，并且微观审慎监管的偏差及宏观审慎监管的缺位是当前资产证券化监管存在的缺陷。为此，关于资产证券化监管框架的构建必须考虑金融稳定的维护，并从宏观审慎监管的强化来改进资产证券化的监管。同时，为了提高信息的共享及协调程度，必须有机结合微观审慎监管和宏观审慎监管来构建资产证券化的监管框架。     

巴塞尔Ⅲ信用风险标准法改革对银行业的影响

国际银行业资本监管改革《巴塞尔Ⅲ:后危机改革的最终方案》中对信用风险标准法的改革,对全球乃至我国银行业监管标准、资本计量与资本管理、业务运营管理等都将产生深刻的影响。在回顾巴塞尔Ⅲ信用风险标准法监管改革背景、思路,以及对《最终方案》信用风险标准法监管准则研究的基础上,本文剖析了巴塞尔Ⅲ信用风险标准法监管改革对全球及我国银行业的影响与应对举措。     

资本监管对我国银行业市场竞争度的影响研究

2004年《商业银行资本充足率管理办法》颁布后,我国开始真正意义上的资本监管。统一的资本监管标准．有利于银行业市场竞争的公平性。本文通过对资本监管与银行业市场竞争度的相关性分析和Granger因果检验,探讨了资本监管对我国银行业市场竞争度的影响。结果发现,资本监管与银行业市场竞争度存在相关性,但相关系数较低,且他们之间没有明显的因果关系,我国商业银行资本监管还有待进一步的改进和完善。     

The impact of regulatory reforms on cost structure,ownership and competition in Indian banking

This paper evaluates the impact of financial sector reforms on the cost structure characteristics and on the ownership–cost efficiency relationship in Indian banking. It also examines the impact of reforms on the dynamics of competition in the lending market. We find evidence that deregulation improves banks performance and fosters competition in the lending market. Results suggest technological progress, once Indian commercial banks have adjusted to the new regulatory environment. This, however, does not translate in efficiency gains. There is also evidence of an ownership effect on the level and pattern of efficiency change. Finally, competition keeps building pace even in the re-regulation period and technological improvements are not hampered by the tightening of prudential norms.     

国际金融危机中我国银行业的风险管控策略

随着社会主义市场经济的不断发展，银行业在国民经济运行中的核心地位日益显现，银行业健康运行与否已经关系到整个国民经济发展的大局。2007年，国内几家金融机构都先后发生了IT风险事件，这些问题不仅制约着银行业的健康发展，而且有可能危及经济发展和社会稳定的全局。银行业的风险管理和防范关系到国家的经济发展，     

中国信贷资产证券化市场发展现状及展望

中国信贷资产证券化仍处于以零星个案、小规模试点为主的初级阶段。审慎和重在规范的发展路径既推动了信贷资产证券化实践,又尚存诸如与上位法不统一、规则制定权限错配、发行难度和成本增大、一级市场销售不畅、二级市场流动性严重不足等负面效应,制约着信贷资产证券化深入发展。2008年以来,受美国金融危机以及国内宏观调控变化的影响,资产证券化发行环境不利,亟待获得政策层面的持续鼓励和支持。国内商业银行应找准切入点,积极探索业务品种,更好地做好证券化产品的资产储备和发行准备工作。     

Capital and liquidity ratios and financial distress. Evidence from the European banking industry

Using a large bank-level dataset, we test the relevance of both structural liquidity and capital ratios, as defined in Basel III, on banks' probability of failure. To include all relevant episodes of bank failure and distress (F&D) occurring in the EU-28 member states over the past decade, we develop a broad indicator that includes information not only on bankruptcies, liquidations, under receivership and dissolved banks, but also accounts for state interventions, mergers in distress and EBA stress test results. Estimates from several versions of the logistic probability model indicate that the likelihood of failure and distress decreases with increased liquidity holdings, while capital ratios are significant only for large banks. Our results provide support for Basel III's initiatives on structural liquidity and for the increased regulatory focus on large and systemically important banks.     

保险中介市场风险状况及监管对策

当前,随着保险中介市场的快速发展,市场风险状况不容乐观,一般性风险普遍存在,个别机构因严重违法造成的风险已相当严重,同时,因保险中介经营模式创新引发的风险也不容忽视。这些风险如不能采取有效的监管措施加以控制,势必对保险中介市场平稳健康发展带来严重冲击。为此,应加快完善监管法律法规和制度,严格市场准入并建立有效的市场退出制度,强化保险公司对代理机构和保险营销员的管理责任,改革现行个人保险营销体制,细化从业人员资格考试,实行从业人员分级管理,充分发挥行业协会的自律职能。     

澳门保险业概况与启示

澳门作为中国的一个特别行政区,一个微型的经济体,其保险活动也有期自身的特点。澳门保险业随经济的发展取得了快速的发展壮大,文章对澳门的保险从业人员和公司、监管体制与活动管制等情况做了全面介绍,进而指出对我国内地保险业的借鉴意义。     

Regulation and the connectedness of insurers to the banking sector: International evidence

Using variation across countries and time in the degree to which regulations restrict banks and insurers from engaging in the same activities, we find that property/liability insurers' connectedness to the banking sector declines when regulatory restrictions increase, but life insurers' connectedness to banks does not. The results suggest that the connectedness between life insurers and banks is largely due to these institutions sharing common underlying economic and financial risk factors that exist even when regulation restricts these institutions from engaging in each other's activities.     

Cross-border banking and financial stability in the EU

This paper examines the implications that alternative regulatory structures may have for resolving failed banking institutions. Emphasis on the European Union (EU), which is both economically and financially large and has several features relating to cross-border banking in the form of direct investment that may heighten the problems we consider. To ensure the efficient resolution of bank failures with minimum, if any, credit and liquidity losses a four step program should be followed. This includes prompt legal closure of institutions before they become economically insolvent, prompt identification of claims and assignment of losses, prompt reopening of failed institutions, and prompt re-capitalizing and re-privatization of failed institutions. These policies together with a prompt corrective action system could be voluntarily adopted through the use of deposit insurance premium discounts as an incentive.     

Bank funding structures and risk: Evidence from the global financial crisis

This paper analyzes the evolution of bank funding structures in the run up to the global financial crisis and studies the implications for financial stability, exploiting a bank-level dataset that covers about 11,000 banks in the U.S. and Europe during 2001–09. The results show that banks with weaker structural liquidity and higher leverage in the pre-crisis period were more likely to fail afterward. The likelihood of bank failure also increases with pre-crisis bank risk-taking. In the cross-section, the smaller domestically-oriented banks were relatively more vulnerable to liquidity risk, while the large cross-border (Global) banks were more vulnerable to solvency risk due to excessive leverage. In fact, a 3.5 percentage point increase in the pre-crisis capital buffers of Global banks would have caused a 48 percentage point in their probability of failure during the crisis. The results support the proposed Basel III regulations on structural liquidity and leverage, but suggest that emphasis should be placed on the latter, particularly for the systemically-important institutions. Macroeconomic and monetary conditions are also shown to be related with the likelihood of bank failure, providing a case for the introduction of a macro-prudential approach to banking regulation.