Social norms, fertility and economic development

This paper presents an overlapping generations model with endogenous fertility and human capital accumulation. Within such a framework, it shows how the presence of family-size norms can lead to multiple equilibria. It can thus potentially explain different development patterns without recourse to increasing returns and differences in initial conditions. Furthermore, it derives sufficient conditions under which different equilibria can be Pareto ranked. Finally, it shows that the main results hold also in the case where there exists parental altruism.     

Dynamic coordination among heterogeneous agents

We study a dynamic model of coordination with timing frictions and payoff heterogeneity. There is a unique equilibrium, characterized by thresholds that determine the choices of each type of agent. We characterize equilibrium for the limiting cases of vanishing timing frictions and vanishing shocks to fundamentals. A lot of conformity emerges: despite payoff heterogeneity, agents’ equilibrium thresholds partially coincide as long as a set of beliefs that would make this coincidence possible exists. However, the equilibrium thresholds never fully coincide. In case of vanishing frictions, the economy behaves almost as if all agents were equal to an average type. Conformity is not inefficient. In the efficient solution, agents follow others even more often.     

Social norms,costly punishment and the evolution of cooperation

Within a co-evolutionary framework of reputations, strategies and social norms, we study the role of punishment in the promotion of cooperation. Norms differ according to whether they allow or do not allow the punishment action to be a part of the strategies, and, in the case of the former, they further differ in terms of whether they encourage or do not encourage the punishment action. In such a framework, depending on the applied social norm, players are first given different reputations based on their employed strategies. Players then update their strategies accordingly after they observe the payoff differences among different strategies. Finally, over a longer horizon, the evolution of the social norms may be driven by the average payoffs of all members of the society. The strategy dynamics are articulated under different social norms. It is found that costly punishment does contribute to the evolution toward cooperation. Not only does the attraction basin of the cooperative evolutionary stable state become larger, but the speed of convergence to the CESS also becomes faster. These two properties are further enhanced if the punishment action is encouraged by the social norm.     

The importance of research teams with diverse backgrounds: Research collaboration in the Journal of Productivity Analysis

Journal of Productivity Analysis - The Journal of Productivity Analysis (JPA) is a pioneering academic journal that aims to develop new methodologies for efficiency and productivity measurement and...     

Social norms and recognition in social fundraising campaigns: The moderating role of self-construal

Developing effective solicitation campaigns has become a priority for nonprofit organizations to raise funds. To do so, they have begun to introduce social information and recognition mechanisms in their campaigns to encourage donations, yet our current understanding of the effectiveness of these interventions is limited. This study intends to contribute to a better understanding of the effectiveness of these campaigns by investigating the role played by social norms, recognition, and their interplay in charitable giving. In addition, the study also investigates the extent to which these effects are moderated by self-construal, an important individual psychological trait. This empirical investigation conducted an experimental design between subjects on a sample of 261 participants. A two-stage correction approach was used to estimate two dependent variables. The effectiveness of social norms and recognition varies depending on the decision in play (whether to donate, or how much to donate) as well as on an individual's self-construal (independent or interdependent). Strategies that combine several of these mechanisms should take into account their objective, that is, whether it is focused on boosting symbolic support or on incentivizing significant contributions. This article contributes by demonstrating that the type of social norm and the type of recognition matter, as they produce significant different effects on both the donation decision and the donation amount.     

Managers, leaders, and teams in a team-based environment

In order to succeed in today's dynamic environment, abundant with corporate restructuring and downsizing, into what must today's manager transform? Part of the answer lies in "leadership." Some managers are leaders, some leaders are managers, but the two are not synonymous. There are notable differences between managers and leaders, particularly in the role each plays in the transition towards organizations that are customer-focused, empowered, and team-based. The evolution towards team-based organizations begins with three different, concurrent transitions: of managers into leaders, of employees into teammates, and of functional hierarchical organizations into those of team empowerment.     

Social support among heterogeneous partners: an experimental test

This paper studies how dyadic social support is affected by heterogeneity of the partners. We distinguish heterogeneity with respect to three parameters the likelihood of needing support; the benefits from receiving support; and the costs of providing support. Hypotheses are based on a game-theoretic analysis of an iterated support game. First, we predict that heterogeneity in one of the parameters hampers social support. Second, we predict that under heterogeneity with respect to two of the parameters, support is most likely if there is a specific heterogeneous distribution such that heterogeneity in one parameter ‘compensates’ for heterogeneity in the other parameter. If there is no compensation social support is even more hampered. The hypotheses have been tested by experimental data with a mixed within-subject, between-subject design. The data gives support to the hypotheses.     

Implementation and information in teams

A risk-neutral principal hires risk-averse agents to work in a team production process. Each agent can observe the actions taken by some subset of the other agents, and (perhaps) the realization of a random variable which is correlated with output. The principal cannot observe actions or the random variable. However, the agents can communicate with the principal, and final output is verifiable. We characterize the information structures that make it possible for the principal to implement his first best. In general it will be desirable to restrict the information available to the agents. If the first best can be implemented, then it can be implemented by a very simple mechanism, in which each agent forecasts the team output, but sends no other message.     

Environment, strategy, and power within top management teams

This study distinguishes two sources of critical contingencies for organizations: environment and strategy. In turn, it explores how coping with each type of contingency is related to power within top management teams. Executives had high power if, by virtue either of their functional area of scanning behavior, they coped with the dominant requirement imposed by their industry's environment. Power patterns within each industry were further affected by the extent to which executives coped with the contingencies posed by their organizations' particular strategies. A temporal critical contingencies model of power is proposed.     

