The Green Revolution,agrarian productivity and labor

The use of Green Revolution inputs has been responsible for higher levels of agrarian productivity in India. This is both because of the biological structure of high-yield varieties of seeds themselves and because of the structure of the agrarian political economy in the country. But the question is: have the laborers benefited from the rise in productivity made possible by the use of these inputs? I have shown, both conceptually and empirically, that laborers do gain from higher productivity, but not uniformly over space. They gain more where they are more organized. This means that the relation between productivity and wages is, in part, a political relation, and the strength of this relation is characterized by ‘spatial inconstancy’. I have also discussed how the Green Revolution has tended to undermine the relations of personal dependence between the landed and the laborers, and this seems to have helped labor organization to some extent. Labor organization is also affected by the structure of land/asset distribution. In particular, whether or not laborers possess some land/asset makes a difference to the effectiveness of laborers’ bargaining power with landowners over wages, and therefore, to the actual level of wages being paid.     

Wages,implicit contracts,and the business cycle: Evidence from a European panel

We study the joint behavior of hours and wages over the business cycle in a unique panel of 13 European countries, and document significant history dependence in wages. Workers who experience favorable market conditions during their tenure on the job have higher wages, and work fewer labor hours. Unobserved differences in productivity, such as varying job quality, or match-specific productivity are not likely to explain this variation. The results instead point to the importance of contractual arrangements in wage determination. In economies with decentralized bargaining practices, such arrangements resemble self-enforcing insurance contracts with one-sided commitment (by the employer). On the other hand, in countries with strong unions and centralized wage bargaining, wage behavior is better approximated by full-commitment insurance contracts. The co-movement of hours and wages further confirms a contractual framework with variable worker hours. Despite the strong prevalence of contracts in Europe, however, the elasticity of labor supply is considerably smaller compared to the U.S. labor market.     

Informality in developing economies: Regulation and fiscal policies

This paper proposes a unified theoretical framework where formal and informal firms coexist and face the same type of product and labor market imperfections: they have monopoly power in the goods market, they are subject to matching frictions in the labor market, and wages are determined by bargaining between large firms and their workers, through either individual or collective bargaining. Our model matches the main stylized facts on informality for developing countries and appears to be a good candidate for policy analysis. In this framework, we study the impact on informality, wages and unemployment of policies that may be used to reduce informality. We consider changes in product market regulation (PMR) and in two types of fiscal policies, labor taxes and formality enforcement. We find that lessening PMR decreases informality and unemployment simultaneously, indicating that there is not necessarily a tradeoff between informality and unemployment. The tradeoff appears when fiscal policies are used, though. Moreover, the impacts of PMR on unemployment and on wages are larger under collective than individual bargaining. With respect to wage inequality, lessening PMR reduces it, while lower taxes tend to increase the formal sector wage premium.     

Who benefits from job placement services? A two-sided analysis

In light of additional information market agents would achieve better outcomes, for example, a lower ask price for the buyer and a higher offer price for the seller. I examine this notion in a labor market, where employers and employees do not possess perfect information about wages, and address the question of who benefits from the information provided by job placement services? The empirical strategy considers the two-sided nature of the labor market. Estimates of employee and employer incomplete information are contrasted between users and non-users of placement services provided by Job Corps, America’s largest and most important job training program for youths. Findings suggest that employees that use placement services don’t have more information about better offer wages, relative to non-users. Interestingly, firms that employed users of placement services are better informed about reservation wages relative to firms that employed non-users.     

