The underperformance of the growth enterprise market in Hong Kong

This paper examines the stock return performance of the IPO stocks which are listed on the Growth Enterprise Market (GEM) in Hong Kong. By using several benchmarks, over 3 years, this paper finds that the results produced are sensitive to the benchmark employed. The two factors causing the underperformance of GEM stocks are the ‘technology boom’ and ‘IPO effects’. This suggests that appropriate benchmarks are very important for assessing the performance of newly issued stocks. The results of the cross-sectional analyses suggest that the Hong Kong GEM is a unique market. Since at least 70 percent of the IPO stocks listed on the GEM are technology stocks, the ‘technology’ factor outweighs the various hypotheses advocated by previous researchers to explain the poor performance of newly listed stocks.     

Myth or Reality? The Long-Run Underperformance of Initial Public Offerings: Evidence from Venture and Nonventure Capital-Backed Companies

We investigate the long-run underperformance of recent initial public offering (IPO) firms in a sample of 934 venture-backed IPOs from 1972–1992 and 3,407 nonventure-backed IPOs from 1975–1992. We find that venture-backed IPOs outperform non-venture-backed IPOs using equal weighted returns. Value weighting significantly reduces performance differences and substantially reduces underperformance for nonventure-backed IPOs. In tests using several comparable benchmarks and the Fama-French (1993) three factor asset pricing model, venture-backed companies do not significantly underperform, while the smallest nonventure-backed firms do. Underperformance, however, is not an IPO effect. Similar size and book-to-market firms that have not issued equity perform as poorly as IPOs.     

Are publicly held firms less efficient? Evidence from the US property-liability insurance industry

This paper studies the performance of publicly held firms in the US property-liability insurance industry by analyzing companies that issued initial public offerings (IPOs) from 1994 to 2005, using private firms as the benchmark. I investigate ex ante determinants and ex post effects of IPOs on firm efficiency, operating performance, and other financials. I also analyze stock returns and follow-on SEO and acquisition activities to provide further information on IPO motivation. The paper finds that the likelihood of an IPO significantly increases with firm size and premium growth. IPO firms experience no post-issue underperformance in efficiency, operations, or stock returns; register improvement in allocative and cost efficiency; and reduce financial leverage and reinsurance usage. Moreover, IPO firms are active in follow-on SEO issues and acquisition activities. The findings are mostly consistent with the theory that firms go public for easier access to capital and to ease capital constraints.     

Long-run performance of global versus domestic initial public offerings

This paper investigates the long-run performance of global IPOs as compared to purely domestic ones made by US industrial companies. We find that global IPOs not only underperform the market but also underperform their domestic counterparts in the three years after issuance. Moreover, global issues with a larger global tranche are more prone to long-run underperformance. The results are consistent with the window of opportunity hypothesis that investors are overly optimistic about the future prospects of firms engaging in global offerings, and underperformance occurs as unduly high expectations are corrected over time.     

Long-run stock performance of German initial public offerings and seasoned equity issues

We estimate the long-run stock performance after initial public offerings (IPOs) in the German capital market with a larger sample than prior studies and alternative benchmarks (the equally and the value-weighted market portfolio, size portfolios and matching stocks). In addition we present the first results on the long-run performance after seasoned equity issues (SEOs) in Germany. We conclude that size portfolios and matching stocks are better benchmarks than market portfolios. Using buy‐and-hold abnormal returns, we estimate that German stocks involved in an IPO or in a SEO, on average, underperform a portfolio consisting of stocks with a similar market capitalization by 6% in three years. This is considerably less than the underperformance after IPOs and SEOs in the US market reported by Loughran and Ritter (1995) and the underperformance after IPOs in Germany reported by Ljungqvist (1997). We also show that the apparent underperformance of the 1988–1990 IPO cohort discussed by Ljungqvist (1997) disappears when the abnormal performance estimate is based on size instead of market portfolios.     

The non-7% solution

While the vast majority of underwriters charge a gross spread of exactly 7%, as documented in Chen and Ritter (2000), more than a third charge something other than 7%. Among offerings of $50 million and below where underwriters charge the firm other than 7%, two-thirds of issuers pay more than published NASD¹ compensation guidelines. When underwriters charge less than expected, they do not trade-off IPO compensation with underpricing. However, our evidence suggests a trade-off between IPO compensation and future SEO business among underwriters that charge something other than 7% and less than expected. Underwriters that overcharge may provide a signal to investors about future underperformance.     

DIVERGENCE OF OPINION AND LONG‐TERM PERFORMANCE OF INITIAL PUBLIC OFFERINGS

Miller's hypothesis posits that divergence of opinion can lead to asset overvaluation and subsequent long‐term underperformance in markets (such as initial public offerings [IPOs]) with restricted short‐selling. Consistent with this hypothesis, we find that early‐market return volatility, a proxy for divergence of opinion, is negatively related to subsequent IPO long‐term abnormal returns. This relation holds after accounting for other factors that previous studies suggest affect long‐term abnormal returns for IPOs (including another proxy for divergence of opinion). Moreover, we find that this relation is stronger in IPO markets than in non‐IPO markets (where short‐selling restrictions are less stringent), again consistent with Miller's hypothesis.     

