Banking deregulation and allocative efficiency in Pakistan

This article examines the impact of deregulation policies on allocative efficiency of banks in Pakistan. It investigates whether deregulation has impacted the pattern of allocative efficiency of banks and explores which bank ownership segment has been more responsive. It uses data from 1991 to 2005 and explicitly models allocative inefficiency by using the translog shadow cost-share system. Empirical results show that overregulation and imperfect market structure hampers the ability of banks to make competitive decisions. We find evidence of allocative inefficiency leading to over-utilization of labour and deposits vis-à-vis operating cost. Empirical results for time-varying allocative efficiency show declining levels of allocative inefficiency for state-owned and private banks in post-reform period. Deregulation policies induce state-owned banks to decrease over-utilization of labour relative to deposits and operating cost while private banks succeed in using operating cost closer to optimal levels. Hence, policymakers have latitude to introduce more reforms without jeopardizing allocative efficiency.     

Productivity and misallocation of energy resources: Evidence from Korea’s manufacturing Sector

This paper analyzes the role of allocative efficiency of energy resources with respect to total factor productivity (TFP) in the Korean manufacturing sector. Using firm-level data for Korea, we extend the framework of Hsieh and Klenow (2009) to measure allocative inefficiency of energy markets as a function of energy price distortions. Our results indicate that between the years 2000 and 2014, intra-industry misallocation has increased. With respect to energy resources, this is truer in the low-oil-price periods than in other periods. An improvement in allocative efficiency could be attained by equalizing total factor revenue productivity across firms within an industry. In reallocating capital, labor, and energy resources, hypothetical TFP increases of 51.3 % and 71.7 % above actual levels in 2000 and 2014, respectively, could have been achieved. The evolution of firm productivity has been shaped by energy (electricity and fuel) market distortion and capital market distortion. Our evidence suggests that government (energy) price intervention is likely to have played an important role in productivity loss and in allocative inefficiency observed in energy markets.     

An Experimental Study of the Effect of Private Information in the Coase Theorem

We investigate, in an experimental setting, the effect of private information on the Coase theorem's predictions of efficiency and allocative neutrality. For a two-person bargaining game, we find significantly more inefficiency and allocative bias in the case of private information compared with the case of complete information. We also find substantial bargaining breakdown, which is not predicted by the Coase theorem. For the case of private information, we reject the Coase theorem in favor of the alternative of a generalized version of the Myerson—Satterthwaite theorem, which predicts inefficiency, allocative bias in the direction of the disagreement point, and some bargaining breakdown.     

To Each According to . . . ? Markets, Tournaments, and the Matching Problem with Borrowing Constraints

We compare the performance of markets and tournaments as allocative mechanisms in an economy with borrowing constraints. The economy consists of a continuum of individuals who differ in their initial wealth and ability level. These must be assigned to a continuum of investment opportunities or inputs of different productivity. With perfect capital markets matching is efficient under both mechanisms. Markets, however, generate higher aggregate consumption because of the waste associated with the production of signals under tournaments. When borrowing constraints are present, tournaments dominate markets in terms of matching efficiency and, for sufficiently powerful signalling technologies, also in terms of aggregate consumption.     

Economic inefficiency in a revenue setting: the Norwegian whitefish fishery

The main focus in the inefficiency literature is on suboptimal input use and how this causes increased costs, due to technical and allocative inefficiency. Production or cost functions are then typically used to describe the underlying technology of the firm. The possible revenue loss, due to lower than maximum production levels and suboptimal output mix, has received substantially less attention. By using a revenue function to measure inefficiency, the focus, model and estimation technique presented in this article differ from those of previous studies. A shadow revenue model is used to decompose revenue inefficiency into its technical and allocative components, in which the allocative inefficiency is due to a suboptimal output mix. The approach is illustrated using panel data of Norwegian whitefish trawlers. The results reveal large inefficiencies, with respect to output levels as well as output mix, indicating that this can be an important part of the picture when investigating economic inefficiency. To identify the determinants of revenue inefficiency, we conduct a second-step regression, in which technical and allocative inefficiency is regressed upon a set of explanatory variables. The inefficiencies are partly explained by the management system and fleet structure.     