The impact of minimum wages on wages,work and poverty in Nicaragua

In this paper we use an individual- and household-level panel data set to study the impact of changes in legal minimum wages on a host of labor market outcomes including: a) wages and employment, b) transitions of workers across jobs (in the covered and uncovered sectors) and employment status (unemployment and out of the labor force), and c) transitions into and out of poverty. We find that changes in the legal minimum wage affect only those workers whose initial wage (before the change in minimum wages) is close to the minimum. For example, increases in the legal minimum wage lead to significant increases in the wages and decreases in employment of private covered sector workers who have wages within 20% of the minimum wage before the change, but have no significant impact on wages in other parts of the distribution. The estimates from the employment transition equations suggest that the decrease in covered private sector employment is due to a combination of layoffs and reductions in hiring. Most workers who lose their jobs in the covered private sector as a result of higher legal minimum wages leave the labor force or go into unpaid family work; a smaller proportion find work in the public sector. We find no evidence that these workers become unemployed.Our analysis of the relationship between the minimum wage and household income finds: a) increases in legal minimum wages increase the probability that a poor worker's family will move out of poverty, and b) increases in legal minimum wages are more likely to reduce the incidence of poverty and improve the transition from poor to non-poor if they impact the head of the household rather than the non-head; this is because the head of the household is less likely than a non-head to lose his/her covered sector employment due to a minimum wage increase and because those heads that do lose covered sector employment are more likely to go to another paying job than are non-heads (who are more likely to go into unpaid family work or leave the labor force).     

Minimum wages,wages and employment in various sectors in Honduras

This paper contributes to our understanding of the impact of minimum wages on labor markets of developing countries, where there are often multiple minimum wages and compliance is weak. We examine how changes in more than 22 minimum wages over 1990–2004 affect employment, unemployment and average wages of workers in different sectors, defined by coverage under the legislation. The evidence suggests that minimum wages are effectively enforced only in medium and large-scale firms, where a 1% increase in the minimum wage leads to an increase of 0.29% in the average wage and a relatively large reduction in employment of ? 0.46%. We find that public sector wages emulate minimum wage trends but the higher cost of labor does not reduce employment there. There are no discernable effects of minimum wages on the wages of workers in small-firms or the self-employed; yet, higher minimum wages may create more unemployment. We conclude that (even under our upper bound estimate of the effect on the wages of workers) the total earnings of workers in the large-firm covered sector fall with higher minimum wages in Honduras, which warrants a policy dialogue on the structure and level of minimum wages.     

Politics in wage setting: does government colour matter?

This paper studies the relationship between wage formation and the political colour of the government in an economy with a centralized wage bargaining system. Ideological, organizational and personal ties between the central trade union and the social democratic political party suggest that the trade union may behave significantly different in wage negotiations under a social democratic than under a conservative government. Using time series data for Norway, we estimate that changing from a conservative to a social democratic central government significantly reduces manufacturing wages and makes wages more responsive to unemployment. This result is consistent with a wage bargaining model augmented by political preferences of the union leaders and suggests that the effect of bargaining coordination depends on the political colour of the government. The estimated effects are both robust with respect to model specification and stable over time. We are grateful to Fredrik Wulfsberg, participants at seminars in Trondheim and Oslo, and an anonymous referee for valuable comments.     

Incentives and the Efficiency of Public Sector-outsourcing Contracts

Abstract.  Outsourcing the provision of traditionally publicly provided services has become commonplace in most industrialized nations. Despite its prevalence, there still is no consensus in the academic literature on the magnitude (and determinants) of expected cost savings to the government, nor the sources of those savings. This article considers the arguments for (and against) outsourcing and then examines the empirical evidence pertaining to whether any observed savings occur and whether they persist over time. In addition, we examine the existing evidence for the 'redistribution hypothesis' and the 'quality-shading hypothesis', which critics have used to argue that outsourcing lowers government expenditure by lowering wages and conditions and/or lower quality services. Finally, we consider the impact of contract design on outsourcing outcomes. While the power of incentives is a strong theme in economics, recent work has suggested that high-powered incentives may be suboptimal for many public sector services, because they may crowd out intrinsic motivation, particularly in instances where agents are highly motivated. We discuss the implications of this insight for the efficiency of public sector outsourcing.     

