新工业革命背景下多元智能组织研究——以GE和海尔为案例

新工业革命背景下组织需要从一元集权制向多元治理转变,本文通过对通用电气公司(GE)和海尔的跨案例研究发现组织从一元集权制向多元治理转变的“四反”演进路径。其中,“反集权”的本质是组织权利分化,组织演进逻辑是从“垂直”到“水平”,以构建赋权赋能为核心的扁平网络化组织。“反边界”的本质是组织边界扩张,组织演进逻辑是从“有形”到“无形”,以构建动态无边界的虚拟组织。“反分工”的本质是组织流程再造,组织演进逻辑是从“分散”到“整合”,以构建人机融合智能型组织。“反范式”的本质是管理范式转变,组织演进逻辑是从“有序”到“无序”,以构建平台为主要特征的后现代管理范式。进一步对“四反”路径进行整合分析,构建了基于“四反”的多元智能组织理论模型,该模型以后现代管理哲学为理论基础,符合新工业革命背景下组织发展的“与时俱进”的时代特征,将引领未来的组织发展方向。     

农村经济组织形态的演变与创新——山东省莱阳市农业产业化调查报告

农业产业化的进程也是一个农村经济组织演变和创新的过程。作者在对山东省莱阳市调研的基础上描述和分析了这一历史过程。在农业产业化之初 ,农村的主要经济组织形式是合作社和“龙头企业 +农户”。但是 ,这两种组织形式都存在着一些缺陷。前者主要是受制于资金不足和缺乏抵押性资产 ;后者主要是契约不能对当事人构成有效约束。为了克服这些缺陷 ,有必要引入组织中介 ,形成新的组织形式———“龙头企业+合作社 +农户”或“龙头企业 +大户 +农户”。这种组织变革在一定程度上弥补了原有制度缺陷 ,从而在实践中日益发展成为农业产业化的主要组织形态。但是 ,由于契约是不完全的 ,合作社和大户抵押性资产不足 ,这两种组织形式也面临着一些新问题 ,本文探索了组织改善和组织创新的路径。     

More on Marriage,Fertility, and the Distribution of Income*

According to Pareto (1896) , the distribution of income depends on “the nature of the people comprising a society, on the organization of the latter, and, also, in part, on chance.” In the model developed here the “nature of the people” is captured by attitudes toward marriage, divorce, fertility, and children. Singles search for mates in a marriage market. Married agents bargain about work, and the quantity and quality of children. They can divorce. Social policies, such as child support requirements, reflect the “organization of the (society).” Finally, “chance” is modeled by randomness in income, marriage opportunities, and marital bliss.     

Optimal search,learning and implementation

We characterize the incentive compatible, constrained efficient policy (“second-best”) in a dynamic matching environment, where impatient, privately informed agents arrive over time, and where the designer gradually learns about the distribution of agents? values. We also derive conditions on the learning process ensuring that the complete-information, dynamically efficient allocation of resources (“first-best”) is incentive compatible. Our analysis reveals and exploits close, formal relations between the problem of ensuring implementable allocation rules in our dynamic allocation problems with incomplete information and learning, and between the classical problem, posed by Rothschild (1974) [20], of finding optimal stopping policies for search that are characterized by a reservation price property.     

Trade,Growth, and Increasing Returns to Infrastructure: The Role of the Sophisticated Monopolist*

Equilibrium in international trade with increasing returns in infrastructure depends on whether the infrastructure provider is “naïve” or sophisticated. A monopolist produces infrastructure under decreasing cost using fixed equipment. Unlike similar work, we derive a unique closed‐economy equilibrium. In a small open economy, with “naïve” infrastructure provider(s), multiple equilibria obtain. The industrial export potential of the economy depends on unexhausted economies of scale, and equilibria are possible where manufactures are exported despite an autarky price higher than the world price. With a sophisticated infrastructure provider, even an open economy has a unique equilibrium, which, at least as long as economies of scale are unexhausted, also involves more industrialization than the “naïve” equilibria. Access to the unlimited world market is necessary for significant industrialization but is not sufficient: one may also require “Schumpeterian” entrepreneurs, monopolists with a panoramic vision of the economy and of their catalytic role in it.     

