Optimal fiscal and monetary policies in the face of rare disasters

This paper studies optimal fiscal and monetary policies in an economy exposed to large adverse shocks (rare disasters). We contrast optimal policies under commitment and discretion and identify several striking differences between these institutional environments. A government that can commit to its policy plans relies heavily on debt to smooth the adverse effects of large shocks over time. Lack of commitment seriously limits the government's ability to use debt as a shock absorber. Under discretion, an increase in debt leads to an increase in inflation expectations and therefore higher nominal interest rate distortions. Hence, the discretionary government keeps debt in close vicinity of its steady-state level, and the response of taxes, inflation, and interest rates to shocks is much more pronounced under discretion than under commitment. This is particularly relevant for large shocks and when the initial stock of government debt is already high at the time the shock occurs. We also argue that the adverse welfare effects of disasters are larger under discretion than under commitment, but these welfare differentials can be significantly reduced by making the discretionary government inflation averse.     

DEBT NONNEUTRALITY,POLICY INTERACTIONS,AND MACROECONOMIC STABILITY*

We study the consequences of nonneutrality of government debt for macroeconomic stabilization policy in a sticky‐price model. Ricardian equivalence fails because debt has a negative impact on its rate of return and on private savings, which is induced by assuming transaction services of bonds. Under aggressive monetary policy regimes, macroeconomic fluctuations tend to be stabilized if nominal budget deficits are low. A smooth debt path limits inflation expectations, such that inflation variances can be reduced. Under a balanced budget policy, the central bank's output gap–inflation volatility trade‐off is improved relative to an environment where debt is neutral.     

Inflation and the fiscal limit

We use a rational expectations framework to assess the implications of rising debt in an environment with a “fiscal limit”. The fiscal limit is defined as the point where the government no longer has the ability to finance higher debt levels by increasing taxes, so either an adjustment to fiscal spending or monetary policy must occur to stabilize debt. We give households a joint probability distribution over the various policy adjustments that may occur, as well as over the timing of when the fiscal limit is hit. One policy option that stabilizes debt is a passive monetary policy, which generates a burst of inflation that devalues the existing nominal debt stock. The probability of this outcome places upward pressure on inflation expectations and poses a substantial challenge to a central bank pursuing an inflation target. The distribution of outcomes for the path of future inflation has a fat right tail, revealing that only a small set of outcomes imply dire inflationary scenarios. Avoiding these scenarios, however, requires the fiscal authority to renege on some share of future promised transfers.     

Monetary Policy Coordination and the Level of National Debt

This paper uses the Canzoneri-Henderson benchmark framework of monetary policy coordination in interdependent economies to analyze how high levels of national debt affect monetary policy interactions. Using a two-country model, I first study how central banks interact in a flexible exchange-rate regime. I find that a low-debt country is better off interacting with a country with high debt, when both economies are affected by an aggregate inflationary shock. I also consider a political dependence scenario, in which central banks are subject to political pressure. In the case of a debt-burdened country, the political incentive to reduce interest payments on debt will spur a Gordon–Barro like inflation bias. However, under a flexible exchange-rate regime, the low-debt country will not be affected. Under a monetary union instead, political pressure may affect the low-debt country as well, and possibly create an inflation bias even greaterthan in the flexible exchange-rate regime. This scenario presents another example of how Rogoff's counterproductive monetary cooperation may arise under European Monetary Union.     

Impact of foreign prices and interest rates on canadian economy under alternative monetary and exchange rate regimes

The main objective of this paper is to analyze the impact of U.S. short- and long-term monetary policy under both flexible and managed floating systems, using the new CANDIDE Model 2.0. We have also examined the role of domestic monetary policy in the Canadian economy under both fixed and flexible exchange rate systems. The following are some of the important findings of our study:

