Collective Bargaining and Within-firm Wage Dispersion in Spain

This paper analyses the effect of collective bargaining on within‐firm wage dispersion for the case of Spain. What is relevant in the Spanish case is to compare the effect of the two basic levels of bargaining (firm and sector) on wage dispersion. By using the Oaxaca–Blinder decomposition, this paper concludes that collective agreements at firm level have a negative effect on wage dispersion. At the same time, firms that have signed these types of agreements show greater wage dispersion than those covered by agreements at the sector level, owing to the positive and compensating effect of firms’ and workers’ features.     

We Want Them All Covered! Collective Bargaining and Firm Heterogeneity: Theory and Evidence from Germany

This article establishes a link between the degree of productivity dispersion within an industry and collective bargaining coverage of the firms in the industry. In a stylized unionized oligopoly model, we show that differences in productivity levels can affect the design of collective wage contracts a sector‐union offers to heterogeneous firms. Using German linked employer–employee data, we test a range of our theoretical hypotheses and find empirical support for them. The dispersion of sector‐level labour productivity decreases the likelihood of firms being covered by a collective bargaining agreement on the industry level, but increases the likelihood of firms being covered by firm‐level agreements. The results hold for different subsamples and (panel) estimation techniques.     

The Impact of Wage Bargaining Regime on Firm‐Level Competitiveness and Wage Inequality: The Case of Ireland

This paper uses a linked employer‐employee dataset to analyze the impact of institutional wage bargaining regimes on average labor costs and within‐firm wage dispersion in private sector companies in Ireland. The results show that while centralized bargaining reduced labor costs within both the indigenous and foreign‐owned sectors, the relative advantage was greater among foreign‐owned firms. The analysis suggests that there are potentially large competitiveness gains to multinational companies that locate in countries implementing a centralized bargaining system. Furthermore, the results provide additional support to the view that collective bargaining reduces within‐firm wage inequality.     

Minimum Wages and Collective Bargaining: What Types of Pay Bargaining Can Foster Positive Pay Equity Outcomes?

Using data from interviews and collective agreements in five European countries, this article analyses the relationship between collective bargaining and the minimum wage. In a context of changing minimum wage policy and competing government objectives, the findings illuminate how pay bargaining strategies of trade unions and employers shape the pay equity effects of minimum wage policy. Two general forms are identified: direct responses to a changing national minimum wage, and responses to the absence or weakness of a national minimum wage. The article explains how particular intersections of minimum wage policy and collective bargaining, together with country and sector contingencies, shape the form of pay bargaining and pay equity outcomes.     

Estimating the Wage Premium of Collective Wage Contracts: Evidence from Longitudinal Linked Employer–Employee Data

Using a large‐scale linked employer–employee dataset from western Germany, this paper presents new evidence on the wage premium of collective bargaining contracts. In contrast to previous studies, we seek to assess the extent to which differences in wages between workers in covered and uncovered firms arise from the nonrandom selection of workers and firms into collective bargaining coverage. By measuring the relative wage changes of workers employed in firms that change contract status, we obtain estimates that depart considerably from previous results relying on cross‐sectional data. Results from analyzing separate transitions show that leaving industry‐level contracts is associated with subsequent wage losses. However, the results from a trend‐adjusted difference‐in‐difference approach indicate that particularly the transitions to no coverage appear to be associated with negative shocks. Overall, our findings provide no evidence of a “true” wage effect of leaving wage bargaining, once we account for differences in pretransition wage growth.     

Does Individualizing the Labor Contract Hurt Women?

The twenty‐first century has been marked by a retreat of the collective bargaining rights of public employees throughout the United States. This study exploits the variation in legal environments resulting from these reforms to estimate the causal impact of different collective bargaining policies on public employee compensation. Using data from the American Community Survey, results show a modest wage penalty at the aggregate level for employees covered by constraints on collective bargaining. However, this wage penalty is differential and is concentrated on women in all but one case—a legal environment in which collective bargaining over wages has either been prohibited or directly constricted, allowing governments to periodically institute wage freezes and caps on raises for public employees. In this case, a pre‐existing wage gap in which men earned more than women is disappearing as male and female earnings converge at a lower wage. The paper suggests that the long‐term effects of restricting collective bargaining occur through the individualization of the labor contract and should be examined along individual‐level characteristics, such as gender.     

