Fiscal institutions and the funding of US state and local pension plans

This paper investigates the relationship between the funded ratio of US public pension plans and several fiscal institutions adopted by state governments. The author analysed a large data set from 1997 to 2012, and found that states with stricter balanced budget requirements and debt limits had a lower pension funded ratio, whereas states with tax and spending limits in place had a higher funded ratio. The findings contribute to the current debate on public sector pension reforms in the US and internationally.     

An examination of state and local government pension underfunding – Implications and guidance for governance and regulation

State and local government pension underfunding has become a major focus of public policy debate due in large part to recent Governmental Accounting Standards Board (GASB) actions that have brought national attention to the issue. The extent of these plans underfunding has been debated, along with the necessity for state government intervention and the level of regulatory actions that should be enacted by state legislatures. State and local public pension plans do not fall under the enumerated powers of the federal government in the Constitution and are therefore left to each individual state to regulate. The amount of plan underfunding and enacted public policy by state varies greatly. Additionally, in contrast to numerous state balanced-budget laws, legal directives for fully funding public pensions are virtually non-existent. This paper analyzes the state and local public pension crisis, examines current and long-term risk, studies public employee fiscal conditions, considers the societal impacts of these plans, considers the strengths and weakness of pension plan types, recommends public policy and regulation, and offers strategies for managers, board members, and public officials to adopt.     

Public pensions and labor supply over the life cycle

In order to remain fiscally solvent, governments of many countries have reformed their public pension schemes to encourage labor supply at older ages. These reforms include reductions in the generosity of public pensions and reduced penalties for working past the normal retirement age. In this paper, we consider how reforms to public pension systems affect labor supply over the life cycle. We put the recent empirical evidence on the effect of government pensions on labor supply in a life cycle context, and we present evidence on the effectiveness of tax reforms for stimulating labor supply over the life cycle. Our main conclusion is that the labor supply of older workers is responsive to changes in retirement incentives. The labor supply of younger workers is less responsive. Thus the trend towards lower taxes on older workers in many developed countries should continue to fuel their trend towards later retirement.     

THE EFFECT OF SFAS 87 ON CORPORATE FUNDING OF DEFINED BENEFIT PENSION PLANS

Statement of Financia1 Accounting Standards No. 87 (SFAS 87) modifies the method of accounting for pensions by requiring companies sponsoring defined benefit pension plans to (1) recognize a balance sheet liability for unfunded pension benefits and (2) disclose their obligation for pension benefits based on expected future compensation levels (the projected benefit obligation). These requirements may affect users' perceptions of a company's financial position, especially if these plans are underfunded. This research examines whether the requirements of SFAS 87 result in increased funding of corporate pension plans to counteract possible adverse perceptions of users about these plans. The results indicate that early adopters (companies adopting SFAS 87 in 1985 and 1986) increased the funding of their defined benefit pension plans in response to SFAS 87 ; however, later adopters did not do so. These findings provide evidence that companies may alter economic policies when faced with significant changes in financial disclosure requirements. Further analysis suggests that the effect of SFAS 87 on the pension expense recognized by the sample companies provided impetus for early adoption of this pronouncement.     

Wages,productivity, and retirement

Pensions, both state provided and privately provided, affect incentives to retire. But private pensions are part of the long term compensation package, and altering pensions not only affects retirement incentives, but also wages. A key factor in determining whether retirement occurs at the appropriate age is the relation of productivity to alternatives. When wages, coupled with public and private pension accrual, deviate from worker productivity, private retirement incentives are distorted. Sometimes this results in too much early retirement, creating fiscal difficulties. Sometimes, it results in a desire for delayed retirement, which argues for mandatory retirement rules. Pay compression, where wages do not vary across individuals as much as productivity, exacerbate distortions. Defined benefit pension plans tend to create incentives to retire after a certain number of years of work. Defined contribution plans do not have this feature. Public plans should be designed noting their interaction with incentives that are already inherent in the private wage and pension schemes.     

Wagner’s law,fiscal discipline,and intergovernmental transfer: empirical evidence at the US and German state levels

Does fiscal discipline restrain the government from increasing its budget size? To answer this question, this paper investigates whether Wagner’s law is satisfied for two types of states: US states, in which fiscal sovereignty is established, and German states, in which fiscal transfer dependence is high and budget constraints are softened. In US states, we demonstrate that Wagner’s law is validated, while some of the balanced budget requirements weaken the validity of the law. In German states, we find an “inverse” law, especially after the bailouts of Bremen and Saarland. The “inverse” law is a new channel of growth in government size and means that soft budget constraints cause significant negative correlation between government size and output. These results are robust regardless of whether intergovernmental fiscal transfers are taken into account, while they quantitatively change the validity of the law. Our findings imply that the characteristics of fiscal discipline are the prime determinants of the channel and degree of growth in government size.     

