Central banks' voting records,the financial crisis and future monetary policy

We examine whether central banks' voting records help predict the future course of monetary policy in the Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland, Sweden and the United Kingdom, controlling for financial market expectations. Unlike previous research, we first examine the period of the global financial crisis, characterized by a high level of uncertainty, and second, examine the predictive power of voting records over longer time horizons, i.e., the next monetary policy meeting and beyond. We find that voting records predict the policy rate set at the next meeting in all central banks that are recognized as independent. In some central banks, voting records are found—before, but not during, the financial crisis—to be informative about monetary policy at even more distant time horizons.     

Risk,uncertainty, and leverage

Using mostly theoretical models and traditional risk/uncertainty measures (VIX index, panic, precaution, scary bad news, etc.), the current literature tries to clarify the risk/uncertainty-deleveraging pattern. The findings are not sufficient to explain the dynamic empirical relationship between modern risk/uncertainty indicators and leverage. We fill this gap in the literature by using US quarterly data, from 1985:1 to 2018:4, Granger causality tests, and a structural vector autoregression model. We find that commercial bank leverage rises when geopolitical risk and macroeconomic, policy, and equity uncertainty increase. Client-based business relationships of banks and high government borrowing from banks during crises periods are responsible for this relationship. We find that the leverage of broker-dealers and shadow banks declines when Chicago risk and macroeconomic, policy, financial, and equity uncertainty increase. We argue that the vulnerability of broker-dealers and shadow banks to the risk/uncertainty of the entire market system is responsible for this relationship.     

Consumer perception of deposit insurance: little awareness,limited effectiveness?

The empirical findings on bank runs and market discipline are at odds with the theoretical predictions from the literature, at least in emerging markets. Using unique survey data from the Netherlands, we explore two possible explanations: deposit holders may have limited knowledge of deposit insurance (DI)-schemes or they may not fully trust these schemes to be executed faithfully. We find that knowledge on the eligibility for DI is limited, particularly when it concerns minor banks. Nevertheless, households with more deposits have better knowledge of the DI-scheme and show higher levels of trust. In addition, deposit holders generally expect an associated payback time that well exceeds the time it has taken to pay back depositors in the past. Moreover, consumers believe repayment is more likely and faster for large, systemic banks. These results confirm that both households’ awareness of the coverage and trust in the operations of the DI-scheme are suboptimal.     

The effect of economic policy uncertainty on bank valuations

This article examines how economic policy uncertainty (EPU) affects bank valuations. Using a large sample of banks over a long period, we find that EPU has a negative effect on bank valuations. One explanation for this result is that EPU reduces bank loan growth, and lower loan growth then leads to lower bank valuations. Consistent with this explanation, we find that the negative effect of EPU is more pronounced for banks with a higher ratio of loans to total assets.     

National culture and national savings: is there a link?

We study the effect of national culture on economic decisions, focusing on GLOBE cultural dimensions of uncertainty avoidance and future orientation. Specifically, we study the effect of divergence between cultural values and practices (societal aspirations), on the aggregate savings decision. Using the life-cycle model of savings as our basic model, we find that societal aspirations are important in explaining national savings behavior. In particular, we show that societal aspirations relating to future orientation and uncertainty avoidance have a positive effect on the rate of savings. We interpret our findings to indicate that such societal aspirations lead to mistrust in the societal arrangements and institutions, and induce savings as a means of securing the future and reducing uncertainty. To substantiate this interpretation, we utilize the microfinance industry; showing that high societal aspirations are associated with preference for savings through member-owned microfinance institutions (MFIs) over savings through non-member-owned MFIs.     

Chinese Shadow Banking: The Case of Trust Funds

Abstract:

This study provides an updated analysis of Chinese trust funds—a specialized and important type of shadow banking. This study is the first to estimate the contribution of Chinese trust funds to economic growth, and also the first to examine the association between trust funds and the volatility of Chinese stock markets. It makes a novel contribution in showing that Chinese trust loans play a negative role in interest rate passthrough from the policy rate to the lending rates of commercial banks.     

A sticky trait: Social trust among Swedish expatriates in countries with varying institutional quality

Social trust is linked to many desirable economic and social outcomes. Using new data from a representative sample of 2668 Swedish expatriates, we examine the robustness of high social trust in countries with different levels of institutional quality. The results suggest that individual trust decreases with length of stay in countries with high corruption and low rule of law. The effect is relatively small and driven by expatriates who were aged 30 years or below upon arrival to the new country. While other studies have found that trust among migrants adapts to destination country trust levels, we find that after the (approximate) age of 30, high trust is a sticky personality trait. The results are robust to controlling for a large array of individual characteristics (including age) and support the view that social trust is sensitive to events that occur early in life.     

