伊斯兰银行:不收利息的银行

2008年,由美国次贷危机所引发的国际金融危机席卷了全球,各大金融巨头纷纷落水。然而,有一种独特的金融机构却在危机中毫发无损,甚至逆势强劲增长,这就是神秘的伊斯兰银行。据《亚洲银行家》杂志所做的一份年度报告,2008年国际金融危机重创全球银行业之际,全球100家伊斯兰银行资产总额达5800亿美元,比前一年增加了2300亿美元,逆势激增近60%。那么,伊斯兰银行到底是什么样的银行呢?     

伊斯兰银行：不收利息的银行

2008年,由美国次贷危机所引发的国际金融危机席卷了全球,各大金融巨头纷纷落水。然而,有一种独特的金融机构却在危机中毫发无损,甚至逆势强劲增长,这就是神秘的伊斯兰银行。     

伊斯兰银行的内部风险管理

风险是银行经营管理的核心。伊斯兰银行在业务种类及业务流程上与商业银行存在显著区别,在构建风险管理体系时,也应有别于商业银行。由于各国伊斯兰银行的管理标准及风险数据不统一,再加之风险模型构建复杂,伊斯兰银行风险管理框架还很不成熟。本文对伊斯兰银行内部风险管理存在的问题进行了分析,并对今后努力方向做了进一步展望。     

探讨伊斯兰银行的特点

伊斯兰金融作为世界两大金融体系之一,在金融危机中显示出其安全、稳定的优势,引起世界的关注。伊斯兰银行作为伊斯兰金融的主体,以伊斯兰教教义及其文化为指导思想、以现代伊斯兰金融理论为理论基础、以"风险共担、利润共享"为经营原则、坚持以实物资产为基础、禁止投机行为等,保证了其在经营及金融交易过程中的安全性和稳定性。     

助学贷款:"银行不爱没商量"

助学贷款是国家实施"科教兴国"战略的一项重要举措.自2000年9月国家助学贷款的有关政策实施以来,特别是2001年7月30日浙江省出台了<浙江省生源地财政贴息助学贷款管理规定>后,黄岩辖内金融机构开展的助学贷款业务有了进一步的发展.全区累计发放的助学贷款为131笔,贷款金额累计为97.36万元,从而使131位的当地贫困学生圆了自己的大学梦,截至2003年9月末,全区助学贷款的余额为66.76万元,结余人数为116人.     

伊斯兰银行在中国的发展之路

伊斯兰银行是根据伊斯兰教义而设立的,"禁止利息"是其发展的标志性语言,至今在全球70多个多家设立了它的分支机构,特别在2008年全球经济危机爆发后以其良好的业绩引起世界的关注。对伊斯兰银行进行研究和分析,为促进中国经济的增长提供了新的动力。     

基于风险视角的伊斯兰银行与传统银行的比较

本文在对伊斯兰金融发展及其风险管理研究进行文献综述的基础上,对伊斯兰银行与传统银行在风险管理方面的异同和可鉴之处分别进行介绍、比较和分析,探索性地提出我国试点开展伊斯兰金融业务的风险管理策略。     

"银行脱媒"演化银行改革

“银行脱媒”大趋势 自20世纪80年代以来，在发达国家银行的发展史上，随着直接融资的发展，银行失去了其融资主导地位，利差收入减少，依靠传统的业务难以维持生存，即产生所谓的“银行脱媒”。近年来，中国银行业也渐渐出现“脱媒”状况。     

"流程银行"和银行"流程再造"

质量认证体系ISO9000将业务流程定义为“一组将输入转化为输出的相互关联或相互作用的活动”。根据这些活动在价值链中的地位,商业银行的业务流程可以分为为直接创造价值的流程和为直接创造价值活动服务的支持流程。“流程银行”指一种商业银行管理模式。这种管理模式的流程以客户为中心,以市场为导向,强调内部主要业务     

创建"大银行"内的"小银行"

分析研究我国国有银行发展的现状，结合农行山西分行的实际，笔认为，全面借鉴和嫁接我国新兴股份制商业银行的经营机制，在农行系统内创建“大银行”内的“小银行”，是当前农行深化机制改革，提高综合竞争力的最佳选择。     

Stakeholder Returns of Islamic Banks Versus Conventional Banks

Sharia principle shaping the Islamic banking model is most determinant on collection and deployment of funds with its ban on interest. This study aims to look at the results of funded activities in isolation for a healthier comparison between Islamic and conventional deposit banks with respect to their financial stakeholders. The differences are reflected as lower asset returns and lower returns for depositors of Islamic banks. These differences sustain throughout normal and crisis periods. Our findings show that despite differences in asset structures and returns, Islamic banks retain similar returns for shareholders to position themselves close to and in competition with their conventional counterparts.     