Re‐assessing the long‐term underperformance of UK Initial Public Offerings

Previous work has identified that IPOs underperform a market index, and the purpose of this paper is to examine the robustness of this finding. We re‐examine the evidence on the long‐term returns of IPOs in the UK using a new data set of firms over the period 1985–92, in which we compare abnormal performance based on a number of alternative methods including a calendar‐time approach. We find that, using an event‐time framework, there are substantial negative abnormal returns to an IPO after the first 3 years irrespective of the benchmark used. However, over the 5 years after an IPO, abnormal returns exhibit less dramatic underperformance, and the conclusion on negative abnormal returns depends on the benchmark applied. Further if these returns are measured in calendar time, we find that the (statistical) significance of underperformance is even less marked.     

Characterizing the Risk of IPO Long‐Run Returns: The Impact of Momentum,Liquidity, Skewness,and Investment

We study 6,686 initial public offerings (IPOs) spanning the period 1981‐2005 and find that the new issues puzzle disappears in a Fama‐French three‐factor framework. IPOs do not underperform in the aftermarket on a risk‐adjusted basis and do not underperform a matched sample of nonissuers. IPO underperformance is concentrated in the 1980s and early 1990s, and IPOs either perform the same as the market or outperform on a risk‐adjusted basis from 1998 to 2005. We find that outperformance in the later period is driven by large firms. Factors for momentum, investment, liquidity, and skewness help to explain aftermarket returns, although size and book‐to‐market tend to proxy for skewness. IPO investors receive smaller expected returns due to negative momentum and investment exposure and in exchange for higher liquidity.     

Underpricing,Share Overhang,and Insider Selling in Follow‐on Offerings

Prospect and information‐momentum theories predict that insiders can offer fewer shares in an initial public offering (IPO) to create informational momentum and obtain higher prices in follow‐on offerings. I find that dilution and insider participation in the IPO are negatively related to the number and size of follow‐on offerings, consistent with the prediction. However, insider selling in follow‐on offerings is positively related to IPO selling, contrary to the theories. Returns around follow‐on offering announcements are more negative for newly public firms than older firms, but for newly public firms do not differ by whether the announcement comes before or after the lockup expiration date.     

Pension funds and IPO pricing. Evidence from a quasi-experiment

We exploit a quasi-experiment arising from the government-forced changes to the assets under management and investment policy of the Polish pension funds. We test whether this new regulation and its resultant demand shock on the investors' side, leads to changes in the IPO pricing and the subsequent stock's performance. We report material and a statistically significant decrease in the IPO proceeds (IPO size) in the post-treatment period equal to over 107 million PLN (34 million USD). We find no empirical evidence that the treatment had a significant effect on the first-day IPO underpricing or on the long-term underperformance. We conclude that the demand shock resulting from the pension system reform that primarily aimed at solving fiscal problems effectively eliminated the so-called ‘pension premium’ of higher IPO valuations. Thus, it indirectly impaired companies' power of raising money in the public stock market. Furthermore, we report a decrease in the average first-day IPO returns among big issuers that is consistent with the book building literature.     

IPO Pricing,Block Sales,and Long‐Term Performance

Block sales following IPOs are related to the IPOs' value relative to an estimate of intrinsic value, opening‐trade return, and IPO size. Overvalued IPOs experience more block sales than undervalued IPOs. IPOs with high block sales outperform IPOs with low block sales from 20 days after IPO through lockup expiration; however, IPOs with high block sales underperform IPOs with low block sales from lockup expiration through the third year after the IPO. The results indicate that block traders are advantaged relative to other traders; whether the advantage is based on superior information or superior valuation capabilities is unknown.     

UNDERPRICING OF IPOS THAT FOLLOW PRIVATE PLACEMENT

In this study we examine the underpricing of initial public offerings (IPOs) by firms that have private placements of equity before their IPOs (PP IPO firms). We find that PP IPOs are associated with significantly less underpricing than their peers. Furthermore, PP IPOs are associated with lower underwriting spreads, more reputable underwriting syndicates, and greater postissue analyst coverage as compared to IPOs that are issued by their industry peers under similar market conditions. Consistent with the implications of the information asymmetry explanation for IPO underpricing, our findings suggest that companies could benefit by conveying their quality via successful pre‐IPO private placements that help reduce the cost of going public.     

