Market power, survival and accuracy of predictions in financial markets

In a standard General Equilibrium framework, we consider an agent strategically using her large volume of trade to influence asset prices to increase her consumption. We show that, as in Sandroni (Econometrica 68:1303–1341, 2000) for the competitive case, if markets are dynamically complete and some general conditions on market preferences are met then this agent’ long-run consumption will vanish if she makes less accurate predictions than the market, and will maintain her market power otherwise. We thus argue that the Market Selection Hypothesis extends to this situation of market power, in contrast to Alchian (J Pol Econ 58:211–221, 1950) and Friedman (Essays in Positive Economics, University of Chicago Press, Chicago, 1953) who claimed that this selection was solely driven by the competitiveness of markets. I would like to thank T. Hens, A. Kirman and A. Sandroni for many stimulating conversations and encouragements. Two anonymous referees also provided very valuable comments.     

Endogenous Land use and the Ricardian Valuation of Climate Change

The Ricardian technique uses cross-sectional variation in the capitalized value of climate in land to infer the agricultural costs or benefits of dynamic climate change. While a practical approach for predicting the consequences of global warming with readily available data, it may yield biased results when land-use decisions depend on the climate attributes being valued and when land has unobserved attributes that differ with the use to which it is put. This paper illustrates the conditions under which such a bias will occur, describes an empirical model that corrects for it, and estimates that model with agricultural census data from Brazil. The approach, moreover, allows constraints on adjustment to be explicitly incorporated into the Ricardian framework, relaxing one of that technique’s most conspicuous assumptions. I would like to thank Patrick Bayer, Steven Berry, Robert Evenson, Michael Hanemann, Robert Mendelsohn, Bill Nordhaus, Kerry Smith, Karl Storchmann, two anonymous referees, and seminar participants at the University of California – Santa Barbara and the Research Triangle Institute for their useful insights and helpful comments. All remaining errors and omissions are my own. Fabiana Tito provided excellent research assistance, and Denisard Alves and Robert Evenson generously supplied the data.     

An Inframarginal Analysis of the Ricardian Model

This paper shows that a 2 × 2 Ricardian model has a unique general equilibrium, and the comparative statics of the equilibrium involve discontinuous jumps. If partial division of labor occurs in equilibrium, the country producing both goods would impose a tariff, whereas the country producing a single good would prefer unilateral free trade. If complete division of labor occurs in equilibrium, both countries would negotiate to achieve free trade. In a model with three countries, the country which does not have a comparative advantage relative to the other two countries, and/or which has low transaction efficiency, may be excluded from trade.     

Division of Labor and Endogenous Comparative Advantage: A Smith–Ricardian Model of International Trade

This paper develops a Smith–Ricardian model that incorporates division of labor into the continuum‐good Ricardian model of Dornbusch et al. (1977 ). The tradeoff between the efficiency gain and coordination cost in production determines the efficient level of division of labor. Consequently, the traditional comparative advantage becomes endogenous. The model is able to explain how the recent progress in information technology (IT) would affect the efficient level of division of labor and competitive margin. In particular, we show that absolute advantage in division of labor and relative labor supply play a crucial role in determining the different effects of universal IT progress on a country's competitive margin in international trade.     

Are the antiglobalists right? Gains-from-trade without a Walrasian auctioneer

We show that the “fear” of globalisation can be rationalised by economic theory in the standard AD/AS equilibrium model, if we substitute the coordinational role of the Auctioneer by an implementation device based on learning (Guesnerie in Am Econ Rev 82, 1254–1278, 1992). When endowing producers with a learning ability to forecast market prices, individual profit-maximizing production decisions become interdependent in a strategic sense (strategic substitutes). Performing basic comparative statics exercises, we show that “competitiveness” matters in a precise sense: as foreign producers gain access to the home market, home producers’ ability to forecast market prices is undermined, so being their ability to forecast the profit consequences of their production decisions. A standard open economy exercise shows that the efficiency gains triggered by increased competition have to be traded-off against higher uncertainty (a lower likelihood to coordinate upon the welfare enhancing free-trade equilibrium). We interpret it as a new rationale for the existence of barriers to trade targeting coordination, rather than protecting mere inefficient sectors or industries (political economy driven). Finally, we show that classical measures evaluating ex-ante the desirability of economic integration (net welfare gains) do not always advice free trade. I wish to specially thank Roger Guesnerie, Thierry Verdier and an anonymous referee for their helpful suggestions. Comments by Facundo Albornoz, Pol Antràs, Gregory Corcos, Maurice Kugler, Robin Mason, Victor Norman, Emmanuel Ornelas and Susanna Thede are sincerely acknowledged. Audiences at the U. of Alicante, U. Autonoma de Barcelona, ETSG 2005 (Dublin), FGV-EPGE (RJ, Brazil), LACEA 2005 (Paris), the Miwest Trade Meeting at Minneapolis 2007, the Norwegian School of Economics (NHH), SBE 2005 (Natal, Brazil), U. of Southampton and T2M 2005 are acknowledged. The contents constitute chapter 4 of my PSE-EHESS PhD thesis, extended while I visited the NYU Economics department, sponsored by A. Bisin. Financial support from the Bank of Spain and CNRS is sincerely acknowledged.     