伊斯兰银行业公司治理:理论与实践

伊斯兰银行业公司治理由于其自身不同的经营特点而与传统银行业治理存在较大的差异,其治理结构、代理关系较为复杂,成为英美、德日模式之外较具代表性的一种模式。本文从伊斯兰银行的治理结构及其复杂的委托代理关系出发,论述了其面临的代理问题,并就其代理问题介绍了伊斯兰银行业的公司治理实践,以期为我国的银行业治理提供一定的借鉴。     

Islamic Banks and Financial Stability: An Empirical Analysis

The relative financial strength of Islamic banks is assessed empirically based on evidence covering individual Islamic and commercial banks in 19 banking systems with a substantial presence of Islamic banking. We find that (a) small Islamic banks tend to be financially stronger than small commercial banks; (b) large commercial banks tend to be financially stronger than large Islamic banks; and (c) small Islamic banks tend to be financially stronger than large Islamic banks, which may reflect challenges of credit risk management in large Islamic banks. We also find that the market share of Islamic banks does not have a significant impact on the financial strength of other banks.     

A Survival Analysis of Islamic and Conventional Banks

Are Islamic banks inherently more stable than conventional banks? We address this question by applying a survival analysis based on the Cox proportional hazard model to a comprehensive sample of 421 banks in 20 Middle and Far Eastern countries from 1995 to 2010. By comparing the failure risk for both bank types, we find that Islamic banks have a significantly lower risk of failure than that of their conventional peers. This lower risk is based both unconditionally and conditionally on bank-specific (microeconomic) variables as well as macroeconomic and market structure variables. Our findings indicate that the design and implementation of early warning systems for bank failure should recognize the distinct risk profiles of the two bank types.     

Islamic Banks,Deposit Insurance Reform,and Market Discipline: Evidence from a Natural Framework

Although it has been intensively claimed that Islamic banks are subject to more market discipline, the empirical literature is surprisingly mute on this topic. To fill this gap and to verify the conjecture that Islamic bank depositors are indeed able to monitor and discipline their banks, we use Turkey as a test setting. The theory of market discipline predicts that when excessive risk taking occurs, depositors will ask higher returns on their deposits or withdraw their funds. We look at the effect of the deposit insurance reform in which the dual deposit insurance was revised and all banks were put under the same deposit insurance company in December 2005. This gives us a natural experiment in which the effect of the reform can be compared for the treatment group (i.e., Islamic banks) and control group (i.e., conventional banks). We find that the deposit insurance reform has increased the market discipline in the Turkish Islamic banking sector. This reform may have upset the sensitivities of the religiously inspired depositors, and perhaps more importantly it might have terminated the existing mutual supervision and support among Islamic banks.     

Standard Setting for the Financial Reporting of Religious Business Organisations: the Case of Islamic Banks

Islamic banks have to abide by Islamic principles in all their business transactions. Accounting practices also have to be in conformity with this cardinal rule. Currently almost every Islamic bank sets its own accounting policy through a process which involves in-house religious advisers and the financial auditor of the bank. However, Islamic banks have recently agreed to establish a standard setting body to regulate their financial accounting and reporting. This paper argues that one of the predominant factors which seems to have influenced this decision and the institutional arrangements through which accounting standards will be promulgated is Islamic banks' fear of possible future intervention by their regulatory agencies.     

The Nature and Rationale of a Conceptual Framework for Financial Reporting by Islamic Banks

Islamic banks have to abide by the revealed doctrines in Islam in conducting their business and financial transactions. They employ in-house religious advisers—often referred to as Shari'a Supervisory Board (SSB)—who issue a special report to inform users of financial statements whether or not the bank has adhered to the Islamic principles. Recently, a private standard-setting body—the Financial Accounting Organization for Islamic Banks and Financial Institutions (FAOIBFI)—has been set up to externally regulate the financial reporting by Islamic banks. The FAOIBFI has published two statements on the objectives and concepts of financial reporting to act as a framework in setting accounting standards for Islamic banks. This paper examines the FAOIBFI's approach for developing objectives and concepts of financial accounting and investigates its need for such a theoretical framework. It is argued that the FAOIBFI's objectives and concepts would not be useful in mandating accounting standards on issues that are affected by religious ruling. This does not necessarily mean that such a framework may not be useful in legitimating the FAOIBFI's role and in setting accounting standards for issues that are not governed by revealed moral doctrines although it will be subject to similar limitations to those found by other standard-setting bodies in utilising and applying their framework. However, it implies that the more the FAOIBFI sets accounting standards that incorporate religious ruling, the less it would tend to find its own objectives and concepts useful. The ambiguities that may arise from different interpretations of the religious rules will require resolutions primarily by reference to religious rather than accounting authority.