The Institutional Context of an ‘Empirical Law’: The Wage Curve under Different Regimes of Collective Bargaining

The wage curve postulates that the wage level is a decreasing function of the regional unemployment rate. In testing this hypothesis, most studies have not taken into account that differences in the institutional framework may have an impact on the existence (or the slope) of a wage curve. Using a large‐scale linked employer–employee dataset for Western Germany, this article provides a first direct test of the relevance of different bargaining regimes (and of works councils) for the existence of a wage curve. In pooled regressions for the period 1998 to 2006, as well as in worker‐level or plant‐level fixed‐effects estimations, we obtain evidence for a wage curve for plants with a collective bargaining agreement at firm level. The point estimates for this group of plants are close to the ?0.1 elasticity of wages with respect to unemployment postulated by Blanchflower and Oswald. In this regime, we also find that works councils dampen the adjustment of wages to the regional unemployment situation. In the other regimes of plants that either do not make use of collective contracts or apply sectoral agreements, we do not find a wage curve.     

Collective Bargaining and the Evolution of Wage Inequality in Italy

Italian male wage inequality has increased at a relatively fast pace from the mid‐1980s until the early 2000s, while it has been persistently flat since then. We analyse this trend, focusing on the period of most rapid growth in pay dispersion. By accounting for worker and firm fixed effects, it is shown that workers' heterogeneity has been a major determinant of increased wage inequalities, while variability in firm wage policies has declined over time. We also show that the growth in pay dispersion has entirely occurred between livelli di inquadramento, that is, job titles defined by national industry‐wide collective bargaining institutions, for which specific minimum wages apply. We conclude that the underlying market forces determining wage inequality have been largely channelled into the tight tracks set by the centralized system of industrial relations.     

Sharp Teeth or Empty Mouths? European Institutional Diversity and the Sector‐Level Minimum Wage Bite

The article explores the link between different institutional features of minimum wage systems and the minimum wage bite. We notably address the striking absence of studies on sectoral‐level minima and exploit unique data covering 17 European countries and information from more than 1,100 collective bargaining agreements. Results provide evidence for a neglected trade‐off: systems with bargained sectoral‐level minima are associated with higher Kaitz indices than systems with statutory floors, but also with more individuals actually paid below prevailing minima. Higher collective bargaining coverage can, to some extent, reduce this trade‐off between sharp teeth (high wage floors) and empty mouths (non‐compliance/non‐coverage).     

Collective Bargaining and Wage Dispersion in Europe

The level at which collective bargaining takes place is usually considered important in determining wage levels and wage inequalities. Two different situations are considered: a first in which bargaining is only ‘multi‐employer’, and a second in which it is ‘multi‐level’, in the sense that workers can be covered by both a ‘multi‐employer’ and a ‘single‐employer’ contract at the same time. The purpose of this paper is to analyse the impact of these different institutional settings on pay dispersion. The study is carried out using the European Structure of Earnings Survey, which is a large dataset containing detailed matched employer–employee information for the year 1995. The countries analysed are Italy, Belgium and Spain. The empirical results generally show that wages of workers covered by only a ‘multi‐employer’ contract are no more compressed than those of workers covered by both ‘multi‐employer’ and ‘single‐employer’ contracts. This implies that where workers are not covered by single‐employer bargaining, they receive wage supplements paid unilaterally by their employers.     

Decentralized Wage Formation in Sweden

Recent Swedish collective bargaining agreements have incorporated provisions for local pay review talks and opportunities for individuals to negotiate their own wages. Using trade union data, we show that members who participate in local pay review talks and members who negotiate their own wages have significantly higher monthly wages than those who do not. Pay decentralization either improves an individual's bargaining position or attracts more productive trade union members. Either way, trade union wage policies to increase individual‐level wage variance are achieving their intended effects.     

The Impact of Collective Bargaining Legislation on Strike Activity and Wage Settlements

We examine the effects of collective bargaining legislation, such as (among others) bans on replacement workers and reinstatement rights, on private sector strike activity and wage settlements using Canadian data from 1978 to 2008. Our estimates indicate that this legislation does not have a statistically significant effect on the incidence of strikes. However, we do find that some of the policy variables have a statistically significant effect on strike duration and wage settlements.     

Rent‐Sharing under Different Bargaining Regimes: Evidence from Linked Employer–Employee Data

Using Belgian linked employer–employee data, we examine how collective bargaining arrangements affect the relationship between firms' profitability and individual wages via rent‐sharing. In industries where agreements are usually renegotiated at firm‐level (‘decentralized industries’) wages and firm‐level profits are positively correlated regardless of the type of collective wage agreement by which the workers are covered (industry or firm). On the other hand, where firm‐level wage renegotiation is less common (‘centralized industries’), wages are only significantly related to firms' profitability for workers covered by a firm‐level collective agreement. Thus, industry‐wide contracts that are not complemented by a firm‐level collective agreement suppress the impact of firm profits on workers' wages in centralized industries.     

