Interregional Income Redistribution and Convergence in a Model with Perfect Capital Mobility and Unionized Labor Markets

The model presents a general equilibrium dynamic model of an economy consisting of many regions. Capital is perfectly mobile and labor is immobile across regions. Wages are determined by local unions. There is training on the job and strategic complementarity between investment in physical capital by firms and investment in becoming “trainable’’ by workers. Structurally similar regional economies preserve forever their differences in per capita output and employment rate, if the workers’ non-labor income is equalized across regions by interregional income redistribution operated via central budget. Regional decentralization of income redistribution allows convergence in per capita output and employment rate.     

Economic consequences of firms’ depreciation method choice: Evidence from capital investments

This study identifies several interrelated reasons why firms’ depreciation method choice is likely to influence managers’ capital investment decisions. We find that firms that use accelerated depreciation make significantly larger capital investments than firms that use straight-line depreciation. Further, we find that there has been a migration away from accelerated depreciation to straight-line depreciation over the past two decades. Firms that make such accounting changes make smaller capital investments in the post-change periods than in the pre-change periods. These results suggest that a choice made for external financial reporting purposes influences managers’ capital investment decisions.     

The impact of foreign board membership on firm value

This study examines the effect of foreign (Anglo-American) board membership on corporate performance measured in terms of firm value (Tobin’s Q). Using a sample of firms with headquarters in Norway or Sweden the study indicates a significantly higher value for firms that have outsider Anglo-American board member(s), after a variety of firm-specific and corporate governance related factors have been controlled for. We argue that this superior performance reflects the fact that these companies have successfully broken away from a partly segmented domestic capital market by “importing” an Anglo-American corporate governance system. Such an “import” signals a willingness on the part of the firm to expose itself to improved corporate governance and enhances its reputation in the financial market.     

Multinationals do it better: Evidence on the efficiency of corporations' capital budgeting

With U.S. multinational enterprises playing increasingly important roles in the global economy, it is important to understand the efficiency of their capital budgeting decisions. We examine an unbalanced panel of 332 U.S. firms from 1992–2000. Using the deviation of a firm's estimated marginal Tobin's q from a benchmark as an indicator of effective resource allocation, we find that widespread multinationals make more efficient capital budgeting decisions. We also test whether this reflects the MNEs' investment locations, but do not obtain support for the hypotheses that they might be monitored by more agents or more successfully resist pressures from interest groups and governments.     

Corporate capital budgeting and CEO turnover

When a firm has minimal agency and informational asymmetry problems it should make efficient capital budgeting decisions. Many firms over-invest prior to CEO turnover, halt investments in the period surrounding the turnover, and then greatly increase their level of expenditures. Empirical analysis of the cross-sectional and inter-temporal variation in the quality of firms' corporate capital budgeting decision reveals that the impact of CEO turnover is asymmetric between under- and over-investing firms, and this complements the larger literature using average firm-wide performance measures. Firms are more likely to have forced turnovers when there is more over-investment prior to the turnover, and these firms make more efficient investment decisions subsequently. Board influence is largely insignificant prior to a CEO turnover but is consistently associated with higher levels of investment subsequently.     

The accounting of interpretations and the interpretation of accounts: The communicative function of “the language of business”

The objectivistic philosophical assumptions which underlie contemporary research in accountancy, as well as economics and elsewhere, are challenged and an interpretive alternative is proposed. A “hermeneutical” view of decision-making is examined, first with regard to science in general, and then concerning the human sciences in particular, and finally with regard to economics. Human decisions are not seen as objective, mechanical or behavioristic but as meaningful utterances of minds, as part of a bidirectional communicative process. That is, scientific decisions, like everyday decisions, are mutually interpretive processes of communication in language. Although it is true that much of mainstream neoclassical economics is incompatible with this interpretive approach, the “Austrian” school can be seen as an interpretive version of neoclassicism. This school of economics indicates a way to understand the communicative function the accounting “language” itself serves in the economic process. The professional judgments made by both accounting researchers and practicing accountants, then, are treated as “matters of interpretation,” but as not, thereby, arbitrary.     

Capital Structure, Information Acquisition and Investment Decisions in an Industry Framework

This paper analyzes the relationship between a firm's capital structure and its information acquisition prior to capital budgeting decisions. It is found that low-growth industries can sustain a large number of levered firms. In these industries, leverage is negatively related to a firm's incentive to acquire information during the capital budgeting process. In contrast, high-growth industries only sustain a small number of levered firms. In these industries, levered firms acquire more information than all-equity financed firms. The model yields empirical predictions regarding the effects of leverage on the expected amount and the volatility of corporate investment. While leverage does not affect firm value, highly levered firms generate a more volatile cash flow than firms with low debt levels.     