网络时代的新组织形成与“四维”形式研究

网络时代下,新的组织现象和组织形式不断涌现,有必要通过对新组织形成的动因、遵循的基本导向、新组织的各种形式等问题综合剖析以揭示新组织的价值创造过程及其本质。国内外近50年来关于新组织的研究提出,以互联网为核心的计算机通信技术带来的技术变革、认知转变和企业应变催生了新组织的出现;新组织的形成遵循知识创造、协作创新和角色重构三个基本导向;新组织形式的“相对新颖性”包括新结构、新主体、新形态和新要素四个方面,构成新组织的“四维”形式。新组织的价值创造过程本质上是由技术变革引发组织形式变化,进而导致组织能力提高形成的。对比科层组织与新组织的组织范式以及各种形式发现,利用新组织形式的多样、灵活、非理性特征对科层制组织架构进行适时调整,是科层组织演化、避免科层陷阱的重要方式。     

项目申请者“头衔”更有利于科研绩效提升吗——一个面向国家社科基金教育学项目产出的倒序评估

如何预判项目申请者的科研绩效是科研资助中的焦点问题。不同于传统做法，以已结题的国家社科基金教育学项目产出为既定绩效，利用倾向得分匹配方法，倒序评估项目申请者既有“头衔”对产出绩效的因果效应，结果发现：项目申请者“头衔”显著提升了科研绩效，较行政职务头衔，学术荣誉头衔带来的科研绩效提升更显著。但并非所有类型头衔都显著作用于科研绩效，确切地讲，教育部新世纪人才、国务院特殊津贴专家、校长、院长、研究所所长及副所长等头衔更有利于科研绩效提升。对此，基金主管部门可通过适当增加对有“头衔”者的资助，构建以成果为导向的资助方式，倡导以结项为依据的评价体系，开放以质量为核心的结题通道等途径改善科研项目绩效。     

Wage posting without full commitment

Wage posting models of job search typically assume that firms can commit to paying workers exactly the posted wage. We relax this assumption and impose “downward” commitment; firms can commit only to paying at least their advertised wage. As each firm can only commit to pay at least their advertised wage, workers may demand that the firm pay more than the advertised wage. In labor markets with a finite number of workers and firms, the strategic interaction between firms makes it costly for firms to provide applicants the incentive not to demand wages in excess of the advertised wage. In equilibrium, firms may settle for running job auctions at the cost of losing control of the number of applicants that they can attract. When this strategic interaction between firms vanishes, workers never choose to demand more than the advertised wage.     

项目申请者“头衔”更有利于科研绩效提升吗——一个面向国家社科基金教育学项目产出的倒序评估

如何预判项目申请者的科研绩效是科研资助中的焦点问题。不同于传统做法，以已结题的国家社科基金教育学项目产出为既定绩效，利用倾向得分匹配方法，倒序评估项目申请者既有“头衔”对产出绩效的因果效应，结果发现：项目申请者“头衔”显著提升了科研绩效，较行政职务头衔，学术荣誉头衔带来的科研绩效提升更显著。但并非所有类型头衔都显著作用于科研绩效，确切地讲，教育部新世纪人才、国务院特殊津贴专家、校长、院长、研究所所长及副所长等头衔更有利于科研绩效提升。对此，基金主管部门可通过适当增加对有“头衔”者的资助，构建以成果为导向的资助方式，倡导以结项为依据的评价体系，开放以质量为核心的结题通道等途径改善科研项目绩效。     

