Uncertainty and Fiscal Policy in an Asymmetric Monetary Union

We examine monetary and fiscal interactions in a monetary union model with uncertainty due to imperfect central bank transparency. It is first shown that monetary uncertainty discourages excessive taxation and may thus reduce average inflation and output distortions. However, as countries enter the monetary union, this tax-restraining effect of uncertainty is mitigated. The monetary union may hence lead to higher fiscal distortions in some member countries, depending on governments’ spending targets and on the change in the degree of uncertainty implied by common monetary policy.     

Structural Reform and Transparency in a Monetary Union

We assess how central bank transparency affects the incentives for labour market reform in a monetary union. We introduce transparency as affecting unemployment forecasts that provide information that the central bank has to the private sector and the governments. Under conditions of monetary policy opaqueness and inflation bias, we show that monetary union may induce more reform (as governments mitigate inflation surprises under idiosyncratic shocks), albeit to a lesser extent when inflation bias is only present at the national level. In the absence of inflation bias, central bank transparency, by eliminating inflation surprises in the face of idiosyncratic shocks, induces less reform in a currency union relative to monetary autonomy. Altogether, these results point to the need for a strong political commitment to reform so that member states benefit most from the combination of a credible and transparent single monetary policy with measures aimed at improving competitiveness and enhancing long-term growth.     

Introducing Instruments of Central Bank Accountability in a Monetary Union

With an increasing number of independent central banks, accountability of central banks is also getting more attention. This paper analyses the possibility of introducing instruments of central bank accountability in a monetary union. In our model, monetary policy is influenced by the governments of the member states according to the degree of independence granted to the central bank. Instruments of democratic accountability are introduced which generate different expected losses for a government. The amount of the expected loss will determine the approval of a government to the implementation of a particular mechanism. We show that the agreement between the governments will only be unanimous for the definition of the inflation target of the central bank.

On the conduct of monetary policy in Vietnam

Vietnam has the highest inflation rate in Southeast Asia (over 20 per cent year‐on‐year in 2011). This paper examines the extent to which inflation in Vietnam is due to its conduct of monetary policy. It is argued that, had the central bank implemented policy on a more timely basis, inflation would not have been as high as it was, but the more fundamental problem is that the central bank does not have the tools it needs to conduct monetary policy effectively. Monetary policy is further complicated by Vietnam's exchange rate policy. By choosing to peg the currency and maintain fairly free capital mobility, the country has all but given up the ability to pursue an independent monetary policy. As a consequence, the central bank is forced to attempt to sterilise its foreign exchange interventions, which it is ill‐equipped to do. The paper argues that financial sector liberalisation is needed not only to promote growth but also to maintain macroeconomic stability.     

Monetary Policy Committee Transparency: Measurement,Determinants, and Economic Effects

This paper studies monetary policy committee transparency (MPCT) based on a new index that measures central bankers’ educational and professional backgrounds as disclosed through central bank websites. Based on a novel cross-sectional data set covering 75 central banks, we investigate the determinants of MPCT as well as its economic consequences. We find that past inflation, institutional indicators, and monetary policy strategy are important determinants of MPCT. MPCT has a robust and significantly negative impact on inflation variability and inflation expectations, even after controlling for important macroeconomic variables and institutional transparency, as well as instrumenting MPCT in various ways. MPCT can be both a complement to and a substitute for institutional transparency.     

Central bank credibility and the expectations channel: evidence based on a new credibility index

This article investigates the relationship between central bank credibility and the volatility of the key monetary policy instrument. First, we propose a time-varying measure of central bank credibility based on the gap between inflation expectations and the official inflation target. While this new index addresses the main limitations of the existing indicators, it also appears particularly suited to assess the monetary experiences of a large sample of inflation-targeting emerging countries. Second, by means of EGARCH estimations, we formally prove the existence of a negative effect of credibility on the volatility of the short-term interest rate. In line with the expectations channel of monetary policy, the higher the credibility of the central bank, the lower the need to move its instruments to effectively fulfill its objective.     

