Does corporate international diversification destroy value? Evidence from cross-border mergers and acquisitions

This paper investigates the valuation effects of corporate international diversification by examining cross-border mergers and acquisitions of US acquirers over the period 1990–2000. We find that, on average, acquisitions of “fairly valued” foreign business units do not lead to value discounts. In contrast, unrelated cross-border acquisitions result in a significant diversification discount of about 24% after accounting for the valuation of foreign targets. Furthermore, significant wealth gains accrue to foreign target shareholders regardless of the type of acquisition. Overall, our results suggest that international diversification does not destroy value while industrial diversification leads to discounts even after controlling for the pre-acquisition value of the target.     

Do cross border and domestic acquisitions differ? Evidence from the acquisition of UK targets

We investigate the determinants of short term wealth effects for both public acquiring and target shareholders following the announcement of UK acquisitions over the period 1990–2005. Regardless of their nationality, overall acquirers incur losses, with domestic acquirers’ under-performing cross-border acquirers in general. For the latter no differences in returns between regions are found once the differences in corporate governance regimes are controlled for. Instead it is firm characteristics and in particular firm leverage that largely explain acquirers' returns. All targets gain significantly but the higher returns associated with international deals disappear once bid characteristics are controlled for.     

Is there a gender gap in CEO compensation?

The gender pay gap generates significant political and social debate. This study contributes to this discussion by examining if a gender pay gap exists at the highest level of corporate management, the CEOs. While previous studies have documented a gender pay gap for most levels of executives the findings with respect to CEOs are conflicting. In this paper we focus only on CEO's as it is the most homogenous of executive roles and does not require us to assume that executives with similar titles undertake identical roles. Our evidence is based on 291 US firm-years for the period of 1998–2010. We do not find any association between CEO pay and gender using both the total sample and a sample matched using propensity scores to control for firm characteristics. These insignificant results hold for total pay, salary and bonuses, and for different matching procedures and econometric specifications. Our results therefore indicate that women who rise through the “glass ceiling” to the level of CEO are remunerated at similar levels to their male counterparts.     

Is there a racial gap in CEO compensation?

Racial gap in corporate leadership has prompted continuous and intense discussions, motivating research into the conditions minorities face after they reach top management positions. We contribute to the ongoing debate in this area by examining the association between CEO race and compensation. We do not find evidence for a significant racial wage gap at the CEO level across various econometric specifications, including total-sample OLS, firm-fixed effects to capture CEO transitions within firm, propensity score matched sample, and instrumental variable analysis. The insignificant results hold for total compensation, cash compensation, and non-cash compensation. Further, there is no consistent evidence of differences in CEO compensation for any of the major racial groups (Blacks, Hispanics, and Asians). Based on our results, we conclude that racial minorities who make it to the CEO position in Corporate America are compensated at similar levels to their Caucasian counterparts.     

Do CEOs gain more in foreign acquisitions than domestic acquisitions?

This paper examines the impact of domestic and foreign acquisitions on chief executive officer (CEO) compensation packages using a sample of 147 completed bids by UK companies from 1999 to 2005. We find that foreign acquisitions lead to higher CEO compensation than domestic acquisitions. Overall, our findings suggest that CEOs have strong incentives to do foreign acquisitions rather than domestic acquisitions since they receive larger compensation following a foreign acquisition regardless of how poor firm performance is. Furthermore, we observe a positive and significant relation between CEO compensation and firm size during the pre-acquisition period for firms involved in foreign acquisitions, thus their CEOs would expect to increase their compensation package through foreign acquisitions. However, our results show that there is no significant link between firm size and CEO compensation during the pre-acquisition period for firms involved in domestic acquisitions.     

An ill wind? Terrorist attacks and CEO compensation

Using multiple measures of attack proximity, we show that CEOs employed at firms located near terrorist attacks earn an average pay increase of 12% after the attack relative to CEOs at firms located far from attacks. CEOs at terrorist attack-proximate firms prefer cash-based compensation increases (e.g., salary and bonus) over equity-based compensation (e.g., options and stocks granted). The effect is causal and it is larger when the bargaining power of the CEO is high. Other executives and workers do not receive a terrorist attack premium.     