The Coverage of Collective Pay-setting Institutions in Britain, 1895–1990

Fewer than 50% of British employees now have their pay and conditions affected by collective pay-setting institutions — collective bargaining or wages councils. This paper charts the historical context for the current picture of a decollectivized Britain, constructing a time series on coverage from 1895 to 1990. Extant estimates and sources of coverage data are presented and discussed alongside estimates drawn from a source used only sparingly before now — the number of workers affected by changes in wage rates of national agreements or wage orders. The recent decline in collective bargaining coverage is the most prolonged ever recorded and has been noticeably steeper than the fall in union density, such that the proportion of British workers covered is lower now than in the 1940s. With the abolition of wages councils in 1993, collective pay-setting machinery now affects the pay and conditions of fewer workers than it did in the 1930s.     

Wage Cyclicality Under Different Regimes of Industrial Relations

We analyze the effect of collective wage agreements and of works councils on the cyclicality of real wages. Using employer–employee data for western Germany (1995–2004), we find that wage adjustments to positive and negative shocks are generally not symmetric. Wage growth increases in all industrial relations regimes when unemployment is falling, but this inverse relationship is weaker when unemployment is rising. Moreover, in plants with individual‐level bargaining, wages do not adjust at all to rising unemployment. Works councils increase wage growth only in firms covered by sectoral agreements, but they do not affect the cyclicality of wages.     

The Impact of Union Wage Concessions on Union Premiums

Previous research showing that union wage premiums actually rose from the late 1970s to the mid-1980s suggests that concession bargaining was more media hype than the result of a fundamental change in collective bargaining. Our study found that nonrandom attrition of workers from the union sector does lead to an upward bias in the measured growth of union premiums, but concession bargaining was not a sufficiently widespread occurrence to reduce the size of union premiums during the sample period.     

The Erosion of the German System of Industrial Relations

The paper assesses current trajectories of change in the German system of industrial relations by analysing the co-determination and collective bargaining systems. It argues that two parallel developments undermine the institutional stability of the German model. First, the institutional base of the German industrial relations system, which has served as the pre-condition of its past success, has been shrinking during the last two decades. This is due to a decline in coverage by the two major industrial relations institutions: the works council system and wage agreements. Today fewer than 15 per cent of German plants are covered by both a valid collective agreement and a works council. Second, increasing decentralization pressures within collective bargaining tend to undermine the division of labour between co-determination and collective bargaining. The dynamics of an institutional erosion of the German industrial relations institutions and the decentralization of collective bargaining disturbs the fine-tuning of the mediating process between macroeconomic steering capacity and co-operative workplace industrial relations. This tendency has been aggravated by the effects of German unification. The current institutional developments of the German industrial relations system leave serious doubts about the future of a successful model of co-operative modernization.     

Indicative and Updated Estimates of the Collective Bargaining Premium in Germany

This study provides updated evidence on the union contract differential in Germany using establishment‐wide wage data and two estimation strategies. It provides pairwise estimates of the union differential based on separate samples of collective bargaining leavers and joiners vis‐à‐vis the corresponding counterfactual groups. We report that average wages increase by 3 to 3.5 percent after entering into a collective agreement and decrease by 3 to 4 percent after abandoning a collective agreement. Excluding establishments that experience mass layoffs does not significantly influence these net findings, although such establishments record wage losses—statistically insignificant for joiners but up to 10 percent in the case of leavers, as compared with the counterfactuals. The backdrop to these new indicative estimates, which are properly conditioned on establishment size and industry affiliation, inter alia, is one of wage stagnation and continuing union decline.     

The Effect of International Unions on Wage Determination in Canada

This article uses collective bargaining agreement wage data spanning 1964–92 to analyse the effect of international unions on wage determination in Canadian manufacturing. Real wage levels for international unions relative to domestic unions are estimated to decline from approximately 4 per cent higher in the 1960s to 4 per cent lower in the 1990s. International unions are also found to be more responsive to US economic conditions. Finally, affiliation with different union federations is a significant determinant of real wage outcomes with AFL–CIO affiliated unions having lower real wages, on average.     

Horticultural exports,female wage employment and primary school enrolment: Theory and evidence from Senegal

In this paper we analyse the indirect effects of the boom in horticultural exports in Senegal on child schooling. The export boom has caused a dramatic increase in female off-farm wage employment, which led to increased female bargaining power in the household. We investigate the causal effect of female wage income on primary school enrolment. We develop a collective household model with endogenous bargaining power to show that, if women have higher preferences for schooling than men, the impact of female wage income on school enrolment will be the result of a positive income effect, a negative labour substitution effect and a positive empowerment effect. We address the question empirically using original household survey data from Senegal. We use different econometric techniques and show that female off-farm wage income has a positive effect on primary school enrolment for both boys and girls, and that female empowerment is specifically important for the schooling of girls. Our results imply that the horticultural export boom in Senegal has indirectly contributed to the second and third Millennium Development Goals of universal primary education and elimination of gender disparities in primary education.