Public Pension Promises: How Big Are They and What Are They Worth?

We calculate the present value of state employee pension liabilities using discount rates that reflect the risk of the payments from a taxpayer perspective. If benefits have the same default and recovery characteristics as state general obligation debt, the national total of promised liabilities based on current salary and service is $3.20 trillion. If pensions have higher priority than state debt, the value of liabilities is much larger. Using zero‐coupon Treasury yields, which are default‐free but contain other priced risks, promised liabilities are $4.43 trillion. Liabilities are even larger under broader concepts that account for salary growth and future service.     

The elusive relation between pension discount rates and deficits

The relation between defined-benefit (DB) pension discount rates and funding status is more complex than it might first appear. Existing evidence suffers from estimation biases that make precise inference unreliable. We document the biases and quantify their impact on inference in relation to corporate window-dressing of DB funding status. Our empirical evidence from the United Kingdom suggests that pension sponsors use discretion in the choice of pension discount rate not only to reduce reported deficits but also to reduce reported surpluses.     

Analyzing state government spending: balanced budget rules or forward-looking decisions?

We analyze US state government spending behavior with a general intertemporal model allowing for asymmetry in balanced budget rules in a panel data setting. We find no strong evidence for forward-looking behavior in state spending; balanced budget rules are a significant constraint. States with budget rules imposing lighter restrictions are more likely to exhibit habit formation, while those with stricter rules demonstrate asymmetric responses to revenue changes. Evidence for a precautionary savings motive is limited. Balanced budget requirements trigger substantial pro-cyclical spending, possibly amplifying state economic volatility for states with tight fiscal rules, especially after revenue increases.

     

An analysis of risk-taking behavior for public defined benefit pension plans

This paper presents the first comprehensive study on the determinants of public pension fund investment risk and reports several new important findings. Unlike private pension plans, public funds undertake more risk if they are underfunded and have lower investment returns in the previous years, consistent with the risk transfer hypothesis. Furthermore, pension funds in states facing fiscal constraints allocate more assets to equity and have higher betas. There also appears to be a herding effect in that CalPERS equity allocation or beta is mimicked by other pension funds. Finally, our results suggest that government accounting standards strongly affect pension fund risk, as higher return assumptions (used to discount pension liabilities) are associated with higher equity allocation and portfolio beta.     

Pension plan solvency and extreme market movements: a regime switching approach

We develop and test a new approach to assess defined benefit (DB) pension plan solvency risk in the presence of extreme market movements. Our method captures both the ‘fat-tailed’ nature of asset returns and their correlation with discount rate changes. We show that the standard assumption of constant discount rates leads to dramatic underestimation of future projections of pension plan solvency risk. Failing to incorporate leptokurtosis into asset returns also leads to downward biased estimates of risk, but this is less pronounced than the time-varying discount rate effect. Further modifying the model to capture the correlation between asset returns and the discount rate provides additional improvements in the projection of future pension plan solvency. This reduces the perceived future risk of underfunding because of the negative correlation between interest rate changes and asset returns. These results have important implications for those with responsibility for balancing risk against expected return when seeking to improve the current poor funding positions of DB pension schemes.     

Public capital, public pension, and growth

This paper constructs an endogenous growth model with overlapping generations, whose engine of economic growth is productive public capital. We investigate a public policy under which the government allocates tax revenue between investment in public capital accumulation and public pension provision. We show that increasing the share of spending on public pensions always reduces economic growth. However, we show numerically that public pension provision improves social welfare and there exists an optimal share of spending on public pension provision unless the value of the time discount factor of the government is sufficiently high. Moreover, we show that in an economy facing an aging population, an increase in social security provision for the old rather than an increase in public investment can be preferable from the viewpoint of social welfare.     

“Actuarial Issues in the Novels of Jane Austen”, Daniel D. Skwire,January 1997

Social security systems for old age have been explicitly studied in a public choice framework for more than 30 years. They illustrate extremely well the problems of allocating economic resources through a system of voting. Despite actuarial interest in state pension systems and despite the actuarial calculations that are needed to understand long-term public choice trends, there is almost no reference to public choice economics in the actuarial pensions literature. It can be argued that pension systems currently provide some of the most significant threats to the long-term budget positions of developed countries, a point that was made in the Nobel Laureate lecture of Professor James Buchanan over 24 years ago. In this article, we look at the costs and benefits that will be faced by different groups of voters as a result of state pension reform in the United Kingdom. The results of this analysis suggest that a majority of the electorate will have a strong financial interest in opposing state pension reform except where reform involves raising retirement ages. These results are in accordance not just with theoretical work but with other empirical work and practical observations.     