Who makes acquisitions? CEO overconfidence and the market's reaction

Does CEO overconfidence help to explain merger decisions? Overconfident CEOs over-estimate their ability to generate returns. As a result, they overpay for target companies and undertake value-destroying mergers. The effects are strongest if they have access to internal financing. We test these predictions using two proxies for overconfidence: CEOs’ personal over-investment in their company and their press portrayal. We find that the odds of making an acquisition are 65% higher if the CEO is classified as overconfident. The effect is largest if the merger is diversifying and does not require external financing. The market reaction at merger announcement (-90$-90$ basis points) is significantly more negative than for non-overconfident CEOs (-12$-12$ basis points). We consider alternative interpretations including inside information, signaling, and risk tolerance.     

Is convexity efficiently priced? Evidence from international swap markets

While it is widely claimed in the literature that convexity is correctly priced, we find evidence in four major swap markets that this is the case only on average and that extended periods occur when convexity-based trading strategies offer economically very significant exceptional returns. These abnormal returns can be reaped with fully no-peek-ahead strategies and after accounting for transaction costs. We find a strong link between the periods of highest profitability and conditions of reduced market liquidity. This suggests that, as observed in recent liquidity studies on US Treasuries, temporary deviations from market efficiency at the long end of the swap curve occur when pseudo-arbitrageurs do not have sufficient capital to correct the mispricings.     

Do industrial and geographic diversifications have different effects on earnings management? Evidence from UK mergers and acquisitions

This paper examines whether corporate diversification has an impact on accruals earnings management by UK targets in mergers and acquisitions. Following prior research (Jiraporn, Kim, & Mathur, 2008; El Mehdi & Seboui, 2011), we explicitly distinguish between industrial and geographic diversification. These two dimensions of diversification differ in terms of their degree of information asymmetry, while in industrially diversified firms the accruals at the business segment level tend to offset each other, geographically diversified firms seem to be subject to higher information asymmetry. Using a sample of 229 UK publicly listed targets and employing cross-sectional accrual models and a panel regression framework, we find that industrial diversification mitigates earnings management by UK targets prior to mergers and acquisitions. The results of our study also show that a combination of industrial and geographic diversification is associated with a lesser degree of earnings management, which is consistent with those reported by Jiraporn, Kim, and Mathur (2008) and El Mehdi and Seboui (2011) for US firms. However, our evidence suggests that geographic diversification is associated with a higher degree of earnings management, however the results are not statistically significant.     

Does CEO inside debt compensation benefit both shareholders and debtholders?

Review of Quantitative Finance and Accounting - We examine whether the proportion of CEO inside debt holdings (pension and deferred compensation) to stock holdings benefit both shareholders and...     

Does debt concentration depend on the risk-taking incentives in CEO compensation?

Using a sample of US non-financial firms we show that an increase in risk-taking incentives in CEO pay is associated with a greater debt concentration by debt type. This result holds in various empirical settings that account for endogeneity and is in line with the view that a more concentrated debt structure in fewer debt types reduces coordination problems among creditors and the related financial distress costs. Along these lines, we find our results are stronger in riskier firms, in firms with more volatile cash-flows or less stakeholder-orientation and when CEO pay incentives are embedded in vested options that are expected to favor business choices with more immediate negative effects on debtholders' wealth. Overall, our findings are consistent with theoretical models in which the debt structure of a firm acts as a commitment device.     

Do financial markets care about SRI? Evidence from mergers and acquisitions

Mergers and acquisitions offer a framework for shedding new light on the stock market performance of socially responsible investments (SRI). We use Innovest’s Intangible Value Assessment (IVA) ratings as a measure of firms’ ability to cope with social and environmental risks. The IVA ratings allow us to uncover a positive relation between acquirer gains and the level of the target’s social and environmental risk management practices. Our findings suggest that the stock market rewards the acquirer for making socially and environmentally responsible investments. We also document that the environmental and social performance of the acquirer increases following the acquisition of a SRI aware target. These results are consistent with acquirer learning from the target’s SRI practices and experiences.     