Bus transit technical efficiency using latent class stochastic indirect production frontier

Using an Indirect Production Frontier (IPF), this article examines technical inefficiency within a latent class framework while simultaneously accounting for allocative distortions from operating and capital subsidies. It identifies two latent classes of US public transit systems, one characterized by economies of scale with 16.61% technical inefficiency and the other by diseconomies of scale with 14.16% technical inefficiency. It decomposes technical inefficiency among some of its sources and finds that the incentive tier of federal operating subsidies, regulations regarding years of vehicle use, subsidy-induced allocative distortion from labour overuse relative to capital negatively influence technical inefficiency in all transit systems. For the Latent Class 1 transit systems, the sources of lower technical inefficiency are operating speed, purchased transportation and years-of-vehicle-use regulation. For the Latent Class 2 transit systems, these sources are subsidy-induced capital-labour allocative distortion and the incentive tier component of the federal formula grant.     

Optimal Factor Taxation under Wage Bargaining: A Dynamic Perspective

Abstract. We consider the issue of steady-state optimal factor taxation in a Ramsey-type dynamic general equilibrium setting with two distinct distortions: (i) taxes on capital and labour are the only available tax instruments for raising revenues and (ii) labour markets are subject to an inefficiency resulting from wage bargaining. If considered in isolation, the two distortions create conflicting demands on the wage tax, while calling for a zero capital tax. By combining the two distortions, we arrive at the conclusion that both instruments should be used, implying that the zero capital tax result in general is no longer valid under imperfectly competitive labour markets.     

Sources of investment inefficiency: The case of fixed-asset investment in China

This study attempts to measure the inefficiency associated with aggregate investment in a transitional economy. The inefficiency is decomposed into allocative and technical inefficiency based on standard production theory. Allocative inefficiency is measured by the deviation of actual investment from the theoretically desired investment demand. Institutional factors are then identified as part of the driving force of the deviation. The resulting model is applied to Chinese provincial panel data. The main findings are: Chinese investment demand is strongly receptive to expansionary fiscal policies and inter-provincial network effects; the tendency of over-investment remains, even with signs of increasing allocative efficiency and improving technical efficiency.     

Marriage Matching and Intercorrelation of Preferences

Men's and women's preferences are intercorrelated to the extent that men rank highly those women who rank them highly. Intercorrelation plays an important but overlooked role in determining outcomes of matching mechanisms. We employ simulation techniques to quantify the effects of intercorrelated preferences on men's and women's aggregate satisfaction with the outcome of the Gale–Shapley matching mechanism. Our results show that even a small amount of positive intercorrelation in a matching market means increased satisfaction for women and dramatically decreased potential for strategic manipulation. Negative intercorrelation has the opposite effects. Thus, matching markets characterized by positive intercorrelation are well suited for matching via Gale–Shapley, while markets characterized by negative intercorrelation may face opposition from the nonproposing side of the market. So that our results are immediately applicable, we also define and employ a general measure of intercorrelation that can be used for any matching market.     

Determinants of banks’ Nerlovian economic efficiency: a DEA-bootstrap approach

ABSTRACT

This study aims to evaluate the Nerlovian economic efficiency of Taiwanese commercial banks and its determinants by assuming the presence of an imperfectly competitive market using a two-stage estimation procedure: Nerlovian economic inefficiency and its components’ price, technical and allocative efficiencies computed and decomposed in the first stage, which are regressed on the explanatory variables with a bootstrapped truncated approach in the second stage. The estimation results show that in the first-stage analysis, the Nerlovian economic inefficiency of banks is primarily due to allocative inefficiency, and indicate the existence of price inefficiency in Taiwan. In the second-stage analysis, the results confirm that both the years in operation of the bank and the ratio of credit loans are the main determinants of banking profit efficiency. In addition, this study not only shows that publicly owned banks contribute to better price efficiency but also proves that loan loss reserve to total assets is negatively associated with technical efficiency. The equity ratio exerts an insignificant favourable impact on allocative efficiency. The findings of this research are essential for bank managers in Taiwan.     

