电力影子价格测算方法探讨

一、电力影子价格的概念及其经济数学描述影子价格是指当社会经济处于某种最优状态下时,能够反映社会劳动的消耗、资源稀缺程度和对最终产品需求情况的价格。影子价格在国外又称为预测价格或计算价格。对于电力影子价格而言,电力影子价格是指能够保证电力资源的最优利用,反映电力真实价值的价格,是建设项目国民经济评价中使用的价格参数。假定P(q)为电力的需求曲线方程,MC(q)为电力生产的边际成本曲线方程。电力影子价格的数学描述是,对于某一电力的需求量或供给量q,整个社会的净效益为:     

再论影子价格的经济含义

影子价格来源于最优化问题,它表示某一经济结构中的某种资源在最优决策下的边际价值,它的大小反映了该种资源的稀缺程度。肖渡和胡汉辉二同志在文[1]中认为,在其他条件不变某一资源的投入量增加△b时,最优目标函数值的增量不一定是y~*△b(y~*是该资源的影子价格),并认为要使最优目标函数值增加y~*△b,除所论资源增加△b外,还可能要增加一些影子价格为O的资源。卢方元同志在文[2]中认为△b可正可负,并认为资源的影子价格表示为它的投入量增加(或减少)一个单位时,在其他条件和最优基不变的条件下原问题的目标函数增加(或减少)的数值。对于上述观点,笔者认为有不妥之处。这里的影子价格应该认为是它的投入量的增量△b(在不改变最优基     

影子价格在资源配置中的一个误用及其判定方法

影子价格在资源的配置中具有重要的指导意义,但是在应用时如果不考虑资源约束项的应用范围,得出的结果将不具备指导性。运用影子价格的边际定义对其与资源常数项的关系进行考察,通过理论与实例分析影子价格在资源配置时的有效范围,避免影子价格的误用。     

影子价格分析及其经济应用

影子价格是现代经济学中的一个重要参量,它在资源配置优化的理论与实践中占据着重要的位置。 资源的影子价格不同于一般意义上的市场价格,而是指该种资源在具体经济结构中的使用价值,或称为该种资源的边际收益。同一种资源在不同的经济结构中的影子价格不同。影子价格的大小反映了该种资源在具体的经济活动中边际贡献的大小,也说明该种资源的稀有     

影子价格及其在经济系统优化中的作用

影子价格的理论渊源与合理内涵影子价格是现代国外经济文献中广泛使用的概念。就西方各国而论,它是一个以“边际”概念为基础的含义很广的经济范畴,在不同的文献中往往具有不同的含义,但大体可归纳为以下两类:一是对数学规划对偶解的经济解释,与最优化方法在经济研究中的广泛应用紧密相关,是现代数学与经济学相互渗透的产物。在数学规划中,若把在有限资源约束下,按既定价格求目标函数极大值的问题称为原问题。则从原问题可导出求目标函数极小值的对偶问题。对偶问题的最优解,被西方经济学家称为资源的“影子价格”。它不是资源在市场上直接出售所得的货币收入,而是     

“影子价格”经济意义的再探讨

影子价格是数量经济学与运筹学中的一个重要概念。对一个反映企业生产计划的线性规划问题:{Max Z=CA|AX≤b,X≥0}(Ⅰ)可以定义对偶线性规划:{Min W=Yb|YA≥C,Y≥0} (Ⅱ) 一般的,我们称规划(Ⅱ)的最优解Y~*为规划(Ⅰ)所需资源的影子价格。它虽然不是资源的实际市场价格,但由于它是企业内部根据资源对生产的贡献作出的估计,因此对搞好工厂的管理有重要意义。若某种资源的影子价格为零,则说明该种资源尚未短缺。若其不为零,则说明该     

基于影子价格的标准成本基准转移定价系统

无外部市场中间产品内部交易时,尤其在多个最终产品对若干中间产品有竞争性使用时,现有以实际、标准及边际等成本为基准确定的转移价格,存在着不足。本文拟运用线性规划方法,构建基于影子价格的转移定价系统,优化资源配置;以影子价格为标准成本,激励单元控制成本;考虑偏离最优方案的机会损失,准确评价各自治单元的绩效。     

