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1.
Philip J. Reny 《Economic Theory》2011,48(1):17-29
An infinite game is approximated by restricting the players to finite subsets of their pure strategy spaces. A strategic approximationof an infinite game is a countable subset of pure strategies with the property that limits of all equilibria of all sequences
of approximating games whose finite strategy sets eventually include each member of the countable set must be equilibria of
the infinite game. We provide conditions under which infinite games admit strategic approximations. 相似文献
2.
Michael R. Caputo 《Games and Economic Behavior》1996,13(2):201-224
The Envelope Theorem for Nash equilibria shows that the strategic reaction of the other players in the game is important for determining how parameter perturbations affect a given player's indirect objective function. The fundamental comparative statics matrix of Nash equilibria for theithplayer in anN-player static game includes the equilibrium response of the otherN−1players in the game to the parameter perturbation and is symmetric positive semidefinite subject to constraint. This result is fundamental in that it holds for all sufficiently smooth Nash equilibria and is independent of any curvature or stability assumptions imposed on the game.Journal of Economic LiteratureClassification Numbers: C72, C61. 相似文献
3.
This paper studies models where the optimal response functions under consideration are not increasing in endogenous variables,
and weakly increasing in exogenous parameters. Such models include games with strategic substitutes, and include cases where
additionally, some variables may be strategic complements. The main result here is that the equilibrium set in such models
is a non-empty, complete lattice, if, and only if, there is a unique equilibrium. Indeed, for a given parameter value, a pair
of distinct equilibria are never comparable. Therefore, with multiple equilibria, some of the established techniques for exhibiting
increasing equilibria or computing equilibria that use the largest or smallest equilibrium, or that use the lattice structure
of the equilibrium set do not apply to such models. Moreover, there are no ranked equilibria in such models. Additionally,
the analysis here implies a new proof and a slight generalization of some existing results. It is shown that when a parameter
increases, no new equilibrium is smaller than any old equilibrium. (In particular, in n-player games of strategic substitutes with real-valued action spaces, symmetric equilibria increase with the parameter.)
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4.
This paper describes algorithms for finding all Nash equilibria of a two-player game in strategic form. We present two algorithms
that extend earlier work. Our presentation is self-contained, and explains the two methods in a unified framework using faces
of best-response polyhedra. The first method lrsnash is based on the known vertex enumeration program lrs, for “lexicographic reverse search”. It enumerates the vertices of only one best-response polytope, and the vertices of the
complementary faces that correspond to these vertices (if they are not empty) in the other polytope. The second method is
a modification of the known EEE algorithm, for “enumeration of extreme equilibria”. We also describe a second, as yet not implemented, variant that is space
efficient. We discuss details of implementations of lrsnash and EEE, and report on computational experiments that compare the two algorithms, which show that both have their strengths and weaknesses. 相似文献
5.
Informationally robust equilibria (IRE) are introduced in Robson (Games Econ Behav 7: 233–245, 1994) as a refinement of Nash equilibria for strategic games. Such equilibria are limits of a sequence of (subgame
perfect) Nash equilibria in perturbed games where with small probability information about the strategic behavior is revealed
to other players (information leakage). Focusing on bimatrix games, we consider a type of informationally robust equilibria
and derive a number of properties they form a non-empty and closed subset of the Nash equilibria. Moreover, IRE is a strict
concept in the sense that the IRE are independent of the exact sequence of probabilities with which information is leaked.
The set of IRE, like the set of Nash equilibria, is the finite union of polytopes. In potential games, there is an IRE in
pure strategies. In zero-sum games, the set of IRE has a product structure and its elements can be computed efficiently by
using linear programming. We also discuss extensions to games with infinite strategy spaces and more than two players.
The authors would like to thank Marieke Quant for her helpful comments. 相似文献
6.
We analyze the effects of strategic behavior and private information in pollution permit markets in which all firms have market
power. The market is characterized by supply-function equilibria. Firms submit net supplies for permits and a market maker
determines the market-clearing price. Net supplies depend on abatement cost functions, which in turn depend on private information
parameters. We calculate the increase in aggregate abatement costs due to strategic behavior and private information and show
that private information attenuates the effects of strategic behavior.
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7.
We analyze situations where the provision of each of c public goods must be voluntarily assumed by exactly one of n private agents in the absence of transfer schemes or binding contracts. We model this problem as a complete information, potentially infinite horizon game where n agents simultaneously wage c wars of attrition. Providing a public good commits an agent not to take on the provision of another public good for a fixed period. We explore the strategic trade-offs that this commitment ability and the multiplicity of tasks provide. Subgame perfect equilibria (SPEs) are characterized completely for games with two agents and two public goods. For games with two identical agents and c > 1 identical public goods, we establish that an equilibrium that yields a surplus-maximizing outcome always exists and we provide sufficient conditions under which it is the unique equilibrium outcome. We show that under mild conditions, the surplus-maximizing SPE is the unique symmetric SPE. Journal of Economic Literature Classification Number: H41, C72, D13. 相似文献
8.
