STRATEGIC BUDGET CONSTRAINTS IN A UNIONIZED MIXED OLIGOPOLY

This paper considers the budget‐constraint problem where the government decides whether or not to impose a budget constraint on the public firm, assuming the public firm is less efficient than private firms. We find that imposing budget constraints on the public firm is the preferred choice because of the welfare‐improving effect. Our model suggests that the wage levels of the public firm can be lower or higher than those of private firms depending upon the degree of inefficiency. These results differ from Ishida and Matsushima's findings that in a unionized mixed duopoly, tight budget constraints can enhance social welfare when the public firm is as efficient as private firms.     

ASYMMETRIC INFORMATION AND MODELS OF CREDIT RATIONING

This paper outlines the development and exposits some of the central ideas and implications of asymmetric information in the credit market.     

评拉丰、梯若尔著《政府采购与规制中的激励理论》

该文对拉丰与梯若尔教授的著作《政府采购与规制中的激励理论》做了一个简明的述评.该书是新规制经济学方面的代表性著作,新规制经济学是委托?代理理论在政府与受规制企业之间合约关系中的运用.该文主要介绍了三个方面的内容??作者的学术背景、本书的特色以及本书对中国经济改革的意义.     

BIDS AND COSTS IN COMBINATORIAL AND NONCOMBINATORIAL PROCUREMENT AUCTIONS—EVIDENCE FROM PROCUREMENT OF PUBLIC CLEANING CONTRACTS

Combinatorial procurement auctions enable suppliers to pass their potential cost synergies on to the procuring entity and may therefore lead to lower costs and enhance efficiency. However, bidders might find it profitable to inflate their stand‐alone bids in order to favor their package bids. Using data from standard and combinatorial procurement auctions, we find that bids on individual contracts in simultaneous standard auctions without the option to submit package bids are significantly lower than the corresponding stand‐alone bids in combinatorial auctions. Further, no significant difference in procurer's cost as explained by auction format is found. (JEL D44, H57, L15)     

JOINT BIDDING,GOVERNANCE AND PUBLIC PROCUREMENT COSTS:A CASE OF ROAD PROJECTS*

ABSTRACT *** : To utilize public resources efficiently, it is important to take advantage of competition in public procurement auctions to the maximum extent. Joint bidding is a common practice that potentially facilitates competition. By pooling financial and experiential resources, more firms are expected to enter the market, but it will also directly reduce competition if more than one bidder who is solely qualified makes a coalition. In theory joint bidding may or may not be beneficial to auctioneers, depending on the model. The paper empirically examines the impacts of joint bidding on firms' entry as well as bidding behaviour, using data on public road projects in developing countries. It shows that coalitional bids, in particular by local firms, would be competitive, but foreign joint ventures would undermine competition. It is also found that good governance can encourage firms' entry into the tendering and facilitate joint bidding practices.     

R&D INVESTMENT, CREDIT RATIONING AND SAMPLE SELECTION

We study whether R&D‐intensive firms are liquidity constrained, by modelling their antecedent decision to apply for credit. This sample selection issue is relevant when studying a borrower–lender relationship, as the same factors can influence the decisions of both parties. We find firms with no or low R&D intensity to be less likely to request extra funds. When they do, we observe a higher probability of being denied credit. Such a relationship is not supported by evidence from the R&D‐intensive firms. Thus, our findings lend support to the notion of credit constraints being severe only for a sub‐sample of innovative firms. Furthermore, the results suggest that the way in which the R&D activity is organized may differentially affect a firm's probability of being credit constrained.     

DYNAMIC PRICE COMPETITION WITH CAPACITY CONSTRAINTS AND A STRATEGIC BUYER

We analyze a simple dynamic durable good model. Two incumbent sellers and potential entrants choose their capacities at the start of the game. We solve for equilibrium capacity choices and the (necessarily mixed) pricing strategies. In equilibrium, the buyer splits the order with positive probability to preserve competition, making it possible that a high and low price seller both have sales. Sellers command a rent above the value of unmet demand by the other seller. A buyer benefits from either a commitment not to make future purchases or by hiring an agent to always buy from the lowest priced seller.     

COMPARING PPP WITH TRADITIONAL PROCUREMENT: THE CASE OF SCHOOLS PROCUREMENT IN IRELAND

Advocates of public‐private partnerships (PPPs) argue that they can deliver public infrastructure more efficiently than traditional procurement through timelier completion and superior value for money. Despite these claims comparative analysis of the performance of both procurement methods has received scant attention in the PPP literature to date. This paper addresses this issue by providing an in‐depth, case‐based comparison of PPP versus traditional procurement in the schools sector in Ireland. Through detailed semi‐structured interviews with key stakeholders and an examination of the available documentation, we assess whether the key objectives of using PPP have been achieved. Overall, we find no evidence that PPP leads to faster delivery of infrastructure when the overall procurement process from contract notice to delivery is accounted for. In addition, we find only limited evidence to suggest that PPP results in better value for money.     

