High-frequency trading and stock liquidity: An intraday analysis

This paper studies the impact of high-frequency trading (HFT) on intraday liquidity of CAC40 stocks listed on Euronext. Spreads display an intraday L-shaped pattern, while quoted depth follows an inverse pattern: low at the open and increasing towards the end of the trading day. When liquidity demand is particularly high, there is a high rate of order cancellations attributable to high-frequency traders who use frequent order cancellations to strategically manage their limit orders and close positions near the market close. Using the generalized method of moments estimator, we generate strong evidence that greater intensity of HFT is associated with lower spreads and higher depth. The positive effect of HFT on liquidity is due mainly to decreased adverse selection costs arising from asymmetric information among market participants.     

Order Flow and Liquidity around NYSE Trading Halts

We study order flow and liquidity around NYSE trading halts. We find that market and limit order submissions and cancellations increase significantly during trading halts, that a large proportion of the limit order book at the reopen is composed of orders submitted during the halt, and that the market-clearing price at the reopen is a good predictor of future prices. Depth near the quotes is unusually low around trading halts, though specialists and/or floor traders appear to provide additional liquidity at these times. Finally, specialists appear to 'spread the quote' prior to imbalance halts to convey information to market participants.     

Do Proprietary Algorithmic Traders Withdraw Liquidity during Market Stress?

We investigate the role of proprietary algorithmic traders in facilitating liquidity in a limit order market. Using order‐level data from the National Stock Exchange of India, we find that proprietary algorithmic traders increase limit order supply following periods of both high short‐term stock‐specific volatility and extreme stock price movement. Even following periods of high marketwide volatility, they do not decrease their supply of liquidity. We define orders from high‐frequency traders as a subclass of orders from proprietary algorithmic traders that are revised in less than three milliseconds. The behavior of high‐frequency trading mimics the behavior of its parent class. This is inconsistent with the theory that fast traders leave the market when stress situations arise, although their limit‐order‐supplying behavior becomes weaker when the increase in short‐term volatility is more informational than transitory. Agency algorithmic traders and nonalgorithmic traders behave opposite to proprietary algorithmic traders by reducing the supply of liquidity during stress situations. The presence of faster traders in the market possibly instills the fear of adverse selection in them. We document that the order imbalance of agency algorithmic traders is positively related to future short‐term returns, whereas the order imbalance of proprietary algorithmic traders is negatively related to future short‐term returns.     

High-Frequency Trading and Market Performance

We study the consequences of, and potential policy responses to, high-frequency trading (HFT) via the tradeoff between liquidity and information production. Faster speeds facilitate HFT, with consequences for this tradeoff: Information production decreases because informed traders have less time to trade before HFTs react, but liquidity (measured by the bid-ask spread) improves because informational asymmetries decline. HFT also pushes outcomes inside the frontier of this tradeoff. However, outcomes can be restored to the frontier by replacing the limit order book with one of two alternative mechanisms: delaying all orders except cancellations or implementing frequent batch auctions.     

Modelling the buy and sell intensity in a limit order book market

In this paper, we model the buy and sell arrival process in the limit order book market at the Australian Stock Exchange. Using a bivariate autoregressive intensity model we analyze the contemporaneous buy and sell intensity as a function of the state of the market. We find evidence that trading decisions are both information as well as liquidity driven. Confirming predictions from market microstructure theory traders submit market orders by inferring from the recent order flow and the book with respect to upper and lower tail expectations as well as trading directions. However, traders also tend to take liquidity when the liquidity supply is high. Moreover, we find evidence that traders pay more attention to recent order arrivals and the current state of the order book than to the past order flow.     

Technology and liquidity provision: The blurring of traditional definitions

Limit orders are usually viewed as patiently supplying liquidity. We investigate the trading of one hundred Nasdaq-listed stocks on INET, a limit order book. In contrast to the usual view, we find that over one-third of nonmarketable limit orders are cancelled within two seconds. We investigate the role these “fleeting orders” play in the market and test specific hypotheses about their uses. We find evidence consistent with dynamic trading strategies whereby traders chase market prices or search for latent liquidity. We show that fleeting orders are a relatively recent phenomenon, and suggest that they have arisen from a combination of factors that includes improved technology, an active trading culture, market fragmentation, and an increasing utilization of latent liquidity.     

Optimal Dynamic Order Submission Strategies in Some Stylized Trading Problems

This study derives optimal dynamic order submission strategies for trading problems faced by three stylized traders: an uninformed liquidity trader, an informed trader and a value-motivated trader. Separate solutions are obtained for quote- and order-driven markets. The results provide practicable rules for how to trade small orders and how to manage traders. Transaction cost measurement methods based on implementation shortfall are proven to dominate other methods.
Since investors demand liquidity when they submit market orders and supply liquidity when they submit limit orders, the results improve our understanding of market liquidity. In particular, the models illustrate the role of time in the search for liquidity by characterizing the demand for and supply of immediacy.     