Ricardian productivity differences and the gains from trade

This paper evaluates the role of sectoral heterogeneity in determining the gains from trade. We first show analytically that in the presence of sectoral Ricardian comparative advantage, a one-sector sufficient statistic formula that uses total trade volumes as a share of total absorption systematically understates the true gains from trade. Greater relative sectoral productivity differences lead to larger disparities between the gains implied by the one-sector formula and the true gains. Using data on overall and sectoral trade shares in a sample of 79 countries and 19 sectors we show that the multi-sector formula implies on average 30% higher gains from trade than the one-sector formula, and as much as 100% higher gains for some countries. We then set up and estimate a quantitative Ricardian–Heckscher–Ohlin model in which no version of the formula applies exactly, and compare a range of sufficient statistic formulas to the true gains in this model. Confirming the earlier results, formulas that do not take into account the sectoral heterogeneity understate the true gains from trade in the model by as much as two-thirds. The one-sector formulas understate the gains by more in countries with greater dispersion in sectoral productivities.     

International Integration and Growth: A Further Investigation on Developing Countries

The paper examines empirically the linkages between international integration and economic growth in a panel of 47 developing countries and 18 trade blocs over the period 1970–1989. Specifically, it attempts to identify through which channel(s) – notably, specialization according to comparative advantage and increased efficiency, exploitation of increasing returns from larger market, and technology spillovers through investment and trade–trade blocs can affect the economic growth of their member countries. The results suggest that (1) intra-bloc trade does not affect growth significantly; (2) income diversion among member countries contributes positively and significantly to growth; and (3) the size of the trade bloc does matter in the sense that the bigger is not always the better for the welfare of the member countries.     

FDI Liberalization as a Source of Comparative Advantage in China

Two features of China's trade patterns suggest that elements beyond factor abundance explain its export performance. The high penetration in world markets of labor-intensive products has been accompanied by: (i) a high share in exports of productivity-advanced foreign-invested enterprises (FIEs) and (ii) a high penetration of FIEs in labor-intensive sectors. We show that FDI liberalization endogenously introduces Ricardian features to an otherwise standard endowment-based trade model, strengthening China's natural comparative advantage in labor-intensive products. We discuss how capital accumulation, productivity growth, rural–urban migration, incentives for foreign investment, and distortions in financial markets affect this bias.     

Classical Ricardian Theory of Comparative Advantage Revisited

According to the classical Ricardian theory of comparative advantage, relative labor productivities determine trade patterns. The Ricardian model plays an important pedagogical role in international economics, but has received scant empirical attention since the 1960s. This paper assesses the contemporary relevance of the Ricardian model for US trade. Cross-section seemingly unrelated regressions of sectoral trade flows on relative labor productivity and unit labor costs are run for a number of countries vis-à-vis the United States. The coefficients are almost always correctly signed and statistically significant, although much of the sectoral variation of trade remains unexplained.     

Sunspot Fluctuations in Two-sector Economies with Heterogeneous Agents

We study a two-sector model with heterogeneous agents and borrowing constraint on labor income. We show that the relative capital intensity difference across sectors is crucial for the conditions required to get indeterminacy and endogenous fluctuations. The main result shows that when the consumption good is sufficiently capital intensive, local indeterminacy arises while the elasticities of capital–labor substitution in both sectors are slightly greater than unity and the elasticity of the offer curve is low enough. Locally indeterminate equilibria are thus compatible with a low elasticity of intertemporal substitution in consumption and a low elasticity of the labor supply. As recently shown in empirical analysis, these conditions appear to be in accordance with macroeconomic evidences. We would like to thank R. Becker, J.P. Drugeon and an anonymous referee for useful comments and suggestions. The current version also benefited from a presentation at the conference “Public Economic Theory 04”, Beijing, August 2004.     