Do pension buyouts help or hurt employees (retirees)?

This article compares expected pension default losses of employees and retirees before and after pension buyouts. The comparisons are made using a stochastic model calibrated with market data. The analysis shows that the lower protection level provided by the State Guarantee Association relative to that of the Pension Benefit Guaranty Corporation (PBGC) is a critical factor that explains the welfare reduction, or equivalently, larger expected pension default losses, of most retirees who become annuity holders in the buyouts. The analysis also shows that the employee welfare, or equivalently expected pension default gains or losses, depends on the continued PBGC protection and, critically, their employers' postbuyout default risk and pension funding status. Moreover, these employee welfare changes are quite different for the corporations included in this analysis. Our results suggest that welfare improvements depend on the PBGC and state insurance regulators' cooperation in protecting pension participants and supervising buyout insurers.     

论社会保障

在对美国社会保障制度改革的政策建议中,彼得·戴蒙德教授主张通过养老金相关参数的调整来适应未来养老基金支出增长的压力,方式是改善养老金待遇标准和税收规则以确保养老基金的精算平衡。其基本观点是:第一,社会保障是退休后收入的基础,是防止贫困和失去保险机会的保障,所以社会保障制度应该建立;第二,因为人们很少自愿进行养老金积累,年金化的强制性公共养老金就非常重要,一是能平衡终生收入,二是能够提供就业激励;第三,公共养老金计划对工人及其家庭,特别是儿童、配偶和遗属有重要保障作用;第四,延迟退休能提高未来的消费,设计合理的待遇累进原则和退休审查制度会有助于增加劳动激励;第五,养老金的代际转移是一种再分配,较多的再分配会对工作生涯形成激励;第六,为实现精算平衡,应引入自动平衡机制来自动调整税率和待遇水平,以减少立法的压力。     

Credible Pensions*

One of the main problems in pension policy is to develop an institutional framework that guarantees that public and private pensions promises are kept. This paper discusses how the governance of public and private pensions is key to making such promises credible. It argues that credibility concerns undermine the case for earnings‐related pensions run by the state and private defined benefit plans.     

The Public Responsibility of Actuaries in American Pensions

Abstract

This article traces the history of the public responsibility of actuaries concerning American pension plans. It includes both defined-benefit and defined-contribution plans for employees of both private and public employers. It does not include Social Security. Actuaries have provided innovative approaches to plan design, funding, funding instruments, accounting, and legal and regulatory requirements. Actuaries have made substantial contributions that have enabled pension plans, together with Social Security, to provide economic security for millions of workers and their dependents when employment ends. However, many Americans still lack assurance of a retirement income that is initially adequate, continues for life, and keeps pace with inflation. Thus, challenges will continue to face pension actuaries in the years ahead.     

英国职业养老金发展动态及启示

本文介绍了英国职业养老金的基本情况。在老龄化等影响下,英国公共部门和私有部门职业养老金分别出现了严重危机。近年英国政府全面加强了职业养老金改革,包括实施养老金个人账户制,调整公共部门养老金政策,提出加强工作养老金的设想等。这些政策的核心是如何设计一种更有效率,但同时保障了人们养老需求的市场化私有养老金模式。英国职业养老金的发展的经验教训,对我国完善养老金制度有积极启示意义。     

Cash balance pension plans: A case of standard-setting inadequacy

Accounting for and ownership of U.S. private employee pensions has long been a controversial and politically contested terrain. The uniqueness in the U.S. of using employers as the principal provider of pensions makes the reporting of pensions more problematic since the corporate employers providing pensions are not strictly accountable to only the pensioners. Over the last quarter century there has been a marked swing in power toward management and away from employees making it possible for increasing numbers of U.S. companies to switch from conventional defined benefit plans to cash balance plans. This paper provides a “case” study of how accounting standard-setters framed the pension reporting problem vis-à-vis how they frame the “reporting problem” in general. Utilizing various sources of commentary about the phenomenon of cash-balance conversions, we triangulate on the pension problem to demonstrate how current FASB disclosure rules fail to satisfy the condition of neutrality and how those rules have facilitated the shifting of economic risk from shareholders to employees.     

公务员养老金制度并轨改革的设计思路与精算评估

我国公务员与企业职工的退休待遇存在巨大差距,养老保险制度的公平性备受质疑,由制度差异带来的阻碍人才流动等弊端日益凸显,已成为近年来社会关注的焦点问题,本文在分析公务员的职业特点及其养老保障特殊性的基础上,借鉴国际经验,并基于融入全国统一的养老金体系和保护公务员既得权益的考虑,给出了公务员养老金改革应采取“基本养老金＋职业年金”的设计思路和具体方案,测算分析了改革方案对个人和财政支出的影响以及在实施上的可行性。