1. Our results support the traditional view that under the fixed exchange rate regime, monetary authorities cannot successfully pursue an independent monetary policy from its trading partners — an effort to increase money supply will be almost offset by increases in the balance of payments deficit. In contrast, in the flexible exchange rate regime, monetary policy is more effective in producing an increased growth in output and employment. However the increased output growth comes at the cost of higher prices induced by increased wages and a depreciation of the Canadian dollar.
2. Our results suggest that the impact of U.S. interest rates on investment, GNE, employment, productivity, and government debt is less severe in a pure floating exchange rate regime, compared to the managed floating system. However, the impact of U.S. interest rate policy on the Canadian inflation rate is worse in the case of flexible exchange rate regime. Even though real income and inflation are less favourable in both cases, our results indicate a trade-off between output growth and inflation.
3. Our results imply that under a pure floating monetary authorities can determine the long-run rate of inflation in Canada independent of others. However, the United States and Canadian economies are interrelated during the adjustment process, even under the flexible exchange rates, through the terms of trade and the wage-price spiral channels.

     

Public debt indexation and denomination with an independent central bank

This paper examines the interaction between public debt management and the design of monetary institutions. The analysis shows that delegation of monetary policy to an independent central bank is more effective in containing inflationary expectations than the use of foreign currency or inflation-indexed debt. If delegation of monetary policy is viable, the optimal policy is to issue nominal debt. This increases the sensitivity of taxes and output to unexpected inflation, thus minimizing the inflation needed to offset supply shocks. Evidence on central bank independence, debt composition and output variability suggests that the normative argument has some positive content.     

Central bank instruments, fiscal policy regimes, and the requirements for equilibrium determinacy

This paper examines the role of the monetary instrument choice for local equilibrium determinacy under sticky prices and different fiscal policy regimes. Corresponding to Benhabib et al.'s results for interest rate feedback rules [Benhabib, J., Schmitt-Grohé, S., Uribe, M., 2001. Monetary policy and multiple equilibria. American Economic Review 91, 167–185], the money growth rate should not rise by more than one for one with inflation when the primary surplus is raised with public debt. Under an exogenous primary surplus, money supply should be accommodating—such that real balances grow with inflation—to ensure local equilibrium determinacy. When the central bank links the supply of money to government bonds by controlling the bond-to-money ratio, an inflation stabilizing policy can be implemented for both fiscal policy regimes. Local determinacy is then ensured when the bond-to-money ratio is not extremely sensitive to inflation, or when interest payments on public debt are entirely tax financed, i.e., the budget is balanced.     

Monetary policy and fiscal limits with no-default

This paper discusses monetary and fiscal policy interactions that stabilize government debt. Two distortions prevail in the model economy: income taxes and liquidity constraints. Possible obstructions to fiscal policy include a ceiling on the equilibrium debt-to-GDP ratio, zero or negative elasticity of tax revenues, and a political intolerance of raising tax rates. At the fiscal limit two mechanisms restore solvency: fiscal inflation, which reduces the real value of nominal debt, and open market operations, which diminish the size of government debt held by the private sector. Three regimes achieve this goal. In all regimes monetary policy is passive. In all regimes a muted tax response to government debt is consistent with equilibrium. The propensity of a fiscal authority to smooth output is found to determine what is an acceptable response (in the form of tax rate changes) to the level of government debt, while monetary policy determines the timing and magnitude of fiscal inflation. Impulse responses show that the inflation and tax hikes needed to offset a permanent shock to transfers are lowest under nominal interest rate pegs. In this regime, most of the reduction in the real value of government debt comes from open market purchases.     

Fiscal limits and monetary policy: default vs. inflation

This paper studies the monetary policy trade-off between low inflation and low sovereign risk in the environment where fiscal authorities fail to fully ensure the sustainability of government debt. Building on the Fiscal Theory of Price Level (FTPL) and the Fiscal Theory of Sovereign Risk (FTSR), this paper differs in its baseline assumption about the monetary policy objective, which is neither to rule out defaults regardless of inflation costs (as in FTPL), nor to follow inflation targeting regardless of associated sovereign risk (as in FTSR). Instead, we study the case in which the central bank controls the risky interest rate to minimize the probability of default while ruling out large inflation hikes. We show that this policy regime can mitigate default risks only when the central bank is expected to allow sufficient increases in inflation. When agents believe that the central bank's tolerance toward inflation hikes has increased, equilibrium risk premium goes down, suggesting that information concerning changes in the central bank's preferences over inflation directly impacts default risks.     

