Idiosyncratic Risk in the United States and Sweden: Is There a Role for Government Insurance?

We examine the effects of government redistribution schemes in an economy where agents are subject to uninsurable, individual specific productivity risk. In particular, we consider the trade-off between positive insurance effects and negative distortions on labor supply and saving. We parameterize the model by estimating productivity processes on Swedish and U.S. data. The estimation results show that agents in the United States are subject to more idiosyncratic risk than agents in Sweden. Although distortions are significant, the welfare benefits of government redistribution and insurance systems can be substantial. Journal of Economic Literature Classification Numbers: E20, H21.     

How Much is Transfer and How Much is Insurance in a Pay‐as‐you‐go System? The German Case

Pay-as-you-go pension systems provide insurance against longevity-related old-age poverty and related risks. They are commonly also used as instruments for redistribution. This paper provides several estimates of the insurance and transfer share of the German public pension system. Estimating these shares is important because they are indicative of taxation-related deadweight losses and influence public acceptance of the pension system. We also disentangle intragenerational from intergenerational transfers. Although our estimate of intragenerational transfers is smaller than recent semi-official estimations, such transfers create substantial deadweight losses. Intergenerational transfers are much larger, thereby contributing to strong negative participation incentives for the younger generation.
JEL classification : H 55; J 26     

农民工养老保险统筹收入再分配研究

农民工养老保险统筹收入再分配集中体现着养老保险全国统筹的缩小收入差距和有利于流动人口养老金异地接转两大主要功能。本文从收入再分配入手研究农民工养老保险全国统筹的合理性及实现路径,构建了农民工养老保险统筹收入再分配系数总模型和分系数模型,提出了农民工养老保险全国统筹“两类型”和“五方案”, 并对农民工养老保险统筹给付水平、收入再分配系数进行了定量分析,最后通过生存公平和劳动公平检验确定了替代率10%的中央统筹模式为现阶段农民工养老保险全国统筹起步最优方案,进而提出了具体政策建议。     

Crowding out and crowding in: When does redistribution improve risk-sharing in limited commitment economies?

When the risk of default constrains financial contracts, public insurance policies can significantly affect private risk-sharing. This is because by changing income expectations and volatility, redistribution changes the attractiveness of default and thus endogenous borrowing constraints. Extending results by Krueger and Perri (2011) [8], this paper analyses the conditions under which redistribution can improve private insurance by making default less attractive to the income-rich, whose income it reduces. I first explain why public redistribution typically crowds out private insurance in the two-income economy, and identify the role of income persistence and saving after default. Second, I show how, in endowment economies with three income states or more and in economies with capital, redistributive taxes can improve, or “crowd in”, private consumption insurance. Finally, in a quantitative exercise using a realistic income process calibrated to US micro-data, moderate redistribution crowds in private insurance with production but not in an endowment economy.     

我国基本养老保险扩面的收入分配效应研究

文章基于一般均衡分析框架,通过构建“统账结合”制基本养老保险的异质性跨期交叠一般均衡动态模型,引入国发〔2005〕38号文的主要内容,利用政策仿真、参数估值和敏感性检验等方法,重点研究了养老保险制度覆盖面扩展的收入分配和再分配效应,并进行了理论推导和实证测算。结果发现：（1）我国基本养老保险扩面具有明显的收入分配和再分配效应,且再分配效应是累进的,发生了从城镇企业职工为代表的高收入者向以灵活就业人员和农民工为代表的低收入者的收入转移;（2）个人账户发挥了平滑作用,有利于改善不同类型劳动者终生的收入分配,但不利于收入再分配的改善;（3）社会统筹账户具有较强的收入再分配效应,有利于改善不同类型劳动者的收入再分配,缩小收入差距。参数敏感性检验表明结论是稳健的。因此,进一步优化社会统筹账户有利于减小收入不平等。     

Social Security Reform with Heterogeneous Agents

This paper analyzes the quantitative role of idiosyncratic uncertainty in an economy in which rational agents vote on hypothetical social security reforms. We find that the role of a pay-as-you-go social security system as a partial insurance and redistribution device significantly reduces political support for a transition to an economy with a fully funded system. We conclude that the status quo bias in favor of an unfunded social security system is stronger in economies in which agents of similar age differ significantly with respect to labor earnings and wealth because of idiosyncratic income uncertainty. Journal of Economic Literature Classification Numbers: H55, E62, H3     

Social Insurance with In-kind Provision of Private Goods

This paper addresses the desirability of providing in-kind transfers as a screening device to facilitate redistribution of income from able to disabled persons within a social insurance system. An optimal policy—consisting of cash transfers, income-contingent in-kind transfers of one good particularly demanded by disabled workers, and linear taxation of other commodities—is characterized. It is then asked whether and, if so, when this policy can be replaced by an "earning-tested scheme" that provides the in-kind good only to those indivi duals who have no earnings from labor or by a non-linear pricing policy.     