违约风险与贷款定价:一个基于期权方法和软预算约束的新模型

由于忽视了软预算约束导致的"优先原则"不成立以及由此产生的还贷道德风险等现实问题,贷款定价传统期权方法在中国的适用性受到了影响。通过引入信贷合同效率,本文构造了二维违约风险,并据此建立了贷款定价的新模型。新模型解决了上述问题,得到以下结论:第一类与第二类违约风险的联动对贷款定价的影响是不确定的,第一类与第二类违约风险相关度越高则贷款定价越低,贷款期限与贷款定价之间的关系受违约风险构成的影响等。     

ECONOMIC AND BUDGET ISSUES FOR DEFICIT POLICY

Much of the controversy about reducing the federal deficit has arisen because policymakers lack a deficit policy that is a consistent part of broader macroeconomic policy. This is not surprising since economists have not reached a consensus about such a policy.
This paper sketches the analytical controversy about monetary and fiscal policies and traces it to issues about how the economy works. Although aspects of the deficit question are controversial, there is general concern about the buildup of federal debt implicit in the projection of persistently large deficits. A growing body of research suggests that the increase in the federal debt-to-income ratio may impinge dangerously on the credit available to finance private capital formation. Also, the rising federal debt may indirectly generate inflation through monetization.
Several criteria and approaches to a deficit policy are identified. The paper suggests that changing the "policy mix" by tightening fiscal policy and loosening monetary policy to reduce interest rates is unlikely to succeed to the extent that expansive monetary policy increases real interest rates by raising inflationary expectations and uncertainty.
Since the potential ill effects of the federal debt buildup, are essentially long-run and bear on capital accumulation, any tax increases should avoid disincentives to saving, investment, and to growth generally. Depending on revenue requirements, fundamental changes in the tax system may be necessary. Further reductions in spending appear to be inevitable if the projected rise in the debt-to-GNP ratio is to be halted. Defense, retirement, and medical care programs are most likely candidates for reduction.     

消费者谈判能力与厂商标价策略-模型及基于实验经济学的检验

本文建立的理论模型研究了消费者谈判能力、谈判成本和对商品的偏好程度等几方面对厂商最优标价决策的影响。当消费者谈判能力较弱时,厂商可能策略性地不对商品标价,以获取更大利润,利润大小与消费者的谈判能力呈倒U形关系;而当消费者谈判能力较强时,厂商会选择对商品进行标价以最大化利润;但若消费者谈判能力很弱,消费者很可能因无利可图而放弃购买,这时厂商就会选择标价销售。通过对模型进行模拟实验,模型的结果得到了进一步验证。本文同时证明,在一定条件下,厂商选择策略性不标价可能不是社会最优的,因此需要通过政府强制标价来实现市场有效性。     

REGULATIONS AND STRATEGY: EVIDENCE ON ADVERTISING

This article evaluates the impact of the introduction of incentive regulation on firms’ advertising spending among the population of local exchange carriers in the United States telecommunications industry between 1988 and 2001. The results show that the hybrid rate of return method and other intermediate incentive schemes have a negative relationship with advertising spending. Conversely, the introduction of pure price caps schemes has had a positive and significant impact on firms’ advertising spending. These results highlight the importance of incentive compatible mechanism design in motivating firms to be market oriented and strive for superior performance.     

居民收入倍增：体制约束与制度因应——基于中国式财政分权的思考

中国式财政分权在成为推动经济增长体制性动力的同时,也是中国居民收入倍增的体制性约束,更是改善国民收入分配格局的体制性障碍,使以经济增长为主要目标的发展战略与服务于民生改善收入差距的目标存在体制性的内在冲突,最终形成了收入分配改善游离于经济增长系统之外的发展模式,造成普通民众难以或较少从经济增长中获得更多的福利改善。必须把财政分权作为一项完整的制度体系来看待,在认清中国式财政分权的动力机制和局限性的基础上,正确合理地设计制度方案,以创新的思维彻底系统地改造现有的分权体制,对于调节收入差距、实现居民收入倍增而言是最根本性的举措。     

FAMILY FIRMS,BANK RELATIONSHIPS,AND FINANCIAL CONSTRAINTS: A COMPREHENSIVE SCORE CARD

We examine the effect of financial constraints on firm investment and cash flow. We combine data from the Spanish Mercantile Registry and the Bank of Spain Credit Registry to classify firms according to whether they are family‐owned, not family‐owned, or belong to a family‐linked network of firms and according to their number of banking relations (with none, one, or several banks). Our empirical strategy is structural, based on a dynamic model solved numerically to generate the joint distribution of firm capital (size), investment, and cash flow, both in cross sections and in panel data. We consider three alternative financial settings: saving only, borrowing and lending, and moral hazard constrained state‐contingent credit. We estimate each setting via maximum likelihood and compare across these financial regimes. Based on the estimated financial regime, we show that family firms, especially those belonging to networks based on ownership, are associated with a more flexible market or contract environment and are less financially constrained than nonfamily firms. This result survives stratifications of family and nonfamily firms by bank status, region, industry, and time period. Family firms are better able to allocate funds and smooth investment across states of the world and over time, arguably done informally or using the cash flow generated at the level of the network. We also validate our structural approach by demonstrating that it performs well in traditional categories, by stratifying firms by size and age, and find that smaller and younger firms are more constrained than larger and older firms.     

预算约束与金融制度选择的新理论:文献述评

本文的考察发现,在预算约束与金融制度结构之间存在着十分紧密的逻辑联系,而且国内外不少文献已经围绕于此展开了广泛而深入的讨论。针对预算约束与金融制度选择的关系,现有文献的理论发现大致包括三个层面:第一,虽然缓解乃至消除软预算约束是任何一种金融体系共同面临的挑战,但软预算约束的消除并非一定有利于长期经济增长;第二,分权的或者集权的金融体制都具有"内生性",因此,至少在理论上无法对其进行孰优孰劣的直观评判,同时也无法在它们之间进行简单的复制和移植;第三,金融体系应对预算约束问题的能力要远弱于企业制度,因此,当一个国家面对预算约束问题时,应当首先着手改善微观经济基础的金融需求结构,而不是调整金融供给结构。