基于影子价格的标准成本基准转移定价系统

无外部市场中间产品内部交易时,尤其在多个最终产品对若干中间产品有竞争性使用时,现有以实际、标准及边际等成本为基准确定的转移价格,存在着不足。本文拟运用线性规划方法,构建基于影子价格的转移定价系统,优化资源配置;以影子价格为标准成本,激励单元控制成本;考虑偏离最优方案的机会损失,准确评价各自治单元的绩效。     

基于机会性边际成本的内部转移价格制定研究

内部转移价格是否合理是企业各分权责任中心能否保持目标一致性的关键因素.已有研究表明依据边际成本制定内部转移价格产生的市场行为能确保这种目标一致性,然而大多数情况下边际成本是不易观测到的,它常常是隐藏的机会成本.文章依据这两个重叠经济概念成本——机会性边际成本,研究内部转移价格的制定方法,通过规划模型验证即便是在频繁的市场价格变化环境中,最优内部转移价格始终是中间环节的机会性边际成本,文章的研究对企业集团挖掘隐含的机会性边际成本优化内部转移价格提升内部效率有一定的指导意义.     

论影子价格的经济含义：兼与肖渡和胡汉辉同志商榷

影子价格来源于最优化问题。从数学意义上说,是目标函数对某约束条件的一阶导数,表现为线性规划中的对偶解、非线性规划中的拉格朗日乘数或动态规划中的哈密顿算子。从经济意义上来说,一般解释为,在其他条件不变时某种资源变化一个单位后,原规划问题最优目标函数值的增量。最近,肖渡和胡汉辉同志对此种经济解释提出了疑义,认为在其他条件不变,某一资源的投入增加△b时,最优目标函数值的增量不一定是y△b(y是该资源的影子价格);并认为要使最优目标函数值增加y△b,除所     

The effects of uncertainty on investment and the expected long-run capital stock

This paper examines the effects of output price uncertainty on the optimal investment behavior of a risk-neutral competitive firm with a constant returns to scale production function. In the presence of convex costs of adjustment, investment is an increasing function of q, the shadow price of capital. Given the current price of output, we find that increased uncertainty will raise the current rate of investment. Increased uncertainty will also increase the expected long-run capital stock if the price of output is serially uncorrelated. However, if the price of output is serially correlated, then the direction of the effect of increased uncertainty on the expected long-run capital stock depends on the curvature of the marginal adjustment cost function. In this case, we obtain results which are directly opposite of the results in the literature and we locate the flaw in the existing analysis.     

建设项目经济评价中影子价格的分析

经济评价是建设项目投资决策的重要依据，而合理的影子价格是决定经济评价结论的关键。阐述了影子价格的涵义，分析了影响影子价格的因素。影子价格属于重要的国家参数，原则上由国家有关权威机构测算颁布，但由于影子价格种类繁多，本身也在不断变化，相当一部分投入物、产出物的影子价格仍需要由项目评价人自己计算，对其而言，简便、准确的计算方法至关重要。提出了几种计算影子价格的方法，并指出了取用影子价格时应注意的问题。     

煤炭价格对燃煤发电项目内部收益率影响关系的研究

煤炭价格对燃煤发电项目经济效益具有决定性影响,煤价与电价的相对水平决定了煤炭行业、电力行业、政府间的利益分配。电力行业的市场化进度相对落后于其上游的煤炭产业,煤炭价格波动对电力企业的运营构成较大的成本风险。内部收益率是燃煤电厂经济效益的关键指标,文章以内部收益率作为研究对象,分析煤炭价格变动对内部收益率的影响,运用回归方法拟合煤炭价格对内部收益率的影响曲线,进一步通过数值差分法得到煤炭价格对内部收益率的微分曲线即边际影响曲线,并利用双曲函数拟合边际影响曲线。研究结果表明,在较低价格区间内,煤炭价格变化对内部收益率的边际影响度较小;在较高价格范围内,边际影响度以双曲函数的形式快速下降。     

Price Dispersion and Consumer Reservation Prices

We describe firm pricing when consumers follow simple reservation price rules. In stark contrast to other models in the literature, this approach yields price dispersion in pure strategies even when firms have the same marginal costs. At the equilibrium, lower price firms earn higher profits. The range of price dispersion increases with the number of firms: the highest price is the monopoly price, while the lowest price tends to marginal cost. The average transaction price remains substantially above marginal cost even with many firms. The equilibrium pricing pattern is the same when prices are chosen sequentially.     