Economy as Instituted Process: Change,Transformation, and Progress

During the past two decades, chronic fiscal deficits have led to elevated and rising ratios of government debt to nominal GDP in Japan. Nevertheless, long-term Japanese government bonds' (JGBs) nominal yields initially declined, and have since stayed remarkably low and stable. This is contrary to the received wisdom which holds that higher government deficits and indebtedness will exert upward pressures on nominal yields. This paper examines the relationship between JGBs' nominal yields and short-term interest rates, as well as other factors, such as low inflation, persistent deflationary pressures, and tepid growth. We also argue that Japan has monetary sovereignty, which gives the Japanese government the ability to service its debt, and enables the Bank of Japan (BOJ) to keep JGBs' nominal yields low by ensuring that short-term interest rates are low, and by using various other tools of monetary policy. The argument that short-term interest rates and monetary policy are the primarily drivers of long-term interest rates follows John Maynard Keynes's (1930) insights.     

Unconventional monetary policy and household debt: The role of cash-flow effects

We study the transmission of conventional and unconventional monetary policy shocks via the loan market, distinguishing between adjustable- and fixed-rate mortgages (ARMs and FRMs, respectively) and focusing on the relative importance of the income channel. Under ARMs, a conventional monetary policy shock implies a temporary cash-flow effect leading to a redistribution between savers and borrowers, a feature that is weaker, but more persistent, under FRMs. Also, an easing via unconventional operations – modelled as a shift in households’ preferences that reduces the term premium on long-term loan rates – has an expansionary effect on output and inflation, although more muted than the one recorded via a conventional monetary policy shock. In the former case, we find a modest contribution of cash-flow effect to the dynamics of consumption.     

On the Effectiveness of Monetary Policy and of Fiscal Policy

There has been a major shift within macroeconomic policy over the past two decades or so in terms of the relative importance given to monetary policy and to fiscal policy in both policy and theoretical terms. The former has gained considerably in importance, with the latter being rarely mentioned. Furthermore, the nature of monetary policy has shifted away from any attempt to control some monetary aggregate (prevalent in the first half of the 1980s), and instead monetary policy has focused on the setting of interest rates as the key policy instrument. There has also been a general shift towards the adoption of inflation targets and the use of monetary policy to target inflation. This paper considers the significance of this shift in the nature of monetary policy. This enables us to question the effectiveness of monetary policy, and to explore the role of fiscal policy. We examine these questions from the point of view of the "new consensus" in monetary economics and suggest that it is rather limited in its analysis. When the analysis is broadened out to embrace empirical issues and evidence the clear conclusion emerges that monetary policy is relatively impotent. The role of fiscal policy is also considered, and we argue that fiscal policy (under specified conditions) remains a powerful tool for macroeconomic policy. This is particularly an apt conclusion under current economic conditions.     

Fiscal consolidation under imperfect credibility

This paper examines the effects of expenditure-based fiscal consolidation when credibility as to whether the cuts will be long-lasting is imperfect. We contrast the impact limited credibility has when the consolidating country has the means to tailor monetary policy to its own needs, with the impact when the country is a small member of a currency union with a negligible effect on interest rates and on nominal exchange rates of the currency union. We find two key results. First, in the case of an independent monetary policy, the adverse impact of limited credibility is relatively small, and consolidation can be expected to reduce government debt at a relatively low output cost given that monetary policy provides more accommodation than it would under perfect credibility. Second, the lack of monetary accommodation under currency union membership implies that the output cost may be significantly larger, and that progress in reducing government debt in the short and medium term may be limited under imperfect credibility.     

Inflation and interest rates in the presence of a cost channel,wealth effect and agent heterogeneity

As far as the control of inflation is concerned, the interest rate is the most important monetary instrument. This paper examines the effectiveness of the interest rate policy in controlling inflation. The model utilized in this paper considers both demand and supply side effects of interest rate policy. These effects are used to derive not only the relevant impulse response functions but also the welfare loss to the society that arises from the supply side shocks. Based on their ability to control inflation and minimization of the overall welfare loss to the society, three policies are compared: (i) monetary policy with commitment, (ii) Taylor's rule, and (iii) inflation targeting. We argue that, in the presence of a cost channel, it is imperative that the interest rate policy is used with restraint. Our results also suggest that ignoring the cost channel of monetary policy can lead to significant under-estimation of the social welfare loss.     

