Assessing the Performance of Business Unit Managers

Using a sample of 140 managers, we investigate the use of various performance metrics in determining the periodic assessment, bonus decisions, and career paths of business unit managers. We show that the weight on accounting return measures is associated with the authority of these managers, and we document that both disaggregated measures (expenses and revenues), and nonfinancial measures play a greater role as interdependencies between business units increase. The results suggest separate and distinct roles for different types of performance measures. Accounting return measures are used to create the proper incentives for managers with greater authority, while disaggregated and nonfinancial measures are employed in response to interdependencies.     

STRATEGIC PERFORMANCE MEASUREMENT SYSTEMS: TRANSLATING STRATEGY INTO RESULTS

A large and growing number of companies worldwide are adopting strategic performance measurement (SPM) systems to help them execute their business strategies. SPM systems use some combination of financial, strategic, and operating measures to evaluate management's success in improving operating efficiency and adding value for shareholders. In many cases, the SPMs also provide the primary basis for rewarding top management, divisional operating managers, and, increasingly, rank‐and‐file employees. Some SPM systems are based entirely on a financial measure like economic value added (or EVA), which encourages managers to consider the opportunity cost of investor capital in making all operating and investment decisions. Other systems are based heavily on nonfinancial considerations, such as the balanced scorecard's emphasis on customer and employee satisfaction, operational excellence, and new product introduction. In this article, the author uses the findings of his recent survey of 113 North American and European companies to shed light on a number of questions: What are the most popular measures in such systems—are they primarily financial, nonfinancial, or amix of the two? To what extent is incentive compensation tied to such measures—and how far down in the organization are such measures (and incentives) extended? What are the most formidable challenges to implementing SPM systems in large corporations, with often diverse collections of businesses and tens if not hundreds of thousands of employees? Among the article's most notable conclusions, a majority of companies expect in the next three years to publish SPM targets and results in their annual reports. The most commonly cited financial SPMs will be cash flow, return on capital employed, and other variations of EVA. The most frequently cited nonfinancial SPMs are customer satisfaction, market share, and new product development. The greatest challenge in implementing SPMs is translating the vision and strategic objectives at the corporate level into performance measures that are relevant to activities at the business unit level, and securing buy‐in from business unit managers and employees.     

Managers' Choices of Performance Measures in Promotion Decisions: An Analysis of Alternative Job Assignments

In this study, we investigate the choice of performance measures in promotion decisions. In particular, we examine the extent to which managers incorporate different performance measures for different types of job assignment. Based on a simple theoretical framework, we predict that, in making promotion decisions, the weight on current job performance decreases with increases in the change in tasks upon promotion, while the weight on subjective assessments of ability increases. This result basically follows from the premise that, with increased changes in tasks between hierarchical levels, the ability to master the current job says little about the ability needed in the next job, which makes current job performance less informative and increases the emphasis on subjective assessments. Using panel data of a retail bank, we find that individual managers behave according to our predictions. By examining the choice of performance measures in promotion decisions, we are able to provide unique insights into the incentive versus sorting roles of promotions, which has important implications for performance measurement and incentive system design.     

Earnings Quality Based on Corporate Investment Decisions

In this paper, I examine a new approach for measuring earnings quality, defined as the closeness of reported earnings to “permanent earnings,” based on firm decisions with regard to capital and labor investments. Specifically, I measure earnings quality as the contemporaneous association between changes in the levels of capital and labor investment and the change in reported earnings. This approach follows the reasoning that (1) firms make investment decisions based on the net present value (NPV) of investment projects and (2) reported earnings with higher quality should more closely associate with real investment decisions. I find that measures of earnings quality based on managerial labor and capital decisions correlate positively with earnings persistence and have incremental explanatory power relative to earnings‐quality measures used in the accounting literature. Furthermore, investment‐based earnings‐quality measures are less informative when managers tend to overinvest.     

