Equilibrium determinacy and inflation measures for interest rate rules

Empirical evidence suggests that goods are highly heterogeneous with respect to the degree of price rigidity. We develop a two-sector dynamic general equilibrium model to study the equilibrium determinacy properties of interest rate rules that respond to inflation measures differing in their degree of price rigidity. We find that rules responding to a headline measure, which puts some weight on the inflation of the sector with low price stickiness, are more prone to generate endogenous aggregate instability—in the form of fluctuations driven by self-fulfilling expectations and equilibria where fluctuations are unbounded—than rules that respond exclusively to a core measure, which includes only the inflation of the sector with high price stickiness. We discuss how our results depend on the elasticity of substitution across goods, the timing of the policy rule, and reacting to aggregate activity.     

论第三方物流中标的物风险负担

买卖合同标的物风险负担的一般规则,各国有交付主义与所有人主义两种不同的立法模式。在第三方物流中,因涉及出卖人、买受人和物流方共三方主体,其标的物的风险负担规则与一般买卖合同有所不同。在当前较为通行的第三方物流模式下,物流方多为卖方或买方的受托人,其接受或提取货物的行为是标的物风险转移的外在标志。在因物流方之过错致标的物毁损、灭失,物流方承运过程中出卖人出卖标的物以及物流方迟延履行等情况下,标的物的风险负担均有其特殊规则。     

National numerical fiscal rules: Not complied with,but still effective?

This paper investigates the effects of (non-)compliance with national numerical fiscal rules on fiscal policy in 11 EU member states with 23 fiscal rules in place from 1994 to 2012. Introducing a new dataset of legal texts constituting the fiscal rules, allows a joint empirical analysis of different types and designs of numerical fiscal rules. In various empirical exercises the change in the difference between the exact variable constrained by the fiscal rule and its numerical limit is analysed. Statistics show that countries comply with their fiscal rules only in about 50% of the years. Nevertheless, various econometric exercises demonstrate that the introduction of fiscal rules does significantly change the behaviour of fiscal policy. If countries do not comply with their fiscal rule in the year or forecast before, there is a strong downward tendency of the constrained variable towards the numerical limit. The results show that fiscal rules act as kind of a benchmark for policy makers and the public, and even though they might be complied with only in half of the years, they still tilt fiscal policy towards the numerical limit in times of non-compliance.     

SPECIALIZATION AND TRADE: A GAME THEORETICAL APPROACH

Abstract.  In this paper we consider the problem of specialization and trade for large economies with a continuum of ex ante identical individuals and with a finite number of goods. Different from the classical treatment, we adopt a game theoretical approach. Therefore in our models the prices of traded goods are endogenously formulated according to the bidding strategies of the producer-consumers. Furthermore, we assume that in the beginning individuals randomly choose their professions. As a result, with a short-run Nash equilibrium different types of professionals may have different utility levels; while through a dynamic process, a long-run Nash equilibrium with utility equalization is reached. Besides, we also attempt to provide a new algorithm for the computation of general equilibrium models in the Yang-Ng framework.     

Fiscal Constitutions

In this paper we examine how taxes, subsidies and the design of constitutional agendas should be regulated in order to allow for an efficient allocation of public goods and a limitation of tax distortions. We show that if public goods are socially desirable, the simple majority rule, combined with taxation constrained to majority winners or a ban on subsidies, can achieve several desirable objectives. Equal treatment regarding taxes and subsidies is undesirable. Super majority rules and equal treatment of all citizens with respect to taxes and subsidies, however, are first-best provided public goods are socially undesirable. Finally, we suggest that constitutions with amendments eliminate excessive taxation and allow treatment rules to universally improve welfare.     

OPTIMAL ARBITRATION

We study common arbitration rules for disputes of two privately informed parties, final offer and conventional arbitration. Conventional arbitration is shown to be an optimal arbitration rule in environments with transferable utility, while final offer arbitration is optimal if utility is nontransferable and the parties’ interests are not too aligned. These results explain the prevalence of both arbitration rules in practice.     

Flexible Integration? Mandatory and Minimum Participation Rules

For a club such as the European Union, an important question is whether a subset of the members should be allowed to form “inner clubs” and enhance cooperation. Flexible cooperation allows members to participate if and only if they benefit, but it leads to free‐riding when externalities are positive. I show that flexible cooperation is better if the heterogeneity is large and the externality small, but that rigid cooperation is the political equilibrium too often. Both regimes, however, are extreme variants of a more general system combining mandatory and minimum participation rules. For each rule, I characterize the optimum and the equilibrium.     

A comparison of first price multi-object auctions

We compare simultaneous multi-object English-type ascending price auctions with first price sealed bid auctions in private values environments with multi-object demands. Special attention is paid to the effect of closing rules on ascending auctions’ outcomes. We find that simultaneous ascending auctions with the soft closing rule are the most efficient, while the sealed bid auctions generate the highest revenue. Ascending auctions with the hard closing rule display a significant amount of late bidding, resulting in the lowest among the three institutions revenue and efficiency.