通胀预期管理下中央银行沟通的有效性研究——基于中国2003～2010年数据的实证分析

有效管理通货膨胀预期已成为中央银行货币政策调控的重要任务之一。近几年,世界上很多国家通过实施中央银行沟通引导市场预期,实现有效的货币政策调控。本文通过考察通货膨胀预期和中央银行沟通及其他经济变量之间的相关关系,分析中央银行沟通能否有效引导市场通胀预期。结果显示,由于缺乏系统性,中央银行沟通对市场预期的引导作用仍不如其他经济变量,但国内中央银行沟通对市场通胀预期的影响是显著的。其中,相对书面沟通,口头沟通对通胀预期的影响更为显著。在目前较强的通胀预期背景下,系统实施中央银行沟通将对未来通胀预期的管理起到积极作用。     

STAGFLATIONARY CONSEQUENCES OF PRUDENT MONETARY POLICY IN A UNIONIZED ECONOMY

Stylised models of the policy game between monetary policy makersand the private sector have suggested that discretionary policyregimes suffer from an inherent inflationary bias and that pre-commitmentto a target rate of inflation may be desirable. This paper showsthat in the presence of labour unions, the monetary policy gamecan lead to radically different results: a central bank thatis completely indifferent to the level of inflation may obtainoutcomes with high employment rates and zero inflation while‘prudent’, inflation-averse, central banks generatestagflation with positive inflation and low rates of employment.     

What Do Central Banks Know about Inflation Factors?

We offer a novel methodology for assessing the quality of central bank monetary policy reports. We evaluate their economic content by comparing verbally reported inflation factors with factors identified from a simple new Keynesian model. Positive correlations indicate that the reported inflation factors were similar to the model-identified ones, marking high-quality inflation reports. Although sample bank reports on average identified inflation factors correctly, the degree of forward-looking reporting varied.     

地方政府赤字财政下的物价控制与货币政策选择

货币经济学的一个基本观点就是,紧缩的货币政策能够降低通货膨胀,而扩张性的货币政策能够导致通货膨胀。费德斯坦指出,没有充分考虑财政政策的影响,这是货币经济学的严重缺陷。因此,文章结合我国当前的财政政策,探讨了在地方政府赤字财政下,中央银行如何控制和治理通货膨胀。文章认为,在地方政府赤字财政下,如果政府通过银行融资具有优先权的话,紧缩的货币政策不仅不能够控制通货膨胀,反而加速了通货膨胀。     

Central Bank Autonomy,the Exchange Rate Constraint and Inflation: The Case of Italy, 1970–1992

This paper analyzes the determinants of inflation in Italy over the period 1970–1992. Particular emphasis is placed on the role of central bank independence in influencing monetary growth, and on the role of monetary growth and of the Exchange rate Mechanism (ERM) in affecting inflation. In the 1970s and early 1980s, when the Bank of Italy lacked independence and the ERM was still not credible, monetary growth was highly unstable and was the main determinant of Italian inflation, although oil price and tax shocks also played a role. After the March 1983 general exchange rate realignment and the French U-turn, the ERM became more credible and monetary growth stopped being a significant determinant of inflation; instead, the German inflation became the main variable influencing Italian inflation.     

货币政策规则非对称性及其在我国的检验

 基于最优货币政策规则的研究框架,本文从非线性总供给曲线和中央银行非对称偏好的角度来阐述货币政策规则中非对称性的理论形成,并利用GMM方法估计和检验了我国货币政策反应函数中的非对称性。研究结果表明非线性总供给曲线可以作为解释我国货币政策非对称反应的一种来源,更重要的是,中央银行对通胀缺口存在负向偏好,且这种负向的通胀偏好可以很好地解释我国“后金融危机时代”的通货膨胀偏差,但对产出缺口的非对称偏好并不显著。此外,不同通胀目标的稳健性研究表明,中央银行都存在负向的通胀偏好,而且该负向偏好随着通胀目标的降低而逐渐减弱。     

The demand for M3 and inflation forecasts: An empirical analysis for Switzerland

The Demand for M3 and Inflation Forecasts: An Empirical Analysis for Switzerland. — This paper argues that money should continue to play an important role in monetary policy even if a central bank pursues a strategy based on inflation forecasts. Within the context of an error correction model, the paper delivers empirical evidence that both the growth rate of the monetary aggregate M3 and the size of excess M3 incorporate useful information with regard to future inflation in Switzerland. This evidence strongly suggests that money should remain an important indicator for monetary policy.     

ARE AFRICAN CENTRAL BANKS SUFFICIENTLY INDEPENDENT FOR MONETARY CONVERGENCE?