The usefulness of financial and nonfinancial performance information in resource allocation decisions

In this article I evaluate the impact of adding nonfinancial performance information to reports containing financial information. I consider the association between nonfinancial information and the resource allocations and performance evaluations made by individuals involved with the governmental budget process. Tests indicated that the allocation decisions made by these individuals were not significantly associated with nonfinancial information. However, nonfinancial information was influential in the performance evaluations of both the agency and the agency's director. Although I found no association between nonfinancial information and resource allocations, I found an association between financial information and resource allocations. Additionally, financial information significantly impacted the performance evaluation of the agency director.An additional test of the importance of nonfinancial information in resource allocations involved resource scarcity. As discussed in the paper, I hypothesized that under scarcity nonfinancial information and financial information would become more important to the allocation process. My results indicated that nonfinancial information had no impact on allocation decisions made under scarcity. The association between financial information and resource allocations was opposite that predicted.     

Tournament incentives, firm risk, and corporate policies

This paper tests the proposition that higher tournament incentives will result in greater risk-taking by senior managers in order to increase their chance of promotion to the rank of CEO. Measuring tournament incentives as the pay gap between the CEO and the next layer of senior managers, we find a significantly positive relation between firm risk and tournament incentives. Further, we find that greater tournament incentives lead to higher R&D intensity, firm focus, and leverage, but lower capital expenditures intensity. Our results support the hypothesis that option-like features of intra-organizational CEO promotion tournaments provide incentives to senior executives to increase firm risk by following riskier policies. Finally, the compensation levels and structures of executives of financial institutions have received a great deal of scrutiny after the financial crisis. In a separate examination of financial firms, we again find a significantly positive relation between firm risk and tournament incentives.     

Nonfinancial and financial performance measures: How do they affect employee role clarity and performance?

Two recent studies have found that comprehensive performance measurement systems comprising both financial and nonfinancial measures (e.g., balanced scorecard) are positively related to managerial performance through role clarity. It is, however, unclear if these results are from the use of financial measures or from the use of nonfinancial measures. It is also unclear if these effects are achievable by using nonfinancial measures alone. This study provides insights into prior studies' findings by distinguishing those effects arising from nonfinancial measures from those arising from financial measures. Based on a sample of 121 managers, the results indicate that nonfinancial measures, by themselves, significantly influence managerial performance through role clarity. More importantly, they also indicate that the effect of nonfinancial measures on role clarity is substantially stronger than that through financial measures.     

CEO Incentives and Corporate Innovation

Using scaled wealth‐performance sensitivity as my measure of Chief Executive Officer (CEO) incentives, and utilizing cross‐sectional variations in industry innovativeness, product market competition and firms’ degree of exposure to the market for corporate control for identification purposes, I find that higher long‐term incentives that stem from CEO holdings of unvested options are associated with greater subsequent corporate innovation in innovative industries, competitive product markets, and firms more exposed to the threat of hostile takeovers, that is, exactly where incentivizing innovation is a matter of necessity. I address the endogeneity concerns with systems of simultaneous equations estimated using three‐stage least squares. A possible channel for the observed relation between unvested options‐based incentives and subsequent corporate innovation is that these incentives encourage managers to undertake riskier projects to achieve long‐term economic benefits.     

The joint impact of accountability and transparency on managers’ reporting choices and owners’ reaction to those choices

We report the results of an experiment designed to investigate the fundamental conflict of interest between managers and owners in a financial reporting setting. In our setting, owners seek accurate reports of financial performance whereas managers have incentives to distort performance reports in a self-serving fashion. Regulatory responses to such conflicts often call for improved disclosure, including more accountability and transparency (e.g., Sarbanes-Oxley Act and Dodd-Frank Act). We use the term accountability to imply answerability—wherein managers are required to reconcile the difference between reported and actual performance. We predict and find that when managers’ incentives are transparently disclosed, accountability does not rein in managers’ opportunistic reporting. By comparison, when managers’ incentives are less transparently disclosed (opaque), accountability dampens managers’ propensity to misreport. However, this reduction in opportunistic reporting due to accountability comes about because managers offset higher reporting bias in compensation periods with lower reporting bias in other periods. Therefore, not only are the benefits of accountability restricted to the setting where managers’ incentives are opaque, but the reduced reporting bias might arise due to window-dressing. Although managers seem to care enough about accountability to engage in window-dressing, financial incentives seem to dominate accountability, at least in our setting. We also find that managers’ payoffs are higher when their incentives are opaque, but owners’ payoffs are invariant regardless of whether incentives are transparent or opaque. Our analyses suggest that owners may be relying on accountability to curb opportunistic reporting by managers—a reliance that may be misplaced. Our findings have implications for regulatory responses aimed at addressing conflicts of interest.     