Optimal Income Taxation with Risky Earnings: A Synthesis

We study optimal nonlinear income taxation when earnings can differ because of both ability and luck, so the income tax has both a redistributive role and an insurance role. A substantial literature on optimal redistribution in the absence of risk has evolved since Mirrlees's original contribution. The literature on the income tax as a social insurance device is more limited. It has largely assumed that households are ex ante identical so unequal earnings are due to risk alone. We provide a general treatment of the optimal income tax under risk when households differ in ability. We characterize optimal marginal tax rates and interpret them in terms of redistribution, insurance, and incentive effects. The case of ex ante identical households and the no‐risk case with heterogeneous abilities come out as special cases.     

POLICY UNCERTAINTY,ELECTORAL SECURITIES,AND REDISTRIBUTION*

This article investigates how uncertainty about the adoption of a redistribution policy affects political support for redistribution when individuals can trade policy‐contingent securities in the stock market. In equilibrium the support for redistribution is smaller than where no “policy‐insurance market” is available. This implies that in economies with well‐developed financial markets redistribution decreases with the level of participation in these markets and with income inequality. Furthermore, the existence of a policy‐insurance market may lead to a less equal distribution of income than where no insurance is available even if a majority of individuals are redistributing resources through private transfers.     

The politics of redistributive social insurance

This paper analyses the political support for a social insurance that includes elements of redistribution when there exists an imperfect private insurance alternative. Individuals differ both in their income and risk. The social insurance is compulsory and charges an income-related contribution with pooling of risks. The private insurance is voluntary and charges a contribution based on individual risks. However due to the adverse selection problem, private insurance companies provide only partial insurance. Adopting a non-expected utility model, we show that there is a general majority support for social insurance and that this support is increasing with risk aversion. We also show that a mixed insurance is politically impossible, regardless of the degree of redistribution of social insurance and the joint distribution of risk and income in the population. Lastly, we analyse how the political support for social insurance is affected by any change in its redistributive component and the possibility of using genetic tests.     

A framework for social security analysis

The public provision of pensions in the U.S. by means of the Social Security systems is examined relative to conventional arguments for public intervention. The system is analysed in terms of income redistribution, the provision of insurance where private markets are not efficient, and the compelling of saving by individuals.     

Redistribution and constitutional political economy

Economists since Pareto have sought to demonstrate that governmental redistribution to assist the poor increases overall welfare in society. This paper addresses the general issue of redistribution but focuses on two recent efforts to justify redistribution in the context of constitutional political economy. It is argued below that income insurance and other proposed rationale for redistribution overlook or minimize information and incentive problems endemic in all governmental programs to assist the poor. Two reasons for opposing legislated redistribution are discussed—the first rooted in pragmatic considerations, the other based on principle. The conclusions are twofold: (1) purported justifications for redistributive policies are inconsistent with methodological individualism, and (2) it is problematic as to whether imposing such an obligation on the public-at-large even at the constitutional level will improve the welfare of the poor and the non-poor.     

Does forced solidarity hamper investment in small and micro enterprises?

Summary: Previous research has shown that small firms in poor countries achieve high marginal returns to capital but show low reinvestment rates. We investigate whether transfers motivated by risk sharing and forced redistribution can explain this pattern and may therefore hamper private sector development. The idea is that the more redistribution distorts the fairness of insurance, the more potentially successful entrepreneurs may be hindered to undertake profitable investments. The empirical results based on a sample of small firms operating in Burkina Faso support the main propositions of this paper.     

Anarchy, efficiency, and redistribution

This paper develops a contractarian theory of the state and the existence of redistribution. The existence of rules of redistribution is explained without any recourse to the risk-aversion of agents. No veil of ignorance is needed. This avoids obligational problems inherent in most other contractarian theories of justice. Hence, this paper departs from the standard legitimization of redistribution as fundamental insurance and interprets it as stemming from a principle of reciprocity in trade. Since this paper deals with an anarchic society, the implementation of redistributional rules is constrained by the assumption of self-enforcement. We show that this assumption changes the interpretation of the state: the state is characterized by a particular design of equilibrium strategies, not by the existence of enforcement agencies.     