What to stabilize in the open economy*

We consider the question how “best” to maintain price‐level stability in an open economy, and evaluate three possible policy choices: (a) a constant money growth rate rule; (b) a fixed exchange rate; and (c) a policy of explicit commitment to a price‐level target. In each case we assume that policy is conducted by injecting reserves into or withdrawing reserves from the “banking system.” In evaluating the three regimes, we adopt the criterion that the “best” policy should leave the least scope for indeterminacy and “excessive” economic volatility. In a steady‐state equilibrium, the choice of regime is largely irrelevant; any steady‐state equilibrium under one regime can be duplicated by an appropriate choice of the “control” variable under any other regime. However, we show that the sets of equilibria under the three regimes are dramatically different. When all countries follow the policy of fixing a constant rate of money growth, there are no equilibria displaying endogenously arising volatility and there is no indeterminacy of equilibrium. Under a regime of fixed exchange rates, indeterminacies and endogenously arising fluctuations are impossible if and only if the country with the low “reserve‐to‐deposit” ratio is charged with maintaining the fixed rate. Finally, when one country targets the time path of its price level, under very weak conditions, there will be indeterminacy of equilibrium and endogenously arising volatility driven by expectations.     

Asset accumulation and short-term employment

If access to credit is limited (especially when young or unemployed) but “bad” jobs are easy to come by, then job seekers might use short term employment in undesirable jobs as a way to finance consumption during subsequent unemployed search for a “good” job. In this paper we explore this idea by building a theoretical model of job search by risk averse, debt constrained agents. In this model we characterise analytically conditions under which voluntary planned separations occur as agents cycle between accumulating assets in short term employment and unemployed search for more desirable employment.     

Organizational Cultures of Corruption

Systematic differences in the incidence of corruption between countries can be explained by models of coordination failure that suggest that corruption can only be reduced by a “big push” across an entire economy. However, there is significant evidence that corruption is often sustained as an organizational culture, and can be combated with targeted effort in individual organizations one at a time. In this paper, we propose a model that reconciles these two theories of corruption. We explore a model of corruption with two principal elements. First, agents suffer a moral cost if their corruption behavior diverges from the level they perceive to be the social norm; second, the perception of the norm is imperfect; it gives more weight to the behavior of colleagues with whom the agent interacts regularly. This leads to the possibility that different organizations within the same country may stabilize at widely different levels of corruption. Furthermore, the level of corruption in an organization is persistent, implying that some organizations may have established internal “cultures” of corruption. The organizational foci are determined primarily by the opportunities and (moral) costs of corruption. Depending on the values of these parameters, the degree of corruption across departments may be relatively uniform or widely dispersed. These results also explain another surprising empirical observation: that in different countries similar government departments such as tax and education rank very differently relative to each other in the extent to which they are corrupt. This is difficult to explain in incentive‐based models if similar departments face similar incentives in different countries.     

Nash equilibrium search for the best alternative

In a recent paper, Weitzman (Econometrica47 (1979) 641–654) described a policy of “optimal search for the best alternative.” The present paper is concerned with the development and characterization of a policy of “Nash equilibrium search for the best alternative.” Specifically, it is shown that, under certain monotonicity assumptions, and under the assumption that firms have incomplete information regarding the results of rivals' search behavior, a Nash equilibrium search policy exists and has the same form as Weitzman's optimal search policy.     

Affirmative action in education: Evidence from engineering college admissions in India

This paper examines an affirmative action program for “lower-caste” groups in engineering colleges in India. We study both the targeting properties of the program, and its implications for labor market outcomes. We find that affirmative action successfully targets the financially disadvantaged: the upper-caste applicants that are displaced by affirmative action come from a richer economic background than the lower-caste applicants that are displacing them. Targeting by caste, however, may lead to the exclusion of other disadvantaged groups. For example, caste-based targeting reduces the overall number of females entering engineering colleges. We find that despite poor entrance exam scores, lower-caste entrants obtain a positive return to admission. Our estimates, however, also suggest that these gains may come at an absolute cost because the income losses experienced by displaced upper-caste applicants are larger than the income gains experienced by displacing lower-caste students. Limited sample sizes in our preferred econometric specifications, however, prevent us from drawing strong conclusions from these labor market findings.     

Automatic stabilizers?