Do Earnings Targets and Managerial Incentives Affect Sticky Costs?

This study explores motivations underlying managers’ resource adjustments. We focus on the impact of incentives to meet earnings targets on resource adjustments and the ensuing cost structures. We find that, when managers face incentives to avoid losses or earnings decreases, or to meet financial analysts’ earnings forecasts, they expedite downward adjustment of slack resources for sales decreases. These deliberate decisions lessen the degree of cost stickiness rather than induce cost stickiness. The results suggest that efforts to understand determinants of firms’ cost structures should be made in light of the managers’ motivations, particularly agency‐driven incentives underlying resource adjustment decisions.     

The Relation Between Voluntary Disclosure and Financial Reporting: Evidence from Synthetic Leases

I investigate how the use and voluntary disclosure of synthetic leases is affected by incentives to defer cash outflows and manage the financial statements by keeping debt off the balance sheet. I find that managers of cash‐constrained firms with incentives to defer cash payments are more likely to finance asset purchases with synthetic leases. The mandated reporting for synthetic leases allows managers to avoid disclosing the financial consequences of these transactions. Managers of firms with incentives to use off‐balance‐sheet financing do not provide transparent disclosure about their synthetic leases. However, managers of cash‐constrained firms, which are less likely to use synthetic leases for financial reporting reasons, do voluntarily disclose the existence and financial consequences of these contracts. Alternative tests around FIN 46 adoption corroborate these findings.     

Financial and nonfinancial performance measures: How do they affect job satisfaction?

Recent interest on the use of nonfinancial measures (e.g. in the Balanced Scorecard) generally assumes that such measures are essential to overcome the inadequacies of financial measures. However, it remains unclear (1) if the behavioural effects of these nonfinancial measures are different from those of financial measures; and (2) whether these effects are influenced by the relative importance of nonfinancial measures vis-à-vis financial measures. This study hypothesises that the use of performance measures for performance evaluation will significantly affect managers' job satisfaction. However, these effects are indirect through the managers' perceptions of the fairness of these measures and the interpersonal trust these measures promote. Based on a sample of 70 managers, these expectations are supported by the results. More importantly, the results also suggest that (1) the process by which nonfinancial measures affect employee job satisfaction is not different from that of financial measures, and (2) the relative importance of nonfinancial measures vis-à-vis financial measures has no significant effect on employee job satisfaction. These results may have important theoretical and practical implications.     

The Impact of Financial Reporting Quality on Debt Contracting: Evidence from Internal Control Weakness Reports

We examine the effect of financial reporting quality on the trade‐off between monitoring mechanisms used by lenders. We rely on Sarbanes‐Oxley internal control reports to measure financial reporting quality. We find that when a firm experiences a material internal control weakness, lenders decrease their use of financial covenants and financial‐ratio‐based performance pricing provisions and substitute them with alternatives, such as price and security protections and credit‐rating‐based performance pricing provisions. We also find that changes in debt contract design following internal control weaknesses are substantially different from those following restatements, where lenders impose tighter monitoring on managers’ actions, but do not decrease their use of financial statement numbers.     

Overvalued equity,benchmark beating and unexpected accruals

We investigate the extent to which the overvaluation hypothesis provides incentives for managers to beat earnings benchmarks, and whether this benchmark beating can be reliably interpreted as evidence of earnings management. We carefully identify firms immediately above earnings benchmarks that have a priori, overvaluation‐based incentives to achieve the benchmark. We therefore focus on benchmark‐beating observations where manipulation is most likely, providing a more powerful test of the existence of opportunistic financial reporting. Consistent with overvaluation‐related incentives encouraging earnings management, we find that overvalued firms that just exceed levels‐related earnings benchmarks have higher unexpected accruals than firms with less extreme valuations.     

Observability and Subjective Performance Measurement

Accounting research provides theory and evidence on the choice and use of subjective performance measures for evaluating managerial performance. However, accounting research does not focus on the subjective performance measurement of managerial behaviour once measures have been chosen. We extend accounting research by investigating the factors that influence the subjective performance measurement decision. We predict that the level of subjective performance measurement is influenced by the informativeness of financial performance measures and by the verifiability of the nonfinancial measures in a formula‐based incentive plan. We expect that the measures' informativeness and verifiability depends on the observability of both the managerial behaviour being subjectively measured and the reliability of the financial and nonfinancial performance measures. More specifically, we hypothesize that the influence of the levels of the financial performance measures on the level of subjective performance measurement is moderated by the observability of either the managerial behaviour being measured (for the financial measures) or the performance measures' reliability (for the nonfinancial measures). Data from a firm provide support for our hypotheses.     