自然开放度、政策导向开放度与劳动生产率提升——理论和基于中国省际面板数据的实证研究

本文以李嘉图模型为基础,分析了贸易开放对提升中国劳动生产率的效应。本文使用1994-2005年间中国省际面板数据,就贸易开放对提升中国劳动生产率水平所产生的效应进行了实证研究。本文得出两个重要的分析结果:第一,贸易开放可以通过比较优势来确定一国专业化产品的生产,如果一国的比较优势存在于干中学系数较大的部门,贸易开放将提高劳动生产率;但若一国的比较优势存在于干中学系数较小的部门,贸易开放将降低劳动生产率;第二,本文将贸易开放度分解为自然开放度和政策导向开放度,结果发现,当自然开放度较小时,政策导向开放度的增加将降低劳动生产率;当自然开放度较大时,政策开放度的增加将提高劳动生产率水平。     

Evaluating currency crises: the case of the European monetary system

In this paper we examine the nature of currency crises. We ascertain whether the currency crises of the European Monetary System (EMS) were based either on fundamentals, or on self-fulfilling market expectations driven by extrinsic uncertainty. In particular, we extend previous work of Jeanne and Masson (J Int Econ 50:327–350, 2000) regarding the evaluation of currency crisis. We contribute to the existing literature proposing the use of Markov regime-switching with time-varying transition probability model. Our empirical results suggest that the currency crises of the EMS were not due only to market expectations driven by external uncertainty, or ‘sunspots’, but also to fundamental variables that help to explain the behavior of market expectations. We would like to thank Joseph Byrne, James Mitchell, Martin Weale and two anonymous referees for very useful comments and suggestions.     

Distributional assumptions and a test of the dual labor market hypothesis

Recent application of the switching regression model to allocate workers into the primary and secondary labor markets is considered to be the best solution to the classification problem of the empirical testing of the dual labor market theory. In such models, normality of the error terms is assumed. This paper adopts the switching regression model to test the dual labor market theory by assuming different distributions of the error terms. The test results strongly support the dual labor market theory regardless of the assumption one makes about the error terms. However, the results indicate that different distribution can lead to different percentage distributions of workers in the two segments. In particular, the normal distribution generates more workers in the primary segment than the non-normal distributions. Therefore, care must be taken not to generalize the type of industries or occupations that fall under the primary and secondary segments. First version received: October 2000/Final version received: March 2002 RID="*" ID="*"  I would like to thank Kevin Lang, Robert Marshall, and two anonymous referees for their helpful comments. I am grateful for comments received from the session participants of the Western Economic Association International Conference, San Francisco, CA, June 28–July 2, 1996, and the Midwest Economic Association Conference, Kansas City, 1997. I thank George Bonney, the Chief Statistician of Fox Chase Cancer Center, Philadelphia for his comments. Any remaining errors are my responsibility. I gratefully acknowledge financial support from Penn State Research and Development Grant, 1995.     

Predicting the pattern of international trade in the neoclassical model: a synthesis

I propose a framework that takes a set of conceivable outcomes as the primitive and a prediction is defined by identifying a subset on the set of conceivable outcomes. This notion of predictability serves as an organizing principle for characterizing pattern of trade predictions in single economy and integrated equilibrium formulations of the neoclassical trade model. I identify allocative efficiency as the unifying subset selection criterion for the different formulations of the neoclassical trade model, ranging from Ricardo’s (in Principles of Political Economy and Taxation, reprinted by J. M. Dent, London, in Everyman’s library, 1817) original comparative advantage formulation to the multi-cone Heckscher–Ohlin specification with multiple countries, goods and factors. I am grateful to comments from Jim Anderson, Chris Starmer, Catia Montagna, Peter Neary, two anonymous referees, as well as participants at the June 2007 GEP Conference on ‘New Directions in International Trade Theory’. I am grateful for financial support from NSF research grant SES-0452991 and from Leverhulme Trust Programme grant F114/BF.     

Neoliberalism as an asocial ideology and strategy in education

There have been many neoliberal education reforms around the world. At the bottom line, those reforms are intended to modify the education system based upon market principles. Reviewing and contrasting various perspectives on education (Adam Smith, Marxists, Veblen, Dewey, and neoclassicists), I argue that: 1) neoliberalism is an asocial ideology of the ruling class in the capitalist system, 2) neoliberalism justifies and propagates market principles in education, 3) there is a discontinuity between classical liberalism and neoliberalism, and 4) when it comes to Korean education reforms, neoliberalism has two contradictions and counter-movements which hinder the realization of market principles in education. I dedicate this paper to the late Dr. William D. Williams (1945–2004), for his encouragement and inspiration. I would also like to thank John F. Henry, Frederic S. Lee, James I. Sturgeon, and Douglas M. Meader for their throught-provoking comments. Final responsibility rests with the author.     