Virginia's New Ban on Public Employee Bargaining: A Case Study of Unions, Business, and Political Competition

This article explores the reasons why the Virginia General Assembly passed a law prohibiting public employee bargaining some 16 years after the Virginia Supreme Court had clearly ruled that such bargaining was impermissible absent express statutory authority. The impetus for this legislation apparently was a series of actions by Governor L. Douglas Wilder's administration involving payroll deductions for state employees. The Virginia case is compared and contrasted to the findings of recent aggregate quantitative studies of the determinants of public sector labor relations legislation, illustrating the relative influence of organized business interests over those of labor.     

Wage Bargaining in Industries with Market Power

We develop a game-theoretic version of the right-to-manage model of firm-level bargaining where strategic interactions among firms are explicitly recognized. Our main aim is to investigate how equilibrium wages and employment react to changes in various labor and product market variables. We show that our comparative statics results hinge crucially on the strategic nature of the game, which in turn is determined by the relative bargaining power of unions and managers.     

Understanding continuity in public sector HRM through neo‐institutional theory: why national collective bargaining has survived in English local government

Most HRM research over recent decades has concentrated on ‘change’, charting ever more fragmented, individualised and unitarist employment relationships. This is equally true of public sector HRM, where the emphasis has been on neo‐liberalism and marketisation. However, in many countries and sectors, collective, pluralist approaches to HRM and industrial relations have proved remarkably resilient. This article uses Neo‐Institutional theory to explain the ‘continuity’ of one such HRM system: national collective bargaining in English local government (1979–2007). We argue that this survives because it manages the political and managerial processes that link central government and central–local relations and acts as a conduit between institutional stakeholders to deliver services to the public. By understanding the ‘passive consensus’ that holds the collectivist HRM system together, we can anticipate the forces that might pull it apart.     

Seniority,experience, and wages in the UK

This paper uses BHPS data to investigate the relative importance of seniority and experience in determining male wages in the UK labor market. Using both the Altonji and Shakotko instrumental variable and the Topel two-step estimation approaches, I find that for all male workers, tenure plays a modest role, increasing wages by about 1% each year over the first 10 years on the job. General labor market experience has a larger role, so that after 30 years wages have increased by about 60%. Individual and job match heterogeneity are important, and should be carefully modeled when estimating wage equations for the British labor market. These results are remarkably similar to the most recent evidence about these relationships in the US labor market. After extending the standard model to include industry and occupation experience, the estimated impact of job seniority becomes negligible for nonunion workers. Instead, the wages of nonunion workers rise because of the accumulation of general and sector-specific experience. The wages of union workers are still found to increase with job seniority over the first ten years with their employer, suggesting that if seniority matters for wages it is only for union workers.     

The government wage bill and private activity

We estimate the macroeconomic effects of public wage expenditures in U.S. data by identifying shocks to public employment and public wages using sign restrictions. We find that public employment shocks are mildly expansionary at the federal level and strongly expansionary at the state and local level by crowding in private consumption and increasing labor force participation and private sector employment. Similarly, state and local government wage shocks lead to increases in consumption and output, while shocks to federal government wages induce significant contractionary effects. In a stylized DSGE model we show that the degree of complementarity between public and private goods in the consumption bundle is key for explaining the observed heterogeneity.     

Wage incentives and wage rigidity: A representative view from within

A recent literature has used surveys of those who set wages to learn about the nature of wage incentives and the sources of wage rigidity. Methodologically, we overcome many of the objections that have been raised against this work. Substantively, we find that: (i) the reasons for real wage rigidity differ significantly between large and small firms, and between the high- and low-end of the labor market; (ii) efficiency wage mechanisms reinforce rigidities due to worker bargaining power; (iii) money illusion is a widespread phenomenon across all segments of the labor market; (iv) unions reinforce nominal wage rigidities due to external pay comparisons; (v) there appears to be gender differences in pay bargaining and work morale.     