Distorted prices and producer efficiency: the case of Romania

This research aims at shedding empirical light on the relative efficiency of small-scale maize producers in Romania. Farmers in transition countries still face heavily distorted price systems resulting from imperfect market conditions and socioeconomic and institutional constraints. To capture such distortions we formulate a stochastic shadow-cost frontier model to investigate the systematic input-specific allocative inefficiency. We further adjust the underlying cost frontier by incorporating shadow price corrections and subsequently reveal evidence on farm specific technical inefficiency. Different models are estimated due to the imposition of curvature correctness and the effects on the individual efficiency estimates are shown. The empirical results show a relative high technical efficiency of the small-scale farmers but relatively poor scores on systematic input price efficiency. The usage of extension services as well as agricultural training on the farm level are found to have a positive effect on the technical efficiency level of the farms. All model specifications further agree on the negative effect on efficiency with respect to the use of insecticides. The imposition of functional concavity on the shadow cost frontier leads to relative differences in the efficiency estimates of up to 240%.      

Monopoly Pricingand Regulatory Oversight

This paper analyzes the interaction between a regulator and monopolist in the determination of the price for the monopolist's product, where only the monoplast knows ex ante its true marginal cost of production. The regulator observes the market price proposed by the monopolist and decides whether to hold a rate hearing, where suck a hearing is a costly means of verifying the monopolist's marginal cost. Subsequent to a rate hearing, the regulator can impose a market price for the monopolist's product; in the absence of a rate hearing, the market price is set equal to the monopolist's proposed price. Equilibrium behavior by the monopolist and regulator is characterized, and the degree of regulatory "activism," as defined by the probability a rate hearing is held, is seen to vary ex post with the monopolist's true marginal cost .     

Estimating the Accounting Price of Foreign Exchange: An Input–Output Approach

When adjustments in the foreign exchange market involve changes in the production of marginally traded goods, the traditional formula for calculating the accounting (shadow) price of foreign exchange assumes that domestic prices and marginal costs at efficiency prices for those goods are equal. In this paper, a method is proposed for estimating an accounting price ratio of foreign exchange in a partial equilibrium framework, abandoning that assumption. For that purpose, input–output techniques are used, to take into account the effets of changes in the production of traded goods.     

供热价格制订的理论探讨

本文概述了供热价格的三种定价方法,对比分析了平均成本定价法和边际成本定价法,介绍了供热成本的主要影响因素,最后用边际理论对两部制热价的合理性进行了论证。     

A MODEL OF SEARCH AND SHOPPING BY HOMOGENEOUS CUSTOMERS WITHOUT PRICE PRECOMMITMENT BY FIRMS

Price setting by firms and search by customers is analyzed, relaxing two basic attributes of most search models: price precommitment and agent heterogeneity. Customers are characterized by individual demand functions for a homogeneous good and can choose to employ a threat to search. Firms noncooperatively make pricing decisions by using the individual demand curves under conditions of constant marginal cost. Firms adopt pricing rules that optimally respond to customer search histories. Bargaining power is endogenously assigned. Firms know their common marginal cost; customers, the cost distribution. The unique separating equilibrium is characterized by a lumpy distribution of prices and by heterogeneous shopping behavior by customers giving rise to "shoppers" and "nonshoppers"     

Competing for Consumers with Self‐Control Problems

I examine strategic implications of competing for consumers with self‐control problems. For investment goods, like health clubs, I find that the equilibrium sign‐up (lump‐sum) fees decrease when competition intensifies, similarly to prices in standard oligopoly models. However, the equilibrium attendance (per‐unit) price increases due to firms' deteriorated ability to take advantage of consumers' self‐control problems. Moreover, firms earn less profit due to consumers' self‐control problems—the firms have a unilateral incentive to charge per‐unit fees lower than the marginal cost; however, they cannot make up the lost margins by increasing the lump‐sum fee, due to competition. I also show that for plausible parameter regions the market adjusts to consumers' self‐control problem in such a way that firms play the standard equilibrium strategies that they would have engaged in with fully rational consumers, with identical market outcomes. Most of the results are qualitatively the same for leisure goods (for example, credit cards); however, some results are reversed: the per‐unit fees are higher than marginal cost and decrease as competition intensifies.