The effectiveness of “automatic stabilizers” is examined in a stochastic model similar to that of McCallum and Whitaker (1979), but where the “automatic stabilizers” are permitted to affect the elasticity of aggregate supply. These measures increase or decrease the variance of output for a closed economy, depending on the nature of the shocks to which it is subject, while for a small open economy these measures increase the variance of output.     

Governing a union's external stakeholders: A prioritization method based on relationship quality and perceived impact

Stakeholder governance is a growing issue in the literature and for organizations. The complex and uncertain environment of nonprofit organizations forces them to prioritize stakeholder requirements. The traditional criterion of influence and power is nevertheless proving insufficient for these organizations, especially those in political or interest representation sectors. This article proposes to use the relationship quality with stakeholders and its components (trust, satisfaction, influence, engagement) as criteria for prioritization. The study is carried out within the “Young Farmers” union, a French 50,000-member union defending the interests of agriculture and of farmers under 35 years of age. It questions external stakeholders on the relationship with the organization and its impact and it enables to verify the relevance of these criteria. The results suggest integrating stakeholder emotions into the same-named theory and studying relationship quality as a process in which satisfaction builds trust that enables engagement, which itself has a positive role on influence. The findings also revisit strategic models of stakeholder prioritization by proposing the four components of relationship quality mentioned above as prioritization attributes. Finally, NPOs’ partners are invited to take into account the subjectivity of the evaluation process and thus to favor reasonable methods to avoid handicapping NPOs.     

On Functionally Distributed Quotas

We consider “functionally distributed” quotas, where trade is restricted to a function of another economic activity, paying special attention to the ratio constraint and its relation to “proportionally distributed” quotas. We propose a simple principle defining the optimal policy under a functionally defined restriction, extend the analysis of ratio import/production constraints to general equilibrium, introduce export constraints, and constraints defined in proportion to factor use. We develop the general‐equilibrium geometry of functional trade constraints and the concomitant optimal policies, deriving a “quota locus” that depicts the consumption possibilities under various regimes.     

Existence of a Condorcet Winner When Voters Have Other‐Regarding Preferences

In standard political economy models, voters are “self‐interested” that is, care only about “own” utility. However, the emerging evidence indicates that voters often have “other‐regarding preferences” (ORP), that is, in deciding among alternative policies voters care about their payoffs relative to others. We extend a widely used general equilibrium framework in political economy to allow for voters with ORP, as in Fehr and Schmidt (1999) . In line with the evidence, these preferences allow voters to exhibit “envy” and “altruism,” in addition to the standard concern for “own utility.” We give sufficient conditions for the existence of a Condorcet winner when voters have ORP. This could open the way for an incorporation of ORP in a variety of political economy models. Furthermore, as a corollary, we give more general conditions for the existence of a Condorcet winner when voters have purely selfish preferences.     

Linking technology intelligence to open innovation

The explosive growth of the Internet has led to a dramatic increase in data sources for (competitive) technology intelligence. Appropriate implementation and use of IT tools to gather and analyze these data is of key importance for the creation of actionable technology intelligence. A strategy to optimize investments in the identified technologies becomes of paramount importance if an organization wants to match knowledge and ideas originating from outside of the organization with internal core competences. Such a strategy can create competitive advantage by effectively linking technology intelligence to open innovation.We show how VIB, a life sciences research organization, has established technology intelligence processes to identify a multitude of external technologies of interest, which are subsequently “probed” for their potential and fit with VIB using real options reasoning, thereby supporting open innovation. Our methodology may be useful for other organizations which are considering implementing open innovation approaches.     

Changes in Investors' Market Attention and Near-Term Stock Market Returns

We use Google Search volume to track changes investors' positive and negative market attention. Our results support the hypothesis that this information reflects investors' optimistic and pessimistic anticipation and can be used to predict near-term future returns. We find that changes in negative search term volume of “market crash” and “bear market” and changes in positive search term volume “market rally” explain near-term stock returns. Changes in investors' attention are partly related to past stock market returns, implying that investors are prone to pay attention to possible price reversals. These measures of market attention are potential gauges of investor sentiment.