Stabilization policy in a Keynes–Goodwin model with debt accumulation

In this paper, we investigate the macroeconomic impact of government's stabilization policy by using an analytical framework of Keynes–Goodwin model of growth cycle with debt accumulation. Formally, our model is formulated as a five-dimensional system of non-linear differential equations. We consider both of private debt and public debt, and we explicitly formulate the budget constraint of the ‘consolidated government’ including the central bank. We mainly study the case of ‘liquidity trap’ under money and debt financing of the government deficit.We study the local stability/instability of the system and the conditions for the existence of cyclical fluctuations analytically by means of the linear approximation method. We show that the sufficiently active monetary/fiscal policy can stabilize the intrinsically unstable economy if the inflation targeting by the central bank is sufficiently credible. We also present some numerical examples, which support our analysis.     

Household debt,macroprudential rules,and monetary policy

Today's Canadian economy features a historic high of household debt and persistently low growth rate. The average debt-to-GDP ratio has reached the level experienced in the U.S. just prior to the recent financial crisis. In this paper, we ask whether monetary policy should lean against the household indebtedness or macroprudential policies are better suited for the task. To provide a quantitative answer, we develop a small open economy dynamic stochastic general equilibrium model featuring a micro-founded banking sector. We estimate the model using Canadian data and conduct policy experiments. Our findings favor macroprudential approach to reining in indebtedness: using monetary policy that reacts to household debt increases inflation volatility and lowers borrowers' welfare, while using macroprudential policies such as lowering the loan-to-value ratio limit increases borrowers' welfare.     

Monetary Policy, Nominal Interest Rates, and Long–Horizon Inflation Uncertainty

Empirical evidence presented in this paper shows that the predictability of inflation at long horizons varies considerably across countries. Both simple theory and empirical evidence suggest that the crucial factor is the extent to which systematic monetary policy succeeds in preventing a unit root in inflation. The mechanism by which it does this appears however to be complicated by strong empirical evidence that nominal as well as real interest rates have real effects, which implies that monetary policy need not be so vigorous in reactions to inflation. This helps to explain why inflation rates in the US and (especially) Germany have been relatively predictable, despite monetary policy rules which appear to have been barely stabilising. The paper also presents tentative evidence that the power of nominal interest rate effects is inversely related to long–horizon inflation uncertainty, and hence ultimately uncertainty about monetary policy.     

The effect of monetary and fiscal credibility on public debt: empirical evidence from the Brazilian economy

This study relates to the literature regarding credibility effect on public debt for developing economies under inflation targeting. The novelty is the investigation of effects of both monetary and fiscal credibility on public debt and its management. The main idea is that high credibility might improve public debt management. With this purpose, this paper addresses empirical evidence based on the Brazilian experience. The findings denote that credibility is an important instrument to improve the public debt management under inflation targeting.     

Monetary policy, oil shocks, and TFP: Accounting for the decline in US volatility

An equilibrium model is used to assess the quantitative importance of monetary policy for the post-1984 decline in US inflation and output volatility. The principal finding is that monetary policy played a substantial role in reducing inflation volatility, but a small role in reducing real output volatility. The model attributes much of the decline in real output volatility to smaller TFP shocks. We also investigate the pattern of output and inflation volatility under an optimal monetary policy counterfactual. We find that real output volatility would have been somewhat lower, and inflation volatility substantially lower, had monetary policy been set optimally.     

Achieving the Best Fiscal Outcome: What Does the Government Need to Know?

This paper examines the operation of fiscal policy under incomplete information when the central bank sets the stance of monetary policy so as to achieve a zero inflation target. The fiscal authority is assumed to aim to achieve a target level for output and a zero level of public debt. The best fiscal policy setting arises under full information and is one where output attains its full employment level and public debt is driven to zero. Deviations from full information can lead to a considerable divergence from the best fiscal setting involving substantial levels of public sector indebtedness. The results suggest that a government should invest available resources determining what outcomes are achievable and what outcomes are not. Then it should focus all its energies on trying to deliver achievable outcomes. The benefits from such a strategy can be substantial.