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Electronic Supplementary Material  The online version of this article () contains supplementary material, which is available to authorized users.      

Robustness of the Incentive Compatible Combinatorial Auction

Goods are said to be combinatorial when the value of a bundle of goods is not equal to the sum of the values of the same goods unbundled. Investigations of combinatorial allocation problems should recognize that there are two separate aspects of such problems: anenvironmental distinction between multiple-unit allocation problems which involve combinatorial goods and those which do not do so, and aninstitutional distinction between auctions in which combinatorial values can be expressed as part of the bidding rules and those in which they cannot. Forsythe and Isaac (Research in Experimental Economics, Vol. 2 (1982). Greenwich, Conn.: JAI Press, Inc.) reports the extension of the Vickrey auction into a demand-revealing, multiple unit, private goods auction that can incorporate combinatorial values. This current paper places that theoretically demand-revealing institution in a series of experimental environments in order to generate results (e.g. efficiencies) which may serve as a benchmark for other auctions (combinatorial or otherwise) whose implementation characteristics may be more favorable. To aid in interpretation of our Vickrey experimental results, we also provide results of alternatives to Vickrey allocations from both institutional and heuristic sources, as well as a discussion of the source of the Vickrey auctions high efficiencies even in the presence of misrevelation.     

Under threat: Rules-based fiscal policy and how to preserve it

Rules-based fiscal policy is under threat. Over the last two decades, it proved frustratingly complicated to strike the right balance between three essential properties of sound fiscal policy rules: simplicity, flexibility, and enforceability. Simplicity has been sacrificed to ensure that more contingent (i.e. flexible) rules remained enforceable. The resulting arrangements have failed to adequately guide fiscal policy, undermining formal compliance, and ultimately, popular and political support for rules. To mitigate the risk that countries abandon rules-based policymaking, we suggest downplaying enforceability—i.e. the role of formal sanctions through enforcement—and enhancing the reputational costs of breaching rules. At the limit, the rule could consist of a simple quantitative benchmark for a key fiscal indicator. To boost reputational effects, independent fiscal councils should focus on debunking the “fiscal alchemy,” clearing the public debate from partisan smokescreens, and fostering popular support for sound fiscal policies.     

Are modern philosophical accounts of well-being excessively ‘individualistic’?

Do modern accounts of well-being which have influenced, or been adopted by, some economists encourage excessive ‘individualism’? I suggest that this question can be answered by considering two objections to modern views of welfare: (1) that they involve an impoverished view of persons and (2) that they decompose all goods into goods for individuals and do not give intrinsic value to collective goods. I argue that two influential views of well-being—the informed desire view and the capability approach—can convincingly respond to these objections. Both views allow for our distinct social roles and identities: the ways in which social norms and institutions shape values and a concern for others. Neither view sees goods as goods only of specific individuals, nor do they require us to separate out neatly the realisation of values in the lives of various individuals. But that does not imply that goods such as friendship are collective rather than individual goods or that collective goods have intrinsic value. Nonetheless, accounts of well-being may need to be more explicit than they have been in incorporating the social dimension.     

On Profits and Hospitals

Empirical evidence strongly suggests that something other than pay is sought in work. By emphasizing consumption over production, the worker as a producer was eclipsed by mainstream economics and replaced by the worker as a consumer. The analysis of the relational dimension of work life was also discarded. We argue that the decision to work and behavior at work is very much driven by the search for relational goods and moral goods, defined as intangible entities that emerge from social interactions. The "goodness" of relational and moral goods stems from their being commonly shared. Two properties of both goods — commonality and immanence-in-action — rule out the possibility of their being captured in a utility maximizing framework.     

Wealth accumulation and economic progress

In an evolutionary dynamic economic theory the accumulation of durable goods (i.e., wealth) is a key feature. Here we show that the wealth of individual economic agents can be measured by the progress function (PF). PF is a function of goods and money under straightforward assumptions, notably the ‘no-loss’ rule for transactions. We derive explicit formulae for wealth from the PF. We also show how the compatibility of the PF and the neoclassical economics deriving the conventional utility functions from the PF.     

Dynamic stability and reform of political institutions

This paper examines endogenous institutional change in a class of dynamic political games. The political aggregation rules used at date t+1 are instrumental choices under rules at date t. Effectively, rules are “players” who can strategically delegate future policy-making authority to different rules. A political rule is stable if it selects itself. A reform occurs when an alternative rule is selected. The stability of a political rule is shown to depend on whether its choices are dynamically consistent. For instance, simple majority rules can be shown to be dynamically consistent in many common environments where wealth-weighted voting rules are not. The result extends to political rules that incorporate private activities such as extra-legal protests, threats, or private investment. The approach is one way of understanding various explanations of institutional change proposed in the literature. A parametric model of public goods provision gives an illustration.     