Financial instruments with sports betting components: Marketing gimmick or a domain for behavioral finance?

We examine theoretically and experimentally a certain class of new financial instruments which are designed as lotteries on the outcome of prominent sports events like the Soccer World Cup 2006. From a theoretical point of view, sports betting products may be superior to a fixed rate investment because of heterogeneous expectations, risk-loving behavior of investors or additional non-monetary utility components. In comparison to the direct placement of bets at bookmakers’, sports betting products may be preferable in cases of hedonic framing. Our experimental section, however, reveals the limited practical relevance of these theoretical arguments for “average” decision makers. Despite this, financial instruments with sports betting components offer a certain profit potential due to the diversity of preferences across individuals. Summarizing, the issuance of sports betting products may actually be mainly driven by marketing aspects, nevertheless sports betting products may be considered to be “viable” niche products with low cost of capital for banks.     

Last resort gambles, risky debt and liquidation policy

This paper develops a real option model in which the interaction between debt, liquidation policy and risky investments is studied. We consider a manager who owns the firm and faces the opportunity to invest in risky projects which may boost current profits at the cost of bankruptcy if they turn out to be unsuccessful. These investments are “last resort gambles” in the sense that, if successful, they save the company from insolvency, while, if unsuccessful, they make liquidation unavoidable. It is shown that last resort gambles delay liquidation. We study how the liquidation trigger and the last resort investment decisions are affected by the firm's capital structure.     

On the role of sunk costs and asset specificity in outsourcing decisions: a research note

The accounting literature has argued that firms overengage in outsourcing because they tend to ignore the transaction costs involved in buying services from external suppliers. A field experiment with managers of health care organizations shows that decision makers are actually quite sensitive to the asset specificity associated with the “buy” option in an outsourcing decision. However, they also appear inappropriately sensitive to the sunk costs inherent in most real-life outsourcing decisions, and may actually underengage in outsourcing. Prior commitment to internal procurement systematically reduced the willingness to outsource, relative to a pure “make or buy” scenario.     

Discourses of transparency in the intellectual capital reporting debate: Moving from generic reporting models to management defined information

In the last decade, transparency has become a necessary mantra for both publicly listed companies and government institutions. Intellectual capital reporting is often related to this goal of enhancing the transparency of business and public institutions. In this paper we emphasize that a movement is seen in the intellectual capital reporting debate, which we argue can be approached as two different discourses of transparency, namely one discourse based on generic reporting versus a second discourse based on management driven information. In other words, one discourse highlights as much information to stakeholders as possible, but seems to be in the process of being substituted by another, which emphasizes reporting what is seen from the perspective of management, namely the “right” information, and only that. The argument for the latter discourse is that it will make intellectual capital reporting more transparent, because of users’ bounded rationality and other constraints such as time. This, however, has the implication that users of intellectual capital reporting may become victims of management's selected “right” information, by [Strathern, M. The tyranny of transparency. British Educational Research Journal 2000;26:310–32] designated as the “tyranny of transparency”. Also, we emphasize the problems of perceiving transparency as a goal and not a means.     

Information Uncertainty and Expected Returns

This study examines the role of information uncertainty (IU) in predicting cross-sectional stock returns. We define IU in terms of “value ambiguity,” or the precision with which firm value can be estimated by knowledgeable investors at reasonable cost. Using several different proxies for IU, we show that (1) on average, high-IU firms earn lower future returns (the “mean” effect), and (2) price and earnings momentum effects are much stronger among high-IU firms (the “interaction” effect). These findings are consistent with analytical models in which high IU exacerbates investor overconfidence and limits rational arbitrage.This revised version was published online in August 2005 with a corrected cover date.     

Do financial factors affect the capital–labour ratio? Evidence from UK firm-level data

This paper analyses how firms’ capital–labour ratio is affected by cash flow, leverage, and collateral, and how this effect differs at firms more and less likely to face financing constraints using a rich UK firm-level data set. It is common in the literature to examine the impact of financial constraints on hiring and firing decisions separately from their impact on decisions related to investment in physical capital. We argue that as long as firms use both inputs in production and there is some substitutability between them, the two decisions need to be jointly analysed. When we differentiate across firms that are more or less financially constrained, we find that the former group exhibits higher sensitivities of the capital–labour ratio to firm-specific characteristics compared to the latter.     