Do firms have leverage targets? Evidence from acquisitions

In the context of large acquisitions, we provide evidence on whether firms have target capital structures. We examine how deviations from these targets affect how bidders choose to finance acquisitions and how they adjust their capital structure following the acquisitions. We show that when a bidder's leverage is over its target level, it is less likely to finance the acquisition with debt and more likely to finance the acquisition with equity. Also, we find a positive association between the merger-induced changes in target and actual leverage, and we show that bidders incorporate more than two-thirds of the change to the merged firm's new target leverage. Following debt-financed acquisitions, managers actively move the firm back to its target leverage, reversing more than 75% of the acquisition's leverage effect within five years. Overall, our results are consistent with a model of capital structure that includes a target level and adjustment costs.     

Is there an association between Vice‐Chancellors’ compensation and external performance measures?

We provide evidence on the pay for performance relation between Australian university Vice Chancellors’ compensation and independent measures of university teaching, research and other performance indicators provided by external ranking bodies. Our results show limited association between university rankings and Vice Chancellors’ compensation, but confirm that Vice Chancellors’ compensation is predominantly driven by size measures based on the different components of revenue. Further, we find that few universities offer performance‐based bonus payments. Our results are robust with respect to a number of sensitivity tests.     

Is Japanese management superior? Evidence from the performance of the USA targets in partial acquisitions

This paper examines the efficacy of Japanese management and corporate governance by comparing the long-term post-merger operating performance of the U.S. targets acquired by Japanese bidders compared to the performance of well-matched U.S. targets of U.S. bidders. Unlike prior studies that focus on short-term stock price reactions of target firms, it is possible to undertake this long-term analysis of performance by identifying targets that survive as independent entities because of partial acquisitions. The findings suggest that targets of Japanese bidders either perform no differently from targets of U.S. bidders, or possibly even underperform. Thus, the evidence does not support the oft-claimed superiority of Japanese management and corporate governance system.     

What happens in acquisitions?: Evidence from brand ownership changes and advertising investment

We study advertising at the brand level in a sample of corporate acquisitions. New owners display an elevated propensity to sharply cut advertising in acquired brands. This behavior is most pronounced in private equity transactions. When a buyer's existing brands overlap with the acquired brands, aggregate advertising spending on the merged portfolio of brands tends to shift downward. Sharp advertising cuts are more likely to be observed when the old owner of the assets was investing at an elevated level and when the new owner has displayed past restraint in their investment spending activities. Combined buyer and seller abnormal returns are more positive in deals characterized by post-acquisition cuts in advertising, suggesting that these cuts often represent efficiency-enhancing cost savings.     

Do Chinese managers listen to the media?: Evidence from mergers and acquisitions

This study investigates whether listed companies in China are sensitive to public media coverage when making investment decisions regarding mergers and acquisitions (M&As). We find that the likelihood of abandoning a proposed M&A transaction is positively associated with negative media coverage, and this association is stronger with lower announcement abnormal returns. Our analysis demonstrates that the negative information effect is amplified for glamour acquirers. We argue that negative media reactions drive the external feedback mechanism of M&A attempts and help guard against managerial hubris.     

Is international diversification really beneficial?

Previous research claims that low constant correlations among international stock indices create substantial risk-reduction from diversification. We contend that only using constant correlations is too simplistic an approach. We examine international diversification by: (1) using conditional correlations, (2) evaluating tail risk, including the effect of skewness and kurtosis, and (3) examining the possible tradeoffs of standard deviation with correlation, skewness, and kurtosis. We show that conclusions concerning diversification based solely on constant correlations across markets can be misleading, since the diversification benefits are time-varying, are affected by non-normality, and depend on the benchmark (country) employed. Finally, tradeoffs do exist between standard deviation and the other risk factors.     

Do REITs use cash reserves efficiently? Evidence from corporate acquisitions

We examine the combined impact of corporate governance and excess cash holdings on the propensity of firms to become bidders and engage in value destroying acquisitions. We focus on the REIT market, due to its unique characteristics caused by regulation and the nature of the industry. The lack of active real estate takeover market should lead to entrenchment and exacerbate agency costs. However, given the mandatory high cash payout for REITs, the absence of takeover market should not cause concerns to shareholders. Our analyses reveal that unlike conventional firms, cash-rich REITs are not more likely to become acquirers and acquisitions by cash-rich REITs are not value decreasing. However, similarly to industrial firms, REITs with higher excess cash and lower insider ownership are more likely to become bidders. We interpret our results to be consistent with the hypothesis that agency problems are less severe in real estate and investors are not averse to use of excess cash by REIT managers on intra-industry acquisitions.