Central bank independence (CBI) is currently a widely debated and topical issue commanding the centre point of many economical and political debates, filling the pages of many scholarly journals. Both central bank independence and accountability are currently regarded as necessary best practices for achieving price stability. The importance of CBI rests on the premise that inflation is primarily a monetary phenomenon, and that the cost of reducing inflation can be lowered by an independent central bank with credibility. Support for CBI also stems from the argument that the power to create money should generally be separated from the power to spend it. This is even more relevant for countries with weak political institutions. However, various studies (cited below) detected lower inflation in those countries where independence of their central banks is the strongest. Countries all over – including some on the African continent – have increased the independence of their central banks accordingly.     

A Macroeconomic Policy Game for a Monetary Union with Adaptive Expectations

We consider a dynamic game model of a two-country monetary union. Governments (fiscal policies) pursue national goals while the common central bank’s monetary policy aims at union-wide objectives. For a symmetric demand shock, we derive numerical solutions of the dynamic game between the governments and the central bank. We consider conflicting (non-cooperative Nash equilibrium) and coordinated policy-making (cooperative Pareto solutions). We show that there is a trade-off between the deviations of instruments and targets from desired paths; the volatility of output and inflation increases when private agents react more strongly to changes in actual inflation.     

Inflation Uncertainty and Monetary Policy in China

This paper uses a stochastic volatility model structural break tests with unknown point, and a counterfactual simulation method to discuss the significant decline in inflation uncertainty in China over 1978-2009. We attempt to quantify the contributions of better monetary policy and smaller structural shocks （including demand, supply and policy impacts） on the reduced inflation uncertainty. Empirical results in the present paper suggest that improved monetary policy accounts for only a small fraction of the reduction in inflation uncertainty from the pre-1997 period to the post-1997 period in China. The bulk of the significant moderation in inflation uncertainty arises from smaller shocks. This finding indicates that the quiescence of inflation in China over the past decade could well be followed by a return to a more turbulent inflation era. Therefore, the use of preemptive monetary policy to anchor inflationary expectations and keep moderate inflation uncertainty is warranted.     

Controlling inflation in transition economies: The relevance of central bank independence and the right nominal anchor

Controlling inflation is a central problem in transition economies. This paper asks under what conditions or even whether central bank independence helps in this task. The conclusion shows that merely imposing legal independence on the central bank may be ineffective or even counterproductive. It is necessary to make a monetary strategy and the responsibilities and restrictions of central bank policy transparent to the public. In addition, it is important that the right nominal anchor is selected—one that is, or is believed to be, effective and sustainable. Both monetary targeting and inflation targeting are assumed to be unsuitable for most transition countries. Instead, some kind of dynamic exchange rate targeting appears to be the most reasonable choice.     

Central bank independence--conceptual clarifications and interim assessment

It is argued that credibility problems in macroeconomics hardlyexist, and certainly do not motivate central bank independence.The Rogoff banker, and much work which follows should be interpretedas blueprints for good policy, not institutional reforms. Thereare likely to be significant but at present unquantified costsassociated with central bank independence once the interactionof monetary and other policymakers is recognised. The evidencethat central bank independence reduces inflation or brings otherbenefits is questioned     

中国货币政策的福利损失与政策规则选择——基于新凯恩斯DSGE模型的分析

本文在新凯恩斯主义DSGE模型框架下,运用福利损失函数和脉冲响应方法研究我国最优货币政策规则选择的问题。研究结果表明,货币供应量规则相对于利率规则,使外生冲击对产出和通货膨胀的影响更持久,造成更大的福利损失,因此中央银行的货币政策规则应该逐步从货币供应量规则转向利率规则;在一定条件下,前瞻型利率规则、后顾型利率规则和泰勒规则所造成的福利损失相差不大,从便利的角度出发,中央银行应该选择后顾型利率规则。     

What does South Korean inflation targeting target?

This paper characterises South Korean monetary policy in the period of explicit inflation targeting that started in 1999. We calculate Bank of Korea's parameters in the policy objective function, conditional on an estimated macro-model. We show that this central bank appears to have pursued optimal policy geared towards achieving price stability, while displaying a considerable degree of interest rate smoothing. In addition, the central bank loss function is estimated to include negligible weights on output and exchange-rate variability.