Debt Concentration and Bargaining Power: Large Banks,Small Banks,and Secondary Market Prices

Commerical bank debts of developing countries are held by large international banks and smaller domestic banks. This paper investigates how debt concentration—the proportion of a country's debt held by large banks relative to small banks—affects the secondary market price for these loans. We find that countries with higher concentrations have higher secondary-market prices. We explain this empirical finding in a bargaining model that endogenizes the maximum penalty that banks can credibly impose on a recalcitrant debtor. We show that the banks' bargaining power increases with the degree of debt concentration, thus increasing repayment and secondary-market prices.     

Trust and growth: a shaky relationship

We conduct an extensive robustness analysis of the relationship between trust and growth by investigating a later time period and a bigger sample than in previous studies. In addition to robustness tests that focus on model uncertainty, we systematize the investigation of outlier influence on the results by using the robust estimation technique Least Trimmed Squares. We find that when outliers (especially China) are removed, the trust-growth relationship is no longer robust. On average, the trust coefficient is half as large as in previous findings.      

Does a bank's business model affect its capital and profitability?

We use a data-driven classification of systemically important European banks into business models based on confidential granular supervisory data and investigate whether banks following different models differ with respect to their capitalisation and profitability. Our aim is to locate the banks' business model in a risk-return space. Using an instrumental variables approach, our econometric methodology addresses potential endogeneity issues. Overall, we find that wholesale funded and securities holding banks are positioned on a relatively high risk-return trade-off plane compared with commercial banks. On the other hand, traditional commercial banks earn lower returns with moderate risk.     

Culture in Preferences for Income Equality and Safety Nets

Economic and social policies vary across countries, reflecting their cultures and shaping them. People in some countries are more loss averse than in others. People in some countries express stronger preferences for income equality than do people in others, and some countries offer stronger safety nets than others do. The cultural dimension of uncertainty avoidance expresses the degree to which people in a country feel uncomfortable with uncertainty and the way a country deals with the fact that the future can never be known. The author finds that uncertainty avoidance is associated with loss aversion. People are more loss averse in the domains of both portfolios and jobs in countries where uncertainty avoidance is high. Moreover, people in countries where uncertainty avoidance is high express stronger preferences for income equality, and social spending in such countries is high. The cultural dimension of power distance expresses the degree to which the less powerful members of a society accept and expect that power is distributed unequally. The author finds that people in countries where power distance is high express weaker preference for income equality, and social spending in such countries is low.     

Risk sharing and export performance with firm heterogeneity

We investigate how market uncertainty affects the export performance of a firm through financial frictions. We first extend Melitz's (2003) heterogeneous firm trade model by incorporating demand shocks, linking the demand uncertainties to the financing costs of firms. In this extension, the default probability is endogenously determined by a firm's productivity and demand uncertainty. Hence, firms with higher productivity or lower market uncertainty are offered lower interest rates and thus show better export performance. As an application, we also show that a risk-sharing mechanism, that pools default risk for a certain group of firms, lowers the default risk. This mechanism allows banks to charge lower interest rates to the member firms and therefore ultimately improves their export performance in both extensive and intensive margins. We find a real-world example of such a mechanism from business groups in Korea. Using Korean firm-level data, we show that the more diversified the business group, the greater the likelihood that its member firms export and the bigger their export revenues. We also show that our results are robust to alternative explanations for Korean business groups’ export competitiveness.     

Market power versus efficiency under uncertainty: conventional versus Islamic banking in the GCC

In this article we estimate the effect of concentration on intermediation margins in Gulf Cooperation Council's (GCC) Islamic and conventional banking under the assumption that margins are uncertain. The empirical model, which we formally derive from an expected utility maximization problem, allows us to test for risk aversion as well as competitive conduct in loan and the deposit markets. The model also yields an expression showing that the effect of concentration on margins is the sum of its respective effects on market power, marginal cost of intermediation and marginal cost of uncertainty. The expression allows us to test whether concentration is welfare enhancing, reducing or neutral. We find Islamic banks to be risk-averse and conventional banks to be risk-neutral. We also find that concentration is welfare-neutral in Islamic loans and deposits, welfare-enhancing in conventional loans and welfare-neutral in conventional deposits. We used Nonlinear Two-Stage Least Squares (N2SLS) and Nonlinear Three-Stage Least Squares (N3SLS) to check for robustness.     

The role of liquidity in monetary policy transmission: Evidence from Indian banks1

The role of bank liquidity in monetary policy transmission has received insufficient attention in the literature. Faced with monetary tightening, banks with more liquidity can sell off securities and protect their loan portfolios. We test this proposition using panel data for Indian banks during 2005–2020. Employing dynamic threshold panel regressions with liquid assets as the threshold variable, we show that bank lending declines with monetary policy tightening in low liquidity regimes, but not in high liquidity regimes. We also find evidence for different portfolio reallocation behaviour by banks in high versus low liquidity regimes in response to monetary policy changes.     

Too-Big-To-Fail: Why Megabanks Have Not Become Smaller Since the Global Financial Crisis?