Optimal unemployment insurance and redistribution

We characterize optimal income taxation and unemployment insurance in a search‐matching framework where both voluntary and involuntary unemployment are endogenous and Nash bargaining determines wages. Individuals decide whether to participate as job seekers and if so, how much search effort to exert. Unemployment insurance trades off insurance versus search and participation incentives. We also allow for different productivity types so there is a redistributive role for the income tax and show that a piecewise linear wage tax internalizes the macro effects arising from endogenous wages. Type‐specific lump‐sum taxes and transfers can then redistribute between individuals of differing skills and employment states. Our analysis embeds optimal unemployment insurance into an extensive‐margin optimal redistribution framework where transfers to the involuntarily and voluntarily unemployed can differ, and nests several standard models in the literature.     

The redistributive roles of unemployment insurance and the dynamics of voting

Public unemployment insurance is analyzed as the majority voting equilibrium policy of a dynamic stochastic economy. Abstracting from incentive effects, we focus on redistribution. Some results are: because of the distribution of heterogeneous employment opportunities, public insurance may be democratically chosen even if complete private markets exist: and because of the dynamics, even when agents are intrinsically homogeneous, the equilibrium benefit level (or duration-benefit schedule) deviates from what has been described as optimal in the literature. The effects of differences in the average frequency or duration of unemployment on equilibrium taxes and benefits are investigated, with some unanticipated results.     

A SAVINGS SUBSIDISATION SYSTEM IN A MODEL OF ENDOGENOUS FERTILITY AND ENDOGENOUS GROWTH: AN EXTENSION OF WIGGER (1999)

Population ageing is now an established demographic characteristic of many economies. Economists working in the endogenous growth theory tradition have sought to model the relationship between public pensions, financed on a 'Pay-As-You-Go' basis, and the growth in per capita incomes. The resultant intergenerational wealth redistribution from young to older people seems to decrease private savings, diminish capital accumulation, and lower the growth of per capita incomes. The underlying transmission mechanism appears to be a crowding out effect in private capital markets contingent upon the introduction of public pension systems. A growing literature exists on the interrelationships between public pension schemes, fertility rates and endogenous growth. Following Wigger's (1999) pioneering overlapping generations endogenous growth model, we extend this model to examine the effects of a savings subsidisation system on the rate of per capita income growth, fertility and voluntary intrafamily wealth transfers, where parents view children both as an insurance good and a consumption good. Moreover, children care about the consumption levels of their parents. An increase in contributions to a savings subsidised public pension scheme will crowd out private intergenerational transfers from the young to the old and thereby negate the usefulness of children as an insurance good.     

THE INCOME REDISTRIBUTION EFFECT OF CHINA'S PERSONAL INCOME TAX: WHAT THE MICRO‐DATA SAY

This article uses continuous micro‐level data to investigate the income redistribution effect of the personal income tax (PIT) in China beginning in 1997. We find that the average tax rate plays a larger role in determining the income redistribution effect of PIT than tax progressivity does. Although tax progressivity decreased as a result of rising personal incomes and a constant PIT policy prior to 2005, the income redistribution effect of the PIT improved as a result of the higher average tax rate. The tax reform beginning in 2006 increased tax progressivity while decreasing the average tax rate, thereby weakening the income redistribution effect of the PIT. Further analysis indicates that the middle‐income group was the only net loser before 2005, but it benefited from the PIT policy reform. A cross‐country comparison shows that China has a lower PIT burden and higher progressivity than developed countries; in fact, China's levels of progressivity and tax burden are similar to those of Latin American countries. (JEL H24, D31, H31)     

Equilibrium taxation and experience rating in a federal system of unemployment insurance

This paper seeks to explain why there is apparent redistribution of tax burdens in UI systems from high to low unemployment firms. In addition to providing reasons for the direction taken by redistribution, the model interprets the accompanying institution of imperfect experience rating, defined as the practice of taxing firms by less than a dollar for every dollar of benefits paid a firm's employees. The null hypothesis views the design of the UI tax as the result of intentional redistribution of economic rents between industries. Concluding sections explore the limitations on redistribution imposed by a federal system and discuss alternative explanations for the design of the UI laws. Empirical evidence is provided on the redistributive hypothesis, which generally receives strong support.