直面网上银行革命

到2015年,现在10岁的少年将成为18岁的成人,可以肯定,他们将置身于金融服务的市场中。但是,他们对服务种类及其提供方式的需求可能会发生巨大变化,甚至难以确定这些需求能否通过传统银行得到满足。在今后的8年中,零售金融的范围将发生变化,而银行前台与后台的作用也将随之改变。     

EVA AND THE "NEW ECONOMY"

Some have observed that the new economy means the end of the EVA performance measurement and incentive compensation system. They claim that although the EVA system is useful for oldline companies with heavy investments in fixed assets, the efficient management of investor capital is no longer an imperative for newage firms that operate largely without buildings and machinery–and, in some cases, with negative working capital. This article argues that EVA is not only suitable for the emerging companies that lead the new economy, but even more important for such firms than for their “rust belt” predecessors. While there may be a new economy in terms of trade in new products and services, there is no new economics– the principles of economic valuation remain the same. As in the past, companies will create value in the future only insofar as they promise to produce returns on investor capital that exceed the cost of capital. It has made for sensational journalism to speak of companies with high valuations and no earnings, but this is in large part the result of an accounting framework that is systematically flawed. New economy companies spend much of their capital on R&D, marketing, and advertising. By treating these outlays as expenses against current profits, GAAP accounting presents a grossly distorted picture of both current and future profitability. By contrast, an EVA system capitalizes such investments and amortizes them over their expected useful life. For new economy companies, the effect of such adjustments on profitability can be significant. For example, in applying EVA accounting to Real Networks, Inc., the author shows that although the company reported increasing losses in recent years, its EVA has been steadily rising–a pattern of profitability that corresponds much more directly to the change in the company's market value over the same period. Thus, for stock analysts that follow new economy companies, the use of EVA will get you closer to current market values than GAAP accounting. And for companies intent on ensuring the right level of investment in intangibles– neither too much nor too little– EVA is likely to send the right message to managers and employees. The recent decline in the Nasdaq suggests that stock market investors are starting to look for the kind of capital efficiency encouraged by an EVA system.     

漫漫长夜的金融之光——我党在新民主主义革命时期领导开展的金融活动

九十载峥嵘岁月,九十年砥砺前行,我们的党为国家塑形象,我们的党给人民谋福利;祖国繁荣昌盛,民族团结,经济发展,社会安定。在中国共产党的领导下,作为经济核心的金融业,昂首阔步,担当重任。九十年间,党领导的金融事业究竟经历了怎样的发展变迁,党在各个时期如何引领金融事业不断推进？本期《特别策划》栏目将与读者一起回顾我党金融事业伟大历程和那些个点点滴滴……     

EVA IN THE E&P INDUSTRY: THE CASE OF NUEVO ENERGY

This article presents a case study illustrating some aspects of the new business model discussed in the roundtable above. Continuing a major theme in the roundtable, the authors begin by arguing that the long‐run failure of the E&P industry to create shareholder wealth stems to a large degree from weak or distorted incentives held out to the top executives and managers of most large, publicly traded companies. This article traces the incentive problem to the lack of an effective wealth creation metric to guide the financial management process. Although the industry employs a variety of accounting‐based performance measures, none is a reliable measure of wealth creation. In place of traditional financial metrics such as earnings, annual cash flow, and return on capital, this article recommends a performance evaluation and incentive compensation system that is tied to the use of a “reserve‐adjusted” EVA measure—one that exhibits a strong statistical correlation with changes in shareholder wealth in the E&P business. The greater explanatory power of this new measure reflects the reality that changes in the value of reserves in the ground can greatly outweigh changes in annual earnings or cash flows. As the focal point of a compensation plan, EVA has advantages over stock options in that it can be calculated at various levels in the organization, even at the level of a single well, whereas stock prices only exist for the company as a whole. For this reason, an EVA incentive system permits a clearer “line of sight” between pay packages and the performance of the part of the business for which managers are directly accountable. Perhaps even more important, EVA can be calculated (using an “internal hedging” mechanism) in a way that removes the impact of changes in oil prices on the incentive outcome. And, as demonstrated in the case study of Nuevo Energy, such internal hedging allows companies to give their employees a much greater share of wealth created with far less cost than by simply granting stock or stock options.     