The recognition and measurement guidelines of FASB concepts no. 5

In making recognition and measurement decisions, accountants often encounter complex and controversial issues. They must decide what events to record, when to record the events, and how to properly measure the financial effects. A framework that could provide guidance for those difficult decisions would be helpful.In 1984 the FASB issued Statement of Financial Accounting Concepts No. 5 (SFAC No. 5) titled “Recognition and Measurement in Financial Statements of Business Enterprises” to meet this need for guidance. The document bears special significance because it may be the “end of the line,” representing the culmination of the efforts of the FASB to develop a theoretical basis for accounting [Kirk, 1984, p. 20]. In this article we review the recognition criteria established in SFAC No. 5 and present a flowchart that may be helpful to accounting educators as a portrayal of those criteria. The article also may be useful in classroom discussions of theory formulation since it indicates that the adoption of SFAC No. 5 took into consideration the diverse views of accountants, statement users, and reporting firms.     

Incentive effects of bonus depreciation

This study examines the effect on capital expenditures of “bonus depreciation,” which was intended to stimulate such spending by allowing businesses to immediately expense a portion of the cost of qualified capital expenditures from late 2001 through 2004. After controlling for many previously documented determinants of capital expenditures, some of our results indicate that capital expenditures during bonus depreciation’s availability were greater than those during the time it was not available, consistent with the expected effect. However, other results indicate that bonus depreciation had an insignificant effect on capital expenditures. These mixed findings generally persist through several sensitivity analyses. We interpret these results as weakly supportive evidence that Congress attained its goal of stimulating capital spending.     

On the role of the organization in auditors’ client-acceptance decisions

The objective of this research is to better understand the role that the accounting firm organization plays when auditors make difficult client-acceptance decisions in the midst of conflicting influences—specifically between the professional and commercial “logics of action”. The investigation was conducted via a field study at three Big Six firms located in Canada. The main argument that is developed in the paper is that the firm sets the stage for auditors’ decision-making by making its formal organizational components (e.g., the firm's partner-compensation scheme and decision-making policies) more reflective of one of the two logics, thereby establishing and helping reproduce certain patterns of order and consistency within the firm. However, the firm's organizational components are also to some extent reflective of the other logic, thereby providing decision-makers with a legitimizing space to influence the decision process differently. I present fieldwork data that is consistent with the paper's argument.     

Race to the top or bottom? Corporate governance,freedom of reincorporation and competition in law

Summary This paper investigates the governance structure choices of firms when there is competition between legal systems. We study the impact of the allocation of control over choice of governance and reincorporation on firms’ technologies and technological specialization of countries in the context of a model of the firm in which there are agency conflicts between shareholders and managers. We show that the allocation of control over firms’ reincorporation decisions determines the corporate governance choice ex ante and the outcome of the competition between legal regimes ex post. When managers have control over reincorporation then competitive deregulation and “runs to the bottom” ensue. When shareholders have partial or full control then there is diversity in governance structures. Runs to the bottom are not necessarily socially undesirable but they have a feedback effect on firms’ choices of technologies that may make the party in control worse off ex ante. We show that it is impossible for any country to achieve social welfare maximization of its existing and new enterprises. With competition between legal regimes, start-up and mature companies incorporate in different jurisdictions even when reincorporation is correctly anticipated.     

Towards an understanding of the phases of goodwill accounting in four Western capitalist countries: From stakeholder model to shareholder model

The objective of this paper is to illustrate that the change in shareholders’ attitude towards firms (from stakeholder model to shareholder model) influences the accounting treatments of goodwill. Our study is based on four countries (Great Britain, the United States, Germany, and France) and covers more than a century, starting in 1880. We explain that all these countries have gone through four identified phases of goodwill accounting, classified as (1) “static” (immediate or rapid expensing), (2) “weakened static” (write-off against equity), (3) “dynamic” (recognition with amortization over a long period) and (4) “actuarial” (recognition without amortization but with impairment if necessary). We contribute several new features to the existing literature on goodwill: our study (1) is international and comparative, (2) spans more than a century, (3) uses the stakeholder/shareholder models to explain the evolution in goodwill treatment in the four countries studied. More precisely, it relates a balance sheet theory, which distinguishes four phases in accounting treatment for goodwill, to the shift from a stakeholder model to a shareholder model, which leads to the preference for short-term rather than long-term profit, (4) contributes to the debate on whether accounting rules simply reflect or arguably help to produce the general trend towards the shareholder model, (5) demonstrates a “one-way” evolution of goodwill treatment in the four countries studied, towards the actuarial phase.     

Intertemporal capital budgeting

This paper analyzes the optimal capital budgeting mechanism when divisional managers are privately informed about the arrival of future investment projects. Consistent with field study evidence, an optimal allocation mechanism can include a stipulation that a capital request for discretionary investment will be declined with positive probability in the period after a significant investment was made even though this is ex post suboptimal. The model derives a number of empirical predictions regarding capital budgeting and the investment of financially constrained firms.