ABSTRACT

More than ten years after the global financial crisis, what has happened to the ‘too-big-to-fail’ (TBTF) banks whose reckless behavior was among its preconditions, but which received public support and guarantees in the midst of that crisis? Insofar as this too-big-to-fail status helped create the crisis and then imposed costs on the rest of society, we would expect these banks to have shrunk. We investigate the evolution of 31 global-TBTF banks and find that their overall size has hardly recorded any substantial change. However, there is no sense of urgency in the flourishing post-crisis literature on TBTF banks about the need to contain their size; the prevalent view therein is that if properly regulated, the risks that arise from a financial system dominated by TBTF banks are manageable. This view rests on the same overly narrow theoretical underpinnings whose flaws were exposed in the crisis. We argue that too-big-to-fail banking is embedded in a set of self-reinforcing policies—consolidation, balance-sheet support through quantitative easing, favorable regulations, bank lobbying, and geo-economic and geo-political considerations—which explain why these banks have not shrunk and why they remain a threat to financial stability, well after the lessons of the crisis should have been learned.     

Money growth,uncertainty and macroeconomic activity: a multivariate GARCH analysis

The impact uncertainty has on money growth has received much attention in recent years and is an issue of critical importance to central banks, particularly for those, such as the European Central Bank (ECB), which place a strong emphasis on monetary analysis in monetary policy formulation. Some recent papers examining this issue use ad hoc estimates and measure variability rather than uncertainty. We employ a multivariate GARCH model, which measures uncertainty by the conditional variance of the data series, to investigate whether macroeconomic uncertainty and monetary uncertainty Granger-cause changes in real money. The estimated model also allows us to investigate how monetary uncertainty impacts economic activity. We find that macroeconomic uncertainty impacts positively on US real M2 growth over a two-year horizon but that monetary uncertainty does not cause changes in real M2. Instead, our results indicate that real money growth causes monetary uncertainty. Monetary uncertainty is found to have a negative effect on real economic activity and on macroeconomic uncertainty. We conclude by discussing the implications of these results and the methodological approach used for institutions such as the ECB that give monetary analysis a prominent role in their monetary policy strategy.     

为什么日本是一个“创业真空”国度

日本的创新水平处于全球前列，而日本社会创业的比例却很低，被称为“创业真空”国家。作为创业领域非常重要的概念和变量，一个国家新生创业者比例对于其经济发展至关重要。使用全球创业观察2014年的数据，采用个人层面是否为新生创业者和创业意愿作为主要因变量，分析国家层面的变量对于个人成为新生创业者的影响。结果发现，国家层面单一因素，如文化上的不确定性规避意识，对新生创业者并不产生显著影响，宏观经济的稳定性则会影响个人是否成为新生创业者。在加入年龄这一调节变量后，发现三者之间的交互项显著。这说明日本低创业率不仅仅是单方面因素导致的，而更是宏观经济不稳定性、不确定性规避以及老龄化三者之间共同影响的结果。研究结果对于正确理解日本创业现状以及制定促进创业的相关政策具有重要意义。     

Portfolio behaviour of selected financial institutions in Canada

It is by now fairly well accepted that financial insititutions in general play role in a market-oriented economy. However,the aim of this paper is more limited. More particularty, it examines the nature of substitutability in the protfolios of selected financial institutions in Canada. The institutions covered are commercial banks, trust and mortgage companies, life insurance companies, and property and casualty companies. These four institutions are by far the most important. The assests covered are, in the most part, dictated by the availability of data. In spite of the obvious significance of the subject, there has been remarkably little work in this area in Canada. The only comprehensive study seems to be that by the Bank of Canada (Clinton and Masson, 1975). However, even this study is confined to the behaviour of commercial banks and the trust and mortgage companies, althouth the treatment of the trust and mortgage companies' portfolio is rather minimal only because just one of its assets is studied. The study covered monthly data until the end of December 1973. The scheme of this paper is as follows. In section I, we briefly discuss the model, the data and the estimation procedures used. In section II the results are given and discussed. The paper concludes with a summary of the main results.     

DOES BIG GOVERNMENT HURT GROWTH LESS IN HIGH‐TRUST COUNTRIES?

Social trust is linked to both public sector size and to economic growth, thereby helping to explain how some countries combine high taxes with high levels of economic growth. This paper examines if social trust insulates countries against the negative effects of public sector size on growth, documented in several studies. We note that the effect is theoretically ambiguous. In panel data from 66 countries across 40 years, we find no robust evidence of insulation effects: when excluding countries with uncertain trust scores, our results suggest that big government hurts growth also in high‐trust countries, and that the mechanism is by lowering private investments. (JEL H10, O11, P16, Z10)     

Does trust promote growth?

We examine the effect of generalized trust on long-term economic growth. Unlike in previous studies, we use Bayesian model averaging to deal rigorously with model uncertainty and attendant omitted variable bias. In addition, we address endogeneity and assess whether the effect of trust on growth is causal. Examining more than forty regressors for nearly fifty countries, we show that trust exerts a positive effect on long-term growth and, based on the posterior inclusion probabilities, suggest that trust is an important driver of long-term growth. Our results also show that trust is key for growth in countries with a weak rule of law.