HOW TO USE EVA IN THE OIL AND GAS INDUSTRY

The use of EVA in the oil industry has lagged behind that in most other industries because the accounting information reported by oil and gas concerns does such a poor job of representing management's effectiveness in adding value for shareholders. The essence of the problem is that the exploration activities of oil companies create assets whose changes in value are recognized by the stock market long before they are reflected on income statements or balance sheets. As a result, all accountingbased performance measures, including generic measures of EVA (which are derived from accounting information), fail to provide meaningful goals, decision tools, or compensation benchmarks.
This article provides a new, EVAbased framework for performance measurement and incentive compensation for oil and gas firms—and for companies in extractive industries in general. The authors show that, when adjusted by a publicly available measure of hydrocarbon reserve value known as "SEC-10," EVA's ability to explain annual stock returns rises from under 10% to almost 50%. Moreover, because SEC-10 has several important limitations as a measure of reserve value, there is considerable additional room for improving EVA's explanatory power. And the actual implementation of an EVA financial management system for an individual oil company can and should be based on more precise estimates of reserve value than those provided by SEC-10.
To this end, the authors provide an approach to hydrocarbon reserve valuation that captures the "real option" value of undeveloped reserves. By incorporating real option values, this new EVA financial management system for oil companies aligns management's incentives with the goal of creating shareholder wealth by rewarding managers for creating real option value as well as current cash flow—and by forcing managers to consider the optimal "exercise" of such strategic options.     

CONTRACTING FOR VALUE: EVA AND THE ECONOMICS OF ORGANIZATIONS

EVA becomes more difficult to apply the farther down in the company you go, especially in organizations with more traditional “functional” designs. Because centralized functions are not independent self-contained entities with direct control over their own revenues, costs, and capital, the performance measures used to evaluate them are necessarily incomplete; they reveal only part of the picture. For example, Marketing may increase sales and operating income—the measures on which it is evaluated—but at the same time drive excessive use of capital in the Manufacturing plants. Manufacturing may reduce unit cost through long production runs, thereby minimizing changeovers and setups, but create excess inventory in the process. Costreducing measures could also lead to declining quality and customer satisfaction, ultimately eroding the company's reputation. In short, each critical function influences results in other parts of the company, and focusing only on activities under a manager's direct control can result in myopic and misleading measures of performance. In organizing key processes as internal EVA Centers, joint costs and benefits shared by different corporate functions or business units can be built into financial measures in a way that encourages collaboration. As one example, a firm can attempt to replicate market forces internally by requiring each marketing region to contract for capacity with the internal manufacturing group. In a traditional management system, Marketing reserves (and relinquishes) manufacturing capacity at no cost; the consequence is excessive demand for resources. An internal pricing mechanism that requires Marketing to pay a fee for capacity will force its managers to assess trade-offs as if it were contracting with an outside party. Such a system effectively requires that functional managers take a more company-wide view of their responsibilities. By including the cost of capital, it forces managers to define costs more carefully. By including the impacts on other functions, it also forces a broader definition of costs. And by using multi-year contracts among different divisions, the framework extends the time horizon over which costs and benefits matter.     

TRANSFERABLE STOCK OPTIONS (TSOS) AND THE COMING REVOLUTION IN EQUITY-BASED PAY

The dominant form of equity pay in the U.S. will change dramatically when accounting rules are changed (most likely in 2005) to require companies to charge the cost of their stock option plans on their income statements. Many companies are already switching from stock options to other forms of equity pay, especially restricted stock. The most notable switcher was Microsoft, the world's largest user of stock option pay. In July 2003, partnering with J.P. Morgan, Microsoft created a onetime transferable stock option (TSO) program that allowed holders of underwater Microsoft options to sell their options to J.P. Morgan in return for restricted shares.
But the most important consequence of this transaction may not be a widespread shift by corporate America to restricted shares, but rather the creation of a more costeffective kind of stock option. By clearing the potentially messy hurdles involving taxes, accounting, SEC rules, and "transaction mechanics," Microsoft has opened the door for TSOs to be considered as an ongoing equitypay instrument, perhaps replacing standard stock options (which are not transferable). TSOs share the key advantages of restricted stock in terms of providing robust retention and ownership incentives and higher valuecost efficiency, while maintaining the key "leverage" advantage of options. In so doing, they create significant upside (and downside) while largely avoiding the "pay for pulse" problem of restricted stock. They also introduce the discipline of competitive pricing by third-party bidders. The bid prices of investment banks create nearly all of the information required for accurate estimates of option cost, which should foster greater board accountability and improved corporate governance.     