Non-Additive Beliefs and Strategic Equilibria 总被引:2,自引:0,他引:2
This paper studies n-player games where players' beliefs about their opponents' behaviour are modelled as non-additive probabilities. The concept of an “equilibrium under uncertainty” which is introduced in this paper extends the equilibrium notion of Dow and Werlang (1994, J. Econom. Theory64, 305–324) to n-player games in strategic form. Existence of such an equilibrium is demonstrated under usual conditions. For low degrees of ambiguity, equilibria under uncertainty approximate Nash equilibria. At the other extreme, with a low degree of confidence, maximin equilibria appear. Finally, robustness against a lack of confidence may be viewed as a refinement for Nash equilibria. Journal of Economic Literature Classification Numbers: C72, D81. 相似文献
9.
Summary. We consider a linear exchange economy and its successive replicas. We study the notion of Cournot-Walras equilibrium in which
the consumers use the quantities of commodities put on the market as strategic variables. We prove that, generically, if the
number of replications is large enough but finite, the competitive behaviour is an oligopoly equilibrium. Then, under a mild
condition, which may be interpreted in terms of market regulation and/or market activity, we show that any sequence of oligopoly
equilibria of successive replica economies converges to the Walrasian outcome and furthermore that every oligopoly equilibrium
of large, but finite, replica is Pareto optimal. Consequently, under the same assumptions on the fundamentals of the economy,
one has an asymptotic result on the convergence of oligopoly equilibria to the Walras equilibrium together with a generic
existence result for the Cournot-Walras.
Received: June 20, 2002; revised version: November 20, 2002
RID="*"
ID="*" Part of this paper was written while the second author was visiting the Universidad de Vigo. The support of the department
of mathematics is gratefully acknowledged.
Correspondence to: J.M. Bonnisseau 相似文献
10.
Toshimasa Maruta 《Games and Economic Behavior》1997,19(2):221-234
In a 2 × 2 symmetric game with two symmetric equilibria, one risk-dominates another if and only if the equilibrium strategy is a unique best response to any mixture that gives itself at least a probability of one-half. In a two-person strategic form game, we call a Nash equilibriumglobally risk-dominantif it consists of strategies such that each one of them is a unique best response to any mixture that gives the other at least a probability of one-half. We show that if a weakly acyclic two-person game has a globally risk-dominant equilibrium, then this is the one that is selected by the stochastic equilibrium selection process of Young.Journal of Economic LiteratureClassification Numbers: C72, C73. 相似文献
11.
Generally, two facts occur with strategic complementarities and fixed prices: (i) the equilibria are multiple and (ii) if the complementarities are strong, the law of demand is violated and the equilibrium is unstable. In this paper, we analyse the effect of price flexibility on these features as well as on market welfare properties. Assuming an exchange economy with H agents consuming two goods with one strategic complement, we show that flexibility of prices may remove both the multiplicity of the equilibria and the instability of behavior when the externalities are strong. Moreover, we find conditions to correct instability when it is caused by perverse wealth effects. When preferences are quasilinear and identical, if the externality is beneficial, any equilibrium is Pareto optimal despite the externality. But if the externality is detrimental, corrections are required. 相似文献
12.
We analyze a class of coordination games in which the Kth player to submit an entry wins a contest. These games have an infinite number of symmetric equilibria and the set of equilibria
does not change with K. We run experiments with 15 participants and with K=3, 7, and 11. Our experiments show that the value of K affects initial submissions and convergence to equilibrium. When K is small relative to the number of participants, our experiments show that repeated play converges to or near zero. When
K is large, an equilibrium is often not reached as a result of repeated play. We seek explanations to these patterns in hierarchical
thinking and direction learning.
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13.
Correlated equilibrium and sunspot equilibrium 总被引:1,自引:0,他引:1
Summary We show by an example that the sunspot equilibria of a competitive economy are not equivalent to the correlated equilibria if sunspots generate transfers between (extrinsic) states of nature (through a contingent commodities market). Nevertheless, we prove that the sunspot equilibrium allocations of a standard overlapping generations economy coincide with the (strategic form) correlated equilibrium allocations of a natural market game mimicking the economy. 相似文献
14.