A Neo-Heckscher–Ohlin Model of Trade with Endogenous Production Patterns*

We propose a Neo-Heckscher–Ohlin (HO) model of trade that combines comparative endowment advantage, comparative technological advantage, international capital mobility and trade costs. Using an inframarginal approach, we produce a partition of the exogenous parameter space in a host of parameter value subsets that demarcate the various equilibrium patterns of production and trade. The results are startling! They suggest that production within the diversification cone – a key assumption of the Heckscher–Ohlin theory that is required for its core propositions (such as factor price equalisation) to hold – may only prevail on the razor's edge, or under exceptional circumstances. In addition, our findings nominate a mechanism by which improvements in transaction efficiency facilitate international trade thereby stimulating cross-country division of labour. Contrary to other generalisations of the Heckscher–Ohlin (such as the various derivatives of the Kemp–Jones model of trade), our model does not assume a purely Ricardian character: comparative endowment advantage may determine the pattern of trade even in the presence of opposing technological differences, as long as total factor productivity coefficients adjusted for transaction efficiency and factor intensity do not confer unambiguous comparative (technological) advantage. Still, ‘intensity-efficiency’-adjusted comparative technological advantage supersedes factor endowments in determining the flow of trade.     

Advantages of backwardness and forwardness with shifting comparative advantage

This paper develops a multi-sector endogenous innovation model that is able to account for the dynamics of comparative advantage of each sector within the economy. The model in this paper assumes that two kinds of learning effects exist in R&D: advantages of backwardness and forwardness. It is shown that if the economy is divided into advanced and backward sectors, in the latter sectors, the advantage of backwardness dominates, leading to cyclic repetition of comparative advantage. However, in the former sectors, the advantage of forwardness becomes more significant, so comparative advantage among these sectors stabilizes. Thus, the direction of learning spillovers has a critical effect on the dynamics of comparative advantage. Given this result, it is shown that only R&D policies for the marginal sector are effective in facilitating economic growth. If a decision is made to facilitate R&D investment within advanced sectors, R&D taxes, rather than subsidies, should be imposed on this marginal sector. Moreover, it is shown that trade liberalization does not affect the intrinsic dynamics of comparative advantage among surviving sectors in the economy if the locus of this marginal sector does not change significantly after trade liberalization.     

Industrial subsidy policy and the optimal level of specialization

Despite compelling rationale based on the theory of comparative advantage for free trade, many countries adopt restrictive trade practices. In this paper we investigate this puzzle in a stylized two-country two-good Ricardian model of international trade. Governments can offer protection to domestic industries via industrial subsidy policy in this model. We prove the existence of a Nash equilibrium in the two-player game where industries choose the level of specialization. We determine the necessary conditions for complete specialization in (a) the free-trade regime; and (b) the protectionist regime implemented through industrial subsidy policy. Our results show that if the government intends to promote complete specialization, then a high degree of comparative advantage and a large elasticity of substitution between export and import goods are required. Empirical evidence on these two parameters indicate that complete specialization is unlikely to survive in the protectionist regime.     

Labour Market Regulations and the Sectoral Reallocation of Workers: The Case of Trade Reforms

In this paper I highlight the importance of incorporating the institutional features of local labour markets into the analysis of trade reforms. A trade reform is often deemed beneficial because the elimination of trade barriers allows labour to reallocate towards those sectors in the economy in which the country has a comparative advantage. The amount and speed of the reallocation, however, and the post-reform behaviour of output, productivity and welfare, will depend on how regulated the labour market is. First, I document that high firing costs slow down the intersectoral reallocation of labour after a trade reform. Second, in order to isolate the effect of firing costs on labour reallocation, output and welfare after a trade reform, I build a dynamic general equilibrium model. I find that if a country does not liberalize its labour market at the outset of its trade reform, the intersectoral reallocation of workers will be 30% slower, and as much as 30% of the gains in real output and labour productivity in the years following the trade reform will be lost. From a policy standpoint, the message is that while trade reforms are desirable, they need to be complemented by labour market reforms in order to be fully successful.     

Product Market Integration and Heterogeneity—Rent Sharing and Pricing to Market

International product market integration makes market penetration easier and therefore creates both export opportunities and import threats. This changes the competitive position of firms and is associated with changes in trade, production, and specialization structures. The gains and losses in this process are unlikely to be equally shared due to heterogeneity across firms/sectors. In a Ricardian trade model with heterogeneity across firms, we find “pricing to market”—effects not only for exports, but also for pricing in the domestic market even for nontradables. Rents to be shared in wage bargaining differ across tradables and nontradables. It is shown that lower trade frictions affect the scope for “pricing to market” and cause wages to become more closely driven by (relative) productivity. Labor market prospects tend not to improve for low wage jobs, and not to deteriorate for high wage jobs.