EVA推进

如果一定要在中央企业考核中找到最大的“加分项”,那非EvA莫属。这一价值“诊脉”工具是自20世纪50年代被美国学者Stewart提出、由思腾思特咨询公司（Stern Stewart ＆ Co．）注册并实施的一套以经济增加值理念为基础的财务管理系统、决策机制及激励报酬制度。     

Beyond EVA

A former partner of Stern Stewart begins by noting that the recent acquisition of EVA Dimensions by the well‐known proxy advisory firm Institutional Shareholder Services (ISS) may be signaling a resurgence of EVA as a widely followed corporate performance measure. In announcing the acquisition, ISS said that it's considering incorporating the measure into its recommendations and pay‐for‐performance model. While applauding this decision, the author also reflects on some of the shortcomings of EVA that ultimately prevented broader adoption of the measure after it was developed and popularized in the early 1990s. Chief among these obstacles to broader use is the measure's complexity, arising mainly from the array of adjustments to GAAP accounting. But even more important is EVA's potential for encouraging “short‐termism”—a potential the author attributes to EVA's front‐loading of the costs of owning assets, which causes EVA to be negative when assets are “new” and can discourage managers from investing in the business. These shortcomings led the author and his colleagues to design an improved economic profit‐based performance measure when founding Fortuna Advisors in 2009. The measure, which is called “residual cash earnings,” or RCE, is like EVA in charging managers for the use of capital; but unlike EVA, it adds back depreciation and so the capital charge is “flat” (since now based on gross, or undepreciated, assets). And according to the author's latest research, RCE does a better job than EVA of relating to changes in TSR in all of the 20 (non‐financial) industries studied during the period 1999 through 2018. The article closes by providing two other testaments to RCE's potential uses: (1) a demonstration that RCE does a far better job than EVA of explaining Amazon's remarkable share price appreciation over the last ten years; and (2) a brief case study of Varian Medical Systems that illustrates the benefits of designing and implementing a customized version of RCE as the centerpiece for business management. Perhaps the most visible change at Varian, after 18 months of using a measure the company calls “VVA” (for Varian Value Added), has been a sharp increase in the company's longer‐run investment (not to mention its share price) while holding management accountable for earning an adequate return on investors’ capital.     

BANK OF AMERICA ROUNDTABLE ON THE SOFT REVOLUTION: ACHIEVING GROWTH BY MANAGING INTANGIBLES

Economist Paul Romer has developed a new theory of economic growth—one that moves the factors of scientific discovery, technological change, and innovation back to the center of economic analysis. For corporate management, Romer's theory amounts to a new model of value creation. Where the old idea was to accumulate and make the most efficient use of hard assets—machines, factories, and natural resources—the new model points to soft, or intangible, assets as the key to growth and profitability.
More precisely, the focus of Romer's model is something he calls nonrivalrous information, or software for short. Software, in brief, is valuable knowledge or formulas or instructions that can readily transmitted to others and therefore replicated throughout an organization. It is nonrivalrous because it can be used outside the firm—and indeed throughout the nation and the world—without diminishing its value to the firm.
In this roundtable, Romer discusses his concept of software and its potential corporate applications with the CEOs of three successful companies. Besides illustrating the variety of forms software can take, the discussion also considers the challenge of managing the development of corporate software. One of Romer's messages to corporate management is that all workers are potentially creators of software—and this theme is echoed in the testimony of each of the three CEOs. In each case, moreover, a certain amount of decentralization of decision-making is said to be necessary to achieve continuous improvement. And a number of comments by the panelists suggest that decentralization reinforced by stock ownership or well-designed profit-sharing schemes has considerable potential to add value.     

THE REVOLUTION IN CORPORATE RISK MANAGEMENT: A DECADE OF INNOVATIONS IN PROCESS AND PRODUCTS

The explosion of corporate risk management programs in the early 1990s was a hasty and ill‐conceived reaction by U.S. corporations to the great “derivatives disasters” of that period. Anxious to avoid the fate of Barings and Procter & Gamble, most top executives were more concerned about crisis management than risk management. Many companies quickly installed (often outrageously priced) value‐at‐risk (VaR) systems without paying much attention to how such systems fit their specific business requirements. Focused myopically on loss avoidance and technical risk measurement issues, the corporate risk management revolution of the '90s thus got underway in a disorganized, ad hoc fashion, producing a curious amalgam of policies and procedures with no clear link to the corporate mission of maximizing value. But as the risk management revolution unfolded over the last decade, the result has been the “convergence” of different risk management perspectives, processes, and products. The most visible sign of such convergence is a fairly recent development called “alternative risk transfer,” or ART. ART forms consist of the large and growing collection of new risk transfer and financing products now being offered by insurance and reinsurance companies. As just one example, a new class of security known as “contingent capital” gives a company the option over a specified period—say, the next five years—to issue new equity or debt at a pre‐negotiated price. And to hold down their cost, such “pre‐loss” financing options are typically designed to be “triggered” only when the firm is most likely to need an infusion of new capital to avoid underinvestment or financial distress. But underlying—and to a large extent driving—this convergence of insurance and capital markets is a more fundamental kind of convergence: the integration of risk management with corporate financing decisions. As first corporate finance theorists and now practitioners have come to realize, decisions about a company's optimal capital structure and the design of its securities cannot be made without first taking account of the firm's risks and its opportunities for managing them. Indeed, this article argues that a comprehensive, value‐maximizing approach to corporate finance must begin with a risk management strategy that incorporates the full range of available risk management products, including the new risk finance products as well as established risk transfer instruments like interest rate and currency derivatives. The challenge confronting today's CFO is to maximize firm value by choosing the mixture of securities and risk management products and solutions that gives the company access to capital at the lowest possible cost.     