YUSUKE SAMEJIMA 《The Japanese Economic Review》2007,58(4):423-442
In elections, the voting outcomes are affected by strategic entries of candidates. We study a class of voting rules immune to strategic candidacy. Dutta et al. (2001 ) show that such rules satisfying unanimity are dictatorial if all orderings of candidates are admissible for voters’ preferences. When voters’ preferences are single‐peaked over a political spectrum, there exist non‐dictatorial rules immune to strategic candidacy. An example is the rule selecting the m‐th peak from the left among the peaks of voters’ preferences, where m is any natural number no more than the number of voters. We show that immunity from strategic candidacy with basic axioms fully characterizes the family of the m‐th leftmost peak rules. 相似文献
15.
16.
Summary. Simple search models have equilibria where some agents accept money and others do not. We argue such equilibria should not be taken seriously. This is unfortunate if one wants a model with partial acceptability. We introduce heterogeneous agents and show partial acceptability arises naturally and robustly. There can be multiple equilibria with different degrees of acceptability. Given the type of heterogeneity we allow, the model is simple: equilibria reduce to fixed points in [0,1]. We show that with other forms of heterogeneity equilibria are fixed points in set space, and there is no method to reduce this to a problem in R1.Received: 4 September 2002, Revised: 23 September 2002JEL Classification Numbers:
C78, E40.A. Shevchenko, R. Wright: We thank seminar participants at the Federal Reserve Bank of Cleveland, Indiana University, Purdue University, University of Toronto, the 2002 Midwest Macroeconomics Conference at Vanderbilt University, and the 2001 Conference on Economic Dynamics at the University of Essex. The National Science Foundation and the Federal Reserve Bank of Cleveland provided financial support. Braz Ministerio de Camargo and Gabriel Camera provided some helpful suggestions. Correspondence to: R. Wright 相似文献
17.
The paper proves, by construction, the existence of Markovian equilibria in a dynamic spatial legislative bargaining model. Players bargain over policies in an infinite horizon. In each period, a sequential protocol of proposal-making and voting, with random proposer recognitions and a simple majority, produces a policy that becomes the next period's status-quo; the status-quo is endogenous. The construction relies on simple strategies determined by strategic bliss points computed by the algorithm we provide. A strategic bliss point, the dynamic utility ideal, is a moderate policy relative to a bliss point, the static utility ideal. Moderation is strategic and germane to the dynamic environment; players moderate in order to constrain the future proposals of opponents. Moderation is a strategic substitute; when a player's opponents do moderate, she does not, and when they do not moderate, she does. We provide conditions under which the simple strategies induced by the strategic bliss points computed by the algorithm deliver a Stationary Markov Perfect equilibrium, and we prove its existence in generic games with impatient players and in symmetric games. Because the algorithm constructs all equilibria in simple strategies, we provide their general characterization, and we show their generic uniqueness. 相似文献
18.
Summary. The paper investigates the nature of market failure in a dynamic version of Akerlof (1970) where identical cohorts of a durable
good enter the market over time. In the dynamic model, equilibria with qualitatively different properties emerge. Typically,
in equilibria of the dynamic model, sellers with higher quality wait in order to sell and wait more than sellers of lower
quality. The main result is that for any distribution of quality there exist an infinite number of cyclical equilibria where all goods are traded within a certain number of periods after entering the market.
Received: December 21, 2000; revised version: September 5, 2001 相似文献
19.
Applying unawareness belief structures introduced in Heifetz et al. (Games Econ Behav 77:100–121, 2013a), we develop Bayesian games with unawareness, define equilibrium, and prove existence. We show how equilibria are extended naturally from lower to higher awareness levels and restricted from higher to lower awareness levels. We apply Bayesian games with unawareness to investigate the robustness of equilibria to uncertainty about opponents’ awareness of actions. We show that a Nash equilibrium of a strategic game is robust to unawareness of actions if and only if it is not weakly dominated. Finally, we discuss the relationship between standard Bayesian games and Bayesian games with unawareness. 相似文献
20.
We study the voluntary provision of a discrete public good via the contribution game. Players independently and simultaneously
make nonrefundable contributions to fund a discrete public good, which is provided if and only if contributions cover the
cost of production. We characterize nonconstant continuous symmetric equilibria, giving sufficient conditions for their existence.
We show the common normalization by which players’ values are distributed over [0, 1] is not without loss of generality: if
the distribution over this interval has continuous density f with f(0) > 0, then no (nonconstant) continuous symmetric equilibrium exists. We study in detail the case in which players’ private
values are uniformly distributed, showing that, generically, when one continuous equilibrium exists, a continuum of continuous
equilibria exists. For any given cost of the good, multiple continuous equilibria cannot be Pareto ranked. Nevertheless, not
all continuous equilibria are interim incentive efficient. The set of interim incentive efficient equilibria is exactly determined.
The authors thank Manfred Dix, George Mailath, Andrew Postlewaite, and an anonymous referee for their comments. 相似文献