Regulations,earnings management,and post-IPO performance: The Chinese evidence

In this study, we examine whether government regulatory initiatives in China involving IPO by SOEs may have contributed to opportunistic behaviors by the issuer. We focus on two sets of IPO regulations issued between January 1, 1996 and February 11, 1999: pricing regulations, which stipulate that IPO prices be a function of accounting performance, and penalty regulations, which penalize IPO firms for overly optimistic forecasts. We find that IPO firms that report better pricing-period accounting performance have larger declines in post-IPO profitability, lower first-day stock returns and worse long-run post-IPO stock performance. Furthermore, IPO firms that make overoptimistic forecasts also have lower first-day returns and worse post-IPO stock performance. Using non-core earnings as the proxy for earnings management, we document some evidence that IPO firms that report higher pricing-period accounting performance have engaged in more income-increasing earnings management. Hence, pricing regulations may have induced IPO firms to inflate pricing-period earnings and affect the post-IPO performance negatively. On the other hand, penalty regulations have deterred IPO firms from making overoptimistic earnings forecast and therefore have a positive impact on the behavior of IPO firms.     

Day-of-the-Week Effects in the Long-Run Performance of Initial Public Offerings

This study examines the influence of day-of-the-week patterns in security returns on long-run IPO underperformance. Comparisons are made between the IPOs in Ritter's [20] database, and a constructed set of matching firms based on SIC code and size, using NYSE, AMEX, and NASDAQ securities. It is found that virtually all of the IPO underperformance occurs on Mondays and Tuesdays and that the degree of underperformance significantly differs from other days. Thus, a common explanation may exist for the general day-of-the-week pattern in security returns and IPO long-run underperformance.     

Explaining underpricing of IPOs in frontier markets: Evidence from the Nigeria Stock Exchange

The paper provides empirical analyses of IPO underpricing on the Nigerian Stock Exchange, from the period 1990 to 2006. The results indicate an average abnormal initial day returns of 43.1%. There is evidence of long-run underperformance of 0.6%. Results from our regression model explaining initial abnormal returns for the IPOs of Nigeria show that size of firm and audit quality are important variables affecting underpricing. The results also show the presence of a non-linear relationship between the offer price and underpricing.     

Board structure,mergers, and shareholder wealth: A study of the mutual fund industry

We study mutual fund mergers between 1999 and 2001 to understand the role and effectiveness of fund boards. Some fund mergers—typically across-family mergers—benefit target shareholders but are costly to target fund directors. Such mergers are more likely when funds underperform and their boards have a larger percentage of independent trustees, suggesting that more-independent boards tolerate less underperformance before initiating across-family mergers. This effect is most pronounced when all of the fund's directors are independent, not the 75% level of independence required by the SEC. Higher-paid target fund boards are less likely to approve across-family mergers that cause substantial reductions in their compensation.     

Underwriter Compensation Structure: Can It Really Bond Underwriters?

Underwriter compensation can be structured as all cash or a combination of cash and warrants. Using a sample of small initial public offerings (IPOs), we find that underwriter compensation contracts that include warrants in exchange for cash can serve as certification for IPO firms by substituting for reputation capital. When underwriters accept warrants when they could have received more cash compensation, the IPOs avoid the well documented long‐run underperformance. However, when underwriters receive warrants after maximizing cash compensation, the IPO experiences higher underpricing and poorer long‐run performance. The findings are consistent with a motivation by the underwriters to circumvent regulatory constraints.     

Earnings management in Malaysian IPOs: The East Asian crisis, ownership control, and post-IPO performance

We find evidence of income-increasing earnings management in Malaysian IPOs, which occurs primarily for IPOs during a period of severe economic stress (the East Asian crisis). Within the high-ownership-concentration Malaysian market, post-IPO control concerns also appear to constrain IPO earnings management: owners seem willing to accept reduced IPO proceeds and signaling opportunities to increase the likelihood of retaining control of the company post-IPO. The requirement to provide a profit guarantee does not seem to greatly affect earnings management. IPO companies engaging in aggressive income-increasing earnings management have significantly worse market-based performance than their more conservative counterparts, but again only for IPOs issued during the economic crisis period. Overall, the results suggest that personal liquidity concerns are an important factor in IPO decisions during the economic crisis.     

Initial and Long-Run IPO Returns in Central and Eastern Europe

ABSTRACT

This article provides original evidence on IPO underpricing and long-run underperformance in Central and Eastern Europe (CEE) and compares results to the European Union’s developed capital markets from 2000 to 2009. Using both index-adjusted and CAPM-adjusted returns, we find significant underpricing that is significantly higher than underpricing of comparable IPOs in the European Union’s developed capital markets. We show that the CEE’s initial IPO returns also exhibit significantly higher volatility. In line with the asymmetric information theory, we indicate that smaller IPOs in the CEE region have greater underpricing than the larger IPOs. Contrary to the literature, we unambiguously confirm long-run underperformance toward the benchmarks. In some model specifications, we also find that IPO long-run underperformance in the CEE region is less present than in the European Union’s developed capital markets.