Bricolage,collaboration and mission drift in social enterprises

Abstract

Increasingly, social enterprises are relying on collaboration with partners to tackle the resource constraints that they face. In this research we focus on the strategy of bricolage to explore whether and how the different types of partner becoming involved may impact on the mission of social enterprises. Grounded in resource dependency and transaction cost theories, we explore how power asymmetry and the nature of involvement may impact on the outcomes of bricolage. Our findings demonstrate that in the more integrated relationships with high power asymmetry, more instances of mission drift might be observed compared to when social enterprises develop the more collaborative or complementary nature of partnerships with symmetrical power dependency, or when the partners’ involvements are mainly transaction-based.     

Leadership and cooperation in growing teams

We study how the growth of teams affects leadership effectiveness and intragroup cooperation. We put experimental participants in two teams. In each team, the members voluntarily contribute to a club good. In one of the two teams, the members observe the contribution of a randomly chosen leader before they decide themselves. Two treatments allow for migration between the teams. In one of them, participants control access to their team with a voting process. By design, participants can achieve the efficient outcome only if they all move into one team. We compare the results with a leaderless setting as well as with four treatments which vary team size exogenously. The results show that high contributions of leaders encourage higher per-capita contributions of their followers which foster migration into their teams. In turn, larger teams experience even more courageous leadership and higher contributions, but the coordination effect diminishes. Nevertheless, the dismissal of potential newcomers in the treatment with voting suggests that team members see a trade-off between team size and contributions. They sacrifice economic benefits from potential entrants to maintain intrateam cooperation.     

Job satisfaction in teams

This paper analyses and discusses the results of a large sample survey of job satisfaction among clerical employees working in teams. The relative strengths of association between several variables and job satisfaction are assessed and the results support the importance of on-the-job training, participation in decision making and management leadership. Questions are raised about first-line supervisors as team leaders.     

Virtual teams in organizations

Organizations continue to widely adopt virtual teams as a primary way to structure work and the recent growth in utilization has outstripped theory and research on virtual teams. The explosive growth in virtual team use by organizations and the inherent challenges of virtual teams highlight the need for theory and research to inform organizations in designing, structuring and managing virtual teams. Therefore, the purpose of this special issue is to (a) advance theory and research on virtual teams, (b) offer new directions for research on the topic, and (c) contribute to efforts to enhance the effectiveness of virtual teams in organizations. Toward this end, in this introduction we provide a brief overview of virtual teams and present an input-process-output framework to contextualize and organize the eight papers appearing in this special issue.     

Institutional monitoring,coordination and corporate acquisitions in China

Within the context of corporate acquisition decisions of China’s Publicly Listed Corporations (PLCs), this paper investigates the monitoring and coordination behaviour of institutional shareholders. Institutional shareholders are divided into four groups: large outsider, large insider, small outsider and small insider. The outsider and insider categorization, respectively, represents the absence of significant business links with relevant PLCs. In China, institutional shareholders tend to either monitor the acquisitions decisions of PLCs or coordinate their response with the controlling shareholders (coordination in the present context amounts to cooperation). Using micro data from China’s stock market over the 2003–2008 period, we find that (through ex-ante coordination with the controlling shareholders) the insider institutional investment tends to increase the likelihood of PLC acquisitions. However, through ex-ante monitoring of the PLC acquisition offers, the outsider institutional investment tends to decrease the acquisition likelihood. We find that, through ex-post monitoring of PLC acquisitions, institutional investors with large shareholdings can help improve the post-acquisition performance of Chinese PLCs. On the other hand, institutional investors with small shareholdings tend to coordinate their actions with the controlling shareholders. Accordingly, small institutional shareholders cannot affect the post-acquisition performance of China’s PLCs. Finally, we find that the so-called ‘cherry-picking effect’ exists only in the case of large outsider institutional investors.     

Buyer-supplier collaboration: A macro,micro, and congruence perspective

Buyer-supplier collaboration, an important part of operational performance, is predicated on the assumption that a firm's stated strategy on inter-firm collaboration is implemented in practice. We argue that a strategy is only as good as its execution and that micro-level factors—the employees' collaborative propensity and their internal collaborative behaviors—also play an essential role in the successful implementation of buyer-supplier collaboration. We test competing models based on secondary data collected from 330 manufacturing firms in 16 countries/regions. Our results show that both the macro-level firm strategy and micro-level employee factors exert substantial influence over buyer-supplier collaboration. In addition, when inter-firm collaborative strategy and micro-level factors are congruent, there is an enhancement effect. Our research explores the critical role of supply managers and surrounding employees in shaping buyer-supplier collaboration and actualizing operational strategies.     

Social business collaboration at the bottom of the pyramid: The case of orchestration

Social business orchestrators (SBOs) help social businesses of various sizes to tackle major societal issues by filling gaps in knowledge and resources. However, research has overlooked these types of collaboration. Situated within a bottom of the pyramid context in Bangladesh, the current study sheds light on the process of value creation for SBO–social businesses partnerships by comparing different collaboration partners. Multiple case study research through the lens of the relational view were used to ask how SBOs facilitate value creation in social businesses by flexibly adapting resource inputs and governance mechanisms to the specific endowment and size of partners; this approach was informed by interviews and field note analyses. The combined deductive–inductive analysis enhances knowledge of idiosyncrasies of SBO–social business collaborations. Our study draws attention to the role of large orchestrators, whose model could be scaled and transferred to other world regions, including industrialised countries.