影响中国城市增长的因素:地级及以上城市的实证检验

论文以国内外相关城市增长理论为基础,构建了分析中国城市增长的系统模型,并利用206个城市1990年与2005年的社会经济统计数据进行了实证研究.研究结果表明:(1)中国城市的经济增长主要是由劳动生产率提高而非人口规模增长推动的;(2)政府财政支出和城市人力资本积累是目前中国城市经济增长的主要驱动力;(3)人力资本积累并没有在工资增长上得到体现;(4)城市公共设施和环境的改善引致了城市人口增长,但对城市经济发展却没有明显的作用.在以上研究结果基础上,论文提出了保持城市可持续发展的一些政策建议.     

Housing tenure and labor market impacts: The search goes on

We develop two search-theoretic models emphasizing firm entry to examine the Oswald hypothesis, the idea that homeownership is linked to inferior labor market outcomes, and compare their predictions to three extant theories. The five models have surprisingly different predictions about the labor market at both the aggregate and micro levels. Using a suitable instrumental variable strategy, we estimate both micro and aggregate level regression models of wages and unemployment and compare the estimates to those predictions. We find that while homeowners are less likely to be unemployed, they also have lower wages, all else equal, compared to renters. In addition, higher regional homeownership rates are associated with a greater probability of individual worker unemployment and higher wages. The outcome of a horserace between our new search-theoretic models is mixed—the wage-posting model predicts observed unemployment impacts while a bargaining variant does a better job explaining observed wages and aggregate labor market outcomes. Overall, we conclude that firm behavior is important for understanding the labor market impacts of homeownership. Because this is the case, regional homeownership rates are not good instruments for individual tenure choice in empirical work. And while individual homeowners may have inferior labor market outcomes as compared to renters, from the viewpoint of society, higher homeownership rates may result in greater job creation and overall production, among other benefits.     

Corporate mergers and union wage premiums

Corporate mergers possibly enhance the labor negotiation advantage of employers. This study investigates the association between wage levels and merger activity to test the employer bargaining strength hypothesis. The results indicate significantly lower union wages as a consequence of merging. Merger activity, however, does not influence wage levels of non-union workers. These findings are supportive of the employer bargaining strength hypothesis.     

Wage bargaining,union membership,and the organization of unemployment insurance

The paper offers a theoretical analysis of a labor market institution known as the Gent system, which is a system where unions run unemployment insurance (UI) through government-subsidized UI funds. This system is practiced in four Nordic countries with comparatively very high unionization rates. The analysis shows that the Gent system is more conducive to unionization than a compulsory UI system if the Gent system is heavily subsidized by the government or if workers are strongly risk averse. Moreover, a rise in the share of benefits financed by union members is likely to reduce wages as well as union membership.     

Firm heterogeneity and wages in unionised labour markets: Theory and evidence

In many countries wages are set in two stages, where industry-level collective bargaining is followed by firm-specific arrangements determining actual paid wages as a mark-up on the industry wage floor. What explains the wage set in each of these stages? In this paper we show that both the industry wage floor and the average wage cushion are systematically associated with the degree of firm heterogeneity in the industry: The former (latter) is negatively (positively) associated with the productivity spread. Furthermore, since the response of the wage floor dominates that of the wage cushion, workers in more heterogeneous industries tend to get lower actual paid wages. These conclusions are reached in a model of Cournot oligopoly with firm productivity heterogeneity and a two-tiered wage setting system. They are then confirmed by administrative data covering virtually all workers, firms and collective bargaining agreements of the Portuguese private sector for the period 1991–2000.     

The Living Wage and the Effects of Real Minimum Wages on Part-Time and Teen Employment

In many parts of the country, campaigns are being carried out and laws are being passed whose aim is to establish, among other things, standards for contracting out public services and setting acceptable living wages that will provide employees decent living standards. Living wages have economic consequences on employment of different groups of workers such as part-time, teenagers, and women and detailed data are needed to measure those effects. In the absence of such data and because of the strong link between living and minimum wages, this study tests the potential impact of living wages by using the model of minimum wages. The study documents a negative and significant relationship between real minimum wages and the employment levels of the various groups. The study also recommends better training and education, free competition in the labor market, and fair compensation based on the workers productivity as justifiable means to achieve a sustainable level of living wages without causing an unemployment repercussion.