Equilibria under deferred acceptance: Dropping strategies,filled positions,and welfare

We study many-to-one matching markets where hospitals have responsive preferences over students. We study the game induced by the student-optimal stable matching mechanism. We assume that students play their weakly dominant strategy of truth-telling.Roth and Sotomayor (1990) showed that equilibrium outcomes can be unstable. We prove that any stable matching is obtained in some equilibrium. We also show that the exhaustive class of dropping strategies does not necessarily generate the full set of equilibrium outcomes. Finally, we find that the ‘rural hospital theorem’ cannot be extended to the set of equilibrium outcomes and that welfare levels are in general unrelated to the set of stable matchings. Two important consequences are that, contrary to one-to-one matching markets, (a) filled positions depend on the equilibrium that is reached and (b) welfare levels are not bounded by the optimal stable matchings (with respect to the true preferences).     

Paths to stability for matching markets with couples

We study two-sided matching markets with couples and show that for a natural preference domain for couples, the domain of weakly responsive preferences, stable outcomes can always be reached by means of decentralized decision making. Starting from an arbitrary matching, we construct a path of matchings obtained from ‘satisfying’ blocking coalitions that yields a stable matching. Hence, we establish a generalization of Roth and Vande Vate's [Roth, A.E., Vande Vate, J.H., 1990. Random paths to stability in two-sided matching. Econometrica 58, 1475–1480] result on path convergence to stability for decentralized singles markets.Furthermore, we show that when stable matchings exist, but preferences are not weakly responsive, for some initial matchings there may not exist any path obtained from ‘satisfying’ blocking coalitions that yields a stable matching.     

Tax Rate Variability and Public Spending as Sources of Indeterminacy

We consider a constant returns to scale, one sector economy with segmented asset markets of the Woodford type. We analyze the role of public spending, financed by labor income and consumption taxation, on the emergence of indeterminacy. We find that what is relevant for indeterminacy is the variability of the distortion introduced by government intervention. We show that the degree of public spending externalities in preferences affects the combinations between the tax rate and its variability under which indeterminacy occurs. Moreover, we find that consumption taxes can lead to local indeterminacy when asset markets are segmented.     

HETEROGENEITY,FRICTIONAL ASSIGNMENT,AND HOME-OWNERSHIP

We study the composition of the housing stock across ownership and rental markets in a dynamic model of frictional assignment. Houses are rented or sold to heterogeneous households that sort over quality. Due to matching frictions and an increasing ownership surplus, wealthy households tend to own and lower value housing tends to be rented, even without financial frictions or rental supply constraints. When calibrated to match key housing market features of the average U.S. city, the model is consistent with observed empirical relationships across cities. We study the model's implications for affordability, ownership, and the impact of progressive property taxation.     

Measurement of technical and allocative efficiencies using a CES cost frontier: a benchmarking study of Japanese transmission-distribution electricity

This paper estimates the technical and allocative inefficiencies of the transmission-distribution sector of Japanese electric utilities using a panel data during the 1981–1998 period. A stochastic production frontier of the CES form is jointly estimated with input demand equations. Taking advantage of the self-duality, we retrieve the cost frontier by which the impacts of technical and allocative inefficiencies on costs and input demands are measured. The estimated elasticity of substitution is significantly different from unity in favor of the CES specification over the Cobb–Douglas. The results show that observed costs are 9 to 48% higher than the efficient level; technical inefficiency raises costs by 1 to 28%, while allocative inefficiency does so by 8 to 30%. Although their impacts on costs are similar, technical inefficiency more fluctuates so the differences in the performance of utilities are mainly due to technical inefficiency. We also find a substantial over-utilization of capital for all utilities.