EVIDENCE ON EVA

EVA has attracted considerable attention as an alternative to traditional accounting earnings for use in both valuation and incentive compensation. With a host of consultants now marketing related metrics, numerous claims have been made—most based on anecdotal evidence or in-house studies. This paper summarizes the authors' independent evidence regarding EVA's alleged advantages.
The authors begin by reviewing the theory that links the underlying concept of residual income to shareholder value. Second, they discuss how Stern Stewart modifies residual income to produce its proprietary EVA metric and show how median EVA compares with residual income, net income, and operating cash flows over the period 1988–97. Third, they examine the claim that EVA is more closely associated with stock returns and firm value than is net income. Their evidence indicates that EVA does not dominate net income in associations with stock returns and firm values. Fourth, they examine a second claim that compensation plans based on residual income motivate managers to take actions consistent with increasing shareholder value. Here the evidence (from a study by Wallace) suggests that managers do respond to residual income-based incentives by, for example, increasing asset sales, cutting capital expenditures, repurchasing stock, and producing higher levels of residual income. The authors conclude by arguing that a metric such as EVA can be effective for internal incentive purposes even if it conveys little news to market participants regarding the firm's valuation.     

"三三"法推行EVA

兵装集团的实践证明,EVA考核是增强企业股东回报意识、提升企业价值创造能力的重要举措,对转变企业经济发展方式和提高企业发展质量起到了重要推动作用。     

EVA与MVA

EVA和MVA的提出对于传统财务评价考核指标来说是一个很大的进步,它们克服了传统财务评价指标仅仅反映当前收益状况的局限性,不但考虑了公司经营可能带来的风险,而且还反映了公司在未来给股东带来的潜在收益。EVA能够准确反映公司为股东创造的价值,并能为公司内部日常决策或长期规划提供指导,适合作为内部业绩衡量指标;市场增加值(MVA)则是衡量公司股东价值创造和管理部门长期业绩的最佳外部指标,二者密切相关,配合使用,可使财务业绩考核指标更趋完善,实现业绩评价的协调。现在,EVA与MVA正在世界范围内被广泛应用,并逐渐成为一种全球通用的衡量标准。     

EVA AND ITS CRITICS

This paper responds to the article by Biddle, Bowen, and Wallace (BBW) by suggesting that their study of EVA and earnings has three potential shortcomings:

• (1)

   A closer look at BBW's regression analysis suggests that investors, while apparently ignoring the cost of equity, put great weight on the cost of debt —a puzzling result in need of an explanation.
• (2)

   The attempt by BBW to level the playing field effectively makes the NOPAT model into a NOPAT and capital model. Thus, it is really an EVA model in disguise and offers no insight into the explanatory power of NOPAT or earnings by itself.
• (3)

   BBW's model of expectations is too simple. The ability of EVA to explain shareholder returns depends upon the accuracy of the model of expected EVA performance, and BBW make no attempt to derive a model of expected EVA improvement from the EVA valuation equation.

     

同业存单或掀存款革命

重建大额存单市场不仅仅是一个单纯的金融产品市场的建立和发展的问题,还是中国利率市场化的重要一步。近日,央行发布并实施《同业存单管理暂行办法》,规定存款类金融机构可在银行间市场发行以市场化方式确定利率的同业存单。这是央行继开放贷款利率后,再次向存款利率市场化迈出的实质胜一步。大额存单首创于20世纪60年代的美国,是最早的金融创新。中国的大额存单业务其实并非新鲜事物,也经历了曲折的发展历程,早在1986年交通银行就曾首先发行大额存单。     

经济增加值(EVA)一般理论框架

传统会计净利润是在公认会计原则的基础上,遵循权责发生制原则和稳健性原则的结果。以税后净利润作为企业业绩衡量基础存在不少问题;EVA是指经过调整的税后净利润(NOPAT)减除该公司现有资产经济价值的使用费用后的余额;EVA将资本成本理念引入了传统的业绩计量中,通过会计调整修正了会计准则潜在的偏差和扭曲,并且将企业业绩与管理者报酬联系起来。