Exchange Rules and the Incentive Compatibility of Choice Experiments

The incentive properties of stated-preference surveys continue to be a central debate in the valuation of public goods. The majority of empirical studies have focused on incentive properties of contingent valuation questions in relation to situations where answers have monetary consequences. This research explores the incentive properties of repeated, attribute-based choice questions when subjects are provided with an explicit connection between choices and outcomes. Two market/provision-rules are investigated: a posted-price market and a plurality-rule vote. These two provision rules are contrasted to treatments in which no provision rule is discussed—subjects are simply asked to choose their preferred alternative. These three hypothetical choice treatments are compared with a binding choice treatment. While none of the public good treatments are theoretically incentive compatible, we include a comparison of hypothetical and binding choices for a private-good that is incentive compatible. The private good experiments indicate that marginal willingness to pay (WTP) estimates from the hypothetical treatment are larger, but not statistically different than corresponding estimates in the binding choice treatment. Results for the public good experiments indicate that marginal WTP estimates from the hypothetical treatments are much larger, and statistically different than corresponding estimates in the binding choice treatment. The bias is largest when no provision rule is discussed. The bias is reduced with the inclusion of a provision rule, but surprisingly, there was no difference across provision rule treatments. Overall, our results indicate that choice experiments involving a public good should include a provision rule to reduce bias, but the resulting marginal WTP estimates may still be more biased, on average, than those arising from contingent valuation survey formats.     

The allocation of badly needed goods to low-income consumers: A system of central planning without redistributive taxation

A simple planning model is constructed that is designed to deliver more of certain badly needed goods to poor consumers than they would receive under a competitive system. The model increases the supply of the badly needed goods, while minimizing the cost, in terms of welfare losses, of the increased production to those consumers for whom the goods are relatively unimportant. Simulation examples are used to demonstrate the methodology, which is sufficiently general to be used to represent many different central-planning systems.     

Dynamic stability and reform of political institutions

This paper examines endogenous institutional change in a class of dynamic political games. The political aggregation rules used at date t+1 are instrumental choices under rules at date t. Effectively, rules are “players” who can strategically delegate future policy-making authority to different rules. A political rule is stable if it selects itself. A reform occurs when an alternative rule is selected. The stability of a political rule is shown to depend on whether its choices are dynamically consistent. For instance, simple majority rules can be shown to be dynamically consistent in many common environments where wealth-weighted voting rules are not. The result extends to political rules that incorporate private activities such as extra-legal protests, threats, or private investment. The approach is one way of understanding various explanations of institutional change proposed in the literature. A parametric model of public goods provision gives an illustration.     

Performance of interest rate rules under credit market imperfections

The stabilization effects of Taylor rules are analyzed in a limited participation framework with and without credit market imperfections in capital goods production. Financial frictions substantially amplify the impact of shocks, and also reinforce the stabilizing or destabilizing effects of interest rate rules on output. However, these effects are reversed relative to new Keynesian models: under limited participation, interest rate rules are stabilizing for productivity shocks, but imply an output-inflation tradeoff for demand shocks. Moreover, because financial frictions imply excessive fluctuation, stabilization via an interest rate rule can be a welfare-improving response to productivity shocks.     

Capital controls and welfare with cross-border bank capital flows

This performance of time-varying capital controls on cross-border bank borrowing is studied in an open-economy, dynamic stochastic general equilibrium model with financial frictions and imperfect capital mobility. The model is parameterized for a middle-income country and replicates the stylized facts associated with a drop in world interest rates—capital inflows, real appreciation, credit boom, asset price pressures, and output expansion. A capital controls rule, which is fundamentally macroprudential in nature, is defined in terms of changes in bank foreign borrowing. The welfare-maximizing rule is established numerically and compared to the Ramsey policy. The analysis is then extended to solve jointly for optimal countercyclical reserve requirements and capital controls rules. The results show that the implementation of a countercyclical credit-based reserve requirement rule induces less reliance on capital controls. Thus, these two instruments are partial substitutes in maximizing welfare.     

Public Versus Private Provision of Public Goods

It is well known that public goods are underprovided in a static setting with voluntary contributions. Public provision—in a median voter framework with proportional taxation—generally exceeds private provision. This paper compares private and public provision of public goods in a dynamic setting. In a dynamic setting, voluntary donations can result in efficient provision. Also, majority‐rule solutions exist even when taxes are not proportional to income. At low discount factors, public provision tends to exceed private provision. As patience increases, however, private provision may exceed public provision. This occurs because many outcomes with a low level of public good provision—and potentially large targeted transfer payments to particular individuals—become sustainable under public provision. Under private provision, however, large targeted transfers are unsustainable. To finance the public good, private provision tends to result in benefit taxation, and public provision tends to result in progressive taxation.