改革中的过度投资需求和效率损失-中国分省固定资产投资案例分析

该文的中心议题是投资效率.我们从基于标准生产函数的投资需求模型出发,从投资需求所处的非均衡状态入手来讨论投资效率.投资需求的非均衡状态由实际投资与理论投资间的偏离来定义.我们将投资效率分成投资的配置效率和投资的生产效率两个方面,并将配置效率与经济制度因素联系起来.我们使用样本期为1989-2000年的中国分省面板数据作为模型分析的实例.分析的重心是中国的过度投资需求在多大程度上是由总投资的配置效率欠佳所造成的.从实例分析中我们发现,资本价格对投资需求几乎无影响,而扩张性的中央与地方财政却对投资需求有着强烈的影响.我们还发现,各省过度投资间存在彼此攀比的网络效应.然而,一旦将这些制度因素分离开来,投资配置效率还是渐有改善的.同时,地区间投资不均的程度也不断有所下降.从投资的生产效率指标估值看,东部沿海省份的效率一般高于西部省份的效率,这是与地区经济的发展水平基本一致的.     

Matching markets with price bargaining

The extant microeconomic literature on matching markets assumes ordinal preferences for matches, while bargaining within matches is mostly excluded. Central for this paper, however, is bargaining over joint profits from potential matches. We investigate, both theoretically and experimentally, a seemingly simple allocation task in a 2×2 market with repeated negotiations. When inefficiency is possible, about 1/3 of the complete matches are inefficient and, overall, more than 3/4 of the experimental allocations are unstable. These results strongly contradict existing bargaining theories requiring efficient matches. Even with regard to efficient matches, the tested theories perform poorly. Standard bargaining and behavioral concepts, such as Selten’s (1972) Equal Division Core, are outperformed by the simplistic ε-Equal Split, i.e., an equal split of the joint profit plus/minus ε.     

The effect of risk-based capital requirements on profit efficiency in banking

The purpose of this paper is twofold: to show how to measure profit efficiency in banking using a newly developed technique, and to use that technique to determine the effect of risk-based capital requirements on the profit performance of US banks. The measure of profit efficiency used captures deviations from profit maximization arising from technical inefficiency, caused by a lack of managerial oversight and allocative inefficiency, which is caused by managers choosing a nonoptimal mix of inputs and outputs. A leverage ratio constraint and a risk-weighted capital ratio constraint are explicitly included in the model, which allows identification of the effect on profits of those constraints. The techniques are applied to random samples of US banks for 1990, 1992, and 1994. The results indicate that allocative inefficiency is a larger source of profit loss than technical inefficiency and that the risk-based capital standards have a significant effect on bank allocative efficiency.     

THE ECONOMICS OF SOCIAL SENTIMENTS: THE CASE OF ENVY

The widespread externality produced by the sentiment of envy is modelled in this paper. We show its specific structural properties, the conditions of its existence, the various reasons for its normative relevance, the basic tool of its analysis ("envy-free preferences") and its crucial relation with the property of equality of liberty ("equity"). We then show that the envy externality respects the efficiency of classical allocative processes in the relevant conditions (competitive markets with not too unequal incomes, cases with indivisibilities, equal-freedom individual choices, etc.). We in particular derive conditions of consistency between efficiency and the vanishing of the envy externality, as well as the effects of actual envy on "divide and choose" processes, preferences to reassignment, multidimensional maximin, "egalitarian equivalence", degrees of envy in society and the rationality of choices.     

Markov-perfect optimal taxation

In this paper we study optimal taxation in a dynamic game played by a sequence of governments and the private sector. We focus on the Markov-perfect equilibrium of this game under two different assumptions on the extent of government's intra-period commitment, which in turn define two within-period timings of actions. Our results show that the extent of government's intra-period commitment has important quantitative implications for policies, welfare, and macroeconomic variables, and consequently that it must be explicitly stated as one of the givens of the economy, alongside preferences, markets and technology. We see this as an important result, since most of the previous literature on Markovian optimal taxation has assumed, either interchangeably or unnoticeably, different degrees of government's intra-period commitment.