The Role of Financial Incentives in Balanced Scorecard‐Based Performance Evaluations: Correcting Mood Congruency Biases

Moods are low‐intensity affective states that individuals bring to a decision, and may be especially important when the balanced scorecard (BSC) is used for performance evaluation purposes. We propose that financial incentives can motivate decision‐makers to correct mood congruency biases, in which judgments and decisions are consistent with moods. In experiment 1, participants rated the performance of one division manager based on two accounting measures and another manager based on a 16‐measure BSC; there were mood congruency biases at both levels of information load. Financial incentives to make benchmark‐consistent judgments eliminated bias in the former condition but not in the BSC condition. In experiment 2, incentives were offered and performance evaluations were based on an eight‐measure BSC; mood congruency bias was eliminated. Results suggest that management control systems, specifically financial incentives, should be included in future affect correction research.     

The performance measurement manifesto

The leading indicators of business performance cannot be found in financial data alone. Quality, customer satisfaction, innovation, market share--metrics like these often reflect a company's economic condition and growth prospects better than its reported earnings do. Depending on an accounting department to reveal a company's future will leave it hopelessly mired in the past. More and more managers are changing their company's performance measurement systems to track nonfinancial measures and reinforce new competitive strategies. Five activities are essential: developing an information architecture; putting the technology in place to support this architecture; aligning bonuses and other incentives with the new system; drawing on outside resources; and designing an internal process to ensure the other four activities occur. New technologies and more sophisticated databases have made the change to nonfinancial performance measurement systems possible and economically feasible. Industry and trade associations, consulting firms, and public accounting firms that already have well-developed methods for assessing market share and other performance metrics can add to the revolution's momentum--as well as profit from the business opportunities it presents. Every company will have its own key measures and distinctive process for implementing the change. But making it happen will always require careful preparation, perseverance, and the conviction of the CEO that it must be carried through. When one leading company can demonstrate the long-term advantage of its superior performance on quality or innovation or any other nonfinancial measure, it will change the rules for all its rivals forever.     

Does fair value accounting contribute to market price volatility? An experimental approach

This paper contributes to the debate on the impact of accounting measurement rules for financial assets. We examine the association between fair value accounting for financial assets and market price volatility for nonfinancial firms in an experimental setting. One group of participants was provided with financial statements where held‐for‐trading securities were reported at fair market value (FVA). Another group received financial statements with investments reported at historical cost (HCA). Controlling for accounting data, we find no systematic difference between FVA and HCA for three different measures of market price volatility, despite higher earnings volatility and marginally heavier trading under FVA.     

THE CHOICE BETWEEN CALLABLE AND NONCALLABLE BONDS

We examine the choice and the offer spreads between callable and noncallable bonds. We find significant differences by industry sector and therefore segment our results by financial and nonfinancial industries. For the financial sector, the popularity of callable and noncallable bonds is significantly related to the economic environment. Financial and high‐grade nonfinancial callable bonds are also more likely to be issued via a shelf prospectus. Although firms that issue callable bonds do not consistently display the characteristics associated with severe agency problems, the issue choice for below‐investment‐grade nonfinancial and lower rated financial bonds, where we can expect agency problems to be more severe, is more consistent with agency theory than is the issue choice for higher rated bonds.     

Portfolio Manager Compensation in the U.S. Mutual Fund Industry

We study compensation contracts of individual portfolio managers using hand‐collected data of over 4,500 U.S. mutual funds. Variations in the compensation structures are broadly consistent with an optimal contracting equilibrium. The likelihood of explicit performance‐based incentives is positively correlated with the intensity of agency conflicts, as proxied by the advisor's clientele dispersion, its affiliations in the financial industry, and its ownership structure. Investor sophistication and the threat of dismissal in outsourced funds serve as substitutes for explicit performance‐based incentives. Finally, we find little evidence of differences in future performance associated with any particular compensation arrangement.