The “make or take” decision in an electronic market: Evidence on the evolution of liquidity

This paper uses experimental asset markets to investigate the evolution of liquidity in an electronic limit order market. Our market setting includes salient features of electronic limit order markets, as well as informed traders and liquidity traders. We focus on the strategies of the traders and how these are affected by trader type, characteristics of the market, and characteristics of the asset. We find that informed traders use more limit orders than do liquidity traders. Our main result is that liquidity provision shifts as trading progresses, with informed traders increasingly providing liquidity in markets. The change in the behavior of the informed traders seems to be in response to the dynamic adjustment of prices to information; they take (provide) liquidity when the value of their information is high (low). Thus, a market-making role emerges endogenously in our electronic markets and is ultimately adopted by the traders who are least subject to adverse selection when placing limit orders.     

Order submission strategies,liquidity supply,and trading in pennies on the New York Stock Exchange

We use NYSE system order data to conduct a controlled experiment examining changes in trader behavior, displayed liquidity supply, and execution quality around the reduction in the minimum price variation to $0.01. Although traders do not substantially reduce their use of traditional limit orders in favor of market orders or non-displayed orders, they do decrease limit order size and cancel limit orders more frequently after decimals than before. These changes in order submission strategy appear to result in less displayed liquidity throughout the limit order book more than 15 cents from the quote midpoint. This reduction in displayed liquidity, however, does not manifest itself in poor execution quality. Even for large system orders, traditional execution quality is not worse with decimals than with fractions.     

Monitoring and limit order submission risks

This paper presents a formal analysis of the relation between monitoring and limit order submission risk. With heterogeneous information, limit order traders face two types of risk. First, they may be “picked off” when prices change unexpectedly after the limit order is entered (known as free trading option risk). Second, they face the possibility that their limit order will not result in a trade. To mitigate these risks, traders can monitor information and prices and cancel or revise their orders as needed. But such monitoring is costly, resulting in a trade-off between the cost of monitoring and the risks of limit order submission. The model predicts that if the stock is actively traded, limit order submission risks and order cancellations/revisions are positively related. Further, shares with a wide bid-ask spread will tend to have a lower rate of order cancellations and revisions than shares with small bid-ask spreads. Finally, the model suggests that if larger capitalization stocks have lower costs of gathering information (and hence more intense monitoring of limit orders), there will be more cancellations and revisions in limit orders. A sample of 23 liquid stocks provides evidence that is consistent with these three main hypotheses.     

Working Orders in Limit Order Markets and Floor Exchanges

We analyze limit order markets and floor exchanges, assuming an informed trader and discretionary liquidity traders use market orders and can either submit block orders or work their demands as a series of small orders. By working their demands, large market order traders pool with small traders. We show that every equilibrium on a floor exchange must involve at least partial pooling. Moreover, there is always a fully pooling (worked order) equilibrium on a floor exchange that is equivalent to a block order equilibrium in a limit order market.     

Undisclosed orders and optimal submission strategies in a limit order market

Reserve orders enable traders to hide a portion of their orders and now appear in most electronic limit order markets. This paper outlines a theory to determine an optimal submission strategy in a limit order book, in which traders choose among limit, market, and reserve orders and simultaneously set price, quantity, and exposure. We show that reserve orders help traders compete for the provision of liquidity and reduce the friction generated by exposure costs. Therefore, total gains from trade increase. Large traders always benefit from reserve orders, whereas small traders benefit only when the tick size is large.     

DOES SPEED MATTER? THE ROLE OF HIGH-FREQUENCY TRADING FOR ORDER BOOK RESILIENCY

We analyze limit order book resiliency following liquidity shocks initiated by large market orders. Based on a unique data set, we investigate whether high-frequency traders are involved in replenishing the order book. Therefore, we relate the net liquidity provision of high-frequency traders, algorithmic traders, and human traders around these market impact events to order book resiliency. Although all groups of traders react, our results show that only high-frequency traders reduce the spread within the first seconds after the market impact event. Order book depth replenishment, however, takes significantly longer and is mainly accomplished by human traders’ liquidity provision.     

Hidden Liquidity: Some New Light on Dark Trading

Using a laboratory market, we investigate how the ability to hide orders affects traders’ strategies and market outcomes in a limit order book environment. We find that order strategies are greatly affected by allowing hidden liquidity, with traders substituting nondisplayed for displayed shares and changing the aggressiveness of their trading. As traders adapt their behavior to the different opacity regimes, however, most aggregate market outcomes (such as liquidity and informational efficiency) are not affected as much. We also find that opacity appears to increase the profits of informed traders but only when their private information is very valuable.     

Liquidity determination in an order-driven market

We exploit full order level information from an electronic FX broking system to provide a comprehensive account of the determination of its liquidity. We not only look at bid-ask spreads and trading volumes, but also study the determination of order entry rates and depth measures derived from the entire limit order book. We find strong predictability in the arrival of liquidity supply/demand events. Further, in times of low (high) liquidity, liquidity supply (demand) events are more common. In times of high trading activity and volatility, the ratio of limit to market order arrivals is high but order book spreads and depth deteriorate. These results are consistent with market order traders having better information than limit order traders.     

Limit Order Book as a Market for Liquidity

We develop a dynamic model of a limit order market populatedby strategic liquidity traders of varying impatience. In equilibrium,patient traders tend to submit limit orders, whereas impatienttraders submit market orders. Two variables are the key determinantsof the limit order book dynamics in equilibrium: the proportionof patient traders and the order arrival rate. We offer severaltestable implications for various market quality measures suchas spread, trading frequency, market resiliency, and time toexecution for limit orders. Finally, we show the effect of imposinga minimal price variation on these measures.     

Market making with minimum resting times

We show how the supply of liquidity in order-driven markets is affected if limit orders (LOs) are forced to rest in the limit order book for a minimum resting time (MRT) before they can be cancelled. The bid-ask spread increases as the MRT increases because market makers (MMs) increase the depth of their LOs to protect them from being picked off by other traders. We also show that the expected profits of the MMs increase when the MRT increases. The intuition is as follows. As the MRT increases, there are two opposing forces at work. One, the longer the MRT, the more likely the LOs are to be filled and, on average, shares are sold at a loss. Two, because the depth of the posted LOs increases, the probability that the LO is picked off by other traders before the end of the MRT decreases. The net effect is that a longer MRT leads to a higher expected profit. We also show that the depth of LOs increases when the volatility of the price of the asset increases. Also, the depth of LOs increases when the arrival rate of market orders increases because it is less likely that LOs will be picked off by the end of the MRT. Finally, our model also makes predictions about the overall liquidity of the market. We show that MMs choose to supply the minimum amount of shares per LO allowed by the exchange because expected profits are maximised when liquidity provided is lowest.     

Does high-frequency trading actually improve market liquidity? A comparative study for selected models and measures

The increasing volume of messages sent to the exchange by algorithmic traders stimulates a fierce debate among academics and practitioners on the impacts of high-frequency trading (HFT) on capital markets. By comparing a variety of regression models that associate various measures of market liquidity with measures of high-frequency activity on the same dataset, we find that for some models the increase in high-frequency activity improves market liquidity, but for others, we get the opposite effect. We indicate that this ambiguity does not depend only on the stock market or the data period, but also on the used HFT measure: the increase of high-frequency orders leads to lower market liquidity whereas the increase in high-frequency trades improves liquidity. We hypothesize that the observed decrease in market liquidity associated with an increasing level of high-frequency orders is caused by a rise in quote volatility.     

The impact of short-selling and margin-buying on liquidity: Evidence from the Chinese stock market

We propose a framework based on limit order book to analyze the impact of short-selling and margin-buying on liquidity. We show that when short-sellers are perceived as informed, adverse selection may lead to uninformed traders withdrawing their limit orders. Given that the Chinese stock market has strong information asymmetry and a high proportion of uninformed traders, we predict that the pilot program launched in March 2010, which lifts restrictions on short-selling and margin-buying for a designated list of stocks, may have a negative impact on liquidity. We perform difference-in-differences tests and show evidence that allowing for short-selling and margin-buying indeed has a significantly negative impact on liquidity for stocks on the designated list. In particular, the negative impact on liquidity is more pronounced for stocks with high information asymmetry. Nevertheless, when short-selling volume dries up due to regulation changes in August 2015, i.e., the “T+1” trading rule on short-selling, we show that consistent with model predictions, lifting restrictions on short-selling and margin-buying has a positive effect on liquidity.     

Is faster or slower trading better? An examination of order type execution speed and costs

We examine order type execution speed and costs for US equity traders. Marketable orders that execute slower exhibit lower execution costs. Those who remove liquidity faster and pay higher trading costs transact in smaller size, spread trading across more venues, take more liquidity, and are better informed. Nonmarketable limit orders that execute slower exhibit greater adverse selection; and larger, uninformed traders who concentrate their trading in fewer venues submit them. Our findings suggest that slowing down the trading process, when faster options exist, can benefit